WHY IRAN WANTS THE BOMB AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US POLICY

Abstract

Understanding why the Iranian regime wants to possess nuclear weapons is essential to formulating the best policy to prevent (or perhaps to simply manage) the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. Three general theories—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—provide a framework for looking at Iran's nuclear motivations. However, contrary to many analyses, the regime's desire to possess nuclear arms stems not from neorealist defensive concerns, but rather from offensive goals driven by domestic politics. The use of extremist Islamism by the Iranian regime to justify its autocratic rule is the primary motivating factor. Accordingly, the outlook for diplomatically addressing the Iranian regime's nuclear aspirations appears dim.

Keywords:

• Iran
• nuclear proliferation
• diplomacy

Notes

1. These broad categories are succinctly, albeit incompletely, outlined in Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 54–86.

2. Classical realism, exemplified in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, fifth ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978); offensive realism, explained in John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); and neoclassical realism, represented in Randall Schweller, “Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?,” Security Studies 5 (Spring 1996), pp. 90–121, all acknowledge the presence of revisionist states having offensive ambitions that exceed simple maintenance of security.

3. Graham T. Allison and Morton J. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications,” World Politics 24, Supplement (Spring 1972), pp. 40–79.

4. Etel Solingen, “Domestic Models of Political Survival: Why Some Do and Others Don't (Proliferate),” in William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21 ^st Century: The Role of Theory, Volume 1 (Stanford: Stanford Security Series, 2010), pp. 38–57.

5. Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 12–29.

6. Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force, Iran: Time for a New Approach (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004), pp. 10, 23; Sanam Vakil, “The Persian Dilemma: Will Iran Go Nuclear?,” Current History 104 (April 2005), p. 183; Jo-Anne Hart, “Perceptions and Courses of Action Toward Iran,” Military Review 85 (September/October 2005), p. 10; Paul Rogers, “Iran: Consequences of a War,” Oxford Research Group Briefing Paper (Oxford, UK: Oxford Research Group, 2006), p. 6; Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Holt, 2006), p. 140; Colin Dueck and Ray Takeyh, “Iran's Nuclear Challenge,” Political Science Quarterly 122 (2007), p. 193; and Ted Galen Carpenter, “Toward a Grand Bargain with Iran,” Mediterranean Quarterly 18 (Winter 2007), pp. 25–26.

7. Kenneth Pollack, testimony before US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, hearing on “Iran's Political and Nuclear Ambitions and U.S. Policy Options,” 109th Cong., 2nd sess., May 17, 2006; Anthony Cordesman and Khalid al-Rodhan, Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Real and Potential Threat (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2006), pp. 12–13; and Richard Russell, “Iran in Iraq's Shadow: Dealing with Tehran's Nuclear Weapons Bid,” Parameters 34 (Autumn 2004), pp. 42–43.

8. On domestic politics, see Elliot Hen-Tov, “Understanding Iran's New Authoritarianism,” Washington Quarterly 30 (Winter 2006/2007), p. 169. On norms, see Patrick Clawson, “Could Sanctions Work Against Tehran?” Middle East Quarterly 14 (Winter 2007), p. 13; Shmuel Bar, “Iranian Defense Doctrine and Decision Making,” Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center, Institute for Policy and Strategy, October 2004, p. 49; Nikola Krastev, “IAEA Chief: Iran's Nuclear Program About Winning Recognition, Prestige,” Radio Free Europe, November 5, 2009,<www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1870151.html>; and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “Pride and Prejudice: Understanding Iran's Nuclear Program,” in William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective, Volume 2 (Stanford: Stanford Security Series, 2010), pp. 42–75.

9. See, e.g., “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Portions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” IAEA, GOV/2011/65, November 8, 2011, pp. 7–8, and Annex, pp. 1–12.

10. The term Islamist, as used here, refers to an extreme interpretation of Islam that rejects secular political authority in favor of clerical rule, espouses intolerance for other religions, and supports the use of violence as a regular instrument of policy. It is distinct from, and should not be considered interchangeable with, the term “Islamic.”

11. Ruhullah al-Musawi Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), p. 55.

12. Mohsen Sazegara, “The Point of No Return: Iran's Path to Democracy,” Policy Focus, No. 54, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2006, pp. 3–4; James A. Bill, “The Cultural Underpinning of Politics: Iran and the United States,” Mediterranean Quarterly 17 (2006), pp. 23–33.

13. Wilfried Buchta, “Iran's Security Sector: An Overview,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Working Paper No. 146, August 2004, p. 18; Abbas William Samii, “The Iranian Nuclear Issues and Informal Networks,” Naval War College Review 59 (Winter 2006), pp. 63–89.

14. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” p. 57, citing former secretary of state George Shultz.

15. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was established in 2001 as a loose alliance linking Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. In 2005 Iran was formally granted observer status, and in 2008 Iran applied for full membership.

16. See, e.g., Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” p. 57 (discussing the “realist-security” model solely in terms of defense); Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (February 2007), pp. 173–74 (listing only defensive independent variables under their concept of international security).

17. Barnett Rubin and Sara Batmanglich, “The U.S. and Iran in Afghanistan: Policy Gone Awry,” MIT Center for International Studies, October 2008, p. 2.

18. Marina Ottaway, “Iran, the United States, and the Gulf: The Elusive Regional Policy,” Carnegie Paper No. 105, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2009.

19. Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 27.

20. Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 145, citing an anonymous Iranian regime strategist as acknowledging that “Iran never really saw Israel as a threat.”

21. Iranian leaders have a history of statements calling for the end of Israel. In 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was quoted as saying that Israel should be “wiped off the map.” Though the accuracy of this phrase's translation has been questioned (see Glenn Kessler, “Did Ahmadinejad Really Say that Israel Should be “Wiped off the Map'?,” The Fact Checker, Washington Post, October 5, 2011,<www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/did-ahmadinejad-really-say-israel-should-be-wiped-off-the-map/2011/10/04/gIQABJIKML_blog.html>; and Uri Friedman, “Debating Every Last Word of Ahmadinejad's 'Wipe Israel off the Map,'” The Atlantic Wire, The Atlantic, October 5, 2011,<www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2011/10/debating-every-last-word-ahmadinejads-wipe-israel-map/43372/>), the sentiment is less debatable. In 1968, Ayatollah Khomeini said: “It is the duty of all Muslims, and specifically of Islamic states, to take the initiative for the obliteration of this pond of decay [Israel] with all possible means, and not to decline the mujahideen any assistance toward this end.” Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi, 2005), pp. 168–69 (quoting Ayatollah Khomeini's comments of September 28, 1968 as published in the Al-Nour newspaper). In 2000, Khomeini's successor, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, called for the “annihilation” of Israel. See Daniel L. Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Jerrold D. Green, Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), p. 83 (citing Afshin Valinejad, “Iran Leader Calls for Israel's Annihilation,” Boston Globe, January 1, 2000, p. 4).

22. In a security dilemma, one state's pursuit of increased security through the acquisition of arms may result in another state perceiving an increased threat, causing it to acquire additional arms. This in turn may lead the first state to believe the reacting state has hostile intentions, causing the first state to further enhance its arsenal, developing into a spiraling arms race and lessening security for both sides. John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2 (January 1950), p. 157.

23. Cited in Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 298.

24. See, e.g., Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), p. 194; Kenneth Katzman, “Iran's Influence in Iraq,” CRS Report for Congress, February 2, 2007; Iraq Study Group, Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward—A New Approach (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2006), p. 3; and Government Accountability Office, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Serious Challenges Confront U.S. Efforts to Build the Capacity of Iraqi Ministries,” GAO-08-124T, October 4, 2007, p. 3.

25. Perhaps reflecting this logic, the US intelligence community released a controversial unclassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that concluded Iran suspended its nuclear weapons activities in 2003. However, since then, IAEA reports, as well as several foreign intelligence agencies, have noted evidence contrary to the NIE's conclusions. IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2010/10, February 18, 2010, p. 9; William J. Broad, Mark Mazzetti, and David E. Sanger, “A Nuclear Debate: Is Iran Designing Warheads?” New York Times, September 29, 2009,<www.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/world/middleeast/29nuke.html>; Joby Warrick, “Evidence of Iran's Nuclear Arms Expertise Mounts,” Washington Post, December 15, 2009, p. A1.

26. See, e.g., David Hastings Dunn, “Real Men Want to Go to Tehran: Bush, Pre-Emption and the Iranian Nuclear Challenge,” International Affairs 83 (2007), p. 24; Flynt Leverett, Dealing with Tehran: Assessing U.S. Diplomatic Options toward Iran (Washington, DC: Century Foundation, 2006), p. 3; Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, pp. 243–50; Suzanne Maloney, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Missed Opportunities and Paths Forward,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 32 (Summer 2008), pp. 30–31.

27. See, e.g., Abbas Milani, “U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future of Democracy in Iran,” Washington Quarterly 28 (Summer 2005), p. 45, describing Khatami as the “epitome of political impotence”; and Jahangir Amuzegar, “Iran's 'Virtual Democracy' at a Turning Point,” SAIS Review (Summer/Fall 2000), pp. 93–109, detailing Khatami's inability to enact meaningful change even within the first years of his administration.

28. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008), pp. 206–07, noting Iranian financial support to the Afghan warlord Mohammed Fahim in 2002 and 2003.

29. See, e.g., David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 50–51.

30. Barbara Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007), pp. 203–04.

31. “Europe: ‘Our Discussions with Iran Have Reached an Impasse,'” Middle East Quarterly 13 (Spring 2006), p. 65.

32. Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Real and Potential Threat (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2006), p. 157. See also “Meeting the Challenge: U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development,” Report of the Independent Task Force, Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2008, p. iv, noting “the admission of [President] Khatami's former spokesman, Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, on June 15, 2008, that a strategy of insincere dialogue provided cover for the Islamic Republic to import technology to further the Islamic Republic's covert nuclear program.”

33. Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2007, pp. 17, 19; Arshad Mohammed, “U.S. Sees Attacks by Iranian-Backed Groups Up in Iraq,“ Reuters, February 7, 2008, <www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/07/us-iraq-usa-satterfield-idUSN0762850020080207>; Katzman, “Iran's Influence in Iraq“; Paul Tait, “Military Finding More Iranian Arms in Iraq,“ Reuters, November 11, 2007, <www.reuters.com/article/2007/11/11/us-iraq-iran-generalidUSL1124367020071111>; Clay Wilson, “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures,” Congressional Research Service Report, CRS22330, August 28, 2007, p. 3; Shannon W. Caudill, “Hizballah Rising: Iran's Proxy Warriors,“ Joint Forces Quarterly 49 (2008), p. 130.

34. X [George F. Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947), pp. 566–82.

35. Zahra Hosseinian and Fredrik Dahl, “Iran Says Courts Will Teach Protestors a Lesson,” Reuters, June 23, 2009,<in.reuters.com/article/2009/06/23/idINIndia-40496320090623>.

36. Thomas Erdbrink, “100 Iranians Tried for Disputing Election,” Washington Post, August 2, 2009, p. A12.

37. Amir Taheri, The Persian Night: Iran under the Khomeinist Revolution (New York: Encounter Books, 2009), p. 189.

38. “Iran's Struggle with America Should Continue,” Reuters, November 13, 2009,<www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/13/us-iran-usa-cleric-idUSTRE5AC21I20091113>.

39. P.R. Chari, “Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Paradox in South Asia,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds. The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2001), p. 20.

40. S. Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” International Security 33 (Fall 2008), p. 72.

41. Peter Beckman et al., The Nuclear Predicament: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century, third ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000), pp. 214–15.

42. No less than President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has overseen unprecedented public allegations of corruption on the part of many senior clerics in Iran. See Ali Alfoneh, “Ahmadinejad versus the Clergy,” Middle Eastern Outlook, No. 5, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, August 2008, pp. 7–8, Table 3, containing a list of numerous senior clerics, including six ayatollahs, and the specific allegations of economic corruption made against them.

43. Takeyh, Hidden Iran, pp. 154–155. Because of this, pursuing nuclear arms simply as a potential bargaining chip is unlikely.

44. Mohamed A. El-Khawas, “Iran's Nuclear Controversy: Prospects for a Diplomatic Solution,” Mediterranean Quarterly 16 (2005), p. 32 (noting the nuclear program as a source of national pride in Iran); Michael Donovan, “Iran's Bomb: A Crisis Deferred?” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 29 (Summer 2005), pp. 27, 34 (noting widespread popular support for the nuclear program); Ted Galen Carpenter and Jessica Shoosh, “A View to a Coup?” The National Interest (March/April 2007), pp. 62–67 (pointing to a January 2006 Iranian poll claiming 85 percent of Iranians supported the nuclear program); and “Public Opinion in Iran,” WorldPublicOpinion.org, April 7, 2008, pp. 14–16 (finding 81 percent of Iranians though it was “very important” for Iran to develop its own nuclear fuel cycle); and Alan Fram, “Poll: Iranians Support Nuclear Weapons,” Associated Press, July 10, 2007,<www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-07-10-3857364054_x.htm>.

45. For example, Mir Hussein Moussavi, a reformist candidate in Iran's 2009 presidential election, praised Iran's nuclear work on nationalist grounds, asserting, “The nuclear technology is one of the examples of the achievements of our youth.” Thomas Erdbrink, “Another Key Politician to Run Against Ahmadinejad,” Washington Post, March 11, 2009, p. A8.

46. Article 44 of the Iranian Constitution states “All large-scale and mother industries, foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like; all these will be publicly owned and administered by the state.” Nikki Keddie identifies the state as controlling 60 percent of the economy, while the bonyads (which are charitable trusts exempt from taxes that are part of Iran's underground economy—and consequently hard to reach with sanctions) control another 10–20 percent. Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, revised and updated ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 273. According to the 2003 World Values Survey, over 90 percent of Iranians reported they were “very proud” of their nationality, an extraordinarily high number compared to the 58 percent mean of respondents across all countries, or even the 71 percent reported by US respondents in 2000. Clifford Grammich and C. Christine Fair, “American and Iranian Public Opinion: The Quest for Common Grounds,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 30 (Spring 2007), p. 12.

47. Kenneth Pollack, “Pariahs in Tehran,” The National Interest 110 (November/December 2010), p. 44.

48. Alireza Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat: President Ahmadinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 134.

49. On the nuclear physics department, \Alireza Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat: President Ahmadinejad and the Coming Nuclear Crisis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 147; on the intelligence see Joby Warrick, “U.N. Alleges Nuclear Work by Iran's Civilian Scientists,” Washington Post, March 11, 2008, p. A1; and Karen DeYoung and Michael D. Shear, “U.S., Allies Say Iran Has Secret Nuclear Facility,” Washington Post, September 26, 2009, p. A1.

50. Yossi Melman and Meir Javedanfar, The Nuclear Sphinx of Tehran: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the State of Iran (New York: Basic Books, 2008), p. 144.

51. See, e.g., Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (New York: Anchor Books, 1995), p. 8.

52. This does not suggest that Iran would necessarily seek nuclear arms under any type of regime. The negatives associated with nuclear proliferation are greater today than in the shah's era. The international community has adopted a stronger nonproliferation norm, the economic effects of globalization mean abiding by international norms is more important than ever, and the rise of Islamism has generated unprecedented concern in the West regarding the dangers of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

53. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 12–36.

54. Judith S. Yaphe and Charles D. Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, August 2005, p. 10; Scott Sagan, “How to Keep the Bomb From Iran,” Foreign Affairs 85 (September/October 2006), p. 47.

55. Neither the US experience with the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and various executive orders sanctioning Iran, nor academic study of the efficacy of sanctions in general, provide optimism that sanctions will result in Iranian policy adjustments. One study of 115 cases of economic sanctions between 1914 and 1990 showed only a 35 percent success rate, with a declining trend since 1970. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, third ed. (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2007). See also Jeannine Aversa, “Analysis: Sanctions Haven't Slowed Iran,” Associated Press, October 25, 2007,<www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-10-25-3730164290_x.htm>.

56. Alfoneh, “Ahmadinejad versus the Clergy,” pp. 7–9, Table 3, detailing specific corruption charges against numerous regime elites.