THE AMBIVALENT NEUTRAL

Abstract

Traditional analyses of Switzerland's nuclear weapons program often explain both its beginning and its end by merely subsuming it under the broad logic of security calculations: the country originally developed an interest in nuclear weapons due to its precarious security environment after the end of World War II; it ended its nuclear ambitions roughly two decades later when it felt less threatened by external powers. Yet this depiction of the Swiss case brushes aside the historical political context in which Switzerland's nuclear decision-making was embedded. Drawing upon studies in sociology and political theory, this article argues that understanding the Swiss debate on nuclear weapons is possible only if we manage to comprehend the significant political and cultural changes that took place within Swiss society. These changes deeply affected the country's defense and foreign policy conceptions and also altered prevalent notions of neutrality, thereby ultimately foreclosing the nuclear option. In more abstract theoretical terms the article moreover suggests that we need to overcome depictions of objectively given threats or predetermined interests and develop analytical tools that help us disentangle the complex, non-linear ways in which threat perceptions, identities, and preferences evolve and shape states’ proliferation policies.

Keywords:

• Switzerland
• nuclear weapons
• proliferation
• neutrality

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Work on a previous version of this paper was facilitated by a grant from the Schweizerische Nationalfonds (Swiss National Science Foundation). The author would like to thank Ulrich Franke, Bernd Bucher, the participants at a 2011 International Studies Association panel on “The Fate of Nuclear History,” and two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on earlier versions of this article.

Notes

1. On nuclear reversal, see for example: T.V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: Mc Gill-Queen's University Press, 2000); Jim Walsh, Bombs Unbuilt: Power, Ideas, and Institutions in International Politics, unpublished PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001; Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security 27 (2002/2003), pp. 59–88; Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004); Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens: University of Georgia, 2009); Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); and Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

2. The following studies are based on detailed historical analyses and provide a wealth of information: Theodor H. Winkler, Kernenergie und Außenpolitik. Die internationalen Bemühungen um eine Nichtweiterverbreitung von Kernwaffen und die friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie in der Schweiz [Nuclear energy and foreign policy: the international efforts toward the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Switzerland] (Berlin: Berlin-Verlag, 1981); Jürg Stüssi-Lauterburg: Historischer Abriss zur Frage der Schweizer Nuklearbewaffnung [Historical overview on the question of Swiss nuclear armament] (Bern: Eidgenössische Militärbibliothek, 1997); Dominique Benjamin Metzler, “Die Option einer Nuklearbewaffnung für die Schweizer Armee 1945–1969” [The nuclear weapons option for the Swiss Army], Studien und Quellen 23 (1997), pp. 121–70; Patrick Kupper, “Sonderfall Atomenergie. Die bundesstaatliche Atompolitik 1945–1970” [The special case of nuclear energy: federal nuclear policy, 1945–1970] Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte 52 (2003), pp. 87–93; Reto Wollenmann, “Zwischen Atomwaffe und Atomsperrvertrag. Die Schweiz auf dem Weg von der nuklearen Option zum Nonproliferationsvertrag (1958–1969)” [Between nuclear weapons and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty: Switzerland on the way from a nuclear option to the nonproliferation treaty (1958–1969)], Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung 75 (2004); Peter Braun, “Dreaming of the Bomb: The Development of Switzerland's Nuclear Option from the End of World War II to the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” unpublished manuscript, 2010.

3. Paul, Power Versus Prudence.

4. Paul, Power Versus Prudence., pp. 90–91.

5. Wollenmann, Zwischen Atomwaffe und Atomsperrvertrag, p. 33, quotation translated from the original by Ursula Jasper.

6. Paul, Power Versus Prudence, p. 96.

7. Paul, Power Versus Prudence, p. 15.

8. Paul, Power Versus Prudence, p. 97.

9. Scott A. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of the Bomb,” International Security 21 (1996), p. 63.

10. For a similar call to “bring politics back into our analysis,” see Walsh, Bombs Unbuilt.

11. Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms; Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation.

12. Oberstkorpskommandant (Lieutenant General) Hans Frick, “Brief an den Chef des Eidgenössischen Militärdepartments, Herrn Bundesrat Dr. Kobelt” [Letter to the head of the federal military, federal counselor Dr. Kobelt], August 15, 1945; “Schweizerische Studienkommission für Atomenergie” [Swiss Study Commission for Atomic Energy], Bundesratsprotokoll (federal protocol), June 8, 1946; for the origins of Switzerland's nuclear research see also Braun, Dreaming of the Bomb; and Kupper, “Sonderfall Atomenergie,” pp. 87–88.

13. “Schweizerische Studienkommission für Atomenergie,” Bundesratsprotokoll (federal protocol), June 8, 1946.

14. Kupper, “Sonderfall Atomenergie,” pp. 87–88.

15. Braun, Dreaming of the Bomb, p. 8; Metzler, “Die Option einer Nuklearbewaffnung,” pp. 133–34, 142;

16. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 10–11; Itty Abraham, “The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories,” Osiris 21 (2006), pp. 49–65.

17. “Erklärung zur Frage der Beschaffung von Atomwaffen für unsere Armee” [Statement on the question of nuclear weapon procurement for our military], Federal Council, July 11, 1958, translation by Ursula Jasper, hereafter “Erklärung zur Frage der Beschaffung (1958)”.

18. “Swiss Will Seek Atomic Weapons,” New York Times, July 12, 1958, p. 1.

19. See “Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung betreffend das Volksbegehren für ein Verbot von Atomwaffen, 4. Mai 1962” [Statement of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the outcome of the referendum concerning the petition for a ban on nuclear weapons, May 4, 1962], Bundesblatt, 1962, Vol. I, pp. 913–15; “Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung vom 26. Mai 1963 betreffend das Volksbegehren für das Entscheidungsrecht des Volkes über die Ausrüstung der schweizerischen Armee mit Atomwaffen, 19. Juni 1963” [Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the outcome of the referendum of May 26, 1963 concerning the petition for the right to decide the people on the equipment of the Swiss army with nuclear weapons, June 19, 1963], Bundesblatt, 1963, Vol. II, pp. 43–45. The first referendum was rejected by a vote of 537,138 to 286,895. In the second referendum, 274,061 voters supported the initiative, and 451,238 opposed it. While the margin was in both cases clear and indisputable, it might nevertheless come as a surprise how many voters actually favored nuclear abstention or at least restraint.

20. In 1963, the Swiss government's research group on the “Possibilities of an indigenous nuclear weapon production” had concluded that the production of a small tactical nuclear force was indeed possible. “Möglichkeiten einer eigenen Atomwaffen-Produktion (MAP-Bericht)” [Possibilities of an indigenous nuclear weapon production (MAP report)], Swiss government, Bern, 1963.

21. Abraham, “The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories.” One could argue that Switzerland's stance remained ambiguous until 1977, when parliament ratified the country's accession to the NPT. Nonetheless, 1969 seems to represent the watershed year for two reasons. In political terms, the signing of the NPT marked the end of the public debate and political contestation of Switzerland's nuclear future; in legal terms, the signature meant that Switzerland was “morally” bound by the treaty obligations—even without having formally ratified the treaty. In a similar vein, Metzler illustrates that the supporters of a Swiss nuclear capability abandoned their efforts after the government signed the treaty in 1969. However, as with the beginnings of the Swiss nuclear program, there appears to be no single date or decision that one can use to pin down the end of the nuclear program. Rather, it seems that both origins and cessation of Switzerland's efforts took place in a rather indecisive, hesitant manner. Metzler, “Die Option einer Nuklearbewaffnung.”

22. Paul, Power Versus Prudence.

23. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 1998).

24. See Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Brighi, eds., Pragmatism in International Relations (Milton Park: Routledge, 2009); Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions,” Perspectives on Politics 8 (2010), pp. 411–31; Jörg Friedrichs and Friedrich Kratochwil, “On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology,” International Organization 63 (2009), pp. 701–31; Friedrich Kratochwil, “Of False Promises and Good Bets: A Plea for a Pragmatic Approach to Theory Building (the Tartu Lecture),” Journal of International Relations and Development 10 (2007), pp. 1–15; Gunther Hellmann, ed., “The Forum: Pragmatism and International Relations?,” International Studies Review 11 (2009), pp. 638–62; and Ulrich Franke and Ralph Weber, “At the Papini Hotel: On Pragmatism in the Study of International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations (forthcoming).

25. “Individual action is not ‘caused’ as in natural science thinking or released as tension from a spring but rather is built-up and constructed by the individual as he confronts an environment which he objectifies on the basis of what he takes into account. … People act, according to this perspective, not from such things as need dispositions or conformity to role-expectations but toward situations.” Peter M. Hall, “A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis of Politics,” Sociological Inquiry 42 (1972), p. 39. See also Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); and Gunther Hellmann, “Creative Intelligence. Pragmatism as a Theory of Thought and Action,” paper delivered at the Millennium Conference, London, 2002, <web.uni-frankfurt.de/fb3/hellmann/mat/millennium_www.pdf>.

26. The study includes an analysis of all publicly available governmental statements that touch upon the nuclear issue from 1958 to 1969, as well as approximately sixty publications (articles, pamphlets, reports, etc.) by relevant nongovernmental groups.

27. For a similar claim see Abraham, who argues that “nuclear programs are best understood as one of a larger family of public technology projects, not all of which are weapons related or have destructive ends. The larger point here is to propose that without a careful appreciation of the political and historical context within which decisions are made to develop nuclear programs, it is not possible to get closer to understanding the desire for, likelihood of potential use of, and possibility of international control of nuclear weapons.” Abraham, “The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories,” p. 51.

28. John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); John Searle: Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

29. Juha A. Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and the Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders,” European Journal of International Relations 14 (2008), pp. 65–99; Neta C. Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

30. Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review 2 (2000), p. 76. Also see Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction,” in Thomas Risse et al., eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999), pp. 1–38.

31. See, for example, Lene Hansen, Security as Practice (Milton Park: Routledge, 2006).

32. Franke and Weber, “At the Papini Hotel,” pp. 4–7; Sil and Katzenstein, “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics.”

33. “Erklärung zur Frage der Beschaffung (1958),” p. 2.

34. Neutrality is put down in two different constitutional articles (Art. 173 and Art. 185), yet neither contains a distinct definition.

35. “Erklärung zur Frage der Beschaffung (1958),” p. 2; see also Metzler, “Die Option einer Nuklearbewaffnung,” pp. 122–23.

36. “Erklärung zur Frage der Beschaffung (1958),” p. 1; see also Winkler, Kernenergie und Außenpolitik, p. 153.

37. “Given this position, the question is whether we, too, must arm our army with nuclear weapons.” (“Angesichts dieser Lage stellt sich die Frage, ob nicht auch wir unsere Armee mit Atomwaffen ausrüsten müssen.”) See “Erklärung zur Frage der Beschaffung (1958),” p. 1, emphasis added.

38. Bryan Taylor and William Kinsella note that this is not an unusual move in framing processes of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology. See Bryan C. Taylor and William J. Kinsella, “Introduction: Linking Nuclear Legacies and Communication Studies,” in Bryan C. Taylor, William J. Kinsella, et al., eds., Nuclear Legacies: Communication, Controversy, and the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007), pp. 4–5.

39. “Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über das Volksbegehren für ein Verbot von Atomwaffen, 7. Juli 1961” [Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly regarding the referendum on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, July 7, 1961], Bundesblatt, 1961, Vol. II, pp. 202–23.

40. “Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über das Volksbegehren für ein Verbot von Atomwaffen, 7. Juli 1961” [Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly regarding the referendum on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, July 7, 1961], Bundesblatt, 1961, Vol. II, p. 203.

41. Christoph Breitenmoser coined this fitting and sound depiction of Switzerland as the antithesis. Christoph Breitenmoser, “Strategie ohne Aussenpolitik. Zur Entwicklung der schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik im Kalten Krieg” [Strategy without foreign policy: For development of the Swiss security policy during the Cold War], Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy 10 (2002), p. 39. See also “Historische Reminiszenzen und Lehren” [Historical reminiscences and teachings], Schweizerisches Aktionskomitee gegen die Atominitiative (Swiss Action Committee against the Nuclear Initiative), press release no. 4, February 1962.

42. “Damit [mit einem Verzicht auf Atomwaffen—ed.] würde aber auch unsere immerwährende, umfassende und bewaffnete Neutralität in ihrer Substanz und ihren völkerrechtlichen Rechten und Verpflichtungen entwertet, ja ausgehöhlt” [But hereby [by renouncing nuclear weapons—ed.] our perpetual, encompassing and armed neutrality would be eroded, even undermined, in its substance and in its rights and obligations of international law], Schweizerisches Aktionskomitee gegen die Atominitiative, press release no. 3, March 1962; “Neutral sein wollen, heisst stark sein müssen!” [Wanting to be neutral means needing to be strong!], Schweizerisches Aktionskomitee gegen die Atominitiative, press release no. 10, March 1962.

43. “Stellungnahme des Vereins zur Förderung des Wehrwillens und der Wehrwissenschaft” [Position of the Association for the Advancement of Military Will and Science], Aktuelle Militärpolitik, No. 1/62, August 1962; Schweizerisches Aktionskomitee gegen die Atominitiative, press release no. 12, March 1962; Schweizerisches Aktionskomitee gegen die Atominitiative, press release no. 7, March 1962.

44. “Aufruf an das Schweizervolk” [Appeal to the Swiss people], Schweizerische Bewegung gegen die atomare Aufrüstung (Swiss Movement against Atomic Armament), October 1958, translation by Ursula Jasper.

45. “Aufruf an das Schweizervolk” [Appeal to the Swiss people], Schweizerische Bewegung gegen die atomare Aufrüstung (Swiss Movement against Atomic Armament), October 1958, translation by Ursula Jasper.

46. See for example, Pamphlet “Noch ist es Zeit!” [Still there is time!], published by the Schweizerische Bewegung gegen atomare Aufrüstung, 1963; Pamphlet “Vertrauen zur Demokratie!” [Trust in Democracy!], published by the Schweizerische Bewegung gegen atomare Aufrüstung, 1963.

47. Schweizerische Bewegung gegen die atomare Aufrüstung, March 1962, Atombulletin, no. 16, translation by Ursula Jasper.

48. “Ergänzungsbericht des Bundesrates an die Kommission des Nationalrates betreffend das Volksbegehren für das Entscheidungsrecht des Volkes über die Ausrüstung der schweizerischen Armee mit Atomwaffen, 15. November 1962” [Supplementary Report of the Federal Council regarding the petition of the National Council for the decision right of the people on the equipment of the Swiss army with nuclear weapons, November 15, 1962], Bundesblatt, 1962, Vol. II, pp. 1155–59.

49. In Swiss domestic politics, the so-called Zauberformel (“magic formula”) guaranteed a fixed distribution of power among the four main parties. More or less independent of the actual electoral results, the Liberals, the Christian Democrats, and the Social Democrats each received two seats in the executive, the National Party received one seat. While this agreement was never codified in statutory terms, it was adhered to between 1959 and 2003 and profoundly characterized Swiss politics by establishing a high degree of institutional continuity and stability.

50. “Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung betreffend die Genehmigung des in Moskau geschlossenen Abkommens über das Verbot von Kernwaffenversuchen in der Luft, im Weltraum und unter Wasser, 13. September 1963” [Message of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly regarding the approval of the agreement signed in Moscow on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in the air, in space, and underwater, September 13, 1963], Bundesblatt, 1963, Vol. II, pp. 619–20, quotation translated from the original by Ursula Jasper, hereafter “1963 LTBT Communiqué.”

51. “Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung betreffend die Genehmigung des in Moskau geschlossenen Abkommens über das Verbot von Kernwaffenversuchen in der Luft, im Weltraum und unter Wasser, 13. September 1963” [Message of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly regarding the approval of the agreement signed in Moscow on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in the air, in space, and underwater, September 13, 1963], Bundesblatt, 1963, Vol. II, pp. 619–20, quotation translated from the original by Ursula Jasper, hereafter “1963 LTBT Communiqué.”, p. 619.

52. “Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Konzeption der militärischen Landesverteidigung, 16. Juni 1966” [Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly about the concept of the military national defense, June 16, 1966], Bundesblatt 1966, Vol. I, pp. 853–77, hereafter “1966 Defense Posture.”

53. Metzler, “Die Option einer Nuklearbewaffnung,” pp. 160–61.

54. “Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über das Volksbegehren für ein Verbot von Atomwaffen, 7. Juli 1961“ [Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly regarding the referendum on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, July 7, 1961], p. 203.

55. “Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über das Volksbegehren für ein Verbot von Atomwaffen, 7. Juli 1961“ [Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly regarding the referendum on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, July 7, 1961], pp. 218–19.

56. 1966 Defense Posture, p. 870, quotation translated by Ursula Jasper.

57. “Erklärung zur Frage der Beschaffung (1958).”

58. This finding is in line with the theoretical literature on the symbolic nature of weapons technology. See, for example, Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, “Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Donald MacKenzie, “Missile Accuracy: A Case Study in the Social Processes of Technological Change,” in Wiebe E. Bijker et al., eds., The Social Construction of Technological Systems (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), pp. 195–222.

59. “Erklärung zur Frage der Beschaffung (1958),” p. 1, quotation translated by Ursula Jasper.

60. “Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung betreffend die Organisation des Heeres (Truppenordnung), 30. Juni 1960” [Report of the Federal Council regarding the Reorganization of the Armed Forces, June 30, 1960], Bundesblatt, 1960, Vol. 2, pp. 321–88.

61. “Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung betreffend die Organisation des Heeres (Truppenordnung), 30. Juni 1960” [Report of the Federal Council regarding the Reorganization of the Armed Forces, June 30, 1960], Bundesblatt, 1960, Vol. 2, p. 331.

62. “Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung betreffend die Organisation des Heeres (Truppenordnung), 30. Juni 1960” [Report of the Federal Council regarding the Reorganization of the Armed Forces, June 30, 1960], Bundesblatt, 1960, Vol. 2, p. 338. It is noteworthy that the authors implicitly concede that a defense of the country might also be possible without having the most modern weapons, i.e., nuclear weapons at the military's disposal. This might be taken as a subtle indication of dissent within the military leadership.

63. It is noteworthy that the authors implicitly concede that a defense of the country might also be possible without having the most modern weapons, i.e., nuclear weapons at the military's disposal. This might be taken as a subtle indication of dissent within the military leadership., pp. 321–22, 331.

64. It is noteworthy that the authors implicitly concede that a defense of the country might also be possible without having the most modern weapons, i.e., nuclear weapons at the military's disposal. This might be taken as a subtle indication of dissent within the military leadership., p. 322.

65. “Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über das Volksbegehren für ein Verbot von Atomwaffen, 7. Juli 1961” [Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly regarding the referendum on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, July 7, 1961].

66. “Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über das Volksbegehren für ein Verbot von Atomwaffen, 7. Juli 1961” [Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly regarding the referendum on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, July 7, 1961]., pp. 204–9.

67. “Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über das Volksbegehren für ein Verbot von Atomwaffen, 7. Juli 1961” [Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly regarding the referendum on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, July 7, 1961]., pp. 205–7.

68. “Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über das Volksbegehren für ein Verbot von Atomwaffen, 7. Juli 1961” [Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly regarding the referendum on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, July 7, 1961]., pp. 218–19, quotation translated by Ursula Jasper.

69. “Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über das Volksbegehren für ein Verbot von Atomwaffen, 7. Juli 1961” [Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly regarding the referendum on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, July 7, 1961]., p. 213, quotation translated by Ursula Jasper.

70. “Aufruf an das Schweizervolk (1958).”

71. “Aufruf an das Schweizervolk (1958).”

72. “Aufruf an das Schweizervolk (1958).”

73. Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 155–89; see also Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms.

74. “1963 LTBT Communiqué.”

75. “1963 LTBT Communiqué.”, p. 617.

76. The similarity to the change in the Swedish nuclear discourse is striking, as Rublee's analysis reveals. See Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, pp. 173–76.

77. Willy Spühler, “Interpellation Binder. Stellungnahme zum geplanten Atomsperrvertrag” [Interpellation Binder: position on the planned NPT], Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung 1967, December 18, 1967.

78. Willy Spühler, “Interpellation Binder. Stellungnahme zum geplanten Atomsperrvertrag” [Interpellation Binder: position on the planned NPT], Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung 1967, December 18, 1967., p. 596, quotation translated by Ursula Jasper.

79. Willy Spühler, “Interpellation Binder. Stellungnahme zum geplanten Atomsperrvertrag” [Interpellation Binder: position on the planned NPT], Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung 1967, December 18, 1967., p. 596, quotation translated by Ursula Jasper.

80. This latter shift seems closely linked to Swiss domestic developments. The Mirage scandal in 1964 triggered a fundamental loss of confidence in state institutions in general and in the military's grand-power projects in particular. As a result, the military lost its previously uncontested role as the sole provider of protection, defense, and security, as the population not only grew more skeptical of ongoing militarization and of large-scale defense technology procurements, but also increasingly questioned the effectiveness of military defensive means in the face of a nuclear threat.

81. Abraham, “The Ambivalence of Nuclear Histories.”

82. For Rublee's work, see Nonproliferation Norms.

83. See, for example, Andrew Cortell and James W. Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996), pp. 451–78; and Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,” International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999), pp. 83–114.