“Islam as a Pillar”: Muslim Tatar Women's Narratives on Tatars' Identity and the Future

Abstract

Based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork in Tatarstan, Russia, this article explores a particular vision of Tatar identity that is gaining recognition among an increasing number of Tatars. Such vision reflects both the older generation's concern for preserving Tatar ethnicity and the younger generation's search for a moral compass. The author concludes that this vision reflects both Tatars' growing interest in Islam and their collective concerns over their identity and the future in light of the Tatar Muslim revival in a country that is struggling to define its national identity and role in the world arena.

Notes

^1.Apa, “aunt” in Tatar. The term is customarily added to the first name as a form of address to an older female to convey respect. Throughout the article, foreign terms are in italics and glossed.

^2. Research was partially supported by an IREX IARO 2009–10 grant. I chose to conduct research primarily in Kazan for several reasons. As Tatarstan's capital, Kazan has been a center of Tatars' ethnic and religious revival, which began in the 1990s. Kazan's population—53 percent Tatar, 40 percent Russian—is the result of centuries-long but incomplete Russian assimilation policies. Finally, as one of Russia's higher education centers, Kazan hosts students from all over Tatarstan and Russia, making it possible for me to interview practicing Muslim Tatar women from outside Kazan. In addition to Kazan proper, I conducted research in three of Kazan's industrial suburbs with predominantly ethnic Russian working-class population. To recruit subjects, I attended classes and informal gatherings at Kazan's Mukhammadiia medrese (Muslim higher educational institution), the Russian Islamic University, and several of Kazan's mosques (primarily the Nurulla Mosque and the Kul Sharif Mosque). I also attended Muslim public events, meetings of the Tatar cultural club Sharyq, and, upon invitation, gatherings in private homes. In the process, I collected over seventy personal audiorecorded interviews with practicing Tatar Muslim women (ages between eighteen and seventy-six) and a smaller number (about fifteen) with non-practicing young Tatar women (ages between eighteen and thirty-five). About thirty of these interviews were in depth, lasting several hours each. I also audiorecorded instances of spontaneous discussions and interactions (such as class discussion or conversations at informal gatherings), which provided insights into manifestations of identity (and religiosity) in more natural settings—a backdrop against which one-on-one interviews can be analyzed. Additionally, I interviewed ten Muslim officials, five scholars and experts specializing on Islam in Tatarstan, and four Tatar journalists who cover ethnic and religious issues to understand the broader social context of the Islamic revival within the Tatar and Russian societies. Finally, I collected samples of Muslim literature popular among younger and older women to document a shift from predominantly Tatar-language religious publications to Russian-language ones, a shift that accounts for a weakening connection between ethnic and religious components of Tatar identity. I collected newspapers published by and for Muslims, such as Islam-Info and Umma, to analyze how women's issues and identities are reflected in the Muslim public discourse. Throughout my research, I also took extensive field notes. I analyzed audiorecorded data by transcribing them in the original language (Tatar or Russian) and then translating them into English. For the purpose of protecting research subjects' identity, I replaced proper names and omitted some identifiable information. All interviews and participant observation were conducted with subjects' oral permission and in accordance with UMASS-Amherst IRB requirements, my home institution at the time.

^3. A Russian name for the Kipchak khanate, established by Batu Khan in the thirteenth century as the most northwestern part of the Mongol Empire. At its peak, the Golden Horde included most of European Russia (“Golden Horde” 2013).

^4. While these dates refer to the period when the Bolsheviks in the region were officially in power, the Volga area was intermittently under the Bolshevik rule during the civil war (since 1919). See Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

^5. Matsuzato (2001) contends that Tatars' failure to secure territorial autonomy following the events of 1917 affected the way Tatar sovereignty movement activists formulated their slogans during the final decade of the Soviet Union's collapse (p. 49).

^6. In my treatment of the Tatars' religious revival, I draw on Hirschkind's (2006) conceptualization of the Islamic Revival, based on Egypt's example, as “not a given socioideological formation but a contingent and shifting constellation of ideas, practices and associational forms” (p. 207). It is important to emphasize the power dimension of the process in the Russian context. As Balzer (2010) observes: “The struggles for how revitalization should proceed in a given community are filled with power games that correlate with the interaction of religious authorities, ideas, and uneven resources” (p. xxiii).

^7. The other three are Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi'i.

^8. I borrow the term “vernacular” from Flueckiger (2006) who uses it to describe a “popular, non-institutionally based Islamic practice” (p. 2). Balzer (2010) observes that “folk Islam” that features a blend of folk pre-Islamic customs with Muslim ones is prevalent in the Volga region as well as North Caucasus. On a similar phenomenon in the Central Asian context, see A. Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia (University of California Press, 2007).

^9. According to Musina, in 2007 there were over 2,000 Muslim communities in Tatarstan (R. Musina, personal communication, 20 June 2013).

^10. In sociological survey data, religious consciousness is measured by asking: “Do you believe in God? Are you a believer?” (Musina, 2008, p. 97).

^11. Iakupov was assassinated on 19 July 2012, by what was believed to be terrorists (see, e.g., a transcript of Vladimir Putin's speech during his visit to Tatarstan shortly after the event (“Poezdka v Tatarstan,” 2012). Alexei Malashenko, a Moscow-based Carnegie center expert on Islam in Russia, also attributed the killing to “radicals” in his 2013 article “The Dynamics of Russian Islam” (Malashenko, 2013).

^12. The authors point out that one's religious practice does not always indicate high degree of religious competence when it comes to theological knowledge. They further point out that observing Tatars tend to come from backgrounds with a strong ethnic (Tatar) component.

^13. Current estimates indicate that the number of Muslims in Russia is close to 20 million (Malashenko, 2013).

^14. In a recent article Lukmanov, first secretary in Russia's department on new Challenges and Threats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, claimed that radical Islam is quickly spreading throughout former Soviet Union and Russia's Volga region and now poses a political threat (pp. 108–9). Lukmanov (2013) based his conclusions on statements by Rais Suleimanov, head of the Volga branch of the Russian Institute of Strategic Research. Suleimanov's claims about the threat of radical Islam in the Volga region and about Tatarstan's ethnic policies have been openly questioned by academics specializing in research on present-day Islam and ethnoreligious relations in Russia/Tatarstan (see, for example, Iskhakov (2013c), Titova (2012), Isaev (n.d.).

^15. Esposito (2003) explains the origin of the term “Wahhabis” (pl. of “Wahhabi”) in the following way: “Eighteenth-century reformist/revivalist movement for socio-moral reconstruction of society. Founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a Hanbali scholar, in Arabia. Proclaimed tawhid (uniqueness and unity of God) as its primary doctrine. Began in response to the perceived moral decline and political weakness of the Muslim community in Arabia. Proposed a return to an idealized Islamic past through reassertion of monotheism and reliance on Q'uran and hadith, rejecting medieval interpretations of Islam and jurisprudence. Emphasized education and knowledge as weapons in dealing with nonbelievers. Known for its sometimes violent opposition to the popular cult of saints, idolatry, and shrine and tomb visitation, as well as the sacking of Shi'a shrines in Najaf and Karbala in 1802. Formed an alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud in 1747, which served as the basis for the consolidation of the present-day kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Referred to as Wahhabis by opponents, but referred to themselves as Muwahhidun, or those upholding the doctrine of tawhid” (“ Wahhabis,” 2003). He explains the origin of the term “Salafi” as follows: “Name (derived from salaf, “pious ancestors”) given to a reform movement led by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh at the turn of the twentieth century. Emphasized restoration of Islamic doctrines to pure form, adherence to the Q'uran and Sunnah, rejection of the authority of later interpretations, and maintenance of the unity of ummah. Prime objectives were to rid the Muslim ummah of the centuries-long mentality of taqlid (unquestioning imitation of precedent) and stagnation and to reform the moral, cultural, and political conditions of Muslims. Essentially intellectual and modernist in nature. Worked to assert the validity of Islam in modern times, prove its compatibility with reason and science, and legitimize the acquisition of Western scientific and technological achievements. Sought reforms of Islamic law, education, and Arabic language. Viewed political reform as an essential requirement for revitalization of the Muslim community. Its influence spread to Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, India, Indonesia, and Egypt in particular. The most influential movements inspired by Salafi were the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan. In the late twentieth century, the term came to refer to traditionalist reformers” (“Salafi,” 2003). In the context of present-day Russia, these terms are controversial because they are often used interchangeably to refer to what are perceived as conservative forms of Islam, regardless of whether those forms of Islam can be considered Wahhabi/Salafi on a theological, and not political, basis. Altstadt further observes that Russian authorities routinely apply these terms to Muslims whom they want to suppress (A. Altstadt, personal communication, May 29, 2013).

^16. Emelianova, “Transnational Islam versus Ethnic Islam in Eastern Europe: The Role of the Mass Media,” p. 245.

^17. Mamdani (2004) suggests that at the root of this fear is the “good Muslim/bad Muslim” paradigm, manifested in contemporary “Culture Talk,” a type of public discourse that views modernity or its absence as the dividing line between those who value civic coexistence and those who espouse violence. This paradigm treats modern political movements that capitalize on Islam (such as Islamists) as primordial cultural or religious entities, which are inherently opposed to what's believed to be progressive, secular values. Such a paradigm requires that a judgment value be placed on Muslims on the basis of compatibility of their form of Islam (manifested in their actions) with those values. Mahmood (2005) also argues that because Muslim piety is rooted in daily physical manifestations that complicate a clear-cut division between the secular and the religious, it becomes inevitably political.

^18. Also see Mukhametshin (2005).

^19. For more information on the Sufi tradition in the Volga region, see Kemper (2008).

^a. Rafael Khakimov, an advisor to former President Mintimir Shamiev, was one of the featured authors in a double issue of this journal focused on Tatarstan. See his “The Tatars,” Anthropology and Archeology of Eurasia, 2004–5, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 45–61, and for context see “Tatars” parts one and two, Anthropology and Archeology of Eurasia, 2004, vol. 43, no. 2 and 2005, no. 3. See also “Alphabet Wars,” Anthropology and Archeology of Eurasia, 2007, vol. 46, no. 1.

^20. In a recent conference, Russia's President Vladimir Putin made the following public statement: “As for the hijabs, you know that in our culture (by ‘our’ I mean traditional Islam) the hijab is not worn…. So why should we introduce foreign traditions at home? We should all pay attention to this, and talk about it, and refer to the views held by representatives of traditional Islam.” (The official website of Russian President Vladimir Putin, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/4779).

^21. My translation from Russian. Iskhakov (2013c) further argues that Tatars possess the theological legacy and intellectual capacity to develop such an understanding of “traditional Islam” that would spread its influence on the “Muslim world,” and not the other way around as is happening now. The problem, Iskhakov (2013c) states, is that such a concept of traditional Islam would unite the Muslim Tatar community to a degree that will create a political threat to Russia's current non-democratic regime. Therefore, Iskhakov (2013c) concludes that, while Russia's politicians encourage “traditional Islam,” they do not support its development in practice (p. 2).

^22. To date, all higher educational institutions in Tatarstan conduct instruction in Russian only. In her conversation with me, Taskira apa regretfully admitted that despite the efforts of the sovereignty movement that she was part of, Tatars were not able to secure “continuous education” in Tatar, which would allow Tatar-speaking high-school students to continue their higher education in Tatar.

^23. Speaking in Russian, a second language for her, Taskira apa, sometimes conjugated her prepositions in nonstandard ways, as in this case. Discussing Soviet ethnic language policies and their effects on ethnic minorities, Taskira apa reflected on her own language skills, acknowledging occasional difficulty with communicating in Russian.

^24. Taskira apa use the Russian word natsia.

^25. Taskira apa refers here to the post–World War II period.

^26. Taskira apa uses the Russian phrase “priiti v Islam” [to come to Islam], which has become a standard expression when referring to one's becoming a practicing Muslim.

^27. This particular conversation took place in English because Malika wanted to practice her English with me.

^28. For a study on the Russian language as the language of Islam in Russia, see A. Bustanov and M. Kemper (ed.), Islamic Authority and the Russian Language: Studies on Texts from European Russia, the North Caucasus, and West Siberia, Amsterdam: Pegagus, 2012.

^29. Historians had considered the year 922 as the year of official conversion to Islam by Volga Bulgarians. However, some evidence suggests that Islam had penetrated the region earlier through trade with Central Asia (Mukhametshin 2009).

^30. Throughout her narrative, Taskira apa used the Tatar version of the word medrese, reflected in the way it is transliterated in the transcript.

^31. Throughout her narrative, Taskira apa used the Tatar pronunciation of the medrese's name, reflected in the way it is transliterated in the transcript.

^32. Taskira apa uses the Tatar version of the Arabic term madhhab, reflected in the way it is transliterated in the transcript.

^33. Abashin (2014) makes a similar observation with respect to Central Asian countries.

Liliya Karimova received her PhD in communications studies from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and is a professorial lecturer at George Washington University. Originally from Tatarstan, she received an International Research and Exchanges Board grant in 2009–10 to do fieldwork in Kazan, where she resides on a part-time basis.