A Neoconservative Consensus in Russia? Main Components, Factors of Stability, Potential of Erosion

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the ideational consensus that has taken shape in contemporary Russian politics, including its key components, and factors both of stability and of potential erosion. Noting the extraordinary durability of this consensus, which is supported by factors including the duration of the regime itself, its support among elites and the bureaucracy, effective mobilizational propaganda and conservative orientations among the middle classes and dominant public opinion, the author draws attention to several factors – as yet less evident – that may in the future change the situation. Among these are the volatility of public opinion, potential intra-elite dynamics, and the internal contradictions of the neo-conservative idea itself.

KEYWORDS:

• “Fortress Russia”
• conservatism
• ideological battle
• traditional values
• geopolitics

This article is the republished version of:

A Neoconservative Consensus in Russia?

Notes

English translation © 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, from the Russian text © 2017 “Politiia.” “Neokonservativnyi konsensus v Rossii? Osnovnye komponenty, faktory ustoichivosti, potentsial erozii,” Politiia, 2017, no. 1, pp. 29–45.

Andrei Melville is professor of political science at the National Research University-Higher School of Economics (Moscow), Dean of the Faculty of Social Science and Head of the Department of Political Science.

Translated by Simon Patterson. Translation reprinted from Russian Politics and Law, vol. 55, no. 4-5. DOI: 10.1080/10611940.2017.1533271.

^1. Melville, Timofeev 2008, 2010; Melville, Timofeev 2009.

^2. See the similar scenario “Besieged Fortress” in Krechetova, Samarov 2016.

^3. See Huntington 1957.

^4. Some positions developed in it are presented in Melville 2017.

^5. See in particular Radaev 1995.

^6. The reasons for this state of affairs, including the decline of liberal and other alternatives, are not clear and require a separate unbiased analysis.

^7. Some institutionalized centers put great emphasis on philosophical-world outlook themes, others on internal political systems, and a third group on geopolitics and international relations, etc.

^8. See http://izborsk-club.ru/.

^9. For a more detailed analysis of them see Tsygankov 2016; Bluhm 2016.

^10. Strategy 2016.

^11. Nagornyjj 2015.

^12. Lukin 2016.

^13. Timofeev 2016.

^14. For a balanced analysis of this trend see Malinova 2014.

^15. Mikhalkov 2010.

^16. Aver’ianov 2015.

^17. Prokhanov 2007.

^18. “At an extreme the Russian ideal is holiness, Holy Russia, this is a universalist ideal, not limited geographically, ideologically or metaphysically” (httsp://izborsk-club.ru/5473).

^19. See for example Mezhuev 2016.

^20. Shchipkov 2015.

^21. Aver’ianov 2015.

^22. Remizov 2014.

^23. Makareno (ed.) 2015.

^24. “Specifically” in this case essentially means a simplified, black-and-white understanding of a complex geopolitical reality that has never gone away. In the figurative expression of Andrei Kortunov, it is “geopolitics for dummies” (Kortunov 2015).

^25. Kotkin 2016; Graham 2016.

^26. Novye 2015

^27. Miller, Luk’ianov 2016

^28. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004

^29. Recently remarkable empirical evidence has appeared of a conservative and authoritarian shift in young people’s mindsets in many countries—while Russia “leads” in this sense (Foa, Mounk 2016, 2017). This is an important indicator, requiring further in-depth analysis, including in the context of the discussion taking place today in the literature of the crisis of democracy and liberalism and the oncoming “conservative wave” (see Ingelhart 2016).

^30. Makarenko 2015: 241.

^31. Lipset 1959.

^32. Zubarevich 2011.

^33. See Gontmaher, Ross 2015.

^34. Here and subsequently data from the Levada Center (http://www.levada.ru). Unless otherwise indicated, the figures relate to 2015.

^35. Russia’s main enemies (data of 2016) are the USA (70%), Ukraine (43%), Turkey (29%), Poland (24%), Latvia (23%), Lithuania (23%), Germany (19%), the UK (18%), Estonia (16%), and Georgia (10%). Thus, Russia is “surrounded by enemies,” and on its side are only Belarus (50%), Kazakhstan (39%), China (34%), India (18%), Armenia (13%), Cuba (10%), and Syria (10%).

^36. Kolesnikov 2015.

^37. Perhaps, however, a role was also played here by a change in official rhetoric after Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential elections.

^38. Kuran 1995.

^39. Rogov (ed.) 2016.

^40. Stanovaia 2016.

^41. Kolesnikov, Volkov 2016.

^42. Melville, Mironyuk 2016; Makarenko, Melville 2015; Melville et al. 2013.

^43. Makarenko 2015: 240.

^44. It is sufficient to recall the Anglo-American neoconservatism of the era of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher (see Melville 1986).

^45. Schlesinger 1949.