Responses to ‘Rising China’ in the East Asian Region: soft balancing with accommodation

Abstract

While the strategic response to ‘rising China’ in the broader East Asian region has been varied, the strongest emphasis has been on ‘soft balancing’. This approach is clearly evident in the strategies pursued by the most significant of the major powers, the United States, Japan and India, as well as by other powers such as Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam. However, other responses such as accommodation and hedging have also featured for various states within the region. Frequently the response of a particular state will involve a number of elements. Soft balancing is most prominent in relation to the security dimension. Economic interaction encourages other kinds of responses. Whatever the overall approach adopted, a key factor is domestic politics, particularly the perceptions of the relevant elites.

Notes

*Derek McDougall is a Principal Fellow (Associate Professor) in the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Australia. His research focuses on Asia–Pacific international politics (including Australian engagement), and the emerging shape of international politics in the twenty-first century. Recent books include Asia Pacific in World Politics (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007) and Australian Foreign Relations: Entering the 21st century (Pearson, 2009). He can be reached by email at [email protected]

^1. Relevant books include David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Michael E. Brown, ed., The Rise of China (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); and Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds, China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). Notable articles include Richard Rosecrance, ‘Power and international relations: the rise of China and its effects’, International Studies Perspectives 7, (2006), pp. 31–35; Robert S. Ross, ‘Balance of power politics and the rise of China: accommodation and balancing in East Asia’, Security Studies 15(3), (July–September 2006), pp. 355–395; Avery Goldstein, ‘Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: theoretical expectations and evidence’, Journal of Strategic Studies 30(4–5), (August–October 2007), pp. 639–682; Shaun Breslin, ‘Understanding China's regional rise: interpretations, identities and implications’, International Affairs 85(4), (2009), pp. 817–835; G. John Ikenberry, ‘The rise of China and the future of the West: can the liberal system survive?’, Foreign Affairs 87(1), (January/February 2008), pp. 23–37; and Steve Chan, ‘An odd thing happened on the way to balancing: East Asian states’ reactions to China's rise', International Studies Review 12, (2010), pp. 387–412.

^2. Figures are from the International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010 (London: Routledge, 2010). The Military Balance 2010 suggests that total Chinese defence expenditure was 1.4 times the official figure, and that issues relating to exchange rates also need to be considered (p. 392).

^3. See further the discussion of ‘domestic threats’ in Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), ch. 3.

^4. A good introduction to the issue of China's objectives is Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), especially ch. 1. On the question of whether China wishes to uphold or change the international status quo, see Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Is China a status quo power?’, International Security 27(4), (Spring 2003), pp. 5–56. Detailed studies of China's regional objectives are available in David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005).

^5. This statement covers both the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau and the neorealism of Kenneth Waltz. ‘Offensive realism’ as represented by John Mearsheimer is different again, arguing that states seek to maximize their power by aiming for dominance. See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).

^6. Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Structural realism after the Cold War’, International Security 25(1), (Summer 2000), pp. 5–41.

^7. For detailed discussion on accommodation strategy, see Baogang He, ‘Politics of accommodation of the rise of China: the case of Australia’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(73), (2012), pp. 53–70.

^8. See Kuik Cheng-Chwee, ‘The essence of hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's response to a rising China’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 30(2), (August 2008), pp. 159–185.

^9. ‘Indirect balancing’ is preferred to ‘soft balancing’ on the grounds that the balancing is not necessarily directed at China as such; however, in certain circumstances the balancing could be directed more explicitly at China. See See Kuik Cheng-Chwee, ‘The essence of hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's response to a rising China’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 30(2), (August 2008), pp. 170–171.

^10. I believe this helps me to meet Steve Chan's point that by having ‘balancing’ include policies aiming for ‘cooperation, accommodation and resistance … one risks obfuscating this concept and convoluting its descriptive accuracy and analytic logic’ (Chan, ‘An odd thing happened on the way to balancing’, p. 408; emphasis in original).

^11. Recent assessments of the strategic context of China's rise include Nick Bisley, ‘China's rise and the making of East Asia's security architecture’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(73), (2012), pp. 19–34; Mark Beeson and Fujian Li, ‘Charmed or alarmed? Reading China's regional relations’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(73), (2012), pp. 35–52.

^12. For reasons of space, Russia's response to ‘rising China’ has not been discussed. As compared with the USSR, Russia has less influence in East Asia. While there have been some differences between Russia and China, there has also been scope for cooperation in relation to those states that might be soft balancing against China and also attempting to limit Russian influence.

^13. Figures from Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, China Fact Sheet and United States Fact Sheet, available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au (accessed 18 June 2010).

^14. See Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick, ‘“Chimerica” and the global asset market boom’, International Finance 10(3), (December 2007), pp. 215–239; Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (New York: Penguin, 2008), ch. 6.

^15. On the Sino-American relationship in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, see Geoffrey Garrett, ‘G2 in G20: China, the United States and the world after the Global Financial Crisis’, Global Policy 1(1), (January 2010), pp. 29–39.

^16. See Rosemary Foot, ‘Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: accommodating and hedging’, International Affairs 82(1), (2006), pp. 77–94.

^17. On the complexities of hegemonic transition, and whether it will ever occur, see Mark Beeson, ‘Hegemonic transition in East Asia? The dynamics of Chinese and American power’, Review of International Studies 35(1), (January 2009), pp. 95–112. See further Goldstein, ‘Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia’; Steve Chan, China, the US, and the Power Transition Theory: A Critique (London: Routledge, 2008); and Jack S. Levy, ‘Power transition theory and the rise of China’, in Ross and Zhu Feng, eds, China's Ascent, pp. 11–33.

^18. For evidence that the relationship was deteriorating in late 2010 over a combination of exchange rate, trade and security issues, see Mark Landler and Sewell Chan, ‘Taking harder stance toward China, Obama lines up allies’, New York Times, (25 October 2010).

^19. See Mike M. Mochizuki, ‘Japan's shifting strategy toward the rise of China’, Journal of Strategic Studies 30(4–5), (August–October 2007), pp. 739–776, for an overview of Japanese strategies towards China since 1972.

^20. Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, China Fact Sheet and Japan Fact Sheet, available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au (accessed 18 June 2010).

^21. See Nick Bisley, ‘The Japan–Australia security declaration and the changing regional security setting: wheels, webs and beyond?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 62(1), (2008), pp. 38–52.

^22. A recent assessment is that by David M. Malone and Rohan Mukerjee, ‘India and China: conflict and cooperation’, Survival 52(1), (February–March 2010), pp. 137–158.

^23. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010.

^24. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2010

^25. Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, India Fact Sheet, available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au (accessed 18 June 2010).

^26. A good assessment of South Korea's strategic options is Gilbert Rozman, ‘South Korea and Sino-Japanese rivalry: a middle power's options within the East Asian core triangle’, Pacific Review 20(2), (June 2007), pp. 197–220.

^27. Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Taiwan Fact Sheet, available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au (accessed 18 June 2010).

^28. ‘China retaliates over US arms sales to Taiwan’, Guardian, (30 January 2010). Further US arms sales to Taiwan were announced in September 2011.

^29. Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Burma (Myanmar) Fact Sheet, available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au (accessed 18 June 2010).

^30. Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Thailand Fact Sheet, available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au (accessed 18 June 2010).

^31. Emma Chanlett-Avery, Thailand: Background and US Relations, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated 6 September 2005, Summary.

^32. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2009 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 350–351.

^33. The states in question are Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia. East Timor, as a small and newly independent state, is a special case in some respects, maintaining a policy of developing links with China where this can result in concrete benefits, but not seeking to alienate other powers with which it is involved.

^34. Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Indonesia Fact Sheet, available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au (accessed 18 June 2010).

^35. See, for example, Denny Roy, ‘Southeast Asia and China: balancing or bandwagoning?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 27(2), (2005), pp. 305–322; John David Ciorciari, ‘The balance of great-power influence in contemporary Southeast Asia’, International Relations of the Asia–Pacific 9, (2009), pp. 157–196; Kuik Cheng-Chwee, ‘The essence of hedging’.

^36. Evelyn Goh, ‘Great powers and hierarchical order in Southeast Asia: analyzing regional security strategies’, International Security 32(3), (Winter 2007/8), pp. 113–157. See further Evelyn Goh, ‘Southeast Asian perspectives on the China challenge’, Journal of Strategic Studies 30(4–5), (August–October 2007), pp. 809–832.

^37. Evelyn Goh, ‘Great powers and hierarchical order in Southeast Asia: analyzing regional security strategies’, International Security 32(3), (Winter 2007/8), pp. 113–157. See further Evelyn Goh, ‘Southeast Asian perspectives on the China challenge’, Journal of Strategic Studies 30(4–5), (August–October 2007), pp. 136–137.

^38. A recent assessment of Australian strategy in relation to China is James Manicom and Andrew O'Neil, ‘Accommodation, realignment, or business as usual? Australia's response to a rising China’, Pacific Review 23(1), (March 2010), pp. 23–44. See also Baogang He, ‘Politics of accommodation of the rise of China’.

^39. Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, China Fact Sheet, available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au (accessed 18 June 2010).

^40. This finding is consistent with Randall Schweller's argument about ‘underbalancing’, i.e. whereas realist theory might predict balancing along certain lines to occur in response to a rising power, the response is often less than this due to the impact of domestic politics. See Randall L. Schweller, ‘Unanswered threats: a neoclassical realist theory of underbalancing’, International Security 29(2), (Fall 2004), pp. 159–201; Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).