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Abstract
Members of the Japanese government and the Japanese security elite welcomed the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, praising its emphasis on the twin goals of pursuing disarmament and protecting international peace and stability. Unlike many non-nuclear weapon states, Japan does not condition its support for nonproliferation upon nuclear weapon states’ progress on denuclearization. Despite general enthusiasm for the review in Japan, concerns remain. The NPR emphasizes the threat posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of non-state actors; from Japan's vantage point, state actors—North Korea, China, and Russia—are just as worrisome. While disarmament advocates in Japan had hoped the NPR would endorse a no-first-use doctrine or “sole purpose” declaration, defense officials and strategists were relieved it did not go that far, fearing that to do so would undermine US extended deterrence and leave Japan vulnerable to attack by North Korean biological or chemical weapons. US policy toward China shadows many Japanese concerns about security policy in general and nuclear policy in particular. In the absence of more clarity on the Sino-US relationship, Japanese concerns can be expected to increase. Nonetheless, the Japanese government has responded positively to the release of the NPR, in large part due to unprecedented levels of coordination and consultation between Tokyo and Washington during the drafting process. Tokyo now seeks continued close consultation on nuclear strategy and policy to develop a better understanding of the concept of extended deterrence and what Tokyo can do to support this shared goal.
Notes
1. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Prague, April 5, 2009, www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/>.
2. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Prague, April 5, 2009, www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/>.
3. Michael Green and Nicholas Szechenyi, “US-Japan Relations; Coordination Amid Uncertainty,” Comparative Connections 11 (July 2009), p. 17, <csis.org/files/publication/0902qus_japan.pdf.
4. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report” (hereafter QDR), February 1, 2010, p. 15, <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>.
5. Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report” (hereafter QDR), February 1, 2010, p. 15, <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>. p. vii.
6. Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, co-chairs, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,” ICNND, November 2009, <www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/index.html>.
7. Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, co-chairs, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,” ICNND, November 2009, <www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/index.html>. at Annex A, Recommendation 51.
8. Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, co-chairs, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,” ICNND, November 2009, <www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/index.html>. at Annex A, Recommendation 51. p. 65.
9. In our track-tow discussions and in interviews, Japanese security specialists assure us that the nuclear allergy, while genuine, is not the final determinant, arguing that Japan's decision not to pursue nuclear weapons is the result of a “cost-benefit” analysis, with the US nuclear umbrella being the principal variant.
10. ICNND, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats,” p. 66.
11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Press Conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada,” October 29, 2009, <www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2009/10/1020.html>. Ironically, one analyst has argued that the commission was freighted with former officials from Japan's foreign ministry who were holding back its creativity. According to his analysis, even co-chair Kawaguchi was opposed to the sole purpose declaration that co-chair Evans sought to adopt. See Masa Takubo, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons: Japan, the U.S. and ‘Sole Purpose,’” Arms Control Today, November 2009, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_11/Takubo>.
12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Successful NPT Review Conference (Joint Statement by Stephen Smith, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Australia, and Katsuya Okada, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Japan),” June 2, 2010, <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/npt/review2010-4/joint_jp-au_1006.html>.
13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Successful NPT Review Conference (Joint Statement by Stephen Smith, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Australia, and Katsuya Okada, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Japan),” June 2, 2010, <www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/npt/review2010-4/joint_jp-au_1006.html>.
14. This bullet-point assessment is adapted from Ralph A. Cossa, “The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review: Moving Toward No First Use,” PacNet, No. 17, April 6, 2010, <csis.org/files/publication/pac1017.pdf>.
15. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report” (hereafter 2010 NPR), April 6, 2010, p. viii, <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>.
16. “United States-Japan Joint Statement Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons,” White House, undated, <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/united-states-japan-joint-statement-toward-a-world-without-nuclear-weapons>.
17. Cited in Rebecca Johnson, “NPT: One Week After Consensus Adoption of Agreed Document,” Acronym Institute Blog, June 7, 2010, <acronyminstitute.wordpress.com/2010/06/07/npt-one-week-after-consensus-adoption-of-agreed-document/>.
18. For more on this, see Brad Glosserman, “Straight Talk about Japan's Nuclear Option,” PacNet, No. 50A, October 11, 2006, <csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0650a.pdf>.
19. Yukio Satoh, “Agenda for Japan-US Strategic Consultations,” National Institute for Defense Studies (Tokyo), p. 21, <www.nids.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2009/e_02.pdf>.
20. “Against nuclear threat Japan will rely on the nuclear deterrent capability of the United States.” See “National Defense Program Outline,” National Defense Council, October 29, 1976, <www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1E.html>.
21. Satoh, “Agenda for Japan-US Strategic Consultation.”
22. The authors organize and run the Pacific Forum CSIS dialogues.
23. Comments cited here and below are from author interviews conducted by Ralph Cossa in Tokyo, July and August 2010. The remarks quoted here, like all others from government officials, were provided on the condition of anonymity.
24. Pacific Forum CSIS, “Anchors for an Alliance Adrift: The Third US-Japan Strategic Dialogue,” Issues & Insights 10 (August 2010), <csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_vol10n18english.pdf>.
25. Pacific Forum CSIS, “Anchors for an Alliance Adrift: The Third US-Japan Strategic Dialogue,” Issues & Insights 10 (August 2010), <csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_vol10n18english.pdf>.
26. “Statement of Mr. Katsuya Okada, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, on the Release of the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 7, 2010, <www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/4/0407_01.html>.
27. 2010 NPR, p. 3.
28. Ministry of Defense, The Defense of Japan 2009, p. 49, <www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2009/11Part1_Chapter2_Sec3.pdf>.
29. Personal interview with Japanese government officials by Ralph Cossa in summer 2010. Interview granted on condition of anonymity. See also Pacific Forum CSIS, “Anchors for an Alliance Adrift.”
30. Personal interview with Michito Tsuruoka, senior fellow, National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS), conducted by Ralph Cossa in Tokyo, August 11, 2010.
31. Personal interview with Masashi Nishihara, president, Research Institute for Peace and Security, conducted by Ralph Cossa in Tokyo, August 12, 2010.
32. Satoh, “Agenda for Japan-US Strategic Consultations,” note 14, p. 27.
33. ICNND, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats,” p. xxvii.
34. Yukio Satoh, “On Rethinking Extended Deterrence,” in Scott Sagan et al., Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Debate (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Science, 2010), p. 33, <www.amacad.org/pdfs/saganInside.pdf>.
35. The harsh Chinese reaction to the Japanese detention of a Chinese fishing boat captain who deliberately rammed a Japanese Coast Guard ship is seen in this light as a demonstration of China's “real intentions” as its power increases.
36. Officials in Washington and Beijing both avoid using the term “G-2,” and in our discussions with Chinese interlocutors it was clear that the very idea makes them nervous because Beijing seems ill-prepared and far from eager to take on the global economic leadership role implied in the concept.
37. Personal interview with a Japanese government official, conducted by Ralph Cossa in Tokyo, July 2010. Interview granted on condition of anonymity.
38. Pacific Forum CSIS, “Anchors for An Alliance Adrift: The Third U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue,” p. 16.
39. Pacific Forum CSIS, “Anchors for An Alliance Adrift: The Third U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue,” p. 16.
40. William J. Perry, chair, “America's Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States,” US Institute of Peace, 2009, p. 26.
41. An unofficial translation of the letter (apparently the Japanese government has never released one) is available through the ICNND, <icnndngojapan.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/20091224_okada_letter_en.pdf>.
42. 2010 NPR, pp. xiii, 28.
43. Michito Tsuruoka, “Why the NATO Nuclear Debate is Relevant to Japan and Vice Versa,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, October 8, 2010, <www.gmfus.org/galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Tsuruoka_NuclearDebate_Oct10_final.pdf>.
44. Personal interview with Japanese government officials, conducted by Ralph Cossa in Tokyo, July 2010. Interview granted on condition of anonymity. Interviewees also knew the United States had not deployed such weapons since 1991; one Japanese defense official noted that the decision reinforced the US position that its ships no longer carry such weapons.
45. For example, one poll shows 75 percent of respondents continue to support the three non-nuclear principles, even after North Korea's first nuclear explosion in 2006. See Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, “Yomiuri Shimbun November Opinion Polls,” Mansfield Asian Opinion Poll Database, November 2006, <www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2006/poll-06-18.htm>.
46. Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects and U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service Report RL34487, February 19, 2009, p. 7.
47. DPJ, “2009 Change of Government: The Democratic Party of Japan's Platform for Government, Putting People's Lives First,” p. 29, <www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2009.pdf>.
48. “Many in DPJ Want Japan to Cut Link to U.S. Nukes,” Japan Times, October 11, 2009, <japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091011a1.html>.
49. This point was made repeatedly during interviews conducted by Ralph Cossa with senior defense and foreign ministry officials in Tokyo, July and August 2010. Interviews were granted on the condition of anonymity. See also Takubo, “The Role of Nuclear Weapons.”
50. Citizens Nuclear Information Center (CNIC), “Japan: A Leader or an Obstacle in Nuclear Disarmament,” updated June 14, 2010, <cnic.jp/english/topics/proliferation/campaign/nfu/nfu.html>. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs website does not include that particular exchange, but it does quote Okada: “From a moral perspective as well as from the position of aiming for a non-nuclear society, forbidding the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations is natural.” “Press Conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, October 16, 2009, <www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2009/10/1016.html>.
51. “Foreign Policy Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada to the 174th Session of the Diet,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, January 29, 2010, lt;www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/okada/speech1001.htmlgt;.
52. Cited in Gregory Kulacki, “Japan and America's Nuclear Posture,” Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2010, p. 7, <www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/japan-american-nuclear-posture.pdf>.
53. Cited in Gregory Kulacki, “Japan and America's Nuclear Posture,” Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2010, p. 7, <www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/japan-american-nuclear-posture.pdf>.
54. Masami Ito, “Japan Avoiding Initiative in Nonnuclear Movement,” Japan Times, May 12, 2010, <japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100512f1.html>.
55. For Hatoyama's reference, see CNIC, “Japan: A Leader or an Obstacle to Nuclear Disarmament.”
56. This was compounded by the DPJ having never been in power before and an LDP policy that essentially kept DPJ legislators and incoming officials in the dark until they assumed office. Added to this was a self-inflicted wound: the DPJ ran against the bureaucracy, and thus new officials were hesitant to turn to these same bureaucrats for advice or insights.
57. “Kan's Reference to Need for Nuclear Deterrence Highlights Policy Dilemma,” Mainichi Shimbun, August 8, 2010.
58. Ito, “Japan Avoiding Initiative in Nonnuclear Movement.”
59. Even in the weeks after the first North Korean nuclear test, 80 percent of Japanese still opposed nuclear armament. “Kaku: ‘Hoyuu nou da ga Giron wa Younin’ ga Saita Roku Wari” [Nuclear (weapons): Possession (no) but discussion is acceptable says the majority], Mainichi Shimbun, November 27, 2006, <www.gslb.mainichi-msn.co.jp/seiji/feature/news/p20061127k0000m010113000c.html>.
60. Satoh, “Agenda for U.S.-Japan Strategic Consultation,” note 14, p. 3.
61. Comment made during a question and answer session at the General Conference of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), Jakarta, Indonesia, November 16–17, 2009.
62. Tokyo Foundation, “New Security Strategy for Japan: Multilayered and Cooperative Security Strategy,” October 8, 2008.
63. The Japanese version of the report, with a six-page English summary near the end, is available online, <www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo.pdf>.
64. The Japanese version of the report, with a six-page English summary near the end, is available online, <www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo.pdf>. pp. 51–52.
65. The Japanese version of the report, with a six-page English summary near the end, is available online, <www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo.pdf>. p. 52.
66. The Japanese version of the report, with a six-page English summary near the end, is available online, <www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo.pdf>. p. 52.
67. Joint development of missile defense components is a meaningless exercise if the components developed in Japan cannot be sold to the United States. The panel's report recognizes this absurdity (as have previous Japanese governments) and calls for revision of the current arms export prohibition policy. Ibid., pp. 52, 55.
68. oint development of missile defense components is a meaningless exercise if the components developed in Japan cannot be sold to the United States. The panel's report recognizes this absurdity (as have previous Japanese governments) and calls for revision of the current arms export prohibition policy p. 19. As of November 2010, there was no official English translation of the report. The interpretation given here is the product of a provisional translation by Pacific Forum CSIS Vasey Fellow Kei Koga.
69. For details, see “Japan Confirms Secret Pact on U.S. Transit,” BBC News, March 9, 2010. In fact, the “secret agreements” were well known. See Bruce Klingner, “Politics of Well-Known Japanese ‘Secrets’ Risk American Nuclear Umbrella,” Heritage Foundation, Web Memo #2844, March 24, 2010, <www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/03/politics-of-well-known-japanese-secrets-risk-american-nuclear-umbrella>. See also Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “Question for Tokyo: Remember ANZUS?” PacNet, No. 71, November 3, 2009, for discussion of potential policy implications, <csis.org/files/publication/pac0971.pdf>.
70. “Okada Does Not Rule out Introduction of Nuclear Weapons in an Emergency,” Associated Press, March 17, 2010.
71. Sachiko Sakamaki, “Panel Recommends Japan Allow Entry of U.S. Nuclear Weapons,” Bloomberg News, July 27, 2010, <www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-27/panel-recommends-japan-allow-entry-of-u-s-nuclear-weapons-asahi-reports.html>.
72. “Kan Mulls Codifying Three Nonnuclear Principles,” Japan Times, August 9, 2010, <japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100809x3.html>. There is speculation that Kan's comment, along with a similar remark by Defense Minister Toshima Kitazawa that the three principles were nonnegotiable, may have impressed upon the panel the good sense of leaving the principles as is. Codification would mandate a challenge to Washington's long-standing “neither confirm nor deny” policy and create a new alliance crisis.
73. Personal interview with Japanese defense official, conducted by Ralph Cossa in Tokyo, August 2010. Interview granted on condition of anonymity.
74. Clark A. Murdock, “Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance: Workshop Proceedings and Key Takeaways,” CSIS, November 2009, p. 3, <csis.org/files/publication/100222_Murdock_NuclearPosture_Print.pdf>.
75. Clark A. Murdock, “Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance: Workshop Proceedings and Key Takeaways,” CSIS, November 2009, p. 3, <csis.org/files/publication/100222_Murdock_NuclearPosture_Print.pdf>. p. 26. Some strategists believe that this lack of understanding is responsible for Tokyo's fixation on the Tomahawk weapons system or numerical balances vis-à-vis China.