Political Institutionalization as Political Development in China

Abstract

Contrary to many doubts, the institutionalization of political leadership survived the succession process in China between 2002 and 2003. In 2004, Jiang Zemin attempted to override the institutionalized political leadership but was unsuccessful. These episodes demonstrate the level of political institutionalization that has been steadily undertaken since the reform and opening of China. After theoretically defining institutionalization as the first significant stage of political development, this article examines the current progress in political institutionalization at two distinct levels: external and internal. This article argues that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership intended to establish political stability directly and facilitate economic development indirectly under the goal of sustaining the political legitimacy of the CCP's rule of China. Finally, this article examines whether China would follow the ideal sequence of political development, i.e. institutionalization leading to participation leading to contestation. Though China has achieved considerable political institutionalization and conducted many experiments of expanding political participation, public contestation is still confined solely to within the party. Thus, it remains to be seen whether or not China will follow the ideal sequence.

Notes

^1. Susan L. Shirk, ‘Will the institutionalization of party leadership survive the 2002–03 succession?’, The China Journal 45, (January 2001), pp. 139–142.

^*Hochul Lee is a professor of political science and an Executive Member of the Institute of China Studies, University of Incheon. He received his Ph.D. from Rutgers University in 1993. His research interests include China's political economy and foreign affairs. This research was supported by the University of Incheon Research Grant of 2004–2005.

^2. Susan L. Shirk, ‘Will the institutionalization of party leadership survive the 2002–03 succession?’, The China Journal 45, (January 2001), p. 140.

^3. Lowell Dittmer, ‘Leadership change and Chinese political development’, The China Quarterly 176, (December 2003), pp. 903–925 at pp. 914–915.

^4. Lowell Dittmer, ‘Leadership change and Chinese political development’, The China Quarterly 176, (December 2003), pp. 903–925 at pp. 914–915

^5. Suisheng Zhao, ‘Toward a rule of law regime: political reform under China's fourth generation of leadership’, in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs Democratization (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), pp. 231–232.

^6. Zhongguo Gongchandang dishiyijie Zhongyangweiyuanhui disanci quanti huiyi gongbao [The Public Report of the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP], available at: http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-06/23/content_1024475.htm; Shaowen Hou, Woguo zhengzhi zhidu yu nongcun jiceng minzhu [Our Country's Political Institution and Rural Grass-roots Democracy] (Beijing: CCP Central Party School Publishing Co., 2004), p. 62.

^7. Dittmer, ‘Leadership change and Chinese political development’.

^8. The need to ‘construct socialist legal system’ (shehuizhuyi fazhi jianshe) through institutionalization and legalization is recurrently stressed in almost all official reports of the Party, from the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 11th Central Committee of 1978 to most recently the 17th Party Congress in 2007.

^9. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), ch. 1.

^10. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971).

^11. Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).

^12. See for instance, John L. Thornton, ‘Long time coming’, Foreign Affairs 87(1), (2008), pp. 2–22.

^13. Hu Jintao, Report at the 17th Party Congress of the CCP, (15 October 2007), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com.

^14. Changzhong Zheng, Dangnei Minzhuzhidu Chuangxin [Innovation of Intraparty Democracy] (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Publishing Co., 2005), pp. 64–65.

^15. See also Yumin Sheng, ‘Central–provincial relations at the CCP Central Committees: institutions, measurement and empirical trends, 1978–2002’, The China Quarterly 182, (June 2005), pp. 338–355.

^16. Zhao, ‘Toward a rule of law regime’, p. 239.

^17. Zhao, ‘Toward a rule of law regime’, p. 239

^18. Deng Xiaoping, Dang he guojia lingdao zhidu de gaige [Reform of the Party and State Leadership], (18 August 1980); Zheng, Dangnei Minzhuzhidu Chuangxin, p. 241.

^19. Dittmer, ‘Leadership change and Chinese political development’, p. 914.

^20. Zheng, Dangnei Minzhuzhidu Chuangxin, p. 285.

^21. Dittmer, ‘Leadership change and Chinese political development’, p. 914.

^22. Zhao, ‘Toward a rule of law regime’, pp. 230–231.

^23. Dittmer, ‘Leadership change and Chinese political development’, p. 924.

^24. Dittmer, ‘Leadership change and Chinese political development’, pp. 910–924.

^25. Zhao, ‘Toward a rule of law regime’, p. 232.

^26. Thornton, ‘Long time coming’, pp. 21–22.

^27. Suisheng Zhao, ‘Political reform and changing one-party rule in Deng's China’, Problems of Post-Communism 44(5), (1997), pp. 13–21.

^28. The Political Report of the 13th Party Congress in 1987; Keping Yu, Quanqiuhua yu Zhengzhi fazhan [Globalization and Political Development] (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2005), p. 26.

^29. Zhao, ‘Political reform and changing one-party rule in Deng's China’, p. 18.

^30. Zhao, ‘Toward a rule of law regime’, p. 238.

^31. The CCP Central Committee, Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quandang bixu jianjue weihu shehuizhuyi fazhi de tongzhi [The Notice of the CCP Central Committee on Whole Party's Resolute Protection of Socialist Legal System], (10 July 1986).

^32. Laura Paler, ‘China's legislation law and the making of a more orderly and representative legislative system’, The China Quarterly 182, (June 2005), pp. 301–318.

^33. Hou, Woguo zhengzhi zhidu yu nongcun jiceng minzhu, p. 63.

^34. Young Nam Cho, ‘From “rubber stamps” to “iron stamps”: the emergence of Chinese Local People's Congress as supervisory powerhouses’, The China Quarterly 171, (September 2002), pp. 724–740.

^35. Zhao, ‘Toward a rule of law regime’, pp. 232–233. However it is reported that the meetings have been resumed since the summer of 2006.

^36. Amy E. Gadsden, ‘The evolution of elections in China’, in Tun-jen Cheng, Jacques deLisle and Deborah Brown, eds, China under Hu Jintao: Opportunities, Dangers, and Dilemmas (New Jersey: World Scientific, 2006), p. 194; Zheng, Dangnei Minzhuzhidu Chuangxin, p. 24.

^37. See Thornton, ‘Long time coming’; and Zheng, Dangnei Minzhuzhidu Chuangxin.

^38. Zheng, Dangnei Minzhuzhidu Chuangxin, p. 239.

^39. Zheng, Dangnei Minzhuzhidu Chuangxin, p. 286.

^40. Zheng, Dangnei Minzhuzhidu Chuangxin, p. 299.

^41. Zheng, Dangnei Minzhuzhidu Chuangxin, pp. 303–314.

^42. See http://english.cpcnews.cn/92243/6285980.html.

^43. See http://english.cpcnews.cn/92243/6285980.html; Delegates to the Congress are chosen from some 30–38 electoral units: 29 provinces, the PLA, central government ministries, central party organizations, special delegation with Taiwan origins (33 electoral units at the 13th), including further Hainan, Chongqing, the People's Armed Police, the central financial system, and the central enterprise system (38 electoral units at the 16th).

^44. See http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66102/6374733.html.

^45. Zheng, Dangnei Minzhuzhidu Chuangxin, p. 433; John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, ‘Social change and political reform in China: meeting the challenges of success’, The China Quarterly 176, (February 2004), p. 935.

^46. See Bruce J. Dickson, ‘Who does the party represent?: from “three revolutionary classes” to “three represents”’, in Tun-jen Cheng et al., eds, China under Hu Jintao, pp. 75–96.

^47. Gadsden, ‘The evolution of elections in China’, p. 195.

^48. Zhao, ‘Political reform and changing one-party rule in Deng's China’, pp. 13–21.

^49. See also Lewis and Litai, ‘Social change and political reform in China’, p. 935.

^50. See also See also Lewis and Litai, ‘Social change and political reform in China’, p. 934.