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Abstract
As worries have grown about global warming and the sustainability and price of fossil fuels, the demand for nuclear energy has increased, and nuclear power is increasingly viewed as a reliable and clean resource. However, the so-called nuclear renaissance coincides with an international security environment in which the norms of nuclear nonproliferation seem to be eroding. Turkey, a non-nuclear weapon state, plans to generate nuclear power to meet future energy demands, but it is aware of and concerned with regional proliferation trends. Questions have also been raised regarding Ankara's rationale for using nuclear energy, as well as its potential motivations and capabilities regarding future proliferation. This article will provide an overview of Turkey's nuclear energy history and plans, as well as the proliferation-related questions that could arise; it will also look at the domestic debate on nuclear energy and Turkey's status as a non-nuclear weapon state.
Notes
1. This article is based on Şebnem Udum, “Turkey's Nuclear Energy Plans Amid Questions on Regional Proliferation,” paper presented at Core Dimensions of Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century, Sixth International Student/Young Pugwash Conference, The Hague, Netherlands, April 16, 2009.
2. John M. Deutch et al., “Update of the MIT 2003 Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary Study,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009, <web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-update2009.pdf>, p. 6.
3. “The Nuclear Renaissance,” World Nuclear Association, September 2009, <www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf104.html>; “World Energy Outlook 2007,” International Energy Agency, 2007, <www.worldenergyoutlook.org/2007.asp>.
4. For a detailed analysis of Turkey's efforts for civilian nuclear power, see Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Turkey's Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (Spring/Summer 1997), pp. 33–44.
5. “Akkuyu'ya Müjde” [Good News for Akkuyu], Hürriyet, July 25, 2000; “Nükleer Santrale Hem Evet Hem HayIr” [Both Yes and No to Nuclear Plant], Hürriyet, July 25, 2000. Years later, president George W. Bush said that an agreement between Turkey and the United States regarding cooperation on civilian nuclear energy was postponed due to concerns that Turkish entities were involved in nuclear proliferation–related trade. See George W. Bush, “Letter of Transmission to the Congress from President George W. Bush for the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,” January 22, 2008,<georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080123-6.html>.
6. Law No. 5710 was passed on November 11, 2007.
7. Ali Tanrikut, TAEA vice chairman, presentation at Sinop Nuclear Technology Center, April 12, 2008.
8. “Nükleer Santral YarIsmasI KapsamInda Teklif Edilen VVER1200 (AES-2006) Reaktör TasarImI” [The VVER 1200 (AES-2006) Reactor Design Offered in the Nuclear Power Plant Competition], TAEA, <www.taek.gov.tr/attachments/213_vver1200_bilgi.pdf>; “TAEK Ölçütleri Uygunluk Değerlendirmesi TamamlandI” [The Assessment on the Compatibility with the TAEA Criteria is Complete], TAEA, <http://www.taek.gov.tr/tr/basin-aciklamalari/41-2008/213-basin-19aralik2008.html>.
9. “Nükleer Santralde Yüce Divanlık Skandal” [Scandal Qualifying for High Court in the Nuclear Plant (Competition)], Hürriyet, April 24, 2009.
10. “YargI Nükleer Santral Ihalesi Yönetmeliğinin Üç Maddesine Yürütmeyi Durdurma KararI Verdi” [The Judiciary Decides to Stop the Execution of the Three Articles of the Nuclear Power Plant Tender Regulation], TMMOB press release, November 10, 2009.
11. “YIldIz: ‘Nükleer Santral Için KararlIyIz’” [YIldIz: “We Are Determined about the Power Plant”], CNN Türk, November 21, 2009. [On May 12, shortly before this article went to press, Turkey signed a deal with Russia for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu.—Ed.]
12. “Natural Gas Purchase Agreements,” BOTAş (The Petroleum Pipeline Corporation), <www.botas.gov.tr/index.asp>.
13. Remarks by Hilmi Güler, Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), April 20, 2006; official statement of the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSIAD), “TÜSIAD: ‘Nükleer Santral YapIlmasI Gecikmiş Ancak Olumlu bir AdIm” [Nuclear Power Plant is a Belated but Positive Step], TS/BAS-BÜL/06-29, May 5, 2006; Remarks by Sinan Aygün, chair of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce, “Nükleer Enerjide Acil Durum Raporu (Urgency in Nuclear Energy Report)” ATO, July 24, 2007; Remarks by Mustafa Öztürk, General Board Minutes, May 8, 2007.
14. “Enerji ve Tabii Kaynaklar Bakanı Sayın Dr. Mehmet Hilmi Güler'in Bakanlığın 2009 Yılı Bütçesini T.B.M.M. Genel Kurulu'na Sunuş Konuşması” [Speech by Hilmi Güler on the Ministry Budget of 2009 to the Turkish Grand National Assembly], December 23, 2008, p. 38, <www.enerji.gov.tr/duyurular/2009_Butce_Konusmasi.pdf>; “Ulusal Nükleer Enerji Politikası” [The National Nuclear Technology Policy], joint paper by the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and the TAEA, June 2, 2009, <www.taek.gov.tr/mevzuat/raporlar/ulusal_nukleer_teknoloji_gelistirme_politikasi.pdf >.
15. Statement by Hilmi Güler, former minister of energy, Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), April 20, 2006; Statement by Hilmi Güler, TGNA, December 20, 2006.
16. These are mainly the antinuclear platforms of Sinop and Mersin, the Antinuclear Front, and various groups and NGOs, including Greenpeace, the Electrical Engineers' Chamber, the Environmental Engineers' Chamber, Turkish Medicals Association, and environmental associations, among others. In addition, political parties on the left oppose nuclear energy, including the Republican Peoples' Party and the Democratic Left Party.
17. See Greenpeace's Turkish-language website, <www.greenpeace.org/turkey/about/faq>.
18. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, TÜSIAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association), TOBB (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey), MÜSIAD (Private Industrialists and Businessmen's Association), ATO (Ankara Chamber of Commerce), ASO (Ankara Chamber of Industry), and NÜKTE (Nuclear Technology Information Platform).
19. Doğan Heper (a popular columnist), “Kamusal Alanı Beklerken” [While Waiting for the Public Domain], Milliyet, July 29, 2004; Doğan Heper, “Geçmişle Hesaplaşma” [Settling Old Scores with History], Milliyet, November 18, 2004; Doğan Heper, “70 Milyon Moral Bekliyor” [The 70 Million Await Morale], Milliyet, January 12, 2007; Doğan Heper, “Türkiye ‘Atom’ Yapabilir” [Turkey Can Make the Atom], Milliyet, January 26, 2006; “Nükleer'de Geç Kalıyoruz” [We Are Late in Nuclear], Milliyet, February 2, 2006; Rıza Zelyut (another columnist), “Türkiye Atom Bombası Yapmalıdır” [Turkey Should Make the Atomic Bomb], Gunes, July 27 and 28, 2007; Ali Külebi, Türkiye'nin Enerji Sorunları ve Nükleer Gereklilik [Turkey's Energy Problems and Necessity of Nuclear] (Istanbul: Bilgi, 2007), p. 131.
20. “Sayın Cumhurbaşkanı'na, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'ne, Hükümet'e, Anayasa Mahkemesi'ne ve Kamuoyuna Açık Mektup” [The Open Letter to the President, Turkish Grand National Assembly, the Government, Constitutional Court and the Public], Türk Nükleer Enerji Forumu [Turkish Nuclear Energy Forum], January 18, 2008; Haluk Utku, “Enerji Güvenliğinde Eylemsizlik Prensibimiz: Nükleer Enerjiye Giriş” [Our Principle of ınaction in Energy Security: Introduction to Nuclear Energy], Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi [Journal of Strategic Research] 12 (December 2008), pp. 1–11; “Prof. Dr. Vural Altın Nükleer Enerji Yasası'nı Yorumluyor: Iskeleti Net, Altyapısı Kemale Muhtaç” [Prof. Dr. Vural Altın Assesses the Nuclear Energy Law: The Skeleton is Clear but the ınfrastructure Needs ımprovement], Global Enerji Magazine, January 2007, pp. 36–41; Ahmed Yüksel Özemre, “Yeni Nükleer Enerji Kanunu Türkiye'yi Nereye Götürür?” [Where Does the New Nuclear Energy Law Take Turkey?], Stratejik Analiz [Strategic Analysis Magazine], January 2008, pp. 26–38.
21. Remarks by Sinan Aygün, chairman of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce (ATO), as cited in “Nükleer Enerjide Acil Durum Raporu” [Urgency in Nuclear Energy Report], ATO, July 24, 2007; Remarks by Mustafa Öztürk, TGNA, May 8, 2007.
22. As stated by former energy minister Hilmi Güler and former chair of the TAEA Okay Çakıroğlu in response to a question posed by the author, February 12, 2008, Ankara.
23. Nuclear detractors include Greenpeace; supporter include columnists Heper and Zelyut cited above.
24. Mohammed ElBaradei, “Nuclear Energy: The Need for a New Framework,” presentation delivered in the International Conference on Nuclear Fuel Supply: Challenges and Opportunities, Berlin, April, 17, 2008, <www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2008/ebsp2008n004.html>.
25. For an analysis of the security perceptions and capabilities of Middle Eastern states, see “Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 20, 2008; Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Beyond Iran: The Risk of A Nuclearizing Middle East,” presentation delivered at the Washington Institute's Policy Forum luncheon, Washington, DC, February 9, 2005; Tariq Khaitous, “Is Syria a Candidate for Nuclear Proliferation?” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies/Nuclear Threat Institute, NTI Issue Brief, March 2008, <www.nti.org/e_research/e3_syria_nuclear_candidate.html>.
26. şebnem Udum, “Turkey's Non-Nuclear Weapon State Status: A Theoretical Assessment,” ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs 3 (2007), pp. 51–59; Leon Fuerth, “Turkey: Nuclear Choices Amongst Dangerous Neighbors,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 145–74;Jessica C. Varnum, “Turkey in Transition: Towards or Away From Nuclear Weapons?” in William C. Potter, ed., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2010); Mustafa Kibaroğlu and Barış Çağlar, “Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey,” Middle East Policy 15 (2008), pp. 59–80.
27. For further analysis, see Udum, “Turkey's Non-Nuclear Weapon State Status.”
28. For further analysis, see Udum, “Turkey's Non-Nuclear Weapon State Status.”
29. Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Isn't it Time to Say Farewell to US Nukes in Turkey?” European Security 14 (December 2005), pp. 443–57.
30. “Turkish-U.S. Political Relations,” Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-u_s_-political-relations.en.mfa>.
31. “Joint Statement by Turkey and the United States of America on the Occasion of the Visit of US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton upon the Invitation of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Ali Babacan,” Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 7, 2009, <www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-statement-by-turkey-and-the-united-states-of-america-on-the-occasion-of-the-visit-of-us-secretary-of-state-hillary-rodham-clinton-upon-the-invitation-of-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey-ali-babacan.en.mfa>.
32. For further discussion, see şebnem Udum, “The Role of Turkish Language and Security Culture for US National Security,” in Michel Gueldry, ed., Languages Mean Business: Integrating Languages and Cultures in/for Business (San Francisco: Mellen Press, 2010).
33. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release on Obama's statement on Armenian Remembrance Day, calling “some expressions … unacceptable.” However, it acknowledged Obama's positive stance on the Turkish-Armenian normalization process. “Press Release Regarding the Statement of President Barack Obama on ‘Armenian Remembrance Day,’” press release No. 58, Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 25, 2009, <www.mfa.gov.tr/no_58_-25-april-2009_-press-release-regarding-the-statement-of-president-barack-obama-on-_armenian-remembrance-day_.en.mfa>.
34. The 1920 Treaty of Sévres was signed between the defeated Ottoman State and the victors of World War I and outlined the partition of Anatolia. The “Sévres syndrome” refers to fears that foreign powers are conspiring to weaken Turkey. Such fears might be set off if Ankara recognizes the “Armenian genocide.” For further analysis, see Udum, “The Role of Turkish Language and Security Culture for US National Security.”
35. See Ali Karaosmanoğlu and Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Defense Reform in Turkey,” in Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler eds., Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002), pp. 135–64.
36. For a detailed analysis of these talks, see şebnem Udum, “Missile Proliferation in the Middle East: Turkey and Missile Defense,” Turkish Studies 4 (Fall 2003), pp. 71–102.
37. “SayIn Bakanımızın Iran'a Hareketinden Önce Esenboğa Havaalanında Gerçekleştirdikleri Basın Toplantısı” [Press Statement of Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Prior to His Visit to Iran], September 11, 2009, Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs; “Iran′In Nükleer Programı hk” [Re: Iran's Nuclear Program], press release No. 89, Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 8, 2006; Mark Bentley, “Erdogan Urges Iran Nuclear Diplomacy Not Sanctions,” Bloomberg, December 10, 2009, <www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601104&sid=aFfti9dbTCmE>.
38. Cyprus is a full member of the EU and is able to exercise a veto on the opening and closing of the chapters of the acquis that Turkey and the EU negotiate. A candidate country should complete negotiations on these chapters before assuming full membership; before Cyprus became an EU member, the outstanding issues on the island were not completely resolved. The Annan Plan that foresaw a settlement was rejected by the Greek Cypriots while it was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots. The talks are still taking place between the two communities under the UN auspices. Cyprus is able to exercise its veto without needing Greece.
39. Heper, “Turkey Can Make the Atom”; Doğan Heper, “Türkiye Bu Kulübe Girecek” [Turkey Will Join This Club], Milliyet, April 27, 2006; Zelyut, “Turkey Should Make the Atomic Bomb.”
40. As stated by former energy minister Hilmi Güler and former chair of the TAEA Okay Çakıroğlu in response to a question posed by the author, February 12, 2008, Ankara.
41. See Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Nükleer Silahlar ve Türkiye” [Nuclear Weapons and Turkey], Görüş [Viewpoint], June 2004, p. 30.
42. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu [Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position] (Istanbul: Küre, 2001); Owen Matthews, Yenal Belgici, and Semin Gümüşel, “Risky Diplomacy,” Newsweek.com, November 28, 2009, <www.newsweek.com/id/224704>.
43. For a detailed presentation of Turkey's energy policy, see “Turkey's Energy Strategy,” Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Directorate General for Energy, Water and Environment, January 2009.
44. Nedim şener, “Iran'a Giden Dev Kaplar Nükleer şüpheye Takıldı” [The Giant Containers To Iran Stuck by Nuclear Suspicion], Milliyet, February 10, 2006; Bush, “Letter of Transmission to the U.S. Congress from President George W. Bush.”
45. Daniel Horner, “Accord on New Rules Eludes Nuclear Suppliers,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2009, <www.armscontrol.org/node/3729>.
46. “Başbakan Sayın Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'In Ulusa Sesleniş Konuşması” [State of the Nation speech by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan], Başbakanlık Basın Merkezi [The Press Office of the Prime Ministry], October 2, 2009.
47. For details on Turkish use of and plans for solar, hydro, wind, geothermal, and biomass power, see Turkey's Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, <www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=en>.