The Debate on Party Legitimacy in China: a mixed quantitative/qualitative analysis

Abstract

We report results here from a mixed quantitative–qualitative analysis of 168 articles published in China on the question of regime and party legitimacy. We find that ideology remains a leading strategy of future legitimation for the CCP, alongside better known strategies of institution-building and social justice. We also find that liberalism, while less often proposed, remains a potent critique of regime legitimacy. We use these results to make predictions about the evolutionary path of institutional change of China's political system, linking up Chinese elite debate with the wider scholarly debate of authoritarian durability.

Notes

^*Bruce Gilley is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University. His research centers on questions of democracy, legitimacy, and global politics. His books on China include China's Democratic Future (2004) and Model Rebels (2001). Heike Holbig is a Research Fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies in Hamburg. Her research centers on legitimation, political change, and the political economy of contemporary China. She is the author of ‘The emergence of the campaign to open up the West: ideological formation, central decision making and the role of the provinces’ (in Goodman, ed., China's Campaign to Open Up the West, 2004) and ‘The party and private entrepreneurs in the PRC’ (in Brødsgaard and Zheng, eds, Bringing the Party Back In, 2004).

^1. Gunter Schubert, ‘One-party rule and the question of legitimacy in contemporary China’, Journal of Contemporary China 17(54), (2008), pp. 191–204; Andre Laliberte and Marc Lanteigne, eds, The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century: Adaptation and the Reinvention of Legitimacy (Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2008); Thomas Heberer and Gunter Schubert, eds, Regime Legitimacy in Contemporary China: Institutional Change and Stability (Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2006).

^2. The homepage is: www.cnki.net.

^3. The Central Party School is under the direct guidance of the CCP's Central Propaganda Department. Cf. Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship. Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), pp. 11, 17, 59.

^4. David Shambaugh, ‘Training China's political elite: the party school system’, China Quarterly, 196, (December 2008).

^5. Two examples are: Liu Xuejun, ‘Sugong shuaishi zhizheng fangshi hefaxing de zhengzhixue fenxi’ [‘A political science analysis of the CPSU's loss of legitimacy’], Makesizhuyi Yu Xianshi [Marxism and Reality] no. 5, (2006); Hao Yuqing, ‘Hefaxing: Sulian jubian poxi’ [‘Legitimacy: an interpretation of the Soviet Union's violent change’], Huadong Shifan Daxue Xuebao Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban [Journal of East China Normal University—Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition] no. 5, (2002). On this debate see David Shambaugh, China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

^6. Communication with researchers from the CCP's Central Party School in February 2008.

^7. Communication with researchers from the CCP's Central Party School in February and March 2008.

^8. ‘Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang dang de zhizheng nengli jianshe de jueding’ [‘Resolution on Strengthening the Construction of the Party's Governing Capacity’] (hereafter as ‘Resolution’), approved by the 4th plenary session of the 16th CCP Central Committee, 16–19 September, English translation available in China Quarterly, Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation 180, (July–September 2004), pp. 1153–1171, at p. 1154.

^9. Zhang Feng, ‘Lun zengqiang dang zhizheng de hefaxing’ [‘On increasing the CCP's ruling legitimacy’], Zhongyang Shehuizhuyi Xuebao [Journal of the Central Institute of Socialism] 134(2), (April 2005), pp. 5–10.

^10. Li Jie, ‘Lun hefaxing shijiao xia dang de zhizheng nengli jianshe’ [‘On the construction of the Party's governing capacity from the perspective of legitimacy’], Neijiang Shifan Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of Neijiang Teacher's University] 21(1), (2006), pp. 27–30, at p. 27.

^11. Zhang Shulin, ‘“Liang ge xuanze” yu dang de zhizheng hefaxing’ [‘“Two choices” and the legitimacy of party rule’], Xin Dongfang [New Orient] 4, (2006), pp. 15–19. Hu Jintao's long speech was published only four months later, obviously in the context of a new climax of social protests; cf. Renmin Ribao, (27 June 2005); an English translation is available in BBC Monitoring Global Newsline Asia Pacific Political File, (2 July 2005).

^12. See Bruce Gilley, ‘Legitimacy and institutional change: the case of China’, Comparative Political Studies 41(3), (2008), pp. 259–284, Figure 3, p. 270.

^13. Xin Yan, ‘Tichu “zhengzhi hefaxing” de wenti jiujing juyou he zhong zhengzhi hanyi?’ [‘What are the political implications in raising the question about “political legitimacy”?’], Dangshi Wenhui [Abstracts of CCP History Studies] no. 10, (2005), pp. 52–53, at p. 53.

^14. Mostly cited authors of theoretical works related to the concept of political legitimacy are Jürgen Habermas, Samuel Huntington, Max Weber, Seymour Lipset, David Easton, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Aristotle. Repeated references are also found of works by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Gabriel A. Almond, Michael G. Roskin, Douglass North, and John Rawls, as well as of China experts such as Frederic Teiwes, Stuart R. Schram, and Gordon White. Combing through the endnotes (included in more than 90% of articles), one is surprised by the fact that works of all of these authors have been translated into Chinese since the early 1980s.

^15. The entire coding book and coding data are available upon request.

^16. Dong Ming, ‘Shanzhi shiyu li de Zhonggong zhizheng hefaxing tanwei’ [‘An exploration of the CCP's legitimacy from the perspective of good governance’], Changbai Xuekan [Changbai Journal] 121, (2005), pp. 10–15, at p. 12.

^17. Sun Yaoxian, ‘Lun Zhongguo Gongchandang changqi zhizheng de hefaxing jichu de gonggu’ [‘On the consolidation of the foundation of the CCP's long-term ruling legitimacy’], Shandong Shehui Kexue [Shandong Social Science] 115(3), (2005), pp. 24–29.

^18. ‘Speech to cadres and soldiers of the Beijing Martial Law Corps’, Beijing, 9 June 1989, available at: http://web.peopledaily.com.cn/deng/.

^19. For example, Sun Xiaowei and Sun Yan, ‘Yishixingtai: Zhongguo Gongchandang zhengzhi quanwei hefaxing rentong de sixiang jichu’ [‘Ideology: the ideological fundament of identification with the legitimacy of the CCP's political authority’], Daizong Xuekan [Journal of Daizong] 7(3), (2003), pp. 5–6; Wang Shanfeng, ‘Zhongguo Gongchandang zhizheng hefaxing jichu de bianqian he chongsu’ [‘Historical change and rebuilding of the CCP's political legitimacy’], Nanjing Gongye Daxue Xuebao—Shehuikexue ban [Journal of Nanjing Industry University—Social Sciences Edition] no. 5, (2006), pp. 25–29, at p. 43.

^20. Lu Ailin, ‘Shehui zhuanxing qi Zhongguo Gongchandang zhizheng hefaxing ziyuan de weihu yu chonggao’ [‘The maintenance and reconstruction of the resources of CCP's ruling legitimacy during social transformation’], Lilun yu Gaige [Theory and Reform] no. 6, (2005), pp. 56–60; Lu Ailin, ‘Xin shiqi weihu yu peiyu dang de hefaxing ziyuan de lujing xuanze’ [‘The strategic choice to maintain and cultivate the legitimacy resources of the CCP in the New Era’], Qiushi [Seeking Truth] 1, (2006), pp. 18–21.

^21. Li Haiqing, ‘Zhengzhi hefaxing de yishixingtai weidu’ [‘The ideological dimension of political legitimacy’], Qiushi [Pursuit of Truth] no. 9, (2005), pp. 66–69.

^22. The precise wording of the Three Represents (San ge daibiao) formula goes: ‘the importance of the communist party in modernizing the nation—representing the demands for the development of advanced social productive forces, the direction of advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the greatest majority of the people’. It had first been formulated by the former CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin in early 2000; for a detailed analysis of the concept cf. Heike Holbig, ‘Ideological reform and political legitimacy in China: challenges in the post-Jiang era’, in Heberer and Schubert, eds, Regime Legitimacy in Contemporary China, pp. 13–34.

^23. Qi Xingfa, ‘Dui “San ge daibiao” guanyu dang zhizheng hefaxing de yiyu jieshi’ [‘Interpreting the “Three Represents” connotation of the legitimacy of party rule’], Lilun Xuekan [Theory Journal] 5, (September 2003), pp. 81–84; Chen Yajie, ‘Cong Zhonggong zhizheng de hefaxing jichu ziyuan ji qi zhuangkuang kan “San ge daibiao” de tichu’ [‘Looking at the formulation of “Three Represents” from the perspective of the legitimacy resources and the present situation of CCP rule’], Shanghai Dangshi yu Dangjian [Shanghai Party History and Party Construction] 5, (2003), pp. 7–10.

^24. Qi Xingfa, ‘Dui “San ge daibiao” guanyu dang zhizheng hefaxing de yiyu jieshi’.

^25. Zhang Lianguo, ‘“San ge daibiao”: Shichang jingji tiaojian xia qianghua Zhonggong zhizheng hefaxing de xitong gongcheng’ [‘“Three Represents”: system engineering to strengthen the legitimacy of CCP rule under market economy conditions’], Jiangsu Shehuikexue [Jiangsu Social Sciences] no. 4, (2003), pp. 192–197.

^26. Huang Jifu, ‘Lun Zhongguo Gongchandang zhizheng hefaxing de tedian’ [‘On the characteristics of the ruling legitimacy of the CCP’], Tanqiu [Exploring Truth] no. 72, (2002), pp. 16–17.

^27. Zhang Lianguo, ‘Lun Deng Xiaoping zhengzhi hefaxing sixiang de tese’ [‘On the characteristics in Deng Xiaoping's thoughts on political legitimacy’], Xueshu Luntan [Academic Forum] 169(2), (2005), pp. 1–7.

^28. Liu Changfa, ‘Shilun Zhonggong zhizheng diwei de hefaxing’ [‘On the legitimacy of the CCP's ruling status’], Zhonggong Zhengzhou Shiwei Dangxiao Xuebao [The Journal of the Party School of CCP Zhengzhou Municipal Committee] 73(1), (2005), pp. 11–13; cf. also Li Haiqing, ‘Zhengzhi hefaxing de yishixingtai weidu’.

^29. Xinhua News Agency, (16 January 2006); South China Morning Post, (23 January 2006), p. 20.

^30. Zhang Lianguo, ‘Lun Deng Xiaoping zhengzhi hefaxing sixiang de tese’.

^31. Wu Xiaotao, ‘Shehui jiegou shiye xia Zhonggong zhizheng de zhengzhi hefaxing de lishi kaocha’ [‘A historical review of the political legitimacy of CCP rule from a socio-structural perspective’], Gansu Lilun Xuekan [Gansu Theory Research] 170(4), (July 2005), pp. 33–38.

^32. Lu Ailin, ‘Shehui zhuanxing qi Zhongguo Gongchandang zhizheng hefaxing ziyuan de weihu yu chonggao’.

^33. For example, Yin Desi, ‘Lüelun “San ge daibiao” yu zhizheng dang de hefaxing’ [‘A brief comment on the “Three Represents” and the legitimacy of ruling parties’], Tanqiu [Exploring Truth] no. 2, (2002), pp. 4–9; Liu Changfa, ‘Shilun Zhonggong zhizheng diwei de hefaxing’; Fang Zhenghong, ‘Yi xianjinxing jianshe gouzhu dang de zhizheng hefaxing de yishixingtai jichu’ [‘Building up the CCP's ideological base by constructing its progressive nature’], Dang de Jianshe [CCP Construction], (June 2006), pp. 54–56.

^34. Xu Haibo, Zhongguo shehui zhuanxing yu yishixingtai wenti [China's Social Transformation and the Issue of Ideology] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 2003).

^35. Xu Haibo and Yang Xianping, ‘Goujian “Hexie shehui” yu Zhongguo Gongchandang de zhizheng hefaxing’ [‘Building a “harmonious society” and the legitimacy of CCP rule’], Shenzhen Daxue Xuebao [Journal of Shenzhen University—Humanity & Social Sciences] 22(6), (November 2005), pp. 41–45.

^36. Zhang Lianguo, ‘Lun Deng Xiaoping zhengzhi hefaxing sixiang de tese’; Xiao Heping and Wang Shide, ‘Lüelun dang de xianjinxing yu dang zhizheng de hefaxing’ [‘On the party's progressiveness and the legitimacy of party rule’], Lilun Shiye [Theoretical Perspective] no. 1, (2002), pp. 32–34.

^37. Wan Jun, ‘Xin shiji Zhongguo Gongchandang chuantong hefaxing ziyuan mianlin de tiaozhan’ [‘Challenges for the traditional resources of legitimacy of the CCP in the new century’], Kexue Shehuizhuyi [Scientific Socialism] no. 3, (2003), pp. 30–33.

^38. Huang Lijuan, ‘Gongchandang zhizheng diwei hefaxing chutan—Jiantan yi fa zhizheng’ [‘Brief exploration of the legitimacy of CCP's ruling position—discussing the rule according to law’], Chutian Zhuren [Chutian Owner] no. 7, (2003), pp. 32–34.

^39. According to Huntington, autocratic rulers may undermine their basis of power by adopting reforms, improving economic performance and thus breeding demands for political participation and democratic freedom, but may risk the same result if they do not do so. Cf. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 177.

^40. Zhang Feng gives a Gini coefficient of 0.47 (Zhang Feng, ‘Lun zengqiang dang zhizheng de hefaxing’); others argue that while the precise value of the Gini coefficient for China is discussed widely, experts agree that it is still on the rise: Long Taijiang and Wang Bangzuo, ‘Jingji zengzhang yu hefaxing de “zhengji kunju”’ [‘Economic growth and the “political performance trap” of legitimacy’], Fudan Xuebao—Shehui Kexue Ban [Fudan Journal—Social Sciences] no. 3, (2005), pp. 169–176.

^41. Long Taijiang and Wang Bangzuo, ‘Jingji zengzhang yu hefaxing de “zhengji kunju”’ [‘Economic growth and the “political performance trap” of legitimacy’], Fudan Xuebao—Shehui Kexue Ban [Fudan Journal—Social Sciences] no. 3, (2005), pp. 169–176

^42. Xu Haibo and Yang Xianping, ‘Goujian “Hexie shehui” yu Zhongguo Gongchandang de zhizheng hefaxing’.

^43. For example, Fang Zhenghong, ‘Yi xianjinxing jianshe gouzhu dang de zhizheng hefaxing de yishixingtai jichu’.

^44. Fang Zhenghong, ‘Yi xianjinxing jianshe gouzhu dang de zhizheng hefaxing de yishixingtai jichu’; see also Zhang Shulin, ‘Shilun Hu Jintao dui dang de zhizheng hefaxing ziyuan kaifa’ [‘Exploration on the development of legitimacy resources of the CCP by Hu Jintao’], Zhonggong Zhengzhou Shiwei Dangxiao Xuebao [Journal of the Party School of CCP Zhengzhou Municipal Committee] no. 2, (2006), pp. 4–7.

^45. Cf. Heike Holbig, ‘Demokratie chinesischer Prägung. Der 17. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas’ [‘Democracy, Chinese style. The CCP's 17th Party Congress’], China aktuell—Journal of Current Chinese Affairs no. 6, (2007), pp. 32–55.

^46. For example, Xinhua News Agency, (25 September 2005).

^47. Yin Qingyan and Liu Lixin, ‘Dang de zhizheng hefaxing chuyi’ [‘Brief analysis of the legitimacy of CCP rule’], Xin Shiye [New Vision] no. 3, (2004), pp. 31–33.

^48. Yin Qingyan and Liu Lixin, ‘Dang de zhizheng hefaxing chuyi’ [‘Brief analysis of the legitimacy of CCP rule’], Xin Shiye [New Vision] no. 3, (2004), pp. 31–33; Long Taijing and Wang Bangzuo, ‘Jingji zengzhang yu hefaxing de “zhengji kunju”’; Wu Jian, ‘Lun zhizheng dang hefaxing de youxiao ziyuan’ [‘An exploration of effective resources of the legitimacy of ruling parties’], Kexue Shehuizhuyi [Scientific Socialism] no. 1, (2006), pp. 48–51.

^49. For the revival of Confucianist values cf. Sebastien Billioud, ‘Confucianism, “cultural tradition” and official discourses in China at the start of the new century’, China Perspectives no. 2, (2007), pp. 50–65; Luigi Tomba, ‘Baolei Zhongguo. Yezhu xiaoqu de kongjian yu zhili’ [‘Fortress China. Space and governance in China's proprietary communities’], in He Zengke, Thomas Heberer and Gunter Schubert, eds, Chengxiang gongmin canyu he zhengzhi hefaxing [Citizen Participation in Rural and Urban Areas and Political Legitimacy] (Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 2007), pp. 285–302.

^50. Guo Jianming, ‘Hexie shehui hexie zhengzhi: Yunyu yi zhong xin zhengzhi hefaxing de moshi’ [‘Harmonious society, harmonious politics: producing a new model of political legitimacy’], Zhonggong Zhejiang Shengwei Dangxiao Xuebao [Journal of the Party School of Zhejiang Provincial Committee] no. 6, (2006), pp. 53–57.

^51. Peng Zhongyi and Li Qi, ‘Zhengfu hefaxing de xin xianzhenglun jiedu’ [‘An interpretation of the new constitutionalism in government legitimacy’], Guihai Luncong [Guihai Tribune] 21(2), (April 2005), pp. 31–35, at p. 33.

^52. Xu Yongjun, ‘Yi ren wei ben: Dangdai Zhongguo zhengzhi tongzhi hefaxing zhi jichu’ [‘People first: the foundations of legitimacy in China's politics’], Xueshu Luntan [Academic Forum] 168(1), (2005), pp. 12–15.

^53. Xu Sugang and Zhong Fang, ‘Yi fa zhi guo: Yi zhong “hefaxing” ziyuan’ [‘Ruling by law: a kind of resources for “legitimacy”’], Wanxi Xueyuan Xuebao [The Journal of West Anhui University] 21(4), (August 2005), pp. 36–39.

^54. Deng Xianming and Xiao Runhua, ‘Hefaxing de yiyi, neihan ji tigao’ [‘The significance, intension and enhancing of legitimacy’], Heilongjiang Sheng Zhengfa Guanli Ganbu Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of Heilongjiang Administrative Cadre Institute of Politics and Law] 51(6), (2005), pp. 5–8, at p. 7.

^55. Zhou Tianyong, and Changjiang Wang, eds, Gongjian: Shiqida hou Zhongguo Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige Yanjiu Baogao [Storming the Fortress: A Report on Political Reforms after the 17th Party Congress] (Urumqi: Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Press, 2008).

^56. Li Haiqing, ‘Zhengzhi hefaxing de renquan jichu lunxi’ [‘Analysis on the human rights foundation of political legitimacy’], Lilun Shiye [Theoretical Perspectives] no. 2, (2007), pp. 45–47, at p. 47.

^57. Zhang Shulin, ‘“Liang ge xuanze” yu dang de zhizheng hefaxing’, p. 17; Zhang Shulin, ‘Shilun Hu Jintao dui dang de zhizheng hefaxing ziyuan kaifa’, p. 5.

^58. Tang Yuanhua and Song Yinjun, ‘Shimin shehui dui dang zhizheng hefaxing de shuang chong yingxiang ji duice’ [‘The double effects of civil society on CCP legitimacy and the solutions’], Dang Zheng Luntan [Party & Government Forum], (November 2006), pp. 16–18.

^59. Ni Xianmin, ‘Gongmin shehui de xingqi yu Zhongguo Gongchandang zhizheng hefaxing de goujian’ [‘The emergence of civil society and the construction of CCP legitimacy’], Xueshu Luntan [Academic Forum] no. 11, (2006), pp. 69–72, at p. 72.

^60. Wei Jiawang, ‘Shimin shehui zuzhi yu Zhongguo Gongchandang zhizheng hefaxing de goujian’ [‘The structure of civil society and the construction of the CCP's ruling legitimacy’], Liaoning Xingzheng Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of Liaoning Administration College] 7(4), (2005), pp. 23–25, at p. 25.

^61. Dong Ming, ‘Shanzhi shiyu li de Zhonggong zhizheng hefaxing tanwei’, p. 13.

^62. Tang Xubin, ‘Chongsu Zhongguo zhengzhi hefaxing jichu de biran xuanze’ [‘The inevitable choice of rebuilding the political legitimacy foundation in China’], Jianghuai Luntan [Jianghuai Forum] no. 1, (2004), pp. 71–76, at p. 75.

^63. Ai Lisheng, ‘Zhizheng hefaxing he kexuexing shiye xia de zhengzhi jingzheng jizhi’ [‘A political competition system seen from the perspective of legitimate and scientific rule’], Zhongguo Kuangye Daxue Xuebao (Shehui Kexue Ban) [Journal of China University of Mining & Technology (Social Sciences)] no. 3, (2005), pp. 43–47, at pp. 46 and 47.

^64. Lu Ailin, ‘Yi fa zhizheng yu Zhongguo Gongchandang zhizheng de hefaxing’ [‘Lawful governance and the CCP's ruling legitimacy’], Qiushi [Seeking Truth] no. 1, (2005), pp. 21–23, at p. 23.

^65. For example Dong Wenfang, ‘Jianguo hou wo dang zhizheng hefaxing jichu de lishi bianqian ji qi qishi’ [‘The transformation of legitimacy bases of the CCP since the founding of the PRC and its enlightening guidance’], Shandong Shehui Kexue [Shandong Social Sciences] no. 8, (2004), pp. 101–103; also Xue Hui, ‘Zhongguo Gongchandang hefaxing jichu de tiaozheng yu chongjian’ [‘The adjustment and reconstruction of the legitimacy bases of the CCP’], Dangzheng Ganbu Luntan [The Party and Government Cadres' Forum] no. 3 (2004), pp. 7–8.

^66. Niu Yuqing, ‘Shilun Zhongguo Gongchandang zhizheng hefaxing ziyuan zhongxin de zhuanhuan’ [‘Exploration of the shifting center of the CCP's legitimacy resources’], Lingnan Xuekan [Lingnan Journal] no. 3, (2007), pp. 46–48, 76.

^67. Liang Yanqiong, ‘Tongyi zhanxian yu Zhongguo Gongchandang zhizheng hefaxing jichu de jiangou’ [‘The united front and the foundation of the CCP's ruling legitimacy’], Shenzhen Daxue Xuebao (Renwen Shehui Kexue Ban) [The Journal of Shenzhen University (Humanity and Social Sciences)] 24(2), (March 2007), pp. 63–66.

^68. Wu Zengji, ‘Zhiquan de hefaxing ji qi zai dangdai Zhonguo de shijian’ [‘The legitimacy of governance and its practice in China’], Zhengzhi yu Falü [Politics and Law] no. 2, (2007), pp. 57–62.

^69. Ai Lisheng, ‘Zhizheng hefaxing he kexuexing shiye xia de zhengzhi jingzheng jizhi’, p. 43.

^70. For discussions of authoritarian durability in China see for example Bruce Dickson, Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Andrew Nathan, ‘China's Resilient Authoritarianism’, Journal of Democracy 14(1), (January 2003), pp. 6–17; Joseph Fewsmith, ‘Staying in Power: What Does the Chinese Communist Party Have to Do?’, in Cheng Li, ed., China's Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institutions Press, 2008), pp. 212–226, as well as various other essays in this volume; Shambaugh, China's Communist Party; Elizabeth Perry and Sebastian Heilmann have coined the term ‘adaptive authoritarianism’ as the title of an ongoing research project on China (‘Adaptive Authoritarianism: China's Party-State Resilience in Historical Perspective’, available at: www.wcfia.harvard.edu/conferences/08_china/overview), David Shambaugh, ‘Training China's political elite: the party school system’, The China Quarterly, 196 (December 2008), pp. 827–844.

^71. For example, see Edward Schatz, ‘Access by accident: legitimacy claims and democracy promotion in authoritarian Central Asia’, International Political Science Review 27(3), (2006), pp. 263–283; Anna Matveeva, ‘Legitimating Central Asian authoritarianism’, unpublished paper, presented at the American Political Science Association's Annual Meeting, August 2008 in Boston; William Case, ‘Legitimacy deficits and stunning elections: the Malaysian experience’, unpublished paper, presented at the American Political Science Association's Annual Meeting, August 2008 in Boston.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Heike Holbig

71 *Bruce Gilley is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University. His research centers on questions of democracy, legitimacy, and global politics. His books on China include China's Democratic Future (2004) and Model Rebels (2001). Heike Holbig is a Research Fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies in Hamburg. Her research centers on legitimation, political change, and the political economy of contemporary China. She is the author of ‘The emergence of the campaign to open up the West: ideological formation, central decision making and the role of the provinces’ (in Goodman, ed., China's Campaign to Open Up the West, 2004) and ‘The party and private entrepreneurs in the PRC’ (in Brødsgaard and Zheng, eds, Bringing the Party Back In, 2004).