IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE?

Abstract

The 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) produced a Final Document calling for an extension of the principles of the nonproliferation norm as well as steps toward complete disarmament. This article looks beyond the rhetoric, however, to examine recent decisions by great powers to expand nuclear trade with non-NPT countries and the implications of these decisions on the traditional nonproliferation norm of restraint. This article seeks to contribute to constructivist theory by supplementing existing accounts of norm creation and establishment with a new model of norm change. The article develops a case study of the 2008 US-India nuclear deal to highlight the role of elite agency in key stages of norm change, including redefinition and constructive substitution through contestation. It concludes that the traditional nonproliferation norm may be evolving in new directions that are not well captured by existing theoretical frames.

Keywords:

• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
• history and theory
• nonproliferation regime
• India
• United States
• norms

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, February 17, 2010. I would like to thank Tom Sauer, Theo Farrell, Martha Finnemore, Isabella Alcaniz, Doug Shaw, Miles Pomper, Charles Glaser, Deepti Choubey, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on this project. I gratefully acknowledge research support from the College of Wooster, the Henry Luce III Fund for Distinguished Scholarship, and the Elliott School of International A f fairs.

Notes

1. Barack Obama, “Statement of President Barack Obama on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,” White House, May 3, 2010, <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-barack-obama-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference>.

2. Jane Harman, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is Obsolete,” Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2008, <online.wsj.com/article/SB121391849561190295.html?mod=googlenews_wsj>.

3. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 5, 1970.

4. Ole Jacob Sending, “Constitution, Choice, and Change: Problems with the Logic of Appropriateness and its Use in Constructivist Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 8 (December 2002), p. 443; see also Paul Meyer, “Saving the NPT: Time to Renew Treaty Commitments,” Nonproliferation Review 16 (November 2009), pp. 463–72.

5. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Draft Final Document,” NPT/CONF2010/L.2, May 27, 2010, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/DraftFinalDocument.pdf>.

6. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52 (1998), p. 895. In a related line of investigation, Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink contend that three processes are significant for norm development over time: “instrumental adaptation and strategic bargaining, moral consciousness-raising, and institutionalization and habitualization.” See Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 5.

7. Tom Sauer, “A Second Nuclear Revolution: From Nuclear Primacy to Post-Existential Deterrence,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32 (October 2009), p. 752; see also Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009).

8. Daniel H. Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 245.

9. Consistent with Finnemore and Sikkink's logic, domestic interests may sometimes trump prevailing international norms; see also Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis Jr., “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review 2 (2000), pp. 70–72.

10. Elites here are defined as government officials who have decision-making authority to allocate government resources or to advise those who do.

11. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 895.

12. Richard Price encourages scholars to examine the “defining moment” when concrete problems force political actors to engage in “bursts of rich debate over appropriate forms of international behavior.” For the purposes of this study, nuclear assistance is defined broadly as including “civilian” assistance, such as provision of potentially dual-use materials, scientific know-how, nuclear power reactors or designs, or more direct, “sensitive” assistance, including uranium enrichment or reprocessing technologies, or assistance in weapon design or construction. The US-India NCA approves civilian nuclear assistance and gives India the right to reprocess uranium provided by other countries (heretofore reserved for a select few partners of the US government). Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 10; Matthew Bunn, Civilian Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons Programs: The Record (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2001). See also Matthew Fuhrmann, “Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), p. 181; Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: the Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomatic History: New Approaches (New York: Free Press, 1979); George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004); David Howarth, Aletta Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis, Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies, and Social Change (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 6; and Jacob Torfing, “Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges,” in David Howarth and Jacob Torfing, eds., Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy, and Governance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

13. Maarten A. Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 63.

14. See Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

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18. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 895; see also Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights, p. 5.

19. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 895.

20. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 897.

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22. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 895.

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27. Author's confidential interviews with former policy makers, and participant observation, Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, New York, May 4–15, 2009.

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29. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 904.

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31. Indeed, other domestic actors and institutions may contribute to norm development and decline.

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36. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 889.

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43. See Fred McGoldrick, Harold Bengelsdorf, and Lawrence Scheinman, “The US-India Nuclear Deal: Taking Stock,” Arms Control Today, October 2005, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/OCT-Cover.asp>.

44. Michael A. Levi and Charles D. Ferguson, “US-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for Moving Forward,” Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 16, June 2006.

45. It is notable that Bhabha and the AEC did accept some safeguards on some facilities, including the reactors at Tarapur and Rawatbhata, which were the first power reactors built with the help of US and Canadian designs.

46. Mario E. Carranza, “From Non-Proliferation to Post-Proliferation: Explaining the US-India Nuclear Deal,” Contemporary Security Policy 28 (December 2007), pp. 464–93.

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48. See Harsh V. Pant, “A Fine Balance: India Walks a Tightrope between Iran and the United States,” Orbis 51 (Summer 2007), 495–509.

49. Leonard Weiss, “US-India Nuclear Cooperation: Better Later than Sooner,” Nonproliferation Review 14 (November 2007), p. 431.

50. George Perkovich, “Faulty Promises: The US-India Nuclear Deal,” Carnegie Endowment Policy Outlook, Spetember 2005, <www.carnegieendowment.org/files/po21.perkovich.pdf>.

51. Bush, as quoted in Elisabeth Bumiller and Somini Sengupta, “Bush and India Reach Pact that Allows Nuclear Sales,” New York Times, March 3, 2006 <www.nytimes.com/2006/03/03/international/asia/03prexy.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=bush%20india%20nuclear&st=cse>.

52. Weiss, “US-India Nuclear Cooperation.”

53. “Bush Praises Pakistan's Help in Terror Fight,” NBC News, March 5, 2006, <www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11651039/>.

54. Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the US India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative,” testimony prepared for Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., April 5, 2006, <foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/RiceTestimony060405.pdf>.

55. Perkovich, “Faulty Promises.”

56. Sharon Squassoni, “US Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL33016, July 29, 2005, p. 4, <www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=48719&coll= limited>.

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58. John Newhouse, “Diplomacy, Inc.,” Foreign Affairs 88 (May/June 2009), pp. 73–92.

59. “US House Approves Historic India Nuclear Deal,” Agence-France Press, September 27, 2008, <afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5h7nAg-NDcn1bZz-E10_dJ8t1QznA>.

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85. The commission was led by some of the most highly respected diplomats in the world on nonproliferation. It was co-chaired by former foreign ministers Gareth Evans (Australia) and Yoriko Kawaguchi (Japan) and included board members Hans Blix, Henry Kissinger, Michel Rocard, Sam Nunn, Hans van den Broek, and George Shultz. See Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,” International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, November 2009.

86. Quoted in testimony of Vann H. Van Diepen, “Hearing on the Future of US International Nuclear Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 6, 2010, <www.hcfa.house.gov/111/56335.pdf>.

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89. Sandholtz, Prohibiting Plunder, p. 3.

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