![Sample our Humanities journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5939/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Humanities.jpg"})
Abstract
By using the theoretical frameworks of rhetorical traditions of both cultures, and realism and post-realism on foreign policy rhetoric, this article examines the dynamics of U.S.-China relations from 1940 to 1990s in historical, political, ideological, and economic contexts as facilitated by media and the discourse of national leaders. It explores the rhetorical construction of U.S.-China relations evolving from “military allies” to “ideological enemies,” and from “moral adversaries” to “strategic partners” in responding to international environment and domestic needs. The author contends that rhetoric on U.S.-China relations is largely shaped by the cultural orientations and national interest of each country. This is particular evident in the interplay of moralistic and pragmatic rhetorical orientation in seeking mutual economic benefits and global cooperation. The article offers implications on international communication from the points of how powerful nations can achieve intercultural understanding and peaceful co-existence.
Notes
According to a speech by President Obama during his recent visit to China, “In 1979, trade between the United States and China stood at roughly $5 billion—today it tops over $400 billion” (Nov. 17th, 2009).
China's President Hu Jiaotao paid a state visit to the United States in January 18–21, 2011. In a speech Mr. Hu delivered at the White House, Hu said, “I have come to the United States to increase mutual trust, enhance friendship, deepen cooperation, and push forward the positive, cooperative, and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship for the 21st century.” The visit was considered successful mostly by the Chinese media (Johnson, Citation2011).
The concept is rooted in the claim by Massachusetts Bay Governor John Winthrop in 1630 that “We shall be as a citty [sic.] upon a hill, the eies [sic.] of all people are uppon [sic.] us.”
According to Fairbank (1967), among the 3,000 missionaries from the West in China by 1930s, half of them were Americans. These missionaries learned the Chinese language and helped China build schools and open hospitals.
Chester Holcombe wrote The Real Chinaman (1895), whereas Arthur Henderson Smith wrote Chinese Characteristics (1894). Both lived in China for many years. Both books have been translated into Chinese.
Manifest destiny was a concept used in the 19th century to justify the United States’ territorial expansion from East to West. It was an action based on American exceptionalism. The concept has heavily influenced American policy in the 1800s and continues to influence American thought and political ideology in the 20th century. See Stephanson's Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right (Citation1995)
Consequently, the missionary movement met with resistance almost from its inception. Violence against churches and individual missionaries was common. The most popular anti-missionary movement is the Boxing Movement (1899–1990). Started by peasants as a secret organization, it engaged in murdering of missionaries and burning of churches.
The word Metis is used in ancient Greece to indicate intelligence and ability, ingenious and complex thought, sharpness of mind, inventiveness, alertness and multiple dexterities (http://www.ilsp.gr/metis2/).
During this transitional period, “China lobby”, which consists of Nationalists Chinese officials and right-wing U.S. politicians with a common goal of supporting Chiang Kai-shek's recovery of mainland China, exerted considerable influence on U.S. foreign policy toward China (Blackwell, Citation2010; Koen, Citation1974).
According to Jeff Blackwell, former President Herbert Hoover had been an ardent opposition to the Truman's foreign policy of abandoning Taiwan. President Hoover also signed the petition conceived by the Committee of One Million opposing Communist China to the United States in 1953. The letter was presented to President Dwight Eisenhower, which resulted in his opposition to China's admittance to the United Nations.
According to Dean Acheson, “the United States Government has authorized aid to Nationalist China in the form of grants and credits totaling approximately 2 billion dollars, an amount equivalent in value to more than 50% of the monetary expenditures” of the Chiang Kai-shek's government. Moreover, “the United States Government has sold the Chinese Government [Chiang Kai-shek's government] large quantities of military and civilian war surplus property with a total procurement cost of over 1 billion dollars” (The China White Paper: August 1949, p. xv).
During the 31st World Table Tennis Game taking place in Japan in 1971, the representatives from the Chinese and American teams respectively met and expressed the interest of exchanging visits and hosting friendship games. Mao soon endorsed the invitation to the American team to visit China, which led to the official exchange at the governmental level after over 20 years of isolation between the two countries.
This strategy is also known as the “triangular diplomacy.” In 1968, the Soviet Union had reached the nuclear-missile capacity that threatened American security and world peace. The relations between China and the Soviet Union were deteriorated. Nixon and Kissnger believed that this is a historic opportunity for the United States to act as a power broker in conflict between China and the Soviets, thus balancing international power and secure world peace. See Goh, Citation2005, for more details on the strategy.
On May 7th, 1999, U.S.-led NATO air force bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese citizens. The Chinese public was outraged. President Clinton later apologized and called it an accident. On April 1st, 2001, a U.S. navy surveillance plane had a collision with a Chinese jet off the Chinese coast. Wang Wei, the Chinese pilot, was missing and presumed dead. This instance enraged the Chinese and evoked hostility toward the United States. See W. Sun and W. J. Starosta (Citation2001) for an insightful analysis of discourse on Wang Wei's memorial website.
Lee was a Taiwan-born nuclear scientist. He spent nine months in solitary confinement after the U.S. government accused him of downloading computer files. The prosecution asserted that the files contained the top secret of the U.S. nuclear program. Prosecutors dropped 58 out of 59 charges against Lee and set him free on Sept. 13, 2000. U.S. district Judge James Parker issued an apology to Lee and called the whole handling of the case a national embarrassment (Lee & Zia, 2002).
China's foreign policy principles include (a) the five principles of peaceful-coexistence; (b) setting up a fair and reasonable political and economic world order; (c) no use of force or threat of the use of force in international relations; (d) all nations, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal in international affairs; and (e) China should always side with the developing countries, it should never seek hegemony or superpower status (Wu, Citation2001, p. 297).