Beyond Power Politics: institution-building and Mainland China's Taiwan policy transition

Abstract

Facing the ever-growing interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland China's strategy towards Taiwan is undergoing a profound change, that is, transcending the staunch realpolitik mentality and turning to an institutional arrangement in policy making. Especially since President Hu Jintao took up his position, the Mainland has endeavored to improve cross-Strait relations through the institutionalization of a series of sensitive issues, such as the proposals and signatures of some long-term accords aiming to advocate economic cooperation, promote social exchanges, weaken political opposition and foster mutual trust. By taking the Mainland's national development strategy shift, Taiwan's domestic reality and ‘institution deficit’ in cross-Strait relations into consideration, this paper analyzes the reasons, efforts and features of the Mainland's recent institutional-orientated policy transition.

Notes

^1. Cf.: Vol. 11, Jianguo yilai maozedong wengao [Mao Zedong's Articles since the Establishment of PRC] (Beijing: Renmin Press, 1999), p. 376; Shaoqi Liu, ‘Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui xiang dibaci quanguo daibiao dahui de zhengzhi baogao’ [‘Report of CPC Central Committee to the 8th CPC National Congress’], Zhongguo Gongchandang Dibaci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui Wenxian [Document of the 8th CPC National Congress] (Beijing: Renmin Press, 1957), p. 59.

^2. Qin Yaqing, ‘Guojia shenfen, zhanlve wenhua he anquan liyi: Guanyu zhongguo yu guoji shehui guanxi de sanzhong jiashe’ [‘National identity, strategic culture, and security interests: three hypotheses on the interaction between China and the international community’], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics] no. 1, (2003), pp. 10–15.

^*Qiang Xin is associate professor and deputy director of the Center for American Studies, Fudan University, Shanghai, China. He would like to thank Professor Dingli Shen for his comments on this article.

^3. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping], Vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin Press, 1983), p. 239.

^4. Su Changhe, ‘Zhoubian zhidu yu zhoubian zhuyi: dongya quyu zhili zhong de zhongguo tujing’ [‘Zhoubian institutions and Zhoubianism: China's approach to governance in East Asia’], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics] no. 1, (2006), pp. 7–9.

^5. Ma Jiantang, 2008 nian guomin jingji zongti baochi pingwen jiaokuai fazhan [National Economy Maintained Stable and Rapid Development in 2008], (22 January 2009), available at: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/jdfx/t20090122_402534140.htm.

^6. Gregory C. Chow, ‘Globalization and China's economic development’, Pacific Economic Review 11(3), (2006), p. 272.

^7. China's Economic Contribution was No.1 in 2008 [Qunian zhongguo jingji gongxiandu shijie diyi], available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-01-23/034015076267s.shtml.

^8. Samuel Kim, ‘China and the United Nations’, in Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, eds, China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), pp. 45–49.

^9. Hu Jintao, ‘The 17th Party Congress political report’, Xinhua, (24 October 2007), available at: http://www.china.com.cn/17da/2007-10/24/content_9119449.htm.

^10. Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays on International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 113.

^11. Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, ‘The promise of institutionalism theory’, International Security 20(1), (Summer 1995), p. 50; Oran Young, ‘International regimes: problems of concept of formation’, in Paul F. Deihl, ed., The Politics of International Organizations: Patterns and Insights (Chicago, IL: Dorsey Press, 1989), pp. 13–28; Stephen Krasner, ‘Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes and intervening variables’, International Organization 36(2), (Spring 1982), pp. 185–205.

^12. Some scholars named such a transition as ‘new diplomacy’, or even asserted it means the emergence of a ‘liberal China’. See Evan S. Medeiros and Taylor Fravel, ‘China's new diplomacy’, Foreign Affairs 82(6), (November/December 2003), pp. 22–35; Su Changhe, ‘Faxian zhongguo xin waijiao: duobian guoji zhidu yu zhongguo waijiao xin siwei’ ‘Rediscovering Chinese foreign relations: multilateral international institutions and China's new thinking on diplomacy’, Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics] no. 4, (2005), pp. 11–16.

^13. Tong Xiaopeng, Fengyu Sishi Nian [Forty Years of Trials and Hardships] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Press, 1996), p. 273; Li Jian, Liang'an Mouhe Zuji Zhuizong [Traces for Peace across the Strait] (Beijing: Huawen Press, 1986), p. 18.

^14. Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan [Selected Works of Mao Zedong's Statements upon Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Press, 1994), p. 211.

^15. Zhou Enlai, Government Report to the 2nd National Congress of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in January 1956, available at: http://www.chinataiwan.org/wxzl/zhyyl/zhel/200211/t20021112_86833.htm.

^16. Zhou Zhihuai, ‘Dalu duitai zhengce he liang'an guanxi de xinfazhan’ [‘Mainland's Taiwan policy and new developments in cross-Strait relations’], Taiwan Research Quarterly [Taiwan Yanjiu] no. 1, (2006), p. 2.

^17. Hu Jintao yu lianzhan huitan xinwen gongbao [Communiqué of Hu–Lien Conference], available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-04-29/19065787389s.shtml.

^18. James C.Y. Soong is the chairman of the People First Party of Taiwan, quoted from Qinmindang duiwai xuanbu husonghui dacheng liuxiang gongshi [People First Party Declared Six Consensus Reached by ‘Hu–Soong Conference’], available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-05-12/17406624798.shtml.

^19. Hu Jintao Huijian Lianzhan he canjia liang'an jingmao luntan de Taiwan renshi, [Hu Jintao Meets Lien Chan and Other Taiwanese Attending Cross-Strait Economic and Trade Forum] (16 April 2006), available at: http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zyjh/zyjh0.asp?zyjh_m_id = 1233.

^20. Hu Jintao, ‘The 17th Party Congress political report’.

^21. The 16-character guideline is the two sides should ‘build mutual trust, lay aside differences, seek consensus while shelving differences, and create a win–win situation’.

^22. ‘President Hu offers six proposals for peaceful development of cross-Strait relationship’, Xinhua, (31 December 2008), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/31/content_10585635.htm.

^23. Quinmindang duiwai xuanbu husonghui dacheng liuxiang gongshi [People First Party Declared Six Consensus Reached by ‘Hu–Soong Conference’], available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-05-12/17406624798.shtml; Sun Yafu, Wei liang'an tongbao mou fuzhi, wei taihai diqu mou heping [Working for Prosperity and Peace across the Strait], available at: http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zyjh/zyjh0.asp?zyjh_m_id = 1456.

^24. Miandui jinrong weiji Wang Yi xuanbu shixiang huitai zhengce cuoshi, [Wang Yi Declared 10 Preferential Policies toward Taiwan Facing International Financial Crisis] (21 December 2008), available at: http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zyjh/zyjh0.asp?zyjh_m_id = 1674.

^25. Chartered flights will be arranged for during Qingming, the Dragon Boat Festival and the Mid-Autumn Festival, besides the Chinese lunar New Year season. The two sides also agreed to open chartered flights for emergent medical rescue, first aid for the handicapped and chartered cargo flights for special needs. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-06/14/content_4695374.htm.

^26. Mainland Opens ‘Green Channel’ for Taiwan Farm Produce, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/31/content_4626879.htm.

^27. ‘Cross-strait expression of unity towards tourism issue’, Lianhe Zaobao [United Daily News] (Singapore), (27 February 2007).

^28. Zhongguo Shibao [China Times], (27 February 2007), p. 8.

^29. Backgrounder: Milestones in Cross-Strait Relations over 30 Years, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/31/content_10587408.htm.

^30. ARATS, SEF Sign Agreements on Regular Flights, Financial, Judicial Co-op., available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/26/content_11259882.htm.

^31. Krasner, ‘Structural causes and regime consequences’, p. 192.

^32. Jiang Zemin, The 16th Party Congress Political Report, available at: http://www.chinanews.com.cn/2002-11-17/26/244505.html.

^33. See Li Yining, Gaige zhilu [Road to Reform] (Beijing: Zhongguo Fazhan Press, 2000); Hu Angang, Zhongguo fazhan qianjing [Prospect for China's Development] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang People Press, 1999).

^34. [Hu Jintao Emphasizes to Hold Tightly the Theme of Peaceful Development in Cross-Strait Relations] Hu Jintao qiangdiao laolao bawo liang'an guanxi heping fazhan de zhuti, (4 March 2008), available at: http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zyjh/zyjh0.asp?zyjh_m_id = 1512.

^35. Bonnie S. Glaser, ‘China's Taiwan policy: still listening and watching’, PacNet no. 33, (17 August 2001), available at: http:llwww.csis.org/pacfor/pacOl33.htm.

^36. In his inauguration speech on 20 May 2008, Ma announced that his cross-Strait policy was ‘no unification, no independence and no use of force’.

^37. ‘Hu Jintao qiangdiao laolao bawo liang'an guanxi heping fazhan de zhuti’ [‘Hu Jintao Emphasizes to Hold Tightly the Theme of Peaceful Development in Cross-Strait Relations’], (4 March 2008), available at: http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zyjh/zyjh0.asp?zyjh_m_id = 1512.

^38. [‘Taiwan was permitted to join IHR’] ‘Tai huozhun canyu guoji weisheng tiaoli yunzuo’, Cankao Xiaoxin, (24 January 2009), p. 8.

^39. Wang Yi, [‘Prospects of Peaceful Development in Cross-Strait Relations’] ‘Liang'an guanxi zhanxian heping fazhan qianjing’, (31 December 2008), available at: http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/gzyw/gzyw1.asp?gzyw_m_id = 1834.

^40. ‘China most popular spot for Taiwan investors: MOEA’, Taiwan Economic News, (12 March 2002).

^41. Karen Sutter, ‘Business dynamism across the Taiwan Strait: the implications for cross-Strait relations’, Asian Survey 42(3), (May–June 2002), pp. 522–540.

^42. Such as Mainland China's Law of the People's Republic of China on Protection of Investments by Taiwanese, and the Provisions of the State Council Concerning the Encouragement of Investments by Compatriots from Taiwan, and Taiwan's Statute Governing the Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area and the Regulations Governing Approvals of Banks to Engage in Financial Activities Between the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.

^43. Chien-min Chao, ‘Will economic integration between Mainland China and Taiwan lead to a congenial political culture?’, Asian Survey 43(2), (March–April 2003), p. 285.

^44. ARATS, SEF Sign Agreements on Regular Flights, Financial, Judicial Co-op, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/26/content_11259882.htm.

^45. For the Mainland, in accordance with the ‘One China’ principle, any possible cross-Strait mechanisms or agreements should be termed as ‘domestic’ arrangements, however, this is unacceptable for Taiwan. On the other hand, Taiwan's claim regarding ‘international’ arrangements has also been rejected by the Mainland. Taking the ambiguous term of ‘cross-Strait’ may be the only practical resolution.

^46. The name of such an agreement may be CECA, as put forward by Taiwan, or something else. The Mainland has not touched upon the name issue clearly yet.

^47. CECA is a kind of economic cooperation model situated between the state-to-state Free Trade Agreement and the CEPA reached by Mainland China with Hong Kong and Macau.

^48. ‘Mainland, Taiwan hold economic, cultural forum’, Xinhua, (20 December 2008), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/20/content_10529915.htm.

^49. Lu Xuehui, ‘Kang shuaitui liang'an jiasu qiaqian CEPA’ [‘Two sides will speed up CECA negotiation against recession’], Zhongguo Shibao [China Times], (2 February 2009).

^50. ‘Dalu dui liang'an jingji hezuo xieyi chi jiji kaifang taidu’ [‘Mainland is Open and Positive towards ECFA’], available at: http://www.chinataiwan.org/wxzl/gtbwx/200905/t20090513_895110.htm.

^51. ‘Hu Meets KMT Chairman, Vows to Avoid “Internal Struggle”’, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/26/content_11439587.htm.

^52. It is rumored that El Salvador, just like Paraguay, has extended its will to switch formal diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the Mainland, however the Mainland has constrained itself from doing so. Malawi's case demonstrated exactly the tactical understanding as an opposite example, that is, Taiwan refused the request of Malawi to resume formal diplomacy in early 2009, after Malawi changed its position to the Mainland in January 2008.

^53. Hu Jintao, ‘The 17th Party Congress political report’.

^54. ‘President Hu offers six proposals for peaceful development of cross-Strait relationship’, Xinhua, (31 December 2008), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/31/content_10585635.htm.

^55. ‘President Hu offers six proposals for peaceful development of cross-Strait relationship’, Xinhua, (31 December 2008), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/31/content_10585635.htm

^56. ‘Mainland Further Facilitates Recognition of Taiwan Court Decisions’, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/14/content_11374923.htm; ARATS, SEF Sign Agreements on Regular Flights, Financial, Judicial Co-op, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/26/content_11259882.htm.

^57. Mainland Further Facilitates Recognition of Taiwan Court Decisions, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/14/content_11374923.htm; ARATS, SEF Sign Agreements on Regular Flights, Financial, Judicial Co-op, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/26/content_11259882.htm

^58. Keohane and Martin, ‘The promise of institutionalism theory’, p. 42; cf. Harvey Starr, Anarchy, Order, and Integration: How to Manage Interdependence (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 17; John Spanier, Games Nations Play, 8th edn (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1993), pp. 478–480.