BRAZIL AND MEXICO IN THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

Abstract

Latin American countries have historically followed different paths and logics toward the nonproliferation regime. Some states have unconditionally advocated for global and nonproliferation efforts, while others have vehemently opposed such measures or remained ambivalent toward the regime itself. By historically comparing two of Latin America's most influential countries—Brazil and Mexico—this study identifies the underlying domestic conditions and external influences that explain their differences in behavior and policy toward the nonproliferation regime. Because little is known about the reasons why different Latin American countries adopt these different approaches, the purpose of this article is to resolve this problem, primarily by focusing on the ways in which evolving civil-military relations and US influence have shaped nonproliferation policy preferences in Latin America. It concludes with a discussion of how these historical cases might shed light on current nonproliferation policies in Latin America.

Keywords:

• Brazil
• Mexico
• Latin America
• nonproliferation
• nuclear weapon-free zones

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For suggestions on earlier drafts, the author thanks Anna Faber, Jeffrey Fields, Janis Higginbotham, Jeffrey Knopf, Arie M. Kacowicz, Danilo Marcondes de Souza, Clay Moltz, Maria Rost Rublee, Stephen I. Schwartz, Elena Sokova, Etel Solingen, Harold Trinkunas, participants of the Defense Threat Assessment Agency funded workshop on “Explaining State Nonproliferation Decision-making,” as well as two anonymous reviewers who provided constructive feedback. This article is dedicated to the memory of Juanita Szyszlo de Garcia Robles, who graciously gave the author access to Ambassador Garcia Robles's personal library.

Notes

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5. For a debate on US power and influence in the Western Hemisphere, see David R. Marex, “Regional Conflict Management in Latin America: Power Complemented by Diplomacy,” in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (Pittsburgh, PA: Penn State Press, 1997), pp. 195–218.

6. David R. Mares, “Middle Powers Under Regional Hegemony: To Challenge or Acquiesce in Hegemonic Enforcement,” International Studies Quarterly 32 (December 1998), p. 454.

7. I follow the insights developed by Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse, “Democratization and International Organizations,” International Organization 60 (Winter 2006), pp. 137–67.

8. Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

9. Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 9.

10. Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 10.

11. See Miriam Fendius Elman, “The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in its Own Backyard,” British Journal of Political Science 25 (1995), pp. 171–217.

12. Maria Rost Rublee, “The Nuclear Threshold States: Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Brazil and Japan,” Nonproliferation Review 17 (March 2010), p. 49.

13. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 5, 1970, Article IV, para. 1: “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.”

14. Emanuel Adler, The Power of Ideology: The Quest For Technological Autonomy in Argentina and Brazil (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987).

15. Monica Serrano, “Brazil and Argentina,” in Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, eds., Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 237.

16. Etel Solingen, “Macropolitical Consensus and Lateral Autonomy in Industrial Policy: The Nuclear Sector in Brazil and Argentina,” International Organization 47 (Spring 1993), pp. 263–98; Etel Solingen, Industrial Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining: Designing Nuclear Industries in Argentina and Brazil (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996).

17. José Goldemberg, “Brazil,” in Jozef Goldblat, ed., Non-Proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore, (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), p. 83.

18. John R. Redick, “Military Potential of Latin American Nuclear Energy Programs,” International Studies Series 1 (1972), p. 26.

19. See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 5, 1970, Article V.

20. See Adler, The Power of Ideology; and Jorge A. Aja Espil, “Argentina,” in Goldblat, ed., Non-Proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore, pp. 73–76.

21. See Paulo S. Wrobel, “A Diplomacia Nuclear Brasileira: A Não-Proliferação Nuclear e o Tratado de Tlatelolco” [Brazil's Nuclear Diplomacy: Nonproliferation and the Treaty of Tlatelolco], Contexto Internacional 15 (January-June 1993), p. 29.

22. Monica Serrano, “Brazil and Argentina,” p. 237.

23. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), February 14, 1967, Article 18.

24. For the genesis of the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, see Alfonso García Robles, El Tratado de Tlatelolco: genesis, alcance y propósitos de la proscripeión de las armas nucleares en la América Latina [The Treaty of Tlatelolco: Genesis, Scope and Purposes of the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America], (El Colegio de México, Mexico: 1967).

25. Wrobel, “A Diplomacia Nuclear Brasileira,” p. 44.

26. Jeffrey A. Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965–1985 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 180–82.

27. Redick, “Military Potential,” p. 31.

28. For reviews on the peaceful disposition of Latin American states, see Paul R. Hensel, “Contentious Issues in World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816–1992,” International Studies Quarterly 45 (March 2001), pp. 81–109; David R. Marex, Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001); and Jorge I. Domínguez, David Mares, Manual Orozco, David Scott Palmer, Francisco Rojas Aravena, and Adrés Serbin, “Boundary Disputes in Latin America,” Peaceworks 50, US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, August 2003 <www.usip.org/publications/boundary-disputes-latin-america>.

29. See, for instance, Arie M. Kacowicz, The Impact of Norms in International Society: The Latin American Experience, 1881–2001 (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2005); and Carolyn M. Shaw, Cooperation, Conflict, and Consensus in the Organization of American States (New York, NY: Palgrave-McMillan, 2004).

30. S.E. Kenza de Garcia Robles, “Une alternative en matiere de non-proliferation: les zones libre d'armes nucleaires” [An Alternative to Nonproliferation: Nuclear-Free Zones], Relations Internationales et Strategiques 17 (Spring 1995), pp. 192–99.

31. Roberto Russell, “Conflicto y armamentismo en América Latin” [Conflict and arms build-up in Latin America], in Mónica Hirst, ed., Desarme y Desarrollo en América Latina [Disarmament and Development in Latin America], (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Fundación para la Democracia y la Paz, 1990) pp. 61–67.

32. Goldemberg, “Brazil,” in Goldblat, ed., Non-Proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore, p. 84.

33. The literature on Argentina and Brazil's nuclear quest includes Adler, The Power of Ideology; Michael Barletta, “Democratic Security and Diversionary Peace: Nuclear Confidence-Building in Argentina and Brazil,” paper delivered at the Latin American Studies Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, September 24–26, 1998; Solingen, Industrial Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining; Carlos Madero Castro and Esteban A. Takacs, Política Nuclear Argentina: ¿Avance o retroceso? [Argentine Nuclear Policy: Progress or setbacks?] (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Libreríra El Ateneo Editorial, 1991); Redick, Military Potential; Jeffrey W. Knopf, “The Importance of International Learning,” Review of International Studies 29 (2003), pp. 198–207; Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels among Neighbors (New York, NY: Praeger, 1985).

34. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center for Special Studies, 1995), p. 14.

35. Andrew Hurrell, “Security In Latin America,” International Affairs 74 (July, 1998), p. 531.

36. On the Brazil-West Germany nuclear agreement, see Michael Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, August 1997.

37. See Goldemberg, “Brazil,” and Espil, “Argentina,” in Goldblat, ed., Non-Proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore, pp. 73–79, 81–87.

38. The first attempt of bilateral cooperation between the Argentine and Brazilian military regimes took place during the 1970s, when they successfully resolved their dispute regarding the Itaipu dam and the use of hydroelectric power. Then, in 1980, the military governments of generals (and presidents) Jorge Videla and João Figueiredo signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which marked the beginning of the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear entente. The military autocracies of Argentina and Brazil mostly cooperated via informal means. The establishment of formal institutions only took place after the two countries democratized. For more information on the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement, see Paul L. Leventhal and Sharon Tanzer, eds., Averting a Latin American Nuclear Arms Race: New Prospects and Challenges for Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Wayne A. Selcher, “Brazilian-Argentine Relations in the 1980s: From Wary Rivalry to Friendly Competition,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 27 (Summer, 1985), pp. 25–53; Joa Resende-Santos, “The Origins of the Security Cooperation in the Southern Cone,” Latin American Politics and Society 44 (Winter 2002), pp. 89–126; Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 122–34; and Maria Regina Soares de Lima, “The Political Economy of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Nuclear Energy, Trade and Itaipu,” PhD diss., Vanderbilt University, 1986; and Alessandro Warley Candeas, “Relaçôes Brasil-Argentina: uma análise dos advances e recuos” [Brazil-Argentina relations: an analysis of progress and retreats], Revista Brasilieira de Politica Interacional 48 (June, 2005), pp. 178–213.

39. Olga Pellicer de Brody, México y la Revolución Cubana [Mexico and the Cuban Revolution], (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1972); Ana Covarrubias, “Cuba and Mexico: A Case for Mutual Nonintervention,” Cuban Studies 26 (January 1996), pp. 121–41.

40. T.V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal, Quebec: McGill Queens University Press, 2000); and Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

41. Alejandro Nadal, “Trayectorias de misiles balistícos internacionales: implicaciones para los vecinos de las superpotencias” [Trajectories of the international ballistic missiles: implications for states neighboring superpowers], Foro Internacional 30 (July-September 1989), pp. 93–114.

42. Serrano, “Brazil and Argentina,” p. 30.

43. Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” in Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 47–65.

44. Wrobel, “A Diplomacia Nuclear Brasileira,” pp. 35–48.

45. Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” p. 6.

46. Redick, “Military Potential,” pp. 18–29.

47. Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil,” p. 6.

48. David Albright, “Bomb Potential for South America,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1989, pp. 16–20; Redick, “Military Potential;” Adler, The Power of Ideology; Jean Krasno, “Non-Proliferation: Brazil's Secret Nuclear Program,” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 38 (Summer 1994), pp. 425–36.

49. Pedro Paulo Leoni Ramos, Minister of Strategic Affairs, Testimony, “Comissão Parlamentar Mista de Inquérito Destinada a Apurar o Programa Autônomo de Energia Nuclear, Também Conhecido como ‘Programa Paralelo’” [Joint Parliamentary Inquiry Commission Intended to Investigate the Autonomous Nuclear Energy Program, also known as the “Parallel Program”], Congressional Report No. 13, November 14, 1990, p. 101. (Author's translation).

50. José Goldemberg, Minister of Science and Technology, Testimony, in “Comissão Parlamentar Mista de Inquérito Destinada a Apurar o Programa Autônomo de Energia Nuclear, Também Conhecido como ‘Programa Paralelo’” [Joint Parliamentary Inquiry Commission Intended to Investigate the Autonomous Nuclear Energy Program, also known as the “Parallel Program”], Congressional Report No. 13, November 14, 1990, p. 88. (Author's translation).

51. Conclusôes [Conclusions], in “Comissão Parlamentar Mista de Inquérito Destinada a Apurar o Programa Autônomo de Energia Nuclear, Também Conhecido como ‘Programa Paralelo’” [Joint Parliamentary Inquiry Commission Intended to Investigate the Autonomous Nuclear Energy Program, also known as the “Parallel Program”], Congressional Report No. 13, November 14, 1990, p. 107. (Author's translation).

52. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 51.

53. On Brazil's transition to democracy, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 166–89.

54. Solingen, Regional Orders, pp. 147–48.

55. Julia Preston, “Brazil's Leader Brings Vigorous Image, Mixed Record,” Washington Post, June 18, 1991, p. A18.

56. There is a large body of literature that addresses the foundation and establishment of ABACC. See, for instance, Barletta, “Democratic Security and Diversionary Peace;” Julio César Carasales, De Rivales a Socios: El proceso de cooperación nuclear entre Argentina y Brasil [From Rivals to Partners: The process of nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil] (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Grupo Editorial Latinoamericano, 1997); Javier Corrales, “Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Power, Interests, and Intellectual Traditions,” International Studies Quarterly 43 (May 1999), pp. 1–36; Hurrell, “Security in Latin America,” pp. 529–46; Andrew Hurrell, “Emerging Security Community in South America?” in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 243–45; Knopf, “The Importance of International Learning,” pp. 198–207; John R. Redick, Julio C. Carasales, and Paulo S. Wrobel, “Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil, and the Nonproliferation Regime,” Washington Quarterly 18 (Winter 1995), pp. 107–22; Serrano, “Brazil and Argentina”; Arturo C. Sotomayor, “Civil-Military Relations and Security Institutions in the Southern Cone: The Sources of Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation,” Latin American Politics and Society 46 (Winter 2004), pp. 29–60; Paul S. Wrobel, “From Rivals to Friends: The Role of Public Declarations in Argentine-Brazilian Rapprochement,” in Michael Krepon, Jenny S. Drezin, and Michael Newbill, eds., Declaratory Diplomacy: Rhetorical Initiatives and Confidence Building (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1999), pp. 135–51.

57. See Sotomayor, “Civil-Military Relations and Security Institutions in the Southern Cone,” pp. 29–60.

58. Mónica Hirst, “Security Policies, Democratization, and Regional Integration in the Southern Cone,” in Jorge I. Dominguez, ed., International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), p. 106.

59. Carasales, De Rivales a Socios, pp. 116–17.

60. James Brooke, “Brazil Uncovers Plan by Military to Build Atom Bomb and Stops It,” New York Times, October 9, 1990: p. A1.

61. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira and Samuel Alves Soares, “Brasil: Forças Armadas, direção política e formato institucional” [Brazil: Armed forces, political direction and institutional format], in D'Araujo, Maria Celina and Celso Castro, eds., Democracia e Forças Armadas no Cone Sul [Democracy and Armed Forces in the Southern Cone], (Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Editora FGV, 2000), pp. 112–16.

62. Sotomayor, “Civil-Military Relations and Security Institutions in the Southern Cone.”

63. See Mansfield and Pevenhouse, “Democratization and International Organizations.”

64. For a theoretical discussion on the domestic effects of international organizations, see Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions,” International Organization 42 (Autumn 1998), pp. 747–57.

65. Roderic Ai Camp, Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992); Monica Serrano, “The Armed Branch of the State: Civil-Military Relations in Mexico,” Journal of Latin American Studies 27 (May 1995), pp. 423–48; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 315–24.

66. Miguel Marín Bosch, Alfonso Garcia Robles: Mexico, Nobel de la Paz (Mexico City, Mexico: SEP-SER, 1984); Serrano, Common Security in Latin America: The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco (London: The Institute of Latin America Studies, 1992).

67. See Peter Baker, “Senate Approves Indian Nuclear Deal,” New York Times, October 1, 2008, <www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/washington/02webnuke.html?ref=nuclearprogram>.

68. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Jim Yardley, “Countering China, Obama Backs India for U.N. Council,” New York Times, November 8, 2010, <www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/world/asia/09prexy.html>.

69. Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, “The Brazilian Way,” Nonproliferation Review 17 (November 2010), p. 552.

70. Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, “The Brazilian Way,” Nonproliferation Review 17 (November 2010), p. 557.

71. On the nature of the Brazilian agreement with the IAEA, see Etel Solingen, “Hindsight and Foresight in South American Nonproliferation Trends in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela,” in James J. Wirtz and Peter R. Lavoy, eds., Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 145; and Claire Applegarth, “Brazil Permits Greater IAEA Inspection,” Arms Control Today, November 2004, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Brazil>.

72. See Marcos Marzo, “Additional Protocol: logic and impact,” Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Energy, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, January 2012, <www.abacc.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Additional-Protocol_Marzo.pdf>.

73. Vieira de Jesus, “The Brazilian Way,” p. 558.

74. Global Security Newswire, “Scientist Says Brazil Has Right to Nuclear Secrets,”April 8, 2004, <www.nti.org/gsn/article/scientist-says-brazil-has-right-to-nuclear-secrets/>.

75. See Mark Hibbs, “Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA Additional Protocol,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, August 18, 2010, <www.carnegieendowment.org/2010/08/18/nuclear-suppliers-group-and-iaea-additional-protocol/ep>. See also Economist, “When nuclear sheriffs quarrel: The job of keeping sensitive materials away from pariah was always hard—and now it's marred by squabbles,” October 30, 2008, <www.economist.com/node/12516611?story_id=12516611>.

76. Hibbs, “Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA Additional Protocol.”

77. For an assessment of Brazil's nuclear program, see Hans Rühle, “Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America: Is Brazil Developing the Bomb?” Spiegel Online, May 7, 2010, <www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,693336,00.html>.

78. Hibbs, “Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA Additional Protocol.”

79. Rublee, “The Nuclear Threshold States,” p. 55.

80. See Global Security Newswire, “Brazil Needs Nukes, VP Says,” September 28, 2009, <www.nti.org/gsn/article/brazil-needs-nukes-vp-says/>.

81. See Global Security Newswire, “Brazil Needs Nukes, VP Says,” September 28, 2009, <www.nti.org/gsn/article/brazil-needs-nukes-vp-says/>.

82. Oliver Stuenkel, “Brazil Should Act on Nuclear Transparency,” World Politics Review, October 20, 2010, <www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6776/brazil-should-act-on-nuclear-transparency>.

83. For an analysis of the Ministry of Defense's institutional weaknesses, see Jorge Zavarucha, “La Fragilidad del Ministerio de Defensa Brasileño” [The Fragility of the Defense Ministry], in José Huerta et al., eds. Operaciones Conjuntas: Civiles y Militares en la Política de Defensa [Joint Operations: Civilians and the Military in Defense Policy] (Lima, Peru: Serie Democracia y Fuerza Armada, 2006), pp. 51–80; and David S. Pion-Berlin, “Political management of the military in Latin America,” Military Review 85 (January-February 2005), pp. 19–31.

84. Rublee, “The Nuclear Threshold States,” p. 49.

85. See Guadalupe González, Ferrán Martínez and Jorge Schiavon, “Mexico, the Americas and the World: Foreign Policy, Public and Leader Opinion 2008,” Report on the results of the third biennial national survey of the Mexican general public and leaders on foreign policy and international affairs, Centride Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Mexico City, 2008, <mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu/Informacion/Imgs/Report_Mexico_the_Americas_and_the_World.pdf>.

86. Antonio Ortiz Mena, “Mexico,” in Patrick F.J. Macrory and Arthur Appleton, eds., The World Trade Organization: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis (New York, NY: Spring Publishers, 2005), pp. 217–47.

87. See, for instance, Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro, The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001), pp. 55–58; and Arturo Sotomayor, “U.S.-Latin American Nuclear Relations: From Commitment to Defiance,” PASCC Report No. 2012013, Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC), Monterey, California, September 2012.