The Missing Link in Sino–Latin American Relations

Abstract

The growing economic presence of China around the world is a widely recognized reality. China's expanding economic relations with other developing countries have generated both positive and negative reactions. Many believe that the increasing economic ties between China and these countries will enhance China's political influence and encourage political cooperation between China and other countries in the Global South. How strong is the economic–political link? This article examines this question in the context of Sino–Latin American relations in recent years. It finds that thus far China's expanding economic relations with the region have not had a significant spillover effect into the political realm. The article provides preliminary explanations of the missing link between the economic and the political. It calls for more nuanced ways to apply familiar international relations paradigms to understanding the implications of the rise of China.

Notes

^1. Kevin Gallagher, Amos Irwin and Katherine Koleski, The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America (Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue, 2012), available at: http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/TheNewBanksinTown-FullTextnewversion_1.pdf.

^2. Michael Swaine, ‘Xi Jinping's trip to Latin America’, China Leadership Monitor, (5 September 2014), available at: http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm45ms-xi_jinpings_trip_to_latin_america.pdf.

^3. People's Bank of China, ‘Monetary Cooperation’, available at: http://www.pbc.gov.cn:8080/publish/huobizhengceersi/3135/index_2.html.

^4. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

^5. See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2001); and Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The future of US–China relations: is conflict inevitable?’, International Security 30(2), (2005), pp. 7–45.

^6. Congressional Research Service, China's Growing Interest in Latin America (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2005).

^7. Stephen Johnson, Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2005).

^8. Peter Hakim, ‘Is Washington losing Latin America?’, Foreign Affairs 85(1), (2006), pp. 39–53.

^9. Roger Noriega, ‘China's Influence in the Western Hemisphere: Statement before the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere’, Washington, DC, 6 April 2005, available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2005/q2/44375.htm.

^10. R. Evan Ellis, ‘Chinese soft power in Latin America’, Joint Force Quarterly 60(1), (2011), pp. 85–91.

^11. See, for example, Loro Horta, ‘In Uncle Sam's backyard: China's military influence in Latin America’, Military Review, (September–October 2008), pp. 47–55; and Eric Farnsworth, ‘Memo to Washington: China's growing presence in Latin America’, Americas Quarterly, (Winter 2012).

^12. This is discussed in Swaine, ‘Xi Jinping's trip to Latin America’.

^13. See China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (Beijing: Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China, 2008), available at: http://english.gov.cn/official/2008-11/05/content_1140347.htm; and Liu Yuqin, ‘Construct new cooperation mechanisms, promote common development between China and Latin America’ [‘Goujian xinde hezuo jizhi, cujin zhongguo he lading meizhou gongtong fazhan’] (Beijing, 2013), available at: http://comment.cfisnet.com/2013/0802/1296505.html. Chinese government makes similar claims about China's relations with African countries. See Chris Alden and Daniel Large, ‘China's exceptionalism and the challenges of delivering difference in Africa’, Journal of Contemporary China 20(68), (2011), pp. 21–38.

^14. Edla Lula, ‘Lula: “Brazil–China: model for the 21st century”’, available at: http://www.brazzil.com/2004/html/articles/may04/p155may04.htm.

^15. AVN, ‘Venezuela–China alliance to break old hegemonies’, available at: http://www.avn.info.ve/contenido/venezuela-china-alliance-break-old-hegemonies.

^16. Garth Shelton, ‘China, Africa and South Africa advancing South–South cooperation’, in Antilio Boron and Gladys Lechini, eds, Politics and Social Movements in an Hegemonic World: Lessons from Africa, Asia and Latin America [Buenos Aires: CLACSO (Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales), 2005], pp. 347–383; Horace Campbell, ‘China in Africa: challenging US global hegemony’, Third World Quarterly 29(1), (2008), pp. 89–105; and Gerard Strange, ‘China's post-Listian rise: beyond radical globalisation theory and the political economy of neoliberal hegemony’, New Political Economy 16(5), (2011), pp. 539–559.

^17. I use a neo-Marxist perspective rather than the neo-Marxist perspective deliberately. Some neo-Marxists are quite critical of the rise of China and its impact on the Global South. For an analysis that contrasts the views of Giovanni Arrighi's optimism and David Harvey's pessimism on the meaning of China's rise, see Strange, ‘China's post-Listian rise’.

^18. See, for example, Raul Prebisch, Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems (Lake Success, NY: United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, 1950); Osvaldo Sunkel, ‘National development policy and external dependence in Latin America’, The Journal of Development Studies 6(1), (1969), pp. 23–48; Arghiri Emmanuel, Charles Bettelheim and Brian Pearce, Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

^19. William Arthur Lewis, The Evolution of the International Economic Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Robert W. Cox, ‘Ideologies and the new international economic order: reflections on some recent literature’, International Organization 33(2), (1979), pp. 257–302.

^20. Norman Girvan, ‘Multinational corporations and dependent underdevelopment in mineral-export economies’, Social and Economic Studies 19(4), (December 1970), pp. 490–526; Samir Amin, ‘Self-reliance and the new international economic order’, Monthly Review 29(3), (1977), pp. 1–21; and Robert W. Cox, ‘Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10(2), (1981), pp. 126–155.

^21. Chris Alden and Marco Antonio Vieira, ‘The new diplomacy of the South: South Africa, Brazil, India and trilateralism’, Third World Quarterly 26(7), (2005), pp. 1077–1095.

^22. Ellis, ‘Chinese soft power in Latin America’.

^23.China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean.

^24. Li Mi, ‘Xi's trip ushers in new chapter of China–Latin American relations’, Xinhuanet, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/05/c_132432058.htm.

^25. Quoted in Swaine, ‘Xi Jinping's trip to Latin America’.

^26. See Andrew Hurrell, ‘The United States and Latin America: neorealism re-examined’, in Ngaire Woods, ed., Explaining International Relations since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Jorge Dominguez, China's Relations with Latin America: Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes (Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper, 2006).

^27. Alex Fernandez Jilberto and Barbara Hogenboom, eds, Latin America Facing China: South–South Relations beyond the Washington Consensus (New York: Bernhahn Books, 2010).

^28. R. Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009).

^29. The Heritage Foundation, China Global Investment Tracker, available at: http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map.

^30. Kevin P. Gallagher and Amos Irwin, China–Latin America Finance Database, available at: http://www.thedialogue.org/map_list.

^31. Raymond Colitt and Anna Edgerton, ‘Xi brings Brazil Chinese deals for jets, energy, cars’, Bloomberg, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-17/xi-visit-brings-brazil-chinese-loans-and-jet-aircraft-purchases.html.

^32. Ellis, China in Latin America; and Fernandez Jilberto and Hogenboom, Latin America Facing China.

^33. The Heritage Foundation, China Global Investment Tracker.

^34. Gallagher and Irwin, China–Latin America Finance Database.

^35. Ellis, China in Latin America; and Fernandez Jilberto and Hogenboom, Latin America Facing China.

^36. The Heritage Foundation, China Global Investment Tracker.

^37. Gallagher and Irwin, China–Latin America Finance Database.

^38. Joel Richards, ‘China loans Argentina $7.5 billion for development’, cctv.com, available at: http://english.cntv.cn/2014/07/19/VIDE1405745400395244.shtml.

^39. Ellis, China in Latin America; and Fernandez Jilberto and Hogenboom, Latin America Facing China.

^40. The Heritage Foundation, China Global Investment Tracker.

^41. Gallagher and Irwin, China–Latin America Finance Database.

^42. Javier Corrales, ‘China and Venezuela's search for oil markets’, in Fernandez Jilberto and Hogenboom, eds, Latin America Facing China, pp. 115–133.

^43. Ellis, China in Latin America; and Fernandez Jilberto and Hogenboom, Latin America Facing China.

^44. The Heritage Foundation, China Global Investment Tracker.

^45. Gallagher and Irwin, China–Latin America Finance Database.

^46. Kajal Vyas, ‘China loosens debt terms for Venezuela’, The Wall Street Journal, (24 November 2014), available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-loosens-debt-terms-for-venezuela-1416858616.

^47. On this point see Kul B. Rai, ‘Foreign policy and voting in the UN General Assembly’, International Organization 26(3), (1972), pp. 589–594.

^48. Quote in Swaine, ‘Xi Jinping's trip to Latin America’.

^49. The data are from Anton Strezhnev and Erik Voeten, 2013-02, ‘United Nations General Assembly Voting Data’, available at: http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId = hdl:1902.1/12379. The voting affinity index runs from − 1 to 1 (least similar interests to most similar interests). It is constructed using a complicated process: from the codebook—‘the affinity data are coded with the “S” indicator. “S” is calculated as 1–2^*(d)/dmax, where d is the sum of the metric distances between votes by dyad members in a given year and dmax is the largest possible metric difference for those votes’.

^50. Dominguez, China's Relations with Latin America.

^51. The comparison of voting behavior across committees is inspired by Suzanne Graham, ‘South Africa's UN General Assembly voting record from 2003 to 2008: comparing India, Brazil and South Africa’, Politikon 38(3), (2011), pp. 409–432.

^52. To develop the data on voting alignment by committee, raw data from Strezhnev and Voeten's databank were re-coded according to which committee each resolution voted on belonged to. Data on how each country voted was used to determine voting alignment. Votes were counted as aligned when the countries pursued the same voting action (voting yes, voting no or abstaining) and as unaligned when they did not pursue the same action. Each country's alignment rate represents the percentage of total votes in a given session in which each country aligned with China. Please note that this is different from the method by which Strezhnev and Voeten's affinity scores are calculated. The overall alignment rate, presented in the graph above, represents the average alignment rate across these six dyads within a given period of time. I am very grateful to Eric French for his research assistance with regard to these data and calculations.

^53. Dominguez, China's Relations with Latin America.

^54. Colum Lynch, ‘China fights enlarging Security Council’, Washington Post, (5 April 2005).

^55. Edith Lederer, ‘US and China united to block G4 plan’, Associated Press, (4 August 2005), available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/200/41222.html.

^56. Carlos Pereira and Joao Augusto de Castro Neves, Brazil and China: South–South Partnership or North–South Competition (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2012).

^57. Matias Spektor, ‘Brazil–China: what's next after Rousseff's visit?’, Americas Quarterly, (25 April 2011).

^58. Pereira and de Castro Neves, Brazil and China.

^59.Ibid.

^60. Oxford Analytica, ‘IBSA group, concerned by China, slowly takes shape’, The Oxford Analytica Daily Brief^®, (Friday, 16 August 2013).

^61. Ellis, China in Latin America; and Corrales, ‘China and Venezuela's search for oil markets’.

^62. Wang Peng, ‘Sino–Venezuela relations during Chavez's Administration’ [‘Chaweisi zhizheng shiqi de zhongwei guanxi’], in Zhongla guanxi 60 nian: huigu yu sikao (Beijing: Dangdai Shijie Chubanshe, 2010).

^63. Lowell Dittmer, ‘China's global rise’, Americas Quarterly, (Winter 2012).

^64. Ellis, ‘Chinese soft power in Latin America’.

^65. Although Latin American countries in general are not as ideological as the United States and European countries in international affairs, the democratic regimes in the region have shown support for fellow democratic countries. One of the concerns of the US policy community is that China is a threat to the normative advance (democratization) in Latin America. See Farnsworth, ‘Memo to Washington’.

^66. ‘Global poll reveals rising concern about China's increasing power’, BBC World Service, (28 March 2011), available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2011/03_march/28/china.shtml.

^67. Joshua Kurlantzick, ‘China's Latin leap forward’, World Policy Journal 23(3), (2006), pp. 33–41; and Rhys Jenkins, Enrique Dussel Peters and Mauricio Mesquita Moreira, ‘The impact of China on Latin America and the Caribbean’, World Development 36(2), (2008), pp. 235–253.

^68. Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente, ‘China's engagement in South America and Africa's extractive sectors: new perspectives for resource curse theories’, The Pacific Review 24(1), (2011), pp. 65–87.

^69. Mauricio Mesquita Moreira, ‘Fear of China: is there a future for manufacturing in Latin America?’, World Development 35(3), (2007); Kevin Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, The Dragon in the Room: China and the Future of Latin American Industrialization (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); and Pereira and de Castro Neves, Brazil and China.

^70. Lawrence Brainard and John H. Welch, ‘Brazil and China: clouds on the horizon’, Americas Quarterly, available at: http://americasquarterly.org/node/3255.

^71. A ‘market economy status’ would narrow the gap between the constructed normal value of goods and the prices of Chinese exports and, thus, reduce the anti-dumping duties imposed on Chinese exports.

^72. International Bar Association, Anti-Dumping Investigations against China in Latin America (London: International Bar Association, 2010).

^73. Spektor, ‘Brazil–China’.

^74. Brainard and Welch, ‘Brazil and China’.

^75. Pereira and de Castro Neves, Brazil and China.

^76. Ellis, ‘Chinese soft power in Latin America’; and Elizabeth Economy, ‘Time for a strategic reset’, Americas Quarterly, (Winter 2012).

^77. Gallagher et al., The New Banks in Town.

^78. Matt Ferchen, China's Latin American Interests (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), available at: http://m.ceip.org/2012/04/06/china-s-latin-american-interests/a7ht.

^79. Chen Huaqiao, ‘A geographic survey of China's relations with Latin American countries’ [‘Zhongguo yu lamei diqu guojiajian guanxi de diyuxing kaoliang’], Shehuizhuyi Yanjiu 198, (2011).

^80. Shen An, ‘Thoughts on China's future diplomatic strategy toward Latin American’ [‘Guanyu zhongguo weilai dui lamei waijiao zhanlue de sikao’], Lading Meizhou Yanjiu 31(5), (2009), pp. 36–40; and Lou Xiangfei, ‘Lessons of cross-region cooperation between the EU and Latin America for Sino–Latin American relations’ [‘Oumeng yu lamei kuadiqu hezuo dui fazhan zhongla guanxi de qishi’], Lading Meizhou Yanjiu 34(2), (2012).

^81. Wu Guoping, ‘Opportunities and challenges for China's investment in Latin America and the Caribbean in the post-crisis era’ [‘Houweiji shiqi zhongguo qiye touzi lamei he jialebihai diqu de jiyu yu tiaozhan’], Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Yanjiushengyuan Xuebao no. 2, (2011), pp. 126–133.

^82. Zhu Hongbo, ‘The trilateral interactions among China, US and Latin America and China's policy toward Latin America’ [‘Zhong, mei, la sanbian guanxi hudong yu zhongguo de lamei zhengce’], Lading Meizhou Yanjiu 32(4), (2010), pp. 59–64.

^83. Brainard and Welch, ‘Brazil and China’.

^84. On China's emphasis on its ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘peaceful development’, see Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘The changing ecology of foreign policy-making in China: the ascension and demise of the theory of “peaceful rise”’, The China Quarterly 190, (2007), pp. 291–310. On the forces behind China's interest in soft power, see Hongying Wang and Yeh-chung Lu, ‘The conception of soft power and its policy implications: a comparative study of China and Taiwan’, Journal of Contemporary China 17(56), (2008), pp. 425–447.

^85. Zhu, ‘The trilateral interactions among China, US and Latin America’; and Chen, ‘A geographic survey of China's relations with Latin American countries’.

^86. Wang Ping, Changes in International Relations in the Western Hemisphere and the Sustainable Development of Sino–Latin American Relations [Xibanqiu guoji guanxi de bianhua yu zhongla guanxi de kechixu fazhan] (Beijing Luntan: Wenming de hexie yu gongtong fanrong, 2013).

^87. Sha Weidong, ‘The United States and contemporary Sino–Latin American relations’ [‘Meiguo yu dangdai zhongla guanxi’], Tongji Daxue Xuebao 18(2), (2007), pp. 95–102; and Zhu, ‘The trilateral interactions among China, US and Latin America’.

^88. Jiang Shixue, South–South Cooperation in the Age of Globalization: Recent Development of Sino–Latin American Relations and its Implications (Beijing: Institute for Latin American Studies and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2005); and Zhang Mingde, ‘Much in common’, Americas Quarterly, (Winter 2012).

^89. Ellis, ‘Chinese soft power in Latin America’, p. 90.

^90. Terra Budini, ‘The Brazilian foreign policy proposals according to the opposition candidates’, available at: http://www.pt.org.br/blog-secretarias/the-brazilian-foreign-policy-proposals-according-to-the-opposition-candidates/.

^91. A recent study argues that China's diplomatic expansion in Africa is partially driven by economic considerations but must be understood also as the strategic impulse of China's emergence as a global power. See Jianwei Wang and Jing Zou, ‘China goes to Africa: a strategic move?’, Journal of Contemporary China 23(90), (2014), pp. 1113–1132. This may seem to be at odds with the claim here, but the two are not necessarily contradictory. China has the impulse to enhance its political and strategic influence in Africa, Latin America and everywhere in the world, but how far it succeeds in translating its economic reach into such influence is questionable.

^92. Alden and Large, ‘China's exceptionalism and the challenges of delivering difference in Africa’; and Gonzalez-Vicente, ‘China's engagement in South America and Africa's extractive sectors’.

^93. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); and G. John Ikenberry, ‘The rise of China and the future of the West: can the liberal system survive?’, Foreign Affairs, (2008), pp. 23–37.

^94. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

^95. Brian Winter and Brian Ellsworth, ‘Brazil and China: a young marriage on the rock’, Reuters, (3 February 2011), available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/03/uk-brazil-china-idUKLNE71202720110203.

^96. Shambaugh, China Goes Global.