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Notes
English translation © 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, from the Russian text © 2016 “Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia.” “Dinamika antiamerikanskikh nastroenii v postsovetskoi Rossii i osnovnye khraraketeristiki antiamerikanizma na segodniashnii den’,” Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2016, no. 3–4, pp. 141–159.
Denis Volkov is the Deputy Director of the Levada Center.
Translated by Simon Patterson. Translation reprinted from Russian Politics and Law, vol. 56, no. 1-2. DOI: 10.1080/10611940.2018.1686923.
1. Focus groups were held in three age groups of residents of Moscow: young people (18–25), middle age (26–45), and the older generation (46 and older). In the first age group, 13 discussions were held, in the two others seven and eight respectively. Discussions were held on a number of topics, including current events in Ukraine, Turkey and Syria, issues of sanctions, etc. The topic of anti-Americanism was discussed in the context of discussion of general topics. Respondents were often the first to initiate discussions about their attitude to America and its role in events.
2. In this section of this work, we would like to clarify several provisions of the recent article by Lev Gudkov, published in one of the previous issues of Vestnik. See L. Gudkov, “Struktura i funktsii rossiskogo antiamerikanizma, faza mobilizatsii 2012–2015 godov” (Structure and functions of Russian anti-Americanism, mobilization phase of 2012–2015), Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2015, no. 3–4, pp. 15–44.
3. G.G. Diligensky, “‘Zapad’ v rossiiskom obshchestvennom soznanii” (The West in Russian public awareness), Obschestvennye nauki i sovremmenost’, 2000, no. 5, pp. 5–19
4. Z.N. Kuzina, “Vneshnepoliticheskie problemy v zerkale obshchestvennogo mneniia, v Rossii (2000-e gody)” (Foreign policy problems in the mirror of public opinion in Russia [2000s]), Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheiniia, 2010, no. 10.
5. This figure arises stably in surveys on different topics. Even at the height of the election campaign in the United States, which was covered extensively by Russian TV channels, this topic drew the attention of the same 15 percent. See “US Presidential Elections,” November 7, 2016, http://www.levada.ru/2016/11/07/vybory-prezidenta-ssha/. In March 2016, interest in the UK possibly leaving the EU was shown by 12 percent of the population. Only a few topics of a catastrophic nature (for example the migration crisis in Europe) are capable of briefly drawing the attention of Russians.
6. Group discussions showed that even among pupils and recent graduates of leading Moscow universities of humanitarian faculties, discussion of current world events and Russia’s role in them cause difficulties.
7. Diligensky, “‘Zapad’ v rossiiskom obshchestvennom soznanii.”
8. The comparison of these questions was approximate because of the differences in methodology. The question of 2016 was open with precoding, in previous cases the respondents were offered a card.
9. See, for example, Kuzina, “Vneshnepoliticheskie problem.”
10. As the authors of the book Heroes of the 90s write: “the reaction of a significant section of Russian society to the general initiative was extremely favorable, not to say ecstatic. … The Kosovo march … became a legend.” See V. Bashkirova, Geroi 90-kh. Liudi i den’gi, istoriia noveishego kapitalizma v Rossii (Heroes of the 90s. People and Money, History of Recent Capitalism in Russia) (Moscow: Algpina Non-Fiction, 2012), pp. 301–302. It is interesting that the authors emphasize the independent nature of the actions of the Russian generals, who planned the operation of Russian troops in Kosovo. The political leadership was only informed after the operation was carried out. So we may assume that in the late 1990s such operations were still not planned for political purposes in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the government.
11. Russians about the “orange revolution,” November 25, 2005, http://www.levada.ru/old/24-11-2005/rossiyane-ob-oranzhevoi-revolyutsii.
12. Dmitry Trenin writes about this: “Coming to power in 2000, soon after the war in Kosovo, Putin tried to restore and improve Russia’s relations with the West. … But from 2003 Putin got the feeling, which grew stronger and stronger, that the West rejected his proposals. … Putin’s hopes for an alliance with the United States were not justified.” D. Trenin, “Russia Breaks with the Unipolar System: The Operative Motives of Putin’s Policy,” Rabochie materialy Moskovskogo tsentra Karnegi, March 19, 2015, http://carnegie.ru/2015.03/19/ru-pub-59425.
13. Opinion of Russians about the conflict in Georgia, August 20, 2008, http://www.levada.ru/2008/08/20/mnenie-rossiyan-o-konflikte-v-gruzii-opros-15-18-avgusta/.
14. In September 2008, Vladimir Putin criticized the radio station “Ekho Moskvy,” which attempted to present the position of the Georgian side, for “incorrect” coverage in South Ossetia, while all the main media outlets gave “correct” coverage. See “Putin Didn’t Like It,” September 16, 2008, http://lenta.ru/articles/2008/09/16/echo/.
15. The majority of Russians (64 percent) in the summer of 2014 believed that the main reason for the events in southeast Ukraine were “interference by the West.” Only 20 percent put responsibility on the Ukrainian leadership, 7 percent on the militia, and 3 percent on the Russian leadership. See “Situation in Southeast Ukraine,” June 29, 2014, http://www.levada.ru/2014/07/29/situatsiya-na-yugo-vostoke-ukrainy-2/.
16. Characteristically, according to another survey by Levada Center, only 25–30 percent of Russians in 2014–2015 said that a war was going on between Russia and Ukraine. In the official rhetoric of the Russian authorities, the country was not a side of the conflict, and the majority of the population preferred to take the same convenient position.
17. A. Borodina, “Televizor Olimpiaidy i Kryma,” Forbes.ru, June 3, 2014, http://www.forbes.ru/mneniia, -opinion/konkurentsiya/261539-televizor-olimpiady-i-ukrainy-rekordy-propagandy.
18. “Maidan, Crimea, Sanctions,” December 30, 2014, http://www.levada.ru/2015/05/05/ukrainskij-krizis/.
19. In February, March, and April 2014 an according question was not asked.
20. This can probably be explained by the continuing war of mutual sanctions and the ongoing (although in weakened form) anti-American rhetoric of Russian TV channels.
21. For example, for the country as a whole only 30 percent have access to alternative sources of information, in Moscow and large cities this figure is twice as large (around 60 percent). Alternative information does exist, but even among the most well-informed, the majority refuse to take it into consideration. For more detail about the calculations of the audience of “independent” and “patriotic” Russian media, see D. Volkov and S. Goncharov, “Rossiiskii medialandshaft: televidenie, pressa, internet” (Russia Media Landscape: Television, Press, Internet), June 8, 2014, http://www.levada.ru/2014/07/08/rossijskij-media-landshaft-televidenie-pressa-internet-3.
22. We have already seen a similar situation in questions about the population’s attitude to events in Ukraine, when the majority of even the best-informed citizens, who followed events in several independent sources, were inclined to take the viewpoint of the Russian government and Russian media on issues of the annexation of the Crimea, and the lack of Russian troops in the southeast of Ukraine, etc. For more detail about Russians’ perceptions of the official version of events, see D. Volkov, “Rodina vne kritiki” (The Motherland is beyond criticism), Vedomosti.
23. In this situation, the “information elite” is meant, i.e. the small section of the population which takes an interest in and follows political events through various sources of information.
24. Russian Elite 2016. Perspectives on Foreign and Domestic Policy, May 11, 2016, https://www.hamilton.edu/news/polls/2016-russian-elite. For a detailed analysis of the previous waves of this study see U. Tsimmerman, R. Inglkhart, E. Ponarin, et al. “Russian Elite-2020.” Analytical report on grant recipients of the “Valdai” international discussion club, Moscow, 2013, https://publications.hse.ru/books/101149290.
25. M. Zhelesnova and N. Epple, “Elite Anti-Americanism,” Vedomosti, May 20, 2016, https://www.vedemosti.ru/opinion/articles/2016/05/20/641720-elitnii-antiamerkianizm.
26. Today, both in Russia and abroad, an increasing number of works are appearing which partially blame the other side for a worsening in Russian-American relations. See, for example, A. Kortunov on the unfulfilled hopes to create a common European security system, which would have included Russia. A. Kortunov, “How Not to Talk with Russia,” European Council on International Affairs, April 1, 2016, http://ww.ecfr.eu/article/commentary/how_not_to_talk_with_russia_6053. Or J. Itzkowicz on how from the very beginning, American experts believed that the main risk of expanding NATO was the possible worsening in mutual relations between Russia and the United States. J. Itzkowicz Shifrinson, “Deal or No Deal: The End of the Cold War and the US Offer to Limit NATO Expansion,” International Security, Spring 2016, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 7–44, https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/deal-or-no-deal-end-cold-war-and-us-offer-limit-nato-expansion.
27. Lev Gudkov writes: “The attitude to ‘America’ is the attitude of the population as a whole or separate groups to leading institutions of society, their functions and the nature of their realization to ‘themselves.’” See L. Gudkov, “The Attitude to the United States and Russia and Problems of Anti-Americanism,” Monitoring obshcestvennogo mneniia, 2002, no. 2 (58), pp. 32–48.
28. Based on the results of focus groups, in March 2016 we asked the question in a mass nationwide survey about whether respondents agreed that the West “has always wanted to weaken and humiliate Russia.” 85 percent of Russian citizens agreed with this statement.
29. Surveys in the United States do not confirm this obsession of American public opinion with the idea of containing Russia, although dissatisfaction toward Russia has been growing recently. A joint study of public opinion of Russians and Americans conducted by Levada Center and the Chicago Council shows that even during the sensational election campaign in America, in which much less attention was given to Russia than usual, concern about the actions of Russia in the United States was almost twice as low as concern about the actions of the United States among Russians. See D. Smelts, S. Goncharov, and L. Voitovich, “United States and Russia: Lack of Trust and Feeling of Safety Determine the Countries’ Relations,” November 7, 2016, http://www.levada.ru//2016/11/07/usa_russia_report_2016/.
30. For example, in March 2016, 7 percent of Russians named Masons and the world conspiracy among the “enemies of Russia” (see ).
31. For more detail about the dynamics of the ratings of the government and their dependency on concepts on the greatness of the country, see D. Volkov, “Putin’s 86 Percent: To Believe or Not to Believe,” Vedomosti, December 9, 2015.
32. Here it is appropriate to recall one of the statements by Sergei Ivanov addressed to Western countries, when he was the head of the RF presidential administration, in his sensational night-time interview with the TV channel Russia Today: “They are unhappy with what is going on in Ukraine, although I stress that we didn’t start it—we only reacted to what the other side started.” See Sergei Ivanov, “The Plan of Western Media to Use Slander to Tarnish the Leadership of Russia Won’t Work,” Russia Today, May 23, 2015, https://russian.rt.com/article/93291.
33. Similar tendencies were recorded by a nationwide Russian survey in October 2016. To the question about what countries of the West wish to achieve most of all by continuing sanctions against Russia, of the three possible answers—“To stop the war, destruction and death of people in east Ukraine,” “Restore geopolitical balance destroyed by the joining of the Crimea to Russia,” “To weaken and humiliate Russia,” 73 percent chose the last. In this logic, the Crimea is simply an excuse, and Western countries would have introduced sanctions against Russia in any case.
34. This is probably a citation of Vladimir Putin’s words from Andrei Kondrashov’s film Crimea. Path to the Homeland shown in March 2015 on the TV channel Rossiia 1. For a partial transcript of his words, see V. Putin, “To Defend the Crimea, We Were Prepared to Deploy Nuclear Weapons,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 15, 2015, http://www.kp.ru/daily/26354.7/3236171/.
35. Vladimir Putin spoke of the readiness to use nuclear forces in the same film “Crimea. Path to the Homeland.”
36. Around a third of the population was ready to believe the president’s words about using nuclear weapons. The majority understood that this war was impossible, as “there cannot be victors in it.” See “The Threat for Russia from the United States,” May 12, 2015, http://www.levada.ru/2015/05/12/ugroza-dlya-rossii -so-storony-ssha/.
37. Indeed, for the absolute majority of the population, the image of the United States is a product of TV viewing, which is discussed below. See Boris Dubin’s writings, for example, “Television Era: Life Afterwards,” in Intellectual Groups and Symbolic Forms: Essays of the Sociology of Contemporary Culture (Moscow: Novoe izdatel’stvo, 2004), pp. 185–208.
38. Both questions were asked in March 2016 with comparable answers: “Are you concerned that the present exacerbation of relations between Russia and the West over Syria may grow into a third world war?” and “Do you think that the present tension in relations between Russia and forces of the anti-Asad coalition will grow into a military conflict between Russia and countries of the West?” Compare this with the results of a similar survey on Ukraine, which was held in the same month: “How do you think relations will develop between Russia and countries of the west after the current conflict surrounding Ukraine and the Crimea?” The majority (49 percent) believed that “everything will be gradually put on hold and our relations will gradually return to what they were before this incident,” and only 32 percent expected “an increase in tension in relations, a new phase of the cold war.”
39. This concerns the incident when the Turkish military shot down a Russian bomber in November 2015.
40. For more detail about the results of the express drawings method on this material, see A. Levinson and S. Goncharov, “War instead of a Future—A Way Out of Anomic Consciousness,” Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniia, 2015, no. 3–4, pp. 45–66.
41. A. Rudyak, “Putin Declares That Russia’s Borders Are Endless,” November 24, 2016, http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5836d7259a7947b8990e36eb/.
42. See “Russia and the West,” November 29, 2016, http://www.levada.ru/2016/11/29/rossiya-i-zapad-2/.