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Abstract
On October 1, 2008, Congress enacted a proposal that originated with President George W. Bush in 2005 to approve an unprecedented nuclear trade pact with India by removing a central pillar of US nonproliferation policy. Despite the numerous political challenges confronting the Bush administration, the initiative won strong bipartisan support, including votes from Democratic Senators Joseph Biden, Hillary Clinton, and Barack Obama. The four-year struggle to pass the controversial US-India nuclear trade agreement offers an exceptionally valuable case study. It demonstrates a classic tradeoff between the pursuit of broad multilateral goals such as nuclear nonproliferation and advancement of a specific bilateral relationship. It reveals enduring fault lines in executive branch relations with Congress. It vividly portrays challenges confronting proponents of a strong nonproliferation regime. This article is based on an analysis of the negotiating record and congressional deliberations, including interviews with key participants. It assesses the lessons learned and focuses on three principal questions: how did the agreement seek to advance US national security interests?; what were the essential elements of the prolonged state-of-the-art lobbying campaign to win approval from skeptics in Congress?; and what are the agreement's actual benefits—and costs—to future US nonproliferation efforts?
Notes
1. Glenn Kessler, “India Nuclear Deal May Face Hard Sell,” Washington Post, April 3, 2006, p. 1, and Glenn Kessler, The Confidante: Condoleezza Rice and the Creation of the Bush Legacy (New York, NY: St Martin's, 2007), p. 49.
2. President Bush declared, “I appreciate the work of Indian-Americans across the nation.” <georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081008-4.html>.
3. Jayshree Bajoria and Esther Pan, “The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Council on Foreign Relations, updated November 5, 2010, <www.cfr.org/india/us-india-nuclear-deal/p9663>.
4. Leonard Weiss, “U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: Better Later than Sooner,” Nonproliferation Review 14 (November 2007), p. 453.
5. Howard LaFranchi, “US Objects to China-Pakistan Nuclear Deal. Hypocritical?” The Christian Science Monitor, June 16, 2010, <www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2010/0616/US-objects-to-China-Pakistan-nuclear-deal.-Hypocritical>.
6. As a senior Iranian official declared, “[W]hat the Americans are doing is a double standard. On the one hand, they are depriving an NPT member [Iran] from having peaceful technology, but at the same time they are cooperating with India, which is not a member of the NPT, to their own advantage.” See Simon Tisdall, “Tehran accuses US of nuclear double standard,” Guardian, July 27, 2005, <www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jul/28/iran.usa>.
7. The Indians used some 21 tons of US-supplied heavy water and a Canadian-US (CIRUS) reactor imported in the mid-1950s in their illicit nuclear weapons program.
8. See prepared statement of Senator Alan Cranston for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing on “Tarapur Nuclear Fuel Export Issue,” 96th Cong., 2nd sess. June 18-19, 1980, p. 8.
9. Bingham's ploy required only majority support in the House Democratic Caucus to bar referral of any legislation to the Committee. See Edward Cowan, “Joint Atomic Panel Stripped of Power,” New York Times, January 5, 1977, p. 16.
10. The NNPA followed the discriminatory NPT notion of “grandfathering” existing nuclear weapons states and permitting unsafeguarded military programs in those nations. The independent efforts by Senator Glenn and Representative Bingham built upon several legislative proposals, including, in the House, an amendment by Clement Zablocki (Democrat of Wisconsin) and Paul Findley (Republican of Illinois), and various proposals by Senators Charles Percy (Republican of Illinois), Abraham Ribicoff (Democrat of Connecticut) and Stuart Symington (Democrat of Missouri).
11. This feature of the NNPA codified the work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
12. Sharon Squassoni, “Looking Back: Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978,” Arms Control Today, December 2008, <www.armscontrol.org/print/3470>.
13. See Lawrence Wittner, Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 113–77.
14. Weiss argues convincingly that US nonproliferation statutes helped check India's “bomb lobby,” especially in the mid-1990s. Weiss, “U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation,” p. 430.
15. The latter was followed by weak US sanctions, then an unsuccessful Clinton administration regional initiative to engage India, as well as Pakistan. See Saroj Bishoyi, “India-US High Technology Cooperation: Moving Forward,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, February 16, 2011, <idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiaUSHighTechnologyCooperationMovingForward_sbishoyi_160211>.
16. Prepared statement of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing, “United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation: The Indian Separation Plan and the Administration's Legislative Proposal,” 109th Cong., 2nd sess., April 5, 2006, reprinted in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act,” Report 109-288, July 20, 2006, p. 110, <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109srpt288/pdf/CRPT-109srpt288.pdf>.
17. Rice insists in her voluminous memoir that seeking a counterweight to China was not the principal motivating factor. See Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York, NY: Crown Publishing Group, 2011), p. 436.
18. Tellis is widely credited with focusing most intently at the State Department on the benefits of improving ties with India. See Ashley J. Tellis, “India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2005, <carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_India_strategy_2006.FINAL.pdf>.
19. Rice, No Higher Honor, p. 437.
20. George Perkovich, “Global Implications of the U.S.-India Deal,” Daedalus 139 (Winter 2010), pp. 20–31.
21. See for example, K. Subrahmanyam, “India and the Nuclear Deal,” Times of India, December 12, 2005, <articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2005-12-12/edit-page/27856485_1_nuclear-energy-nuclear-power-nuclear-deal>.
22. Scholars note that Congress tends to champion the former, while the executive branch—especially the State Department—supports the latter. See Stanley J. Heginbotham, “Dateline Washington: The Rules of the Games,” Foreign Policy 53 (Winter 1983–84), p. 157.
23. Rice, No Higher Honor, p. 437.
24. Former State Department official, personal interview with author, Washington, DC, July 10, 2010.
25. The attraction of “game-changer” moves are discussed throughout George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York, NY: Crown Publishing Group, 2010).
26. Rice, No Higher Honor, p. 439.
27. Prepared statement of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing, “United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation: The Indian Separation Plan and the Administration's Legislative Proposal.”
28. As described by former senior State Department and intelligence community officials, personal interviews with author, Washington, DC, July 8, 2010.
29. Kessler, “India Nuclear Deal May Face Hard Sell.”
30. Former senior State Department and intelligence community officials, personal interviews with author, Washington, DC, August 10, 2010.
31. Rice, No Higher Honor, p. 439.
32. John Newhouse, “Diplomacy, Inc.: The Influence of Lobbies on U.S. Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 88 (May–June/2009), pp. 73–92.
33. Kessler, The Confidante, p. 55.
34. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, majority and minority staffers, personal interviews with author, Washington, DC, July 21, 2010.
35. Representative Howard Berman, “The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal: Striking the Right Balance,” May 8, 2006, <www.house.gov/list/speech/ca28_berman/India_nuke.shtml>.
36. See, for example, United News of India, “Democrats Spearhead Opposition to U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” May 12, 2006, <news.oneindia.in/2006/05/12/democrats-spearhead-opposition-to-us-india-nuclear-deal-1147421922.html>.
37. According to House staffers, then-Chairman Tom Lantos (Democrat of California) insisted that India set “a precedent of one,” noting that there is no other democracy with nearly one billion citizens seeking a nuclear deterrent.
38. One maneuver backfired: the State Department failed to respond to pointed congressional inquiries about alleged Indian cooperation with Iranian missile programs until hours before a key vote. Representative Henry Hyde (Republican of Illinois) was so incensed that he initially sought a criminal investigation of the failure to meet its legal obligation to keep Congress “fully and currently informed.”
39. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, majority and minority staffers, personal interviews with author, Washington, DC, July 21, 2010.
40. See Gerald Warburg, “Congress: Checking Presidential Power,” in Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds., The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), p. 233.
41. J. Sri Raman, “The U.S.-India nuclear deal—one year later,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1, 2009, <www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-us-india-nuclear-deal-one-year-later>.
42. Former State Department official, personal interview with author, Washington, DC, July 10, 2010.
43. Remarks by Dr. Jeffrey Bergner at University of Virginia Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy Forum, November 10, 2011.
44. Effectively pressing this point was former US Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill, on retainer at the lobbying firm, BGR Group. A veteran nonproliferation policy maker noted that Blackwill and colleagues “argued that the rule preventing India from getting United States nuclear technology was an artifact of an earlier epoch, which no longer was relevant.” See Leonard S. Spector, interview by Bernard Gwertzman, “Symbolism Tops Substance in US-India Nuclear Agreement,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 15, 2008, <www.cfr.org/india/symbolism-tops-substance-us-india-nuclear-agreement/p168033>.
45. Data cited from the US Energy Information Agency, as quoted in Richard Dobb, “Key Cities,” Foreign Policy 91 (September/October 2010), p. 134.
46. Former senior State Department and intelligence community officials, personal interviews with author, July 8, 2010.
47. See Newhouse, “Diplomacy, Inc.”
48. Mira Kamdar, “Forget the Israel Lobby. The Hill's Next Big Player is Made in India,” Washington Post, September 30, 2007, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/28/AR2007092801350.html>.
49. Mira Kamdar, “Forget the Israel Lobby. The Hill's Next Big Player is Made in India,” Washington Post, September 30, 2007, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/28/AR2007092801350.html>.
50. Senior Bush administration State Department official, personal interview with author, Washington, DC, July 6, 2010.
51. Former State Department official, personal interview with author, Washington, DC, July 10, 2010.
52. Consider for example, congressional consideration of the Taiwan Relations Act, the Panama Canal treaties of 1977, and the 2002 vote authorizing the use of force against Iraq.
53. See Fred McGoldrick, Harold Bengelsdorf, and Lawrence Scheinman, “The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal: Taking Stock,” Arms Control Today, October 2005, pp. 6-12.
54. Under the NNPA, proposed agreements must be provided to Congress sixty days before voting, a requirement that was waived in the September 2008 legislation approving the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement.
55. Rep. Berman blasted the strategy as “incomprehensible” in an August 5, 2008 letter to Rice, see <www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Berman_NSG_letter_to_Rice20080805.pdf>. Remarkably, in recounting these events before a US-Indian industry gathering in Mumbai on September 30, 2011, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Geoffrey Pyatt reversed the sequence of events, stating that Congress passed the final 123 Agreement before the NSG action. See Geoffrey Pyatt, “Taking Stock of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” US Department of State, September 30, 2011, <www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2011/174883.htm>.
56. See Leonard Weiss, “India and the NPT,” Strategic Analysis 34 (March 2010), pp. 255–71.
57. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, majority and minority staffers, personal interviews with author, Washington, DC, July 21, 2010, and Paul Kerr, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, November 5, 2009.
58. Rice, No Higher Honor, p. 698.
59. John Isaacs, Executive Director, Council for a Livable World, e-mail correspondence with the author, August 28, 2010. See Barry Blechman, et. al., “The U.S.-Indian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: A Bad Deal,” letter to members of Congress, September 19, 2010, from the files of the Council for a Livable World.
60. Statement by Representative Edward Markey to the House of Representatives, September 26, 2008, <markey.house.gov/press-release/sep-26-2008-markey-breaking-nuclear-rules-india>.
61. E-mail correspondence with John Isaacs.
62. Squassoni, “Looking Back: Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.”
63. Senate Foreign Relations committee staffers, personal interviews with author, Washington, DC, July 21, 2010.
64. Ironically, members of Congress supporting a strong NNPA in 1978 employed similar brinksmanship against the executive branch. After a tough draft of the NNPA passed the House of Representatives in 1977, industry lobbyists, working with State Department lawyers, convinced senators to open a number of issues for compromise in an anticipated House-Senate conference. Those pushing less stringent export controls hoped to wrest control from Senator Glenn over the Senate conference delegation. But Representative Bingham outmaneuvered them; he convinced House leaders to adopt the Senate version of the bill, which was developed independently by Senators Percy and Glenn, by voice vote, thus bypassing conference. The Carter administration was presented a fait accompli on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. President Jimmy Carter signed the bill, while taking written exception to several of the stronger provisions.
65. Prepared statement of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing, “United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation: The Indian Separation Plan and the Administration's Legislative Proposal,” 109th Cong., 2nd sess., April 5, 2006, reprinted in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and U.S. Additional Protocol Implementation Act,” Report 109-288, July 20, 2006, p. 110, <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109srpt288/pdf/CRPT-109srpt288.pdf>.
66. United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, H.R. 5682, p.1.
67. Prepared statement of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing, “United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation: The Indian Separation Plan and the Administration's Legislative Proposal.”
68. Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, makes this point in Bajoria, “The US-India Nuclear Deal.”
69. On December 2-3, 1984, a major leak of methyl isocynate gas and other chemicals from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, owned by the Indian subsidiary of Union Carbide, killed more than 2,200 people immediately (and perhaps more than 5,000 others soon thereafter) and injured more than 558,000 people overall. Although Union Carbide and the government of India reached an out of court settlement in 1989 totaling $470 million in damages, civil and criminal cases seeking additional compensation and punishment for the employees responsible are still pending in US and Indian courts.
70. See B. Muralidhar Reddy, “PM proposes joint group to iron out difficulties for U.S. nuclear suppliers,” The Hindu, November 18, 2011, <www.thehindu.com/news/national/article2638487.ece>. See also Sharon Squassoni, “The US-Indian Deal and Its Impact,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2010, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_07-08/squassoni>, and Lisa Curtis, “India's Flawed Nuclear Legislation Leaves U.S.-India Partnership Short,” Heritage Foundation, August 31, 2010, <www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/08/indias-flawed-nuclear-legislation-leaves-us-india-partnership-short>.
71. On French and Chinese proliferation records, see, for example, Seema Gahlaut, “U.S.-India nuclear deal will strengthen nonproliferation,” PacNet, No. 37, Pacific Forum CSIS, August 31, 2005, <csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0537.pdf>.
72. Relations with Moscow and Beijing were certainly more crucial than those with India, and it is true New Delhi had few other superpower suitors. Yet the challenges confronting US security interests in the twenty-first century—nuclear arms control in South Asia, greenhouse gases, and terrorism—also involve existential threats.
73. On the limits of a US-India anti-China condominium, see, for example, Harry Harding, “The Evolution of the Strategic Triangle: China, India, and the United States,” in Harry Harding and Francine R. Frankel, eds., The India-China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 321–50.