NUCLEAR ISLANDS

Abstract

Current International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards do not provide adequate protection against the diversion to military use of materials or technology from certain types of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. In view of highly enriched uranium's relatively greater ease of use as a nuclear explosive material than plutonium and the significant diseconomies of commercial spent fuel reprocessing, this article focuses on the need for improved international controls over uranium enrichment facilities as the proximate justification for creation of an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Association (INFCA). In principle, the proposal is equally applicable to alleviating the proliferation concerns provoked by nuclear fuel reprocessing plants and other sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The INFCA would provide significantly increased nonproliferation assurance to its member states and the wider international community by holding long-term leasehold contracts to operate secure restricted zones containing such sensitive nuclear facilities.

Keywords:

• Nuclear fuel cycle
• nuclear energy
• international controls
• highly enriched uranium

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the International Forum on “Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Energy,” Amman, Jordan, June 23, 2009, and the 2010 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, Moscow, Russia, March 6, 2010. The authors gratefully acknowledge support for their nonproliferation research from the Hewlett Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ploughshares Fund, the Prospect Hill Foundation, and the Telemachus Foundation.

Notes

1. “A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy,” March 16, 1946, p. 11, <www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ach46.pdf>.

2. “A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy,” March 16, 1946, p. 11, <www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ach46.pdf>.

3. For a summary of technical inadequacies in the current international safeguards system, see Christopher E. Paine, Thomas B. Cochran, and Robert S. Norris, “Technical Realities Confronting Transition to a Nuclear Weapon Free World,” in Background Papers (Canberra: Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, 1996), p. 109.

4. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, Article X.

5. See Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, “The Amount of Plutonium and Highly-Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Weapons,” Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook monograph series, April 13, 1995, <docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_04139501a_144.pdf>.

6. The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament noted in its November 2009 report that “any new binding international norm stipulating that sensitive fuel cycle activities must be conducted exclusively in the context of a multilateral arrangement and no longer as a national undertaking, would amount to a reinterpretation of Article IV of the NPT and the right specified therein for each party to pursue their own national programs. Such a reinterpretation might not be entirely impossible, but would likely only be agreed in the context of a broader negotiation in which all existing facilities, wherever located, in nuclear weapons states or elsewhere, would need to be subsumed unto the new arrangement. Any new restrictions on independent national operations would need to apply to all, including non-NPT, nuclear armed states as well as to non-nuclear-weapon states, thus bringing them to the same level of obligation as the latter.” We have sought to satisfy this criterion in the design of this proposal. See Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,” International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 2009, p. 144, <www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/contents.html>. While we believe protections sufficient to ensure that peaceful nuclear cooperation does not undermine the basic nonproliferation obligations of the NPT (Articles I and II) are explicitly required by the plain language of Article IV and common sense notions of legal interpretation—i.e., ancillary or collateral rights should not be construed in such a way as to undermine or defeat the fundamental purpose of a statute, and therefore no legal “reinterpretation” is necessary—we note that our proposal represents a fusion of national and multilateral approaches that would not deny the “right” of countries to their “own national programs,” but would rather make these subject to a form of multilateral, nondiscriminatory collective supervision in which all countries with such national facilities would be both eligible and strongly encouraged, but not required, to take part. The consequence of declining to provide this added layer of cooperative nonproliferation assurance would represent not the loss of a national “right” to pursue peaceful nuclear technology under existing IAEA safeguards, but rather the exercise of the inherent right of other nations not to cooperate in the nuclear sphere with a country that elects not to provide such added assurance that sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities are indeed conducted “in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” Similarly, the “right to participate in the fullest possible exchange” of technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Article IV does not give any individual nation an unqualified right to dictate the terms of its participation in such exchanges with other NPT parties, without regard to their views regarding what “peaceful” nuclear fuel cycle arrangements are “possible” and yet still “in conformity with” the treaty's basic obligations. In short, any enhanced nonproliferation assurance arrangement will likely have to encompass both national and multilateral nuclear enterprises—as both already exist—but do so in a way that makes non-membership a possibility but by no means cost-free to those who would opt out of the voluntary arrangement. Maintaining a future “right” or “option” to misuse peacefully acquired nuclear facilities in a future nuclear weapons program would come at a price, hopefully a steep one.

7. See Appendix A for a discussion of other proposals that involve some form of international control of various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle.

8. See Pierre Goldschmidt, “Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Nonproliferation Paper no. 100, April 2009; and Pierre Goldschmidt, “Multilateral Nuclear Fuel Supply Guarantees and Spent Fuel Management: What are the Priorities?” Daedalus 139 (Winter 2010), pp. 7–19. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS) has continued the discussion in a recent booklet that focuses primarily on the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. See Charles McCombie et al., “Multinational Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” AAAS, 2010.

9. Yury Yudin, Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Assessing the Existing Proposals (Geneva: United Nations Publications, 2009). Yudin has since expanded on his earlier analysis in Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: The Need To Build Trust (Geneva: United Nations Publications, 2010). This new analysis is more a survey of the political obstacles facing a more effective regime than an attempt to formulate a specific solution to the NPT's conundrum of peacefully proliferating the inherent technical capacities for treaty breakout and future weaponization. Nonetheless, Yudin concludes, “The majority of NPT states parties recognize the risks arising from the proliferation of these technologies and diversion or misuse of nuclear materials, but many find it difficult to accept arrangements that would codify a ‘two-tier’ system, where some states are entitled to certain nuclear fuel cycle technologies, and others are not” (p. 54). We believe Yudin is correct on this point, and yet it also follows that if a more effective arrangement could be found that did not “codify,” in Yudin's phrase, “a new discriminatory system of ‘haves’ and ‘have nots,’” there might be a chance for a political consensus to emerge in support of it. This article represents our attempt to formulate such an effective but “nondiscriminatory” arrangement.

10. IAEA, “The Texts of the Agency's Agreements with the United Nations,” INFCIRC/11, October 30, 1959, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc11.pdf>.

11. IAEA, “The Texts of the Agency's Agreements with the United Nations,” INFCIRC/11, October 30, 1959, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc11.pdf>, p. 3.

12. Given the vital nonproliferation assurance mission of the association, and the importance of countries attaining and adhering to certain required standards and practices before enjoying the full benefits of peaceful cooperation and trade in nuclear fuel services, not all countries that fit the nuclear facility or power generation criteria for membership may qualify immediately for full membership because of their possible failure, in the view of the secretary-general, to conduct their activities “in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter, and in conformity with the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies.” See IAEA, INFCIRC/11, Article 1, Principles, para. 4. Such members would be classified as “candidate members” of INFCA until all the requirements of the necessary protocols and contracts with the association had been met and had entered into full force and effect.

13. For example, to help ensure future peaceful uses, these agreements could preclude ownership or operation of enrichment plants by military establishments or other bodies with national defense functions.

14. This would be similar to the “Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project” under the German proposal. See Appendix A of this paper for a brief description and references.

i. “A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy,” March 16, 1946, <www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ach46.pdf >.

ii. U.S. Code, Title 22, Sec. 3223(a), <codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/22/47/I/3223>.

iii. Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation (New York: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1983), p. 88, <books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=286>.

iv. Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation (New York: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1983), p. 88, <books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=286>, pp. 79, 88–91, 207.

v. U.S. Congress, Security Assistance Act of 2008, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., S.3563, Sec. 422, <www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s110-3563>.

vi. Yury Yudin, Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Assessing the Existing Proposals (Geneva: United Nations Publications, 2009).

vii. The MESP is tenth of the twelve proposals reviewed by Yudin in Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Assessing the Existing Proposals, p. 18. This proposal is also discussed in detail on pp. 46–48 and in Appendix D, “MESP Details.” For the original text and revisions of the German proposal, see IAEA, “Communication Received from the Resident Representative of Germany to the IAEA with Regard to the German Proposal on the Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” INFCIRC/704, May 4, 2007, <www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/Themen/Abruestung/Downloads/MESP-Zirkularnote704.pdf>; IAEA, “Communication Date 30 May 2008 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Agency with Regard to the German Proposal for a Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project,” INFCIRC/727, May 30, 2008, <www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/Themen/Abruestung/Downloads/MESP-Zirkularnote727.pdf>; IAEA, “Communication Dated 22 September 2008 Received from the Permanent Mission of Germany to the Agency Regarding the German Proposal on a Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project,” INFCIRC/735, September 25, 2008, <www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/Themen/Abruestung/Downloads/MESP-Zirkularnote735.pdf>.

viii. IAEA, “Communication Dated 26 May 2009 Received from the Permanent Mission of Austria to the Agency Enclosing a Working Paper Regarding Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” INFCIRC/755, June 2, 2009, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2009/infcirc755.pdf>.

ix. IAEA, “Communication Dated 26 May 2009 Received from the Permanent Mission of Austria to the Agency Enclosing a Working Paper Regarding Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” INFCIRC/755, June 2, 2009, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2009/infcirc755.pdf>, p. 1.

x. IAEA, “Communication Dated 26 May 2009 Received from the Permanent Mission of Austria to the Agency Enclosing a Working Paper Regarding Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” INFCIRC/755, June 2, 2009, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2009/infcirc755.pdf>, pp. 4–5.

xi. IAEA, “Communication Dated 26 May 2009 Received from the Permanent Mission of Austria to the Agency Enclosing a Working Paper Regarding Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” INFCIRC/755, June 2, 2009, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2009/infcirc755.pdf>, p. 5.

xii. IAEA, “Communication Dated 26 May 2009 Received from the Permanent Mission of Austria to the Agency Enclosing a Working Paper Regarding Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” INFCIRC/755, June 2, 2009, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2009/infcirc755.pdf>.

xiii. IAEA, “Communication Dated 26 May 2009 Received from the Permanent Mission of Austria to the Agency Enclosing a Working Paper Regarding Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” INFCIRC/755, June 2, 2009, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2009/infcirc755.pdf>, p. 6.

xiv. IAEA, “Communication Dated 26 May 2009 Received from the Permanent Mission of Austria to the Agency Enclosing a Working Paper Regarding Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” INFCIRC/755, June 2, 2009, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2009/infcirc755.pdf>.

i. Regarding (2)(b): we note that this partial solution, which we first advanced in a paper presented in Tehran in April 2006, is now part of the current discussions to resolve Iran's dispute with the UN Security Council over its enrichment program and undeclared nuclear activities. See Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, “Ensuring the Peaceful Use of Iran's Uranium Enrichment Capability,” paper presented at the Pugwash Conferences Workshop held in collaboration with the Center for Strategic Research, Tehran, Iran, April 24–25, 2006, <www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/me/tehran2006/Cochran-paper.pdf>.