Revisiting US–China Wartime Relations: a study of Wedemeyer's China mission

Abstract

In the history of US–China wartime relations, the Stilwell Incident has become ‘hard evidence’ that the Nationalist Government had no intention of fighting against Japan and would exploit Allied resources to expand its strength. Interestingly enough, Stilwell's successor, Albert C. Wedemeyer, despite taking command in a difficult and awkward situation, succeeded in strengthening the Nationalist armies to fight the Japanese and kept Sino–American relations out of a state of crisis. With the availability of Chiang Kai-shek's newly-released diaries and the Wedemeyer Papers, historians are now in a good position to explore how and why Wedemeyer could successfully fulfill his mission. The basis of Wedemeyer's success becomes clear upon close examination of his perception of and attitude toward the Chinese situation and of his dealings with Chiang Kai-shek, the ongoing offensive of the Japanese troops, and KMT–CCP conflicts. Wedemeyer's case provides insight into the nature of the US–China wartime relationship.

Notes

^*Peter Chen-main Wang is Professor of History at the National Central University in Taiwan. His main research interests include the Ming-Qing transition in seventeenth century China, US–China diplomatic history, and Church history in China. Wang has received research grants and honorary positions from Leiden University (European Chair of Chinese Studies); the Fulbright Foundation; the Luce Foundation; the Roosevelt Library; the Truman Library; and the George C. Marshall/Baruch Fellowship. In 2008, he traveled to China to give lectures as the ‘Zhang Kaiyuan Academic Forum Scholar’. He has authored or edited the following books and monographs: A Daily Record of Marshall's Mediation in China (1992); The Rise and Fall of Wen-she: A Case Study of the Indigenization of Christianity in China in the 1920s (1993); The Life and Career of Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou (1593–1665): Public Service in a Time of Dynastic Change (1999); New Perspectives to Ming-Qing Culture (2000); Contextualization of Christianity in China: An Evaluation in Modern Perspective (2007); and Setting the Roots Right: Christian Education in China (2007). The author would like to take this opportunity to thank the Hoover Institution for its grant and visiting scholar status for conducting this research at the Hoover Institution Archives.

^1. Chiang Kai-shek's diaries, which were deposited at the Hoover Institution by Chiang's descendants, have been available to scholars since 2006.

^2. As Wedemeyer said in his report, he had heard this term many times over. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1958), p. 269. In fact, when General J. E. Hull, Wedemeyer's close friend at the Operation Division of War Department, heard about Wedemeyer's new assignment, he wrote to Wedemeyer, ‘Congratulations on your assignment—or should I say commiserations’. Hull to Wedemeyer, 10 November 1944, Wedemeyer Papers, 81/35, Hoover Institution Archives.

^3. Arthur N. Young, China and Helping Hand, 1937–1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 350–351 and 401–403.

^4. The Allies had decided to have a joint operation against the Japanese in Burma four times. However, this joint operation had been either delayed or canceled each time. Later, the Burma Campaign became the sole business of China and this also aggravated the clash between Stilwell and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. See, Chin-tung Liang, General Stilwell in China, 1942–1944: The Full Story (New York: St. John's University Press, 1972), ch. 6–7.

^5. The Stilwell incident has been studied by many scholars with different viewpoints, such as Chin-tung Liang, General Stilwell in China, 1942–1944; Charles R. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, United States Army in World War II: China–Burma–India Theater (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army), vol. 1, Stilwell's Mission to China (1953), and vol. 2, Stilwell's Command Problems (1956); Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–1945 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1971); Kenneth R. Young, ‘The Stilwell controversy: a bibliographical review’, Military Affairs 39(2), (1975), pp. 66–68.

^6. Some scholars suggest that the Joint Chiefs of Staff ‘did not refer to the Generalissimo in his role as Supreme Commander, China Theater … Rather, they made Wedemeyer's potential sphere of activity coextensive with the Generalissimo's, and left Wedemeyer free to advise the Generalissimo on any topic of interest to the Chinese leader …’. See Charles R. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, United States Army in World War II: China–Burma–India Theater (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army), vol. 3, Time Runs out in CBI (1959), pp. 15–16.

^7. For example, in October l944, 35,131 tons were flown into China, four times the tonnage which entered China to support Stilwell in October 1943 (Time Runs out in CBI., p. 12).

^8. Hurley's mission in China has been best studied by Russell D. Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973).

^9. ‘United States short and long range objectives in China, 29 January 1945’ was enclosed in J. E. Hull to A. C. Wedemeyer, 27 February 1945, Wedemeyer Papers, 81/35.

^10. A. C. Wedemeyer to J. E. Hull to A. C. Wedemeyer, 25 November 1945, Wedemeyer Papers, 81/35.

^11. ‘One might have expected that General Stilwell, whom I relieved, would have remained in the theater until I arrived, in order to give me information concerning both Americans and Chinese in the area—what positions they occupied, how effectively they cooperated, and what I might expect them to do … When I arrived in Kunming, I was still confident that there would be a memorandum from Stilwell pointing out to me what I must look out for, telling me in which men he had placed special confidence, their capabilities and their key jobs, and advising me concerning the Chinese and Americans of whom I should be careful, indicating their weakness and what difficulty he may have had with them. But here was nothing whatsoever, no message wishing me good luck, or go to hell, or anything else.’ See Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, p. 304.

^12. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!., p. 275.

^13. Wedemeyer wrote ‘On my arrival in The China Theater I asked General Hearn to explain the plans which had been prepared for projected operations there and how General Stilwell had visualized bringing about a coordinated, decisive effort against the Japanese. Hearn said that he was not familiar with operational plans, because the “old man had carried such information in his hip pocket”’ (Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!., p. 294).

^14. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!.

^15. It should also be pointed out here that Stilwell did have ‘some very devoted friends among the Chinese military leaders, and his American staff members were fanatically loyal to “Uncle Joe” as many affectionately called him’ (Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!., p. 305).

^16. In a letter to Hull, he said ‘I also found in my headquarters officers who are absolutely incompetent for various and sundry reasons. I intend to send them home’. See A. C. Wedemeyer to J. E. Hull, 25 November 1944, Wedemeyer Papers, 81/35.

^17. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, p. 271; A. C. Wedemeyer to J. E. Hull, 25 November 1944, Wedemeyer Papers, 81/35.

^18. For example, General Thomas Hearn and Brigadier General Benjamin C. Ferris were asked to leave and the old associates he brought in included Robert B. McClure (then a division commander with MacArthur) and Brigadier General T. S. Timberman, B. F. Taylor, J. H. Caughey and Ray T. Maddocks.

^19. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, pp. 271 and 294.

^20. A. C. Wedemeyer to George C. Marshall, 1 August 1945, Wedemeyer Papers, 82/23, p. 10.

^21. A. C. Wedemeyer to George C. Marshall, 13 April 1945, Wedemeyer Papers, 82/23, p. 5.

^22. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!., Joseph Alsop was closely associated with T. V. Soong (who was then Chiang Kai-shek's personal representative at Washington D.C.), and even became a core member of China Defense Supply, Inc.—an agency to acquire moral and material support for the ROC government. For more information, see Tai-chun Kuo, ‘A strong diplomat in a weak polity: T. V. Soong and wartime US-China relations, 1940–1943,’ in Journal of Contemporary China, 18(59) (March 2009), pp. 219–231.

^23. Guo Ting-yi, Jindai Zhong guo shigang [An Outline of Modern Chinese History] (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1980), p. 729.

^24. As for the Ichigo Operation and its impact on China, see Lloyd E. Eastman, ‘Nationalist China during the Sino–Japanese War, 1937–1945’, in John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, eds, The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 13, Republican China, 1912–1949, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 580–583. On Chinese morale and high ranking officials, see, Keith E. Eiler, ed., Wedemeyer on War and Peace (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), p. 85.

^25. Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs out in CBI, p. 56.

^26. For ALPHA plan, see, Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs out in CBI., pp. 58–60.

^27. Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs out in CBI., p. 63.

^28. Eiler, Wedemeyer on War and Peace, p. 92. Strategically speaking, Wedemeyer considered Kunming was the most important stronghold because it is ‘the terminal of all American supplies being flown into China. The fall of Kunming would have eliminated China as an active military factor in the war’. ‘Report of the China Theater 24 October 1944 to 1 February 1946 to the Chief of Staff of the Army’ (hereafter Report of the China Theater), Wedemeyer Papers, 86/3, pp. 16–17. Wedemeyer further explained the importance of Kunming—‘Kunming, militarily speaking, was the most important city in the war against Japan. First, Ledo Road (later Stilwell Road, operational in late January 1945) connected with the Burma Road to Kuming and was a major road for vehicles to Burma. Second, the Calcutta–Kunming pipeline brought in gasoline into China since May 1945. Third, Kunming became the busiest airport in the world. Those air transportations principally delivered munitions, supplies, gasoline and personnel to China and to forward bases. They also performed vital work in supplying front-line troops and clandestine teams by air-drop’. Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs out in CBI., pp. 8–9. In fact, Yunnan was also important to China's wartime contact with its western boarder provinces. The Nationalist Government made strenuous efforts to explore air and land routes to western regions. For more information, see Hsiao-ting Lin's ‘War, Leadership and Ethnopolitics: Chiang Kai-shek and China's Frontiers, 1941–1945,’ in Journal of Contemporary China, 18(59) (March 2009), 201–217.

^30. Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs out in CBI, pp. 151–152.

^29. Eiler, Wedemeyer on War and Peace, pp. 92–93.

^31. Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs out in CBI., p. 154.

^32. 4 December 1944, Chiang kai-shek diaries, Hoover Institution. However, Wedemeyer, in his report to Marshall, said, ‘I will remain here with the Generalissimo as long as possible, but not long enough to be captured by the Japs’. Eiler, Wedemeyer on War and Peace, p. 84. Wedemeyer also thought that the reason that the Generalissimo refused to move was based on some political consideration. Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (New York: Atheneum Press, 1965), pp. 203–204.

^33. 4 December 1944 and the review of the week (4–9 December), Chiang kai-shek diaries.

^34. ‘Report of the China Theater’, Wedemeyer Papers, 86/3, p. 14.

^35. Eiler, Wedemeyer on War and Peace, p. 85.

^36. ‘Report of the China Theater’, Wedemeyer Papers, 86/3, p. 20.

^37. Eiler, Wedemeyer on War and Peace, p. 125.

^38. Eiler, Wedemeyer on War and Peace., p. 90.

^39. Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs out in CBI, pp. 73–74.

^40. Eiler, Wedemeyer on War and Peace, p. 91.

^41. Eiler, Wedemeyer on War and Peace., pp. 93–94.

^42. Eiler, Wedemeyer on War and Peace., p. 74.

^43. Eiler, Wedemeyer on War and Peace., pp. 74–75; David D. Barrett, Dixie Mission: The United States Army Observer Group in Yenan, 1944 (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1970), pp. 77–78; Carolle J. Carter, Mission to Yenan: American Liaison with the Chinese Communists 1944–1947 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1997), pp. 141–142.

^44. Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs out in CBI, pp. 252–253; ‘The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State, February 7, 1945’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. VII, pp. 205–212; Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, pp. 305–307. ‘To Wedemeyer from Marshall’, 16 January 1945, Wedemeyer Papers, 82/23.

^45. Michael Schaller, The US Crusade in China, 1938–1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 242–243.

^46. Wedemeyer later wrote to Mao about his meeting with Chou: ‘Wedemeyer letter to Mister Mao, 30 July 1945’, Wedemeyer Papers, 82/22.

^47. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, p. 287.

^48. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports.

^49. ‘Wedemeyer letter to Mister Mao, 30 July 1945’, Wedemeyer Papers, 82/22.

^51. ‘Report of the China Theater’, Wedemeyer Papers, 86/3, p. 6.

^50. Eiler, Wedemeyer on War and Peace, p. 85.

^52. Interview of General Albert C. Wedemeyer, 29 December 1980, Boyds, Maryland, by Kam Tai Lee, Wedemeyer Papers, 27/25, p. 2.

^53. For example, in the case that George Washington warned in his farewell Presidential address to be wary of attachments and entanglements with other nations, Chiang did not think that to be the origin of American isolationism, as Soong suggested. Chiang believed that what Washington denoted are Occidental countries, not Oriental, and therefore Asia or Oriental countries wouldn't become the target of detachment in the United States foreign policy (24 January 1943, Chiang Kai-shek diaries).

^54. ‘This [event] is crucial not only to the success of US–China foreign relations, but also to the life and death of China’ (15 October 1944, Chiang Kai-shek diaries). The impact of the Stilwell Incident on Chiang was extremely serious because Chiang found out that his subjects could not stand firm with him in resisting American pressure. He wrote in his diary later ‘Several days ago, most military officials were also wavering and thought my attitude toward the United States was too stubborn, which might result in stalemate and lead to the end of China. Therefore [they] were vexed and voiced their complaints daily. Alas, [I] had no one to talk about national affairs and make decision together’ (20 October 1944, Chiang Kai-shek diaries).

^55. ‘His mentality is the same as that of other Americans. [They] always thought that China would ask for their cooperation because of the need of their material. From my observation, his attitude reveals an inherit disdain toward my country’ (6 November 1944, Chiang Kai-shek diaries).

^56. 6 November 1944, Chiang Kai-shek diaries.

^57. 9 November 1944, Chiang Kai-shek diaries.

^58. ‘Talking with Wedemeyer, … he is a man of righteousness, understanding, and industriousness, and is an antithesis of Stilwell who was deceitful and despicable. Wedemeyer deals with matters with alacrity. Our soldiers should follow his example’ (16 November 1944, Chiang Kai-shek diaries).

^59. ‘When I conversed with Wedemeyer, his words were full of trivia and humiliation. My subjects were incapable and my country was backward. What can I say? However, what he said was like “a good medicine with a bitter taste”’ (21 November 1944); ‘When I conversed with Wedemeyer, his alarming words made me feel ashamed and frightened’ (27 November 1944); ‘His [criticism] of our generals incapable of fighting in the front and of governmental agencies dealing things discursive and slack in the rear … made me feel extremely ashamed’ (30 November 1944); ‘However, Wedemeyer's criticism of our military and action really made me feel ashamed to the extreme. However, I am deeply impressed by his warm-heartedness, uprightness and understanding, not like Stilwell's treacherousness and viciousness. Therefore, to him, there are only excitement and self-reflection in my heart. I have great expectations for him’ (Reflections of November 1944, Chiang Kai-shek diaries).

^60. 4 December 1944, Chiang Kai-shek diaries.

^61. ‘Any slight inattention of mine will lead to humiliating the nation and forfeiting its sovereignty. How can I not be careful? Today, Wedemeyer requested to put surveillance on the intelligence activities of other countries in China. And he added that the Chinese intelligence work could not function until his permission … [I] strong refused’ (23 January 1945, Chiang Kai-shek diaries).

^62. Eiler, Wedemeyer on War and Peace, p. 130.

^63. Wedemeyer said that these were the words used in his directive from the War Department on his being assigned to the China Theater: Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, p. 281.

^64. Wesley M. Bagby, The Eagle–Dragon Alliance: America's Relations with China in World War II (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1992), p. 197.

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Peter Chen-Main Wang

65 *Peter Chen-main Wang is Professor of History at the National Central University in Taiwan. His main research interests include the Ming-Qing transition in seventeenth century China, US–China diplomatic history, and Church history in China. Wang has received research grants and honorary positions from Leiden University (European Chair of Chinese Studies); the Fulbright Foundation; the Luce Foundation; the Roosevelt Library; the Truman Library; and the George C. Marshall/Baruch Fellowship. In 2008, he traveled to China to give lectures as the ‘Zhang Kaiyuan Academic Forum Scholar’. He has authored or edited the following books and monographs: A Daily Record of Marshall's Mediation in China (1992); The Rise and Fall of Wen-she: A Case Study of the Indigenization of Christianity in China in the 1920s (1993); The Life and Career of Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou (1593–1665): Public Service in a Time of Dynastic Change (1999); New Perspectives to Ming-Qing Culture (2000); Contextualization of Christianity in China: An Evaluation in Modern Perspective (2007); and Setting the Roots Right: Christian Education in China (2007). The author would like to take this opportunity to thank the Hoover Institution for its grant and visiting scholar status for conducting this research at the Hoover Institution Archives.