This issue includes a series of articles that highlight developments in Russian politics during the course of 2015. The articles analyze key trends that have developed in Russian politics, economics, and center–periphery relations over the past year and discuss what consequences they may lead to in the near future. Most of the articles were originally published in the Russian media outlet Slon as part of a project curated by Nikolai Petrov.
Nikolai Petrov's “The Year 2015: A Chronicle of Growing Authoritarianism” is the first article in the issue. He argues that Russian politics in 2015 was characterized by a continuation and strengthening of the lines of development first announced in the previous year. The chief trends in political development included a growing personalism and progressive deinstitutionalization of the Russian political system, the degradation of elections and of the judicial system, and the de facto dismantling of local self-government. The political elite underwent a radical shift in power, changing its overall configuration and enhancing the role of heads of the security forces. This coincided with the activation and strengthening of the apparatus of repression and an increase in pressure on regional elites, with continuing replacement of governors and of managers of state corporations.
In “At the Turning Point to Repression: Why There Are More and More ‘Undesirable Elements’ in Russia,” Maria Lipman discusses the political implications of the murder of Boris Nemtsov in February 2015. Russian activists know that they may be killed because their public activity is not to the liking of some powerful actor. As the Kremlin has increasingly painted Russia as a country at war, it has created an attitude of emergency state legitimacy in which criticism of the authorities has become a crime. The labeling of some nongovernmental organizations as foreign agents is part of a continuing trend toward increasing restrictions on civil society. Defense of traditional values and morality has been part of this trend toward increasing repression, which may result in the loss of all protections for activism and free expression.
Turning next to the Russian economy, Sergei Aleksashenko's “Not Thanks to But Despite: Why the Russian Economy Is Not Yet Bad Enough” makes the point that although the Russian economy declined in 2015, the decline was not as serious as expected by Russian leaders. None of the disasters anticipated at the end of 2014 happened. The decline was moderated by continued demand from the main consumers of Russian raw materials, continued government financial support for defense industry, and the balancing of changes in internal prices. The ruble has remained stable because it is largely dependent on the price of oil on world markets. The effect of Western sanctions on the Russian economy steadily declined throughout 2015. Although Russia avoided economic collapse, the prospect for the near future is continued stagnation, rather than renewed growth.
Natalia Zubarevich continues the discussion of the Russian economy in her article on the economic situation in the regions, entitled “Bad but Stable: What Keeps the Russian Regions Afloat?” She notes that Russia's fiscal system was destabilized in 2015 because of the fall in national oil revenues. The budget crisis resulted in a sustained fall in personal income, which in turn led to a fall in consumption. This in turn resulted in a decline in trade and investment. These trends were present in the majority of Russia's regions. Russia's industrial slump, on the other hand, was relatively small and did not last long, in large part due to continued investment and growth in defense industry. The sustained industrial production, combined with the buffer of a substantial pool of foreign migrant labor, allowed for stable employment figures. Overall, the Russian economy was better able to adapt to the deterioration in conditions than most expected.
The political aspects of center–periphery relations are analyzed in “Inertia of the State Power Hierarchy: The Kremlin Loses Control of Regional Elites” by Alexander Kynev. He argues that Russian regional policy in 2015 was focused on the continued dismantling of the modest political reforms introduced during the Medvedev presidency. These changes were implemented in order to minimize the possibility of the emergence and strengthening of new independent political players, and the resultant institutional imbalance toward centralization at the regional level was merely a side effect of this effort. The net effect has been a major strengthening of the power of governors at the expense of all other political actors at the regional level. The governors' power will now only be checked by federal oversight.
Lev Gudkov's “Traces of Defeat: Why the Propaganda Effect Will Be Felt for a Long Time Yet” examines the state monopoly over television, which has over the course of time changed the structure of public and information space in Russia by turning television into a vehicle of total propaganda. Although television undoubtedly continues to occupy the dominant place in the structure of information sources, trust in the quality of broadcasts has declined sharply in recent years. As a result of the regime's efforts, the public sphere has been thoroughly sterilized. Opportunities for the representation of group interests and exchange of information have grown increasingly limited. The Russian public is once again subject to an institutional fear that goes back to Soviet times, a condition that is likely to have severe and prolonged consequences.
In “All-Encompassing Paranoia: How the Attitude Toward Security Has Changed in Russia,” Andrei Soldatov continues the focus on state efforts to control the information space. He argues that the Russian state has over the past five years gradually increased its ability to control the Internet. Russian Internet companies recognize that in order to continue to work in Russia they have to be willing to help state security and to exert pressure on foreign information technology companies. The ability of the Russian government to secure the Internet is limited by the openness of Russian society and of the Russian Internet itself. While the government has so far not succeeded in countering this openness, it is likely to continue to try, as the priority is now on securing the regime against external and internal threats rather than ensuring the personal security of Russians.
The final article in the issue, “No Room: What Has Changed in Russia's System of Repression During the Past Year” by Ella Paneiakh, examines Russia's judicial system, which saw a marked expansion in the repressive activity of the law enforcement bodies in 2015. For the first time in many years there was a significant rise in the frequency of sentences involving imprisonment, while standards of proof in the Russian courts declined. In addition, there was a decline in the standards of proof in the courts. The judiciary tried to compensate for its inability to resist pressure from the law enforcement bodies through the unprecedented application of amnesty in court verdicts. Sporadically declared amnesties have become almost the only thing protecting the Russian penal system from overcrowding.
The articles in this issue show that the Russian political system continues to evolve in the direction of greater authoritarianism, although it has not yet reached a point where all dissent is forbidden. Furthermore, although the combination of lower oil prices and Western sanctions have had a negative effect on the Russian economy, this effect has not been as bad as Russian leaders initially feared and has in fact been used to some extent by the leadership to mobilize the population. The overall assessment is that the Russian political system is relatively stable and is unlikely to undergo fundamental change in the near future.