From Zero-sum Game to Positive-sum Game: why Beijing tolerates Pacific Island states' recognition of Taipei

Abstract

The Pacific Islands region might be regarded as one of the most remote and politically least significant areas in the geopolitical and economic considerations of world giants. However, as the regional order of the Asia–Pacific changes rapidly, China has shown more eagerness to engage the island states. Interestingly, Beijing's former arch-rival Taipei still maintains, arguably, considerable influence over the region. This raises a question that is thought-provoking: why is this status quo tolerated by Beijing? Drawing on empirical sources in relation to communication between Beijing, Taipei and these island states, by focusing on how Beijing handles the South Pacific region in general and the six non-recognizing states in particular, this article attempts to tackle the question by distinguishing the difference in Beijing's mentality today from that of 30 or 40 years ago. It argues that the zero-sum mentality of fighting against Taipei in the region has now been replaced by a positive-sum assumption to engage Taipei, as well as the pan-Chinese community in the world, via the PIS, regardless of whether they establish formal ties with Beijing or not.

Notes

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^2. The list excludes Australia and New Zealand, includes the three United Nations member states which are in free association with the United States, and excludes Cook Islands and Niue, which are in free association with New Zealand but cannot join the United Nations.

^3. Note that Beijing also maintains diplomatic relations with the two free associated states of New Zealand, Cook Islands and Niue, yet they are generally not recognized as totally independent states at present.

^4. In this article, ‘Beijing’ refers to the People's Republic of China (PRC) regime whereas ‘Taipei’ refers to the Republic of China (ROC) regime. When the term ‘China’ is used, it refers to the PRC unless otherwise specified.

^5. John Henderson, Benjamin Reilly and Nathaniel Peffer, ‘Dragon in paradise: China's rising star in Oceania’, The National Interests 72, (2003), pp. 94–104.

^6. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia's National Security (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, January 2013).

^7. Henderson et al., ‘Dragon in paradise’, pp. 94–104; Kurt Campbell, ‘US Policy in the Pacific Islands’, Testimony before The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, The Pacific, and the Global Environment, Washington, DC, 29 September 2010.

^8. Susan Windybank, ‘The China syndrome’, Policy Magazine 21(2), (Winter 2005), p. 29.

^9. Zhiqun Zhu, China's New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), p. 163; Jian Yang, The Pacific Islands in China's Grand Strategy: Small States, Big Games (New York: Palgrave, 2011), p. 129.

^10. Terence Wesley-Smith, China in Oceania: New Forces in Pacific Politics, East–West Center: Pacific Islands Policy 2 (2007).

^11. Joel Atkinson, ‘China–Taiwan diplomatic competition and the Pacific Islands’, The Pacific Review 23(4), (2010), p. 408; Chien-peng Chung, ‘China's multidimensional diplomacy towards the Pacific Islands’, in Simon Shen and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, eds, Multidimensional Diplomacy of Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), pp. 267–283; Xiujun Xu, ‘China and the Pacific Islands States’, Contemporary International Relations 20(4), (2010), pp. 125–127; and Yongjin Zhang, ‘China and the emerging regional order in the South Pacific’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 61(3), (2007), p. 375.

^12. Zhang, ‘China and the emerging regional order in the South Pacific’, p. 32.

^13. Jenny Hayward-Jones, ‘China no rival in the battle for island influence’, The Australian, (17 May 2013); Paul Buchanan, ‘The giant's rival, part one: China on the horizon’, Scoop: Independent News, (14 September 2009).

^14. The Fijian Government, ‘China ready to assist Fiji in development’, Press Release, (30 May 2013).

^15. ‘China commits 800,000 USD to Fiji's 2014 General Election’, Global Post, (7 June 2014).

^16. Yang, The Pacific Islands in China's Grand Strategy, pp. 84–85.

^17. Atkinson, ‘China–Taiwan diplomatic competition and the Pacific Islands’, pp. 415–416; Zhu, China's New Diplomacy, p. 151; Palenitina Langa'oi, ‘China's diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Tonga’, in Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar Porter, eds, China in Oceania: Shaping the Pacific? (London: Berghahn Books, 2010), pp. 167–168.

^18.Ibid.

^19. Robert Kaplan, ‘The geography of Chinese power: how far can Beijing reach on land and at sea?’, Foreign Affairs 89(2), (2010), p. 34.

^20. Chung, ‘China's multidimensional diplomacy towards the Pacific Islands’, p. 275; Terence Wesley-Smith, ‘China's rise in Oceania: issues and perspectives’, Pacific Affairs 86(2), (June 2013), pp. 351–355.

^21. Wesley-Smith, China in Oceania, pp. 13–14.

^22. Philippa Brant, ‘China–Taiwan diplomatic rivalry gives way to new maturity’, The Interpreter, (25 November 2013).

^23. Wang Yang, ‘Address at the Opening Ceremony of the Second China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum’, Guangzhou, 8 November 2013.

^24. Hayward-Jones, ‘China no rival in the battle for island influence’.

^25. Henry Wai-chung Yeung and Weidong Liu, ‘Globalizing China: the rise of mainland firms in the global economy’, Eurasian Geography and Economics 49(1), (2008), pp. 57–86.

^26. Chung, ‘China's multidimensional diplomacy towards the Pacific Islands’, pp. 276–277; Michael Powles, ‘Challenges, opportunities and the case for engagement’, in Wesley-Smith and Porter, eds, China in Oceania, pp. 1–26.

^27. ‘The 10th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development’, People's Daily, (18 March 2011).

^28. Nick Thomas, ‘The economics of power transitions: Australia between China and United States’, Journal of Contemporary China 24(95), (2015), DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1013376.

^29. Yang, The Pacific Islands in China's Grand Strategy, p. 136.

^30. Chung, ‘China's multidimensional diplomacy towards the Pacific Islands’, p. 277.

^31. ‘Guoji Bujing Weiyuanhui Jujue Riben Tuoxiexing Bujing Jihua’ [‘IWC turned down Japan whaling plan’], Lianhe Xinwen, (28 May 2007).

^32. Chung, ‘China's multidimensional diplomacy towards the Pacific Islands’, pp. 270–276; Yang, The Pacific Islands in China's Grand Strategy, pp. 51–54.

^33.Ibid.

^34. Yang, The Pacific Islands in China's Grand Strategy, pp. 53–54; Wesley-Smith and Porter, eds, China in Oceania, p. 32; Atkinson, ‘China–Taiwan diplomatic competition and the Pacific Islands’, pp. 415–416.

^35. Yang, The Pacific Islands in China's Grand Strategy, pp. 55–66.

^36. Joel Atkinson, ‘Vanuatu in Australia–China–Taiwan relations’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 61(3), (2007), pp. 351–366.

^37. Fred Vurobaravu, ‘Parliament debates Vanuatu–Taiwan deal’, Vanuatu Daily Post, (24 November 2004).

^38. Jessica Drun, ‘China–Taiwan diplomatic truce holds despite Gambia’, The Diplomat, (29 March 2014).

^39. Kevin Scott, ‘China–Taiwan relations: building trust’, Comparative Connections 15(3), (2014).

^40. ‘Lai Yizhong: Waijiao Xiubing, Youbang Wuliketu Hui Chang Fandiao’ [‘Lai Yizhong: On diplomatic truce, allies would defect for no benefits’], China Review News, (21 October 2008); Wesley-Smith, ‘China's rise in Oceania’, pp. 364–365.

^41. Lucy Hornby and Luc Cohen, ‘No ties? No problem as China courts Taiwan's remaining allies’, Reuters, (6 March 2014).

^42. Gerald Chan, ‘“Diplomatic truce” in cross-Strait relations: limits and prospects’, in Weixing Hu, ed., New Dynamics in Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations: How Far Can the Rapprochement Go? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 97–114.

^43. Wesley-Smith, ‘China's rise in Oceania’, pp. 364–365.

^44. Chan, ‘“Diplomatic truce” in cross-Strait relations’, p. 107.

^45. Charlie Savage, ‘US frees last of the Chinese Uighur detainees from Guantánamo Bay’, New York Times, (31 December 2013).

^46. Takashi Mita, ‘Changing attitudes and the two Chinas in the Republic of Palau’, in Wesley-Smith and Porter, eds, China in Oceania, pp. 189–190.

^47. Chung, ‘China's multidimensional diplomacy towards the Pacific Islands’, pp. 270–274.

^48. ‘China to lend $1b to Pacific island nations’, China Daily, (8 November 2013).

^49. Yang, ‘Address at the Opening Ceremony of the Second China–Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum’.

^50. Fergus Hanson and Mary Fifita, China in the Pacific: The New Banker in Town, Lowy Institute Policy Brief (11 April 2011).

^51. Wesley-Smith, ‘China's rise in Oceania’, pp. 366–368.

^52. Windybank, ‘The China syndrome’; Anne-Marie Brady, ed., Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), pp. 10–12; Wesley-Smith, ‘China's rise in Oceania’, pp. 366–368; Atkinson, ‘China–Taiwan diplomatic competition and the Pacific Islands’, p. 414.

^53. Atkinson, ‘China–Taiwan diplomatic competition and the Pacific Islands’, p. 415.

^54. Kate Hannan and Stewart Firth, ‘Trading with the dragon: Chinese trade, investment and development assistance in the Pacific Islands’, Journal of Contemporary China 24(95), (2015), DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2015.1013377.

^55. Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC Counter-Terrorism Action Plan: China (Singapore: APEC, 2015).

^56. Aditya Surya, ‘APEC: countries must work together to tackle terrorism funding’, Khabar Southeast Asia, (12 April 2013).

^57. Hayward-Jones, ‘China no rival in the battle for island influence’.

^58. Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2013 (Metro Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2013).

^59.Ibid.

^60. Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, ‘Milking the dragon in Solomon Islands’, in Wesley-Smith and Porter, eds, China in Oceania, pp. 133–150.

^61. ‘China offers $40M “soft” loan to Palau’, Pacific Islands Report, (5 August 2009).

^62. Quote from Margaret Myers from the InterAmerican Dialogue, Hornby and Cohen, ‘No ties?’.

^63. Atkinson, ‘China–Taiwan diplomatic competition and the Pacific Islands’, pp. 415–416.

^64. ‘PRC and Taiwan engagement in Fiji, Tonga, Nauru, Kiribati and Tuvalu’, Wikileaks, (28 January 2007).

^65. Graham Norris, ‘Pawns in the game: Pacific becoming key battleground between Taiwan and China’, Pacific Magazine, (May 2004).

^66. Susan Windybank, ‘Why China first wooed then jilted Kiribati’, The Canberra Times, (29 January 2007); Chung, ‘China's multidimensional diplomacy towards the Pacific Islands’, pp. 270–276.

^67. Mita, ‘Changing attitudes and the two Chinas in the Republic of Palau’, pp. 189–190.

^68. Ron Crocombe, ‘The software of China–Pacific Island relations’, in Brady, ed., Looking North, Looking South, pp. 40–41.

^69. Andre Vltchek, ‘Wooing the islands: China and Taiwan high stakes bid for Pacific Island support’, Asia–Pacific Journal: Japan Focus Newsletter no. 16, (2008), p. 5.

^70. For instance, in Papua New Guinea, Rimbunan Hijau, a company started by Malaysian Chinese, is the biggest timber operator and even owns one of the two national newspapers, The National, in the country.

^71. Crocombe, ‘The software of China–Pacific Island relations’, pp. 40–41.

^72. Bill Willmott, ‘The overseas Chinese experience in the Pacific’, in Wesley-Smith and Porter, eds, China in Oceania, pp. 93–103.

^73.Ibid., p. 98.

^74. Graeme Smith, ‘Beijing's orphans? New Chinese investors in Papua New Guinea’, Pacific Affairs 86(2), (2013), pp. 327–349.

^75. Zhen Guo and Fei Liu, Zhongguo Dui Dayangzhou Diqu De Waijiao Zhengce Ji Jianyi [Recommendations on China's Oceania Policy] (Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, 15 March 2014).

^76.Ibid.

^77. Yang, The Pacific Islands in China's Grand Strategy, pp. 111–115.

^78. Bertil Linter, ‘America's China worries—Part III’, Yale Global, (13 February 2008).

^79. ‘Riots highlight Chinese tensions’, BBC, (21 April 2006).

^80. ‘310 Chinese back home from Solomons’, China Daily, (25 April 2006).

^81. ‘Taipei refused to rescue Chinese in Solomon Islands, Beijing took diplomatic advantage’ [‘Tai Dangju Jujue Jiuzhu Suoluomen Huaqiao Dalu Cheqiao Xian Waijiao Xinfeng’], Sina News, (24 April 2006).

^82. ‘Chinese in PNG’ [‘Huaren Zai Babuya xinjineiya’], Sohu News, (26 June 2013).

^83. Bijian Zheng, ‘China's “peaceful rise” to great-power status’, Foreign Affairs 84(5), (2005), p. 24.

^84. Crocombe, ‘The software of China–Pacific Island relations’, pp. 35–48; Zhu, China's New Diplomacy, p. 154.

^85. Shannon Tiezzi, ‘At CICA, Xi calls for new regional security architecture’, The Diplomat, (22 May 2014).

^86. Chan, ‘“Diplomatic truce” in cross-Strait relations’, p. 107; Hornby and Cohen, ‘No ties?’.