NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy

Abstract

In nuclear nonproliferation negotiations, many governments pursue multiple objectives, and changes in policy can occur rapidly—and often unexpectedly. For these reasons, understanding nonproliferation requires empathy and imagination rather than just historical fact. This article considers one teaching tool to encourage such insight—simulations—and demonstrates how teaching and scholarship can interact to improve our understanding of the complex decisions and negotiations involved in nuclear nonproliferation. The article consists of five parts: first, it explains the benefits of simulations as both a policy development tool in Washington and as a teaching tool in universities; second, it describes the pedagogical strategy of the Stanford University simulation program; third, it shows how the simulations have identified and highlighted theoretical and substantive insights that are often neglected in scholarly studies of nonproliferation; and fourth, it describes how students are tested to enhance the learning experience from the simulation. Fifth and finally, the article provides concluding observations about how using simulations in the classroom can help scholars develop insights that improve their understanding of real-world nuclear negotiation dynamics and outcomes.

Keywords:

• Nonproliferation
• education
• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
• simulations

Notes

1. Charles Dickens, Hard Times (New York: Chelsea House Publications, 1987), p. 7.

2. Benjamin Frankel, Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications (London: Frank Cass, 1991); Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results (New York: Routledge, 1993); Itty Abraham, “The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories,” Osiris 21 (2006), pp. 49–65; and Itty Abraham, “Contra-Proliferation: the Indian Bomb and Nuclear Developmentalism,” in Scott D. Sagan, ed., Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 106–36.

3. Alexander Montgomery and Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Predicting Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), pp. 302–28.

4. Scott D. Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Annual Review of Political Science 14 (2011), pp. 224–44; T.V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000).

5. Herbert Goldhamer and Hans Speier, “Some Observations on Political Gaming,” World Politics 12 (October 1959), pp. 71–83; David M. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History (London: Frank Cass, 1992), pp. 81–89; and US Department of Homeland Security, “National Exercise Program,” November 20, 2009, <www.dhs.gov/files/training/gc_1179350946764.shtm>.

6. Robert Mandel, “Political Gaming and Foreign Policy Making During Crises,” World Politics 29 (July 1977), p. 610.

7. See National Public Radio, “Results of Simulated Israeli Strike on Iran,” March 29, 2010, <www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125311250>; Kenneth M. Pollack, “Osiraq Redux: A Crisis Simulation of an Israeli Strike on the Iranian Nuclear Program,” Middle East Memo No. 15, Brookings Institution, February 2010, <www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/02_iran_israel_strike_pollack.aspx>; and Sharon Wilkie, “Iran Game Stimulates Policy Discussions with Sobering ‘What Ifs,’” Belfer Center Newsletter (Spring 2010), <belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19962/iran_game_stimulates_policy_discussions_with_sobering_what_ifs.html>.

8. Brigid A. Starkley and Elizabeth L. Blake, “Simulation in International Relations Education,” Simulation and Gaming 32 (2001), pp. 537–51.

9. These benefits are not uncontested, however. For arguments casting doubt on the educational benefits of simulation exercises in teaching, see Chad Raymond, “Do Role-Playing Simulations Generate Measurable and Meaningful Outcomes? A Simulation's Effect on Exam Scores and Teaching Evaluations,” International Studies Perspectives 11 (February 2010), pp. 51–60; Matthew Krain and Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Building Knowledge? Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Global Programs Summit Simulation,” International Studies Perspectives 7 (November 2006), pp. 395–407; and Leanne C. Powner and Michelle G. Allendoerfer “Evaluating Hypotheses about Active Learning,” International Studies Perspectives 9 (February 2008), pp. 75–89. See also Kent J. Kille, “Simulating the Creation of a New International Human Rights Treaty: Active Learning in the International Studies Classroom,” International Studies Perspectives 3 (August 2002), pp. 271–90; Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Simulations and Experiential Learning in the International Relations Classroom,” International Negotiation 3 (1998), pp. 39–57; Beth K. Dougherty, “Byzantine Politics: Using Simulations to Make Sense of the Middle East,” Political Science and Politics 36 (April 2003), pp. 239–44; and Victor Asal, “Playing Games with International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 6 (August 2005), pp. 359–73.

10. Brent D. Ruben, “Simulations, Games, and Experience-Based Learning: The Quest for a New Paradigm for Teaching and Learning,” Simulation Gaming 30 (1999), pp. 498–505; Sarah Wheeler, “Role Playing Games and Simulations for International Issues Courses,” Journal of Political Science Education 2 (September-December 2006), pp. 331–47; and Jeremy Youde, “Crushing Their Dreams? Simulations and Student Idealism,” International Studies Perspectives 9 (2008), pp. 348–56.

11. Ole R. Holsti, “Reflections on Teaching and Active Learning,” in Jeffrey S. Lantis, Lynn M. Kuzma, and John Boehrer, eds., The New International Studies Classroom (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp. 257–69.

12. Elena A. Korosteleva, “Threshold Concepts Through Enactive Learning: How Effective Are They in the Study of European Politics?,” International Studies Perspectives 11 (February 2010), pp. 37–50; William W. Newmann and Judyth L. Twigg, “Active Engagement of the Intro IR Student: A Simulation Approach,” PS: Political Science and Politics 33 (December 2000), pp. 835–42; Youde, “Crushing Their Dreams?”

13. Victor Asal and Elizabeth L. Blake, “Creating Simulations for Political Science Education,” Journal of Political Science Education 2 (January 2006), pp. 1–18; and Asal, “Playing Games with International Relations.”

14. Ruben, “Simulations, Games, and Experience-Based Learning,” p. 499.

15. Cathy S. Greenblat, “Teaching with Simulation Games: A Review of Claims and Evidence,” Teaching Sociology 1 (October 1973), pp. 62–83.

16. Brent E. Sasley, “Teaching Students How to Fail: Simulations as Tools of Explanation,” International Studies Perspective 11 (2010), p. 62.

17. Starkley and Blake, “Simulation in International Relations Education,” p. 539.

18. See Lisa A. Trei, “Dirty Bombs. A Coup. You're a Diplomat? What Do You Do?,” Stanford Report, February 11, 2009, <cisac.stanford.edu/news/dirty_bombs__a_coup__youre_a_diplomat__what_do_you_do_20090211/>.

19. For an analysis of the respective roles of nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapon states, see Scott D. Sagan, “Shared Responsibility for Nuclear Disarmament,” Daedalus 138 (Fall 2009), pp. 157–68.

20. See H. Richard Friman, “Side-Payments versus Security Cards: Domestic Bargaining Tactics in Economic Negotiations,” International Organization 147 (Summer 1993), pp. 387–410; Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21 (Winter 1996/7), pp. 54–86; and Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt, “The Little Known Story of De-Proliferation: Why States Give up Nuclear Weapon Activities,” in William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21 st Century: The Role of Theory (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 124–58.

21. William C. Potter, Patricia Lewis, Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, and Miles Pomper, “The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Deconstructing Consensus,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Special Report, June 17, 2010, p. 6, <cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/100617_npt_2010_summary.pdf>.

22. Gerald Steinberg, “Middle East Peace and the NPT Extension Decision,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (Autumn 1996), pp. 17–29.

23. Susan B. Welsh, “Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference,” Nonproliferation Review 2 (Spring 1995), p. 7.

24. Sophia Lin, “A North Korean Perspective on the 2001 ABM Conference,” reprinted in The CISAC Monitor (Spring 2001), p. 17.

25. Fred C. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), p. 15, as quoted in Thomas Graham Jr. and Blake Mobley, “Deliberate Ambiguity in Modern Arms Control and the ABM Treaty,” International Spectator 36 (July 2001), p. 20.

26. Graham and Mobley, “Deliberate Ambiguity in Modern Arms Control and the ABM Treaty,” pp. 22–23.

27. Kingston Reif and Travis Sharp,” “Sharing New START's Negotiating Record Is Unwarranted,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 17, 2010, <thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/sharing-new-starts-negotiating-record-unwarranted>.

28. Graham and Mobley, “Deliberate Ambiguity in Modern Arms Control and the ABM Treaty,” pp. 19–26.

29. See Thomas Graham Jr., Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms Control and International Law (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), p. 290; and Jayantha Dhanapala, “The Management of NPT Diplomacy,” Daedalus 139 (Winter 2010), pp. 57–67.

30. Mark Landler, “Nudge on Arms Further Divides U.S. and Israel,” New York Times, July 4, 2010, p. 6.

31. Potter, Lewis, Mukhatzhanova, and Pomper, “The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Deconstructing Consensus,” p. 13.

32. Dickens, Hard Times, pp. 11–12.

33. Cecilia Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

34. Sharon Squassoni, Nuclear Energy: Rebirth or Resuscitation? (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009).

35. Harald Müller, “A Nuclear Nonproliferation Test: Obama's Nuclear Policy and the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), pp. 219–36.

36. Pavel Podvig, “Instrumental Influences: Russia and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), pp. 39–50.