The Devolution of Taiwan's Democracy during the Chen Shui-bian Era

Abstract

When Chen Shui-bian won the presidency in 2000 and the Democratic Progressive Party became the ‘ruling party’, many observers said Taiwan experienced democratic consolidation. Nevertheless Chen and his supporters continued to talk of democratization in the ensuing years. But political reform, advances in civil liberties, and ridding the system of corruption must be considered essential to that process. Reform failed due to the fact that Chen's party did not have a majority in the legislature and the president showed poor leadership. Civil liberties deteriorated owing to Chen playing ethnic politics as well as his administration's lack of respect for democratic values. The view that money ruled in politics and the prevalence of personal greed caused corruption to worsen. These three factors suggest the devolution of Taiwan's democracy during the Chen era rather than its consolidation and explain the new administration's loss of public support.

Notes

^*John F. Copper is the Stanley J. Buckman Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee

^1. The reasons for Taiwan democratizing are, of course, manifold. They include its geography, history, constitutionalism, economic growth, enlightened leaders, US pressure, and many other factors. Opposition leaders emphasize the role of opposition politicians and the creation of the Democratic Progressive Party.

^2. This writer has used the term ‘political miracle’ frequently when writing on Taiwan's elections, politics and more. See John F. Copper, The Taiwan Political Miracle: Essays on Political Development, Elections and Foreign Relations (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997).

^3. For a more complete definition of ‘political miracle’, see John F. Copper, Historical Dictionary of Taiwan (Republic of China) (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2007), pp. 208–210. For a definition of the ‘Taiwan Experience’, a related term, see p. 242.

^4. See Jaushieh Joseph Wu, Taiwan's Democratization: Forces behind the New Momentum (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), ch. 3.

^5. See John F. Copper, Consolidating Taiwan's Democracy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005).

^6. For details on Chen Shui-bian's election and the reaction to it, see John F. Copper, Taiwan's 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Consolidating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 2000). For information on the optimism after Chen's victory, see Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), chs 9 and 10.

^7. See Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy (New York: Times Books, 2008), p. 217. Diamond notes that Chen turned to ‘mischievous old practices’ such as ‘intervention in trade union elections, unlawful surveillance of political foes, selective prosecutions, tax audits to make KMT donors and precinct captains switch sides, and lavish fundraising from big businesses for government contracts and loans’. Also see, Yun-han Chu, ‘Taiwan in 2006: a year of political turmoil’, Journal of Democracy, (April 2006), p. 47.

^8. The author has already examined the ‘consolidation’ of Taiwan's democracy after 2000 using criteria for democratization most often cited in Taiwan for that. See Copper, Consolidating Taiwan's Democracy. The author has also assessed Taiwan's democratization looking at the political system, the US model of democracy adopted by Taiwan, and its economic slowdown. See John F. Copper, ‘Taiwan: democratization gone awry’, Journal of Contemporary China, (February 2003), pp. 145–162. Here the criteria are different, reflecting both what Taiwan's democracy looks like after seven years of the Chen administration and more from the perspective of outsiders.

^9. Chen Shui-bian, The Son of Taiwan: The Life of Chen Shui-bian and his Dreams for Taiwan (Taipei: Taiwan Publishing Co., 1999), pp. 161–164.

^10. Chen Shui-bian, The Son of Taiwan: The Life of Chen Shui-bian and his Dreams for Taiwan (Taipei: Taiwan Publishing Co., 1999), p. 72 and pp. 140–144.

^11. Rigger, From Opposition to Power, p. 119.

^12. Rigger, From Opposition to Power, pp. 136–137. Rigger, however, notes that some of the reform measures were vague and that more attention was given to the issue of Taiwan's independence or reunification.

^13. Chen's popularity soon after the election ranged in the 70% area. It soon dropped but was high even into 2002. See ‘Approval rating for Taiwan's President hits an 18-month high after cabinet reshuffle’, Associated Press, cited in China Post, (1 March 2002), available at: www.chinapost.com.tw.

^14. For details, see Copper, Taiwan's 2000 Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election.

^15. For details, see Copper, Taiwan's 2000 Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election The need for having a provision in the Constitution for holding a runoff election was discussed during the 1990s when the Constitution was amended in some important ways, but nothing was done owing to the perceived greater need to make other changes in the polity such as changing the status of the National Assembly and more.

^16. See Yun-han Chu, ‘Democratic consolidation in the post-KMT era: the challenge of governance’, in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization and Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 91–93.

^17. See Yun-han Chu, ‘Democratic consolidation in the post-KMT era: the challenge of governance’, in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Taiwan's Presidential Politics: Democratization and Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-first Century (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 103. At this time former DPP chairman Shih Ming-teh proposed forming a cross-party majority coalition. But Chen and the DPP could not decide how this should work; anyway Chen perceived, wrongly as it turned out, that he could elevate the presidency above party politics by resigning his party positions and by making himself a populist president.

^18. Larry Diamond, ‘Anatomy of an electoral earthquake: how the KMT lost and the DPP won the 2000 presidential election’, in Alagappa, ed., Taiwan's Presidential Politics, p. 82.

^19. President Chen seriously underestimated the strength of the KMT at this time, thinking, some said, that it had disintegrated. See Chu, ‘Democratic consolidation in the post-KMT era’, p. 103.

^20. For details on this issue and other of President Chen's foibles, see John F. Copper, ‘Taiwan's failed president’, Asian Affairs, (Winter 2008).

^21. The fact that the writers of the Constitution created a weak executive (changed by the Special Provisions) and made the legislature dominant in domestic affairs seems to indicate the system was more a parliamentary one. In the 1990s, the Constitution was amended to strengthen presidential power, but the changes also strengthened the legislature (whose power was enhanced extraconstituitionally by democratization). Taiwan's political system at that point resembled the French Fifth Republic, a cabinet system, but did not have the mechanisms for breaking deadlock during a period of ‘cohabitation’. See Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu, ‘Building democracy in Taiwan’, in David Shambaugh, ed., Contemporary Taiwan (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1998), pp. 108–109. For an assessment of what kind of system Taiwan had, see Yu-shan Wu, ‘The ROC's semi-presidenitalism at work: unstable compromise, not cohabitation’, Issues and Studies, (September–October 2000), pp. 1–40.

^22. See John F. Copper, ‘Taiwan in gridlock’, in John F. Copper, ed., Taiwan in Troubled Times: Essays on the Chen Shui-bian Presidency (Singapore: World Scientific, 2002), pp. 43–44.

^23. Shelley Rigger, ‘The unfinished business of Taiwan's democratization’, in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed., Dangerous Strait: The US–Taiwan–China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 28.

^24. There was also a problem of the public favoring stability over reform in this milieu. See John Fu-sheng Hsieh, ‘Whither the Kuomintang?’, in Bruce Dickson and Chien-min Chao, eds, Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan's Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), p. 120.

^25. For details, see Rigger, ‘The unfinished business of Taiwan's democratization’, p. 21. Rigger cites both the Chen administration's ‘inexperience and demagoguery’ and the system for the problem.

^26. See Steve Chan, ‘Taiwan in 2005: strategic interaction in two-level games’, Asian Survey, (January/February 2006), p. 67. Also see Jacky Hsu, ‘Taipei set to outline new round of reforms; Chen rejects speculation he might use referendums to change the status quo’, South China Morning Post, (20 July 2005), available at: lexis-nexis.com.

^27. See Rigger, ‘The unfinished business of Taiwan's democratization’, pp. 36–40.

^28. See Chan, ‘Taiwan in 2005’, p. 67. The voter turnout in the National Assembly election at this time was only 23.4%.

^29. That the new system would lead to a two-party system seemed to be proven by the results of the January 2008 legislative election. The KMT and DPP won the overwhelming portion of the votes and seats in the legislature.

^30. Chan, ‘Taiwan in 2005’, p. 67.

^31. See Brian L. Kennedy, ‘Changes to Taiwan's legal professions: judges, prosecutors and attorneys’, American Journal of Chinese Studies, (April 2007), pp. 10–11.

^32. See Michael D. Swaine, ‘Taiwan's defense reforms and military modernization program: objectives, achievements and obstacles’, in Tucker, ed., Dangerous Strait, pp. 131–132. The author notes that questions ‘remain unanswered regarding … Taiwan's ability and/or willingness to develop a more realistic and coherent military strategy, to more accurately evaluate … and to increase popular support for the armed forces …’.

^33. The opposition long complained that the basic individual and civil rights in the Constitution were circumvented, not that the Constitution did not contain them.

^34. In 1987, the government abolished martial law and lifted the travel ban on citizens going to China. It then enacted a new set of laws guaranteeing freedom of speech, association, and public assembly. In 1991, it repealed the Temporary Provisions and ended the state of war (with China) and the next year disestablished the Garrison Command. It got rid of Article 100 of the Criminal Code (that contained broad provisions against ‘intending to destroy the national polity’), which ‘removed the last legal barrier to freedom of speech’. See Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng, ‘Crafting democratic institutions’, in Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien, eds, Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999), pp. 24–25.

^35. This writer has argued that this demand for democratic reform was formalized in the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 insofar as an expectation of improved human rights assumed democratization. See John F. Copper, China Diplomacy: The Washington–Taipei–Beijing Triangle (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 120–124.

^36. See, for example, Bih-jaw Lin, ‘Taipei's search for a new foreign policy approach’, in Steven W. Mosher, ed., The United States and the Republic of China: Democratic Friends, Strategic Allies, and Economic Partners (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1992).

^37. Beijing made a number of appeals to Taiwan, offering its leaders positions in the Chinese government and autonomy in various ways. Taipei, however, felt that its sovereignty was the main question and China denied that.

^38. Even Chiang's critics have praised him in this regard. See, for example, Cheng, ‘Democratizing the quasi-Leninist regime in Taiwan’, World Politics, (July 1989), p. 478. The main reason for crediting Chiang for Taiwan's democratization is that he launched Taiwan's economic growth and raised the per capita to a level that many believe made democracy possible.

^39. See Ray S. Cline, Chiang Ching-kuo Remembered: The Man and His Political Legacy (Washington, DC: US Global Strategy Council, 1989), ch. 11.

^40. See Shih-shan Henry Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan's Quest for Identity (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005), ch. 9.

^41. See, for example, Wu, Taiwan's Democratization, pp. 60–70.

^42. Copper, Taiwan's 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election, pp. 48–50.

^43. President Chen focused on the release of ‘prisoners of conscience’ from jails in Taiwan though there were few there. He also pushed for incorporating the International Bill of Rights into Taiwan's Constitution though with political polarization in Taiwan there was little chance of this ‘gesture’ going anywhere.

^44. For details, see Taiwan Civil Rights Watch Group, 2004 Taiwan's Civil Rights Violation Report (Washington, DC: Democracy and Truth Alliance, 2 December 2004), available at: truthalliance.org.

^45. Brian Hsu, ‘Ex-officers sell secrets for cash’, Taipei Times, (21 July 2001), available at: taipeitimes.com.

^46. This writer heard this term used often to categorize Mainland Chinese. Many Mainland Chinese said the use of the term began early on and this in part prompted the reaction rather than the use of the term following the resignations and defections.

^47. ‘Chen–DPP election victory will not end instability’, China Post, (4 December 2001), p. 2.

^48. Taiwan Civil Rights Watch Group, 2004 Taiwan's Civil Rights Violation Report, p. 5.

^49. Wang Jenn-hwan, ‘DPP needs to heal ethnic divisions’, Taipei Times, (8 December 2001), available at: taipeitimes.com.

^50. Taiwan Civil Rights Watch Group, 2004 Taiwan's Civil Rights Violation Report, p. 5. Also see, Peter Ng, ‘Lu hasn't learned from mistakes’, Taipei Times, (2 August 2004), available at: taipeitimes.com.

^51. Taiwan Civil Rights Watch Group, 2004 Taiwan's Civil Rights Violation Report, p. 3.

^52. See Copper, Taiwan's 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election, p. 32 for details on DPP promises.

^53. See Allen T. Cheng, ‘The trouble with Annette’, Asiaweek, (21 April 2000), available at: asiaweek.com.

^54. Taiwan Civil Rights Watch Group, 2004 Taiwan's Civil Rights Violation Report, p. 6.

^55. Taiwan Civil Rights Watch Group, 2004 Taiwan's Civil Rights Violation Report, pp. 10–12.

^56. Chen Ping-hung, ‘State ads replace professionalism’, Taipei Times, (17 January 2007), available at: taipeitimes.com.

^57. US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Taiwan Country Report on Human Rights, (8 March 2006), available at: lexisnexis.com. This same report notes that the GIO had spent NT$1 billion that year on advertising.

^58. US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Taiwan Country Report on Human Rights, (8 March 2006), available at: lexisnexis.com. This same report notes that the GIO had spent NT$1 billion that year on advertising

^59. These data can be found online at: www.rsf.org/article.php3?d_article = 4116.

^60. For a discussion of these phenomena as it applies to Taiwan, see Peter R. Moody, Jr, ‘Some problems in Taiwan's democratic consolidation’, in Dickson and Chao, eds, Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan's Politics, pp. 35–37.

^61. See Bruce Dickson, ‘Taiwan's democratization: what lessons for China?’, in Alagappa, ed., Taiwan's Presidential Politics, pp. 128–129.

^62. This point is made above in the discussion about political reform in Taiwan.

^63. Chen, The Son of Taiwan, p. 40.

^64. See Rigger, From Opposition to Power, p. 138.

^65. For comments on both local corruption and the increase of corrupt activities under Lee Teng-hui, see Ramon H. Myers, Linda Chao and Tai-chun Kuo, ‘Consolidating democracy in the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1996–2000’, in Dickson and Chao, eds, Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan's Politics, pp. 81–83.

^66. Chen was reported to have received support from the Celestial Alliance (gang) when he ran for mayor of Taipei and had been associated with Luo Fu-chu, who represented criminals in the legislature. See Ko-lin Chin, Heijin: Organized Crime, Business, and Politics in Taiwan (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 155 and p. 181.

^67. Kessings Contemporary Archives, a widely used reference published in the US, in mid-2002 reported this. It is also noteworthy that the KMT had ‘turned over a new leaf’ in that it put an anti-corruption rule in its charter stating those convicted of or prosecuted for criminal offenses were ineligible to hold party positions or for party nomination in an election. See Chu, ‘Democratic consolidation in the post-KMT era’, p. 109.

^68. There was considerable talk in Taiwan at this time and it was the topic on many TV talk shows. Later there appeared to be evidence that President Chen diverted campaign money at this time. See Edward Cody, ‘Chen's battle: survival’, Asian Wall Street Journal, (8 November 2006), p. 8.

^69. For an assessment of Chen's prospects going into the 2004 election see John F. Copper, Taiwan's 2004 Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections: Democracy's Consolidation or Devolution (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 2004). After the election it was reported that Chen had diverted a considerable sum of money from his campaign account into a secret account. See Shih Hsiu-chuan, ‘Chiu keeps up attack on president's “secret” account’, Taipei Times, (7 August 2006), p. 3. The general level of corruption increasing at this time is confirmed by Transparency International's rating, which dropped five notches from 2003 to 2004.

^70. See John F. Copper, Taiwan's 2004 Legislative Election: Putting it in Perspective (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 2004).

^71. See John F. Copper, ‘A referendum on President Chen’, and Shelley Rigger, ‘Taiwan voters bring back the blues’, both in Far Eastern Economic Review, (December 2005), pp. 38–40 and 34–38.

^72. See Rigger, ‘Taiwan voters bring back the blues’ for details.

^73. ‘Presidential office may investigate Ma Yung-cheng’, China Post, (21 April 2006), p. 4.

^74. ‘TRA suspends NT$17 billion purchase of trains’, China Post, (24 April 2006), p. 1.

^75. Lawrence Chung, ‘Chen's woes give power to premier’, South China Morning Post, (2 June 2006), available at: www.lexisnexis.com.

^76. ‘“Anti-graft” campaign now targets judicial officials’, China Post, (31 August 2006), available at: chinapost.com.

^77. Ong Hwee Hwee, ‘Drive to oust Chen: target hit in a week’, Straits Times, (23 August 2006), available at: www.taiwansecurity.org.

^78. Cat Sieh, ‘Should Chen go?’, Time (Asia Edition), (30 September 2006), available at: www.taiwansefcurity.com.

^79. See John F. Copper, Taiwan's 2006 Metropolitan Mayoral and City Council Elections and the Politics of Corruption (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 2006), pp. 19–25. As it turned out, due to using the ‘ethnic card’, Chen actually helped the DPP candidate win the election in Kaohsiung.

^80. For further details on corruption in the Chen administration, see John F. Copper, The Corruption Blight in Taiwan under Democratic Progressive Party Rule (Singapore: East Asian Institute, 2007).

^81. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2006, (6 March 2007), available at: lexisnexis.com.

^82. S. C. Chang, ‘International evaluations show Taiwan corruption worsening: KMT head’, Central News Agency, (9 December 2005), available at: lexisnexis.com.

^83. ‘Taiwan moves down to 34th place in World Corruption Index’, Asia Pulse, (7 November 2006), available at: lexisnexis.com.

^84. See John F. Copper, Taiwan's 2008 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Maturing Democracy (Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Law, 2008) for details on the impact of corruption on the election. It should be pointed out that Ma Ying-jeou was also indicted on corruption charges, but that most people felt that this was not a legitimate charge and instead was leveled by the Chen administration to divert attention away from his and his administration's dirt. The public believed this as evidenced by the fact that Ma's public opinion ratings went up when the indictment was announced and various polls showed that the majority of citizens did not believe Ma was corrupt.

^85. See D. Kaufman, A. Kray and M. Mastruzzi, Governance Matters 2008: Worldwide Indicators, 1996–2007 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008), available at: info.worldbank.org. The criteria for good governance were voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption. All of these declined during the last years of the Chen administration, some of them throughout the Chen years.

^86. In the 2008 presidential election a majority of Taiwanese voted for Ma Ying-jeou and Vincent Siew, this notwithstanding the fact that President Chen strongly campaigned for Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang. See Copper, Taiwan's 2008 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election.

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John F. Copper

87 *John F. Copper is the Stanley J. Buckman Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee