ADVANCED US CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Abstract

The Obama administration has made a great effort to increase the role of advanced conventional weaponry in US national security thinking and practice, in part to help reinvigorate the global nuclear disarmament agenda by reducing the role played by nuclear weapons in the US defense posture. However, such a strategy is fundamentally flawed because increases in US conventional superiority will exacerbate US relative strength vis-à-vis other powers, and therefore make the prospect of a nuclear weapon-free world seem less attractive to Washington's current and potential nuclear rivals. Consequently, it is highly likely that the impact of efforts to increase US advanced conventional superiority through ballistic missile defense and a conventional “prompt global strike” program will ensure that the Obama administration is adopting a pathway to nuclear abolition on which it is the sole traveler for the foreseeable future.

Keywords:

• Nuclear disarmament
• conventional weapons
• ballistic missile defense
• prompt global strike
• Barack Obama

Notes

1. In one of the few pieces of analysis that has highlighted this point, analyst Dennis Gormley has noted that “Indeed, the Obama administration's 2010 NPR readily admits that it can afford to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in satisfying its fundamental security requirements due to the ‘growth of unrivalled US conventionally military capabilities, major improvements in missile defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries.’” Dennis Gormley, “Nuclear Disarmament and Russian Perceptions of US Conventional Superiority,” Security Challenges 6 (Summer 2010), p. 83.

2. See for example, US Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” (April 2010), pp. 6–7, 15–16, 25, 32, 45. See also US Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” February 2010, p. 14 and US Department of Defense, “Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report,” February 2010, p. 23.

3. President Ronald Reagan did discuss pursuing a nuclear weapon-free world through increases in conventional capabilities, most notably through the Strategic Defense Initiative, but was never able to put this into practice. See Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (New York: Random House, 2006).

4. Harold Brown, “New Nuclear Realities,” Washington Quarterly 31 (Winter 2007–8), p. 20.

5. It is important to note that while we are arguing that US conventional superiority (and in particular the trajectory toward future increased superiority due to the close link between PGS and BMD developments and reductions in nuclear weapons in the Obama administration's current approach) acts as a barrier to progress on nuclear disarmament, we are not necessarily adopting Brown's argument that conventional imbalances are the most important factor in continued possession and further proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world. See Harold Brown, “New Nuclear Realities,” Washington Quarterly 31 (Winter 2007–8), p. 20.

6. See Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama”, Prague, April 5, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/>.

7. On this, see for example Bruno Tertrais, “The Illogic of Zero,” Washington Quarterly 32 (Spring 2010), pp. 125–38.

8. “Presidential Q&A: President-elect Barack Obama”, Arms Control Today, December 2008, <www.armscontrol.org/2008election>.

9. See US Missile Defense Agency, “Historical Funding for MDA FY85-10,” <www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/histfunds.pdf>. For more on the final point, see Andrew Futter, “The Elephant in the Room: US Ballistic Missile Defense under Obama,” Defense & Security Analysis 28 (2012) pp. 3–16.

10. Tom Collina, “U.S. Alters Non-nuclear Prompt Strike Plan,” Arms Control Today, April 2011, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_04/PromptStrike>.

11. Dennis M. Gormley, “The Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions: Dealing with American Conventional Superiority,” Institut Français des Relations Internationales Proliferation Papers, No. 29, Fall 2009; Amy F. Woolf, “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues,” Congressional Research Service, April 2011, <www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=5575&id_provenance=97>.

12. While PGS may be under considerations for so-called “niche missions” at present, some military analysts are already reportedly saying that these could “eventually substitute for assignment against 10 to 30 percent of today's nuclear target list.” Elaine M. Grossman, “Jury Out: Do Advanced Conventional Weapons Make Nuclear War More Likely?,” Global Security Newswire, August 22, 2012, <www.nti.org/gsn/article/jury-out-do-advanced-conventional-weapons-make-nuclear-war-more-likely/>.

13. David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “US Faces Choice on New Weapons for Fast Strikes,” New York Times, April 22, 2010, p. 1.

14. On the importance of mutual vulnerability for trust building, see Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Beyond Waltz's Nuclear World: More Trust May be Better,” International Relations 23 (2009), pp. 428–45; Geoffrey Hosking, “Terrorism and Trust,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 2 (2009), pp. 482–96.

15. On this, see Jan Ruzicka and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” International Affairs 86 (January 2010), p. 72.

16. Richard Weitz, “NATO's non-proliferation challenges in the Obama era,” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Transatlantic Paper Series No. 4, October 2010, p. 10.

17. Dinshaw Mistry, “Correspondence: Going Nowhere Fast: Assessing Concerns about Long-range Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” International Security 34 (2010), p. 176.

18. US Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April 2010, p. x.

19. Nikolai Sokov, “New Start Ratification in Russia: Apparent Smooth Sailing Obscures Submerged Drama and Revelations,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 25, 2011, <http://cns.miis.edu/stories/110125_russia_new_start_ratification.htm>.

20. Quoted in David Usborne, “US Moves from Nuclear Arms to Conventional Missiles with Global Reach,” Independent, April 9, 2010, <www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/us-moves-from-nuclear-arms-to-conventional-missiles-with-global-reach-1939876.html>.

21. Pavel Podvig, “Instrumental Influences: Russia and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (March 2011), p. 46.

22. Richard Weitz, “Illusive Visions and Practical Realities: Russia, NATO and Missile Defense,” Survival 52 (April-May 2010), p. 100.

23. Barry Blechman & Jonas Vaicikonis, "Unblocking the Road to Zero: US-Russian Cooperation on Missile Defenses," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66 (November-December 2010), pp. 25–35.

24. Yevgeny Primakov, Igor Ivanov, Evgeny Velikhov, and Mikhail Moiseyev, “Nuclear disarmament: the end of the atomic option,” Telegraph, December 8, 2010, <www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/opinion/8188782/Nuclear-disarmament-the-end-of-the-atomic-option.html>.

25. Global Security Newswire, “Pentagon Revises Prompt Global Strike Effort,” April 7, 2011, <www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110407_4669.php>; Global Security Newswire, “Gates Makes Missile Defense Offer to Russia,” March 22, 2011, <http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110322_2880.php>.

26. James Acton, Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security, Adelphi Paper 417, Routledge: 2011, p. 64.

27. Peter Brooks, “New START Treaty's China Challenge,” New York Post, September 20, 2010, <www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/new_start_treaty_china_challenge_5niHZQbbup6tknXsyjN2II>.

28. M. Taylor Fravel & Evan Medeiros, “China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security 35 (Fall 2010), pp. 48–87.

29. Hui Zhang, “China's Perspective on a Nuclear Free World,” Washington Quarterly 33 (Spring 2010), pp. 139–56.

30. Bruce G. Blair, “General Zhu and Chinese Nuclear Preemption,” China Security 1 (2005), p. 15; Stephanie Lieggi, “Going Beyond the Stir: The Strategic Realities of China's No-First-Use Policy,” Issue Brief, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, December 2005.

31. Yang Yi, “Navigating Stormy Waters: The Sino-American Security Dilemma at Sea,” China Security 6 (2010), p. 3.

32. David M. Lampton, “Power Constrained: Sources of Mutual Strategic Suspicion in U.S.-China Relations,” NBR Analysis, National Bureau of Asian Research, June 2010.

33. Jing-dong Yuan “Sino-US Military Relations: The Need for Deep Engagement,” SITREP 66 (2006), pp. 14–16.

34. Global Security Newswire, “South Korea to Study Missile Defense Needs with US,” April 18, 2011, <www.nti.org/gsn/article/south-korea-to-study-missile-defense-needs-with-us/>.

35. Thomas Fingar, “How China Views US Nuclear Policy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 20, 2011, <www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-china-views-us-nuclear-policy>.

36. Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan: 2008), p. 270.

37. Mark Beeson, “Hegemonic Transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power,” Review of International Studies 35 (2009), pp. 95–112.

38. This may be more accurately described as short-term confidence building in order to arrive at a degree of stability rather than fully-fledged “trust building.” Gormley goes even further arguing that the strategic stability that is “so central to achieving the goal of a nuclear-free world” is upset by these developments in US conventional weaponry and directly affects “regional competitions in Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East.” Gormley, Nuclear Disarmament and Russian Perceptions, p. 84.

39. The importance of future uncertainty is recognized by most theories of international relations but is especially emphasized by offensive realism. See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York & London, W. W. Norton & Company: 2001) p. 31, and Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca & London, Cornell University Press: 2000) p. 245.

40. Gormley, Nuclear Disarmament and Russian Perceptions, p. 86.

41. For more on this, see Andrew Futter, “Getting the Balance Right: Ballistic Missile Defense and Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Comparative Strategy 30 (2011), pp. 254–67.

42. In analyzing Russian perceptions in this regard, Gormley is clear in finding that the Obama administration's current approach is having a decidedly negative effect. See Gormley, Nuclear Disarmament and Russian Perceptions.

43. Tom Collina, “Senate Approves New START,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2011, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_01-02/NewSTART>.

44. Global Security Newswire, “House Approves Bill with Treaty-Limiting Provisions as Veto Bait,” May 27, 2011, <http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110527_6150.php>.

45. Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Independent Task Force Report No. 62, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations 2009), p. 45.

46. On this point, David Cortright and Raimo Väyrynen argue that Russian and Chinese concerns about missile defense must be genuinely addressed in order to achieve progress towards nuclear zero, and they argue for a “return to Reykjavik” and the discussion about the timing of BMD deployment and abolition that took place on the second day of the historic summit between Reagan and Gorbachev. David Cortright and Raimo Väyrynen, Towards Nuclear Zero, IISS Adelphi Paper No. 410, Routledge: 2010, pp. 152–4.

47. On this point, David Cortright and Raimo Väyrynen argue that Russian and Chinese concerns about missile defense must be genuinely addressed in order to achieve progress towards nuclear zero, and they argue for a “return to Reykjavik” and the discussion about the timing of BMD deployment and abolition that took place on the second day of the historic summit between Reagan and Gorbachev. David Cortright and Raimo Väyrynen, Towards Nuclear Zero, IISS Adelphi Paper No. 410, Routledge: 2010, pp. 165–6.

48. George Perkovich and James Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, IISS Adelphi Paper No. 396 (London, Routledge: 2008), p. 27.

49. Global Security Newswire, “China Lashes Talk of Asian Missile Shield,” April 12 2012, <www.nti.org/gsn/article/china-lashes-talk-asian-missile-shield/>; Global Security Newswire, “Chinese Missile Push Seeks to Counter U.S. Protections, Experts Say,” April 24, 2012, <www.nti.org/gsn/article/chinese-missile-push-seeks-counter-us-protections-experts/>.

50. For more on the problems of future uncertainty and strategic decision making, see Evan Braden Montgomery, “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty,” International Security 31 (Fall 2006), pp. 151–85, and Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma.

51. Gormley, Nuclear Disarmament and Russian Perceptions, p. 100.