CONCLUSION

Abstract

The case studies in this special issue demonstrate that the Obama administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and related nuclear policy initiatives encouraged a number of other nuclear weapon states to likewise reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security doctrines and helped pave the way with non-nuclear weapon states for a successful 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This article reviews the contributing authors’ case study findings regarding key foreign governments that applauded the 2010 NPR and were receptive to President Barack Obama's vision of a world free of nuclear weapons as well as governments that remained skeptical about US disarmament and arms control initiatives. We conclude with an analysis of the lessons that should be learned from the 2010 NPR process: the need for consistent implementation of changes in nuclear weapons doctrine, improved coordination and consultation with allies and other states, and further global education about the likelihood and consequences of nuclear terrorism.

Keywords:

• United States
• nuclear policy
• nuclear weapons
• nuclear disarmament
• Russia
• China
• United Kingdom
• France
• India
• Pakistan
• Egypt
• Brazil
• NATO
• Japan
• South Korea
• Turkey

Notes

1. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April 6, 2010, p. 12, <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>.

2. Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007, p. A19.

3. Christopher Ford, “Disarmament Versus Nonproliferation,” speech delivered at a Los Alamos National Laboratory and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars event, October 28, 2010, <www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=7472&pubType=HI_Speeches_Testimony>.

4. Chyba is director of the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University; Crouch was deputy national security advisor to President George W. Bush. See Christopher F. Chyba and J.D. Crouch, “Understanding the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Debate,” Washington Quarterly 32 (July 2009), p. 29. Also see the excellent analysis of this debate in Christopher F. Chyba, “Time for a Systematic Analysis: U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Proliferation,” Arms Control Today, December 2008, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/Chyba>.

5. UK Ministry of Defence, “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: “The Strategic Security and Defence Review,” October 19, 2010, pp. 5, 37, <www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf>.

6. UK Ministry of Defence, “Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: “The Strategic Security and Defence Review,” October 19, 2010, pp. 5, 37, <www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf>, pp. 37–38.

7. Pavel Podvig, “Instrumental Influences: Russia and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. 47.

8. Nikolai Patrushev, as quoted in Dmitry Solovyov, “Russia Reserves Pre-emptive Nuclear Strike Right,” Reuters, October 13, 2009.

9. “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” February 5, 2010, <www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010>.

10. Podvig, “Instrumental Influences,” p. 44.

11. Thomas Fingar, “Worrying about Washington: China's Views on the US Nuclear Posture,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. 58.

12. M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security 35 (Fall 2010), pp. 48–87; Fingar, “Worrying about Washington,” p. 63.

13. Michael Krepon, “The Limits of Influence: US-Pakistani Nuclear Relations,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. 96.

14. David E. Sanger, The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2009), pp. 173–266.

15. Krepon, “The Limits of Influence,” p. 98.

16. Scott D. Sagan, “The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” in Scott D. Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 219–63; K. Subrahmanyam, “No First Use: An Indian View,” Survival 51 (October/November 2009), pp. 32–36.

17. S. Paul Kapur, “'More Posture than Review’: Indian Reactions to the US Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. 77.

18. “Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India,” White House, November 8, 2010, <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/joint-statement-president-obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india>.

19. Harald Müller, “Flexible Responses: NATO Reactions to the US Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. 108.

20. Harald Müller, “Flexible Responses: NATO Reactions to the US Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. 106.

21. Alain Juppé, Bernard Norlain, Alain Richard, and Michel Rocard, “Pour un désarmement nucléaire mondial, seule réponse à la prolifération mondiale” [For global nuclear disarmament, the only response to global proliferation], Le Monde, October 15, 2009, p. 21; Michel Rocard and Georges Le Guelte, “Le rêve du Docteur Folamour. Il faut mettre un terme à la prolifération nucléarie en éliminant les arsenaux” [The dream of Doctor Strangelove. We must put an end to nuclear proliferation by eliminating the arsenals], Le Monde, May 4, 2010, p. 22.

22. As cited in Harald Müller, “A Nuclear Nonproliferation Test: Obama's Nuclear Policy and the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. 223.

23. “Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” NPT/CONF.2010/50, June 18, 2010, p. 21, <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)>.

24. “Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” NPT/CONF.2010/50, June 18, 2010, p. 21, <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)>, p. 14.

25. “Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” NPT/CONF.2010/50, June 18, 2010, p. 21, <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)>, p. 5.

26. “Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” NPT/CONF.2010/50, June 18, 2010, p. 21, <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20(VOL.I)>, p. 9.

27. Müller, “A Nuclear Nonproliferation Test,” pp. 230–31.

28. Müller, “A Nuclear Nonproliferation Test,”, p. 226.

29. Nabil Fahmy, “Mindful of the Middle East: Egypt's Reaction to the New US Nuclear Posture,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. 176.

30. Maged Abdelaziz, UN Ambassador for Egypt, as quoted in Colum Lynch, “The Nuclear Backlash Begins,” ForeignPolicy.com, April 20, 2010, <turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/20/the_nuclear_backlash_begins>.

31. “Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” pp. 4–5.

32. Fahmy, “Mindful of the Middle East,” p. 173.

33. Irma Argüello, “Nuclear Rights and Responsibilities: Brazilian Responses to the US Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. 189.

34. Irma Argüello, “Nuclear Rights and Responsibilities: Brazilian Responses to the US Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. 189.

35. Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “Extended Deterrence and Disarmament: Japan and the New US Nuclear Posture,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. 150.

36. Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “Extended Deterrence and Disarmament: Japan and the New US Nuclear Posture,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. TK.

37. Scott Snyder, “Finding a Balance between Assurances and Abolition: South Korean Views of the Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. TK.

38. Sean Dunlop and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “Indonesia Takes the Lead on the CTBT,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, May 4, 2010, <cns.miis.edu/stories/100504_indonesia_ctbt.htm>.

39. Hassan Wirajuda, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, speech to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 8, 2009, <www.carnegieendowment.org/files/060809_indonesianfm.pdf>.

40. “Indonesia to Ratify UN-backed Pact Banning Nuclear Testing,” UN News Centre, May 4, 2010, <www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34592&Cr=nuclear&Cr1>.

41. Statement by H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Minister for Foreign Affairs Of the Republic of Indonesia to the General Debate of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, New York, May 3, 2010, <www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/indonesia_en.pdf>.

42. Stephen Kaufman, “Obama Praises Indonesia's Intent to Ratify Test Ban Treaty,” America.gov, May 5, 2010, <www.america.gov/st/nonprolif-english/2010/May/20100505142720esnamfuak0.920849.html#ixzz0xvsN46n3>.

43. Müller, “Flexible Responses,” p. 121.

44. North Atlantic Council, “The Alliance's Strategic Concept”, April 24, 1999, Article 62, <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm>.

45. North Atlantic Council, “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, November 19, 2010, Article 26, <www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html>.

46. North Atlantic Council, “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”, November 19, 2010, Article 26, <www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html>.

47. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Acceptance and Anxiety: Turkey (Mostly) Embraces Obama's Nuclear Posture,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. 207.

48. Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Acceptance and Anxiety: Turkey (Mostly) Embraces Obama's Nuclear Posture,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), pp. 207–8.

49. Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” Foreign Affairs, September-October 1998. Also see Cecilia Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 181–214).

50. On nuclear latency and hedging behavior, see Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Proliferation,” in William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21 ^st Century: The Role of Theory, vol. 1 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 80–101; Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security 27 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 58–80; and M.D. Zentner, G.L. Coles, and R.J. Talbert, Nuclear Proliferation Technology Trends Analysis, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, PNNL-14480, September 2005, <www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-14480.pdf>.

51. Scott D. Sagan, ed., with responses by James M. Acton, Jayantha Dhanapala, Mustafa Kibaroglu, Harald Müller, Yukio Satoh, Mohamed I. Shaker, and Achilles Zaluar, Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Debate (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2010).

52. Elaine M. Grossman, “U.S. General Reserves Right to Use Force, Even Nuclear, in Response to Cyber Attack,” Global Security Newswire, May 12, 2009, <gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090512_4977.php>.

53. General Kevin Chilton, “Strategic Command and Nuclear Deterrence,” remarks at the National Defense University Foundation and National Defense Industrial Association Breakfast Forum, Washington DC, September 13, 2010.

54. Matthew Bunn, “Reducing the Greatest Threats of Nuclear Theft & Terrorism,” Daedalus 138 (Fall 2009), pp. 112–23.