THE BRAZILIAN WAY

Abstract

This article examines the positions held by Brazil under the administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–present) on nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament regimes and on contentious issues in those areas. Under Lula's government, Brazil has wanted to mediate between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states to consolidate its position as a strong negotiator and to benefit from the possible gains of this position in terms of greater participation in international institutions. It has also wanted to pressure nuclear weapon states to fulfill their disarmament obligations in order to reduce asymmetries in its relations with powerful nuclear weapon countries. At the same time, Brazil has tried to preserve its autonomy and flexibility to protect commercial secrets and preserve national security in relation to its own nuclear program.

Keywords:

• Brazil
• nuclear nonproliferation
• nuclear disarmament

Notes

1. Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, “Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification,” Third World Quarterly 28 (2007), pp. 1309–26.

2. Marco Antônio Marzo and Silvio Gonçalves de Almeida, A evolução do controle de armas: desarmamento e não-proliferação [The Evolution of Arms Control: Disarmament and Nonproliferation] (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Ciência Moderna Ltda., 2006), pp. 191–92.

3. Sharon Squassoni and David Fite, “Brazil's Nuclear History,” Arms Control Today, October 2005, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/Oct-Brazil#BrazilHistory>.

4. Daniel Flemes, “Brazil's Nuclear Policy: From Technological Dependence to Civil Nuclear Power,” German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Working Paper No. 23, June 2006, pp. 9–13, <www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp23_flemes.pdf>.

5. Marzo and Almeida, A evolução do controle de armas [The Evolution of Arms Control], p. 193.

6. Maria Rost Rublee, “The Nuclear Threshold States: Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Brazil and Japan,” Nonproliferation Review 17 (March 2010), pp. 50–51.

7. Squassoni and Fite, “Brazil's Nuclear History.”

8. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, Brasil e Alemanha: A Construção do Futuro [Brazil and Germany: The Construction of the Future] (Brasília: Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais/Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 1995); Flemes, “Brazil's Nuclear Policy,” pp. 15–17. As Brazilian nuclear expert José Goldemberg has written, “Brazil conducted covert activities in military installations that could have led to the production of nuclear weapons,” as did Argentina; however, neither country ever produced such weapons. See José Goldemberg, “Looking Back: Lessons from the Denuclearization of Brazil and Argentina,” Arms Control Today, April 2006, <www.armscontrol.org/print/2023>.

9. Squassoni and Fite, “Brazil's Nuclear History.”

10. Squassoni and Fite, “Brazil's Nuclear History.”

11. Marzo and Almeida, A evolução do controle de armas [The Evolution of Arms Control], p. 195.

12. Luiz Felipe Lampreia, “Remarks on Brazil's Accession to the NPT,” September 18, 1998, <www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/news/98091823_llt.html>.

13. Tullo Vigevani and Marcelo Oliveira, “Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era: The Search for Autonomy through Integration,” Latin American Perspectives 34 (2007), pp. 58–80.

14. Vigevani and Cepaluni, “Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification,” pp. 1309–26.

15. Celso Amorim, “Let's Hear From the New Kids on the Block,” New York Times, June 14, 2010.

16. Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Monica Hirst, “Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities,” International Affairs 82 (2006), pp. 21–40.

17. Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Monica Hirst, “Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities,” International Affairs 82 (2006), pp. 29–33.

18. Vigevani and Cepaluni, “Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification.”

19. Lima and Hirst, “Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power,” pp. 25–29.

20. Andrew Hurrell and Amrita Narlikar, “A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil and India in Multilateral Trade Negotiations,” Global Society 20 (2006), pp. 415–33.

21. Lima and Hirst, “Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power,” p. 33–35.

22. Squassoni and Fite, “Brazil's Nuclear History.”

23. Nuclear Suppliers Group, “What is the NSG?” <www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/default.htm>.

24. Rublee, “The Nuclear Threshold States,” p. 54.

25. Sharon Squassoni and David Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment,” Arms Control Today, October 2005, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/Oct-Brazil>.

26. Flemes, “Brazil's Nuclear Policy,” pp. 17–20, 22–23.

27. Rublee, “The Nuclear Threshold States,” p. 55.

28. Squassoni and Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test.”

29. Claire Applegarth, “Brazil Permits Greater IAEA Inspection,” Arms Control Today, November 2004, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Brazil>.

30. Applegarth, “Brazil Permits Greater IAEA Inspection.”

31. Squassoni and Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test.”

32. Flemes, “Brazil's Nuclear Policy,” pp. 17–20, 22–23.

33. Peter Muello, “Brazil Follows Iran's Nuclear Path, but Without the Fuss,” Associated Press, April 20, 2006, <www.informationclearinghouse.info/article12797.htm>.

34. Squassoni and Fite, “Brazil as Litmus Test.”

35. “Brazil Defends Iran Nuclear Rights,” PressTV, September 24, 2009, <www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=106992&sectionid=351020104>.

36. “EU Taps Brazil to Help Resolve Iran Nuclear Row,” PressTV, February 15, 2010, <www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=118707&sectionid=351020104>.

37. See Rublee, “The Nuclear Threshold States,” p. 51.

38. “Brazil's President Lula in Iran for Key Nuclear Talks,” BBC News, May 16, 2010, <news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8685036.stm>.

39. Peter Crail, “Iran-Turkey-Brazil Fuel Deal Has Potential if Iran Provides Follow-Up Steps,” Arms Control Association Issue Briefs, May 7, 2010, <www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/IranTurkeyBrazilFuelDeal>.

40. Amorim, “Let's Hear From the New Kids on the Block.”

41. Clive Leviev-Sawyer, “UN Extends Iran Sanctions, with Turkey and Brazil Voting Against,” The Sofia Echo, June 10, 2010, <sofiaecho.com/2010/06/10/914749_un-extends-iran-sanctions-with-turkey-and-brazil-voting-against>.

42. “Brazil ‘Quits as Mediator’ over Iran, Turkey Alone,” World Bulletin, June 21, 2010, <www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=60253>.

43. “Brazil ‘Quits as Mediator’ over Iran, Turkey Alone,” World Bulletin, June 21, 2010, <www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=60253>.

44. For a thorough discussion on the idea of consensual hegemony, see Sean Burges, “Without Sticks or Carrots: Brazilian Leadership in South America During the Cardoso Era, 1992–2003,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 25 (2006), pp. 23–42.

45. For a thorough discussion on the idea of consensual hegemony, see Sean Burges, “Without Sticks or Carrots: Brazilian Leadership in South America During the Cardoso Era, 1992–2003,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 25 (2006), pp. 23–42.

46. Daniel Cancel, “Venezuela to Develop Nuclear Energy With Russian Help (Update 1),” Bloomberg, September 19, 2009, <www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aElQ3UEU9eYM>.

47. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, <www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/Disarmament/0-Nuclear/0-new-agenda-coalition.php>.

48. “Lula: ‘Nuclear Weapons Make the World More Dangerous, Not Agreements with Iran,’” Campaign Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran, May 29, 2010, <www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=node/10212>.

49. Rublee, “The Nuclear Threshold States,” p. 51.

50. Rebecca Johnson, “Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 80 (Autumn 2005), <www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd80/80npt.htm>.

51. Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, “Treze passos para o juízo final: a nova era do desarmamento nuclear dos Estados Unidos e da Rússia” [Thirteen steps to judgment day: The new era of Russian and North American nuclear disarmament], Contexto internacional 30 (2008), <www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-85292008000200005&lng=en&nrm=iso>.

52. See Johnson, “Politics and Protection.”

53. Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte, “A President's Assessment of the 2005 NPT Review Conference,” Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 81 (Winter 2005), <www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd81/81npt.htm>.

54. NAC, “New Agenda Coalition Working Paper,” submitted to the Second Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.26, April 30, 2008, <www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/disarmament/prepcom-working-paper-final.pdf>.

55. Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?” International Affairs 82 (2006), pp. 1–19.

56. Andrew Hurrell, “Hegemony, Liberalism and Global Order: What Space for Would-be Great Powers?” International Affairs 82 (2006), pp. 1–19.

57. Lima and Hirst, “Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power,” pp. 35–38.