INSTRUMENTAL INFLUENCES

Abstract

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) conducted by the United States has become an important element of the US-Russian relationship, for the policies set during the review process directly affect Russian officials' perceptions of their security environment and provide a framework for the domestic debate on security issues. From Moscow's point of view, the most important outcome of the NPR process was the resumption of the bilateral arms control negotiations and the US willingness to work with Russia to resolve the dispute about missile defense. These developments helped strengthen the domestic institutions in Russia that support a cooperative US-Russian agenda, securing Russia's cooperation with the United States on a range of nonproliferation issues. Additionally, the renewed US commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons has apparently had an effect on the new Russian military doctrine, which somewhat reduces the role of nuclear weapons in Russian national security policy.

Keywords:

• Russia
• United States
• nuclear weapons
• disarmament
• diplomacy
• nonproliferation policy

Notes

1. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report” (hereafter 2010 NPR), April 6, 2010, p. iii, <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>.

2. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report” (hereafter 2010 NPR), April 6, 2010, p. iii, <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf> p. xi.

3. Sergei Kislyak, Russian ambassador to the United States, “International Perspectives on the Nuclear Posture Review,” presentation at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace Conference, Washington, DC, April 21, 2010, <www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=2842>.

4. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” Office of Secretary of Defense, December 31, 2001. The report was released in classified form, and key conclusions of the document were summarized in Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Annual Report to the President and the Congress,” August 15, 2002. A copy of the NPR report was obtained by the media in March 2002; see Michael R. Gordon, “US Nuclear Plan Sees New Targets and New Weapons,” New York Times, March 10, 2002, p. 1. Excerpts are available at GlobalSecurity.org, “Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],” <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>.

5. I. Ivanov, “Novaya yadernaya strategiya SShA” [New nuclear strategy of the USA], Zarubezhnoye voennoye obozrenie, No. 2, 2002.

6. Sergei Rogov, “Doktrina Busha i perspektivy rossisko-amerikanskikh otnoshenii” [The Bush doctrine and the future of US-Russian relations], Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, April 5, 2002.

7. Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” Munich, February 10, 2007.

8. “Joint Statement by Dmitriy A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arm [sic],” White House, April 1, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-Dmitriy-A-Medvedev-and-Barack-Obama/>.

9. “Joint Statement by Dmitriy A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arm [sic],” White House, April 1, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-Dmitriy-A-Medvedev-and-Barack-Obama/>.

10. Sergei Lavrov, “Novyi dogovor o SNV v matrtse globalnoy bezopasnosti. Politicheskoye izmereniye” [The New START in the matrix of global security: political dimension], Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, No. 7, 2010.

11. 2010 NPR, pp. 5, 28.

12. Lavrov, “Novyi dogovor o SNV v matrtse globalnoy bezopasnosti” [The New START in the matrix of global security].

13. 2010 NPR, p. 22.

14. Sergei Brezkun, “Sem’ raz otmerit’ … ” [Measure it seven times …], Voenno-promyshlenny kur'er, No. 15, April 21, 2010.

15. Author's interview with a former Russian Ministry of Defense official, Moscow, June 9, 2010; Brezkun, “Sem’ raz otmerit’ … ”[Measure it seven times …]; Leonid Ivashov, “SNV-3: Pobeda, porazheniye ili nichiya?” [The New START: Victory, defeat or a draw?], Voenno-promyshlenny kur'er, No. 15, April 21, 2010; Viktor Yesin, “SShA: Kurs na globalnuyu PRO” [USA: On the course to a global missile defense], Voenno-promyshlenny kur'er, No. 33, August 25, 2010.

16. Pavel Podvig, “Long-Term Force Projections,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces blog, January 25, 2009, <russianforces.org/blog/2009/01/long-term_force_projections.shtml>.

17. For more on the potential violation, see Pavel Podvig, “Is RS-24 a New Missile?” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces blog, July 6, 2007, <russianforces.org/blog/2007/07/is_rs24_a_new_missile.shtml>; “Experimental Russian ICBM Would Violate START, Senator Says,” Global Security Newswire, October 27, 2009, <gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20091027_9850.php>.

18. Yuri Solomonov, Yadernaya vertical [A Nuclear Vertical] (Moscow: Intervestnik, 2010), p. 279.

19. Dmitri Medvedev, “Address to the Federal Assembly of Russian Federation,” November 5, 2008. See the discussion at Pavel Podvig, “Changes in the Kozelsk Division Liquidation Plans,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces blog, November 5, 2008, <russianforces.org/blog/2008/11/changes_in_the_kozelsk_divisio.shtml>.

20. Pavel Podvig, “Will Russia's Numbers Decline Without START Follow-on?” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces blog, October 13, 2009, <russianforces.org/blog/2009/10/would_russias_numbers_decline.shtml>.

21. General Yu. N. Baluyevsky and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S. I. Kislyak, Stenogramma brifinga, RIA Novosti, [Transpript of a briefing at RIA Novosti], June 25, 2007, available (in Russian) at <russianforces.org/rus/blog/2007/06/briefing_20070625.shtml>.

22. Medvedev, “Address to the Federal Assembly of Russian Federation.”

23. Frank A. Rose, “Prospects for US-Russia Missile Defense Cooperation,” US Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, remarks at the 11th Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) Missile Defence Conference, London, May 27, 2010, <www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/142329.htm>; Vladimir Yermakov, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remarks at the 11th RUSI Missile Defence Conference, London, May 27, 2010; and Lucian Kim, “US-Russia Accord on Missile Defense Almost Ready, Lavrov Says,” Bloomberg News, October 1, 2010.

24. Anatoly Antonov, statement at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, May 4, 2009.

25. Dmitry Medvedev has said, “The problem of the relationship of strategic offensive and defensive weapons should be clearly laid out in the treaty.” See Dmitry Medvedev, “Zayavleniye Presidenta Rossii” [Statement by the president of Russia], Amsterdam, June 20, 2009, <archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2009/06/218172.shtml>.

26. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Preamble, April 8, 2010.

27. “Statement by the Russian Federation on Missile Defence,” President of Russia, April 8, 2010, <eng.news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/4>.

28. Evgeny Miasnikov, Vysokotochnoye oruzhiye i strategicheckiy balans [High-precision weapons and strategic balance] (Dolgoporudny: MFTI, 2000); Varfolomey Korobushin, “Metamorfozy yadernogo sderzhivaniya” [Metamorphoses of nuclear deterrence], NVO, April 15, 2005; V.V. Sukhorutchenko and S.V. Kreidin, “Aktualnye apekty problem yadernogo sderzhivaniya i dostatochnosti yadernykh vooruzhenii” [Modern issues in nuclear deterrence and sufficiency in nuclear armaments], Voyennaya mysl’, No. 7, July 2004.

29. Ivanov, “Novaya yadernaya strategiya SShA” [New nuclear strategy of the USA].

30. Russian Ministry of Defense, “Aktualnye zadachi razvitiya Vooruzhennykh sil RF” [First-order goals of development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation], October 2, 2003.

31. General Yuri N. Baluyevsky, presentation at the Conference on National Security of Russia, Moscow, January 19, 2008, as quoted in A. Aleksandrov, “Krepit bezopanost otechestva” [Strengthen the security of the motherland], Krasnaya zvesda, January 23, 2008.

32. V. Mamontov, “Menyaetsya Rossiya, menyaetsya i ee voyennaya doktrina” [Russia is changing, its nuclear doctrine is changing too], Izvestiya, October 14, 2009.

33. “Voyennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” [Military doctrine of the Russian Federation], April 21, 2000.

34. “Voyennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” [Military doctrine of the Russian Federation], February 5, 2010.

35. “Statement Dated 5 April 1995 by the Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,” April 5, 1995, UN General Assembly Security Council, S/1995/261.

36. S.A. Ryabkov, deputy foreign minister of Russia, interview with Voice of Russia Radio, October 12, 2010; Josh Rogin, “How the Obama Team Convinced Russia Not to Sell Arms to Iran,” Foreign Policy, September 23, 2010, <thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/23/how_the_obama_team_convinced_russia_not_to_sell_arms_to_iran>.