ASSESSING RUSSIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD PHASED, DEEP NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

Abstract

As the United States and Russia contemplate the next stage of nuclear arms reductions beyond the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, another issue enters the agenda—that of the impact of possible deep reductions on the shape of the global nuclear balance. As the gap between the US/Russian arsenals and the arsenals of “second-tier” nuclear weapon states narrows, the familiar shape of the global balance, which remains, to a large extent, bipolar, is likely to change. The article explores the Russian approach to the relationship between further US-Russian reductions and the prospect of “nuclear multipolarity,” and assesses the relative weight of this issue in Russian arms control policy as well as the views on the two specific regional balances—the one in Europe (including UK and French nuclear weapons) and in Asia (the possible dynamic of the Russian-Chinese nuclear balance).

Keywords:

• Russia
• United States
• China
• NATO
• India
• nuclear weapons
• arms control
• disarmament

Notes

1. See Pavel Podvig, “Russian Federation,” in Ray Acheson, ed., Assuring Destruction Forever, (Reaching Critical Will, 2012), pp. 59–66; Pavel Podvig, Russia's Nuclear Forces: Between Disarmament and Modernization, IFRI Proliferation Paper No. 37, 2011.

2. Alexei Arbatov, “Perekhod k Mnogostoronnemu Yadernomu Razoruzheniyu: Problemy i Varianty” [Transition to Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament: Problems and Variants], Theses for a Meeting of the Scientific Council of IMEMO RAN [Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences], September 26, 2012, <www.imemo.ru/ru/sc/2012/26092012.pdf>; Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, Sergey Oznobishchev, eds., “Rossiya i Dilemmy Yadernogo Razoruzheniya” [Russia and Dilemmas of Nuclear Disarmament], IMEMO, 2012, p. 251.

3. “Stenogramma Vystupleniya Ministra Inostrannykh Del Rossii S.V. Lavrova na Plenarnom Zasedanii Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federalnogo Sobraniya Rossiiskoi Federatsii npo Novomy Dogovoru o SNV, Moskva, 14 Yanvarya 2011 goda” [Transcript of a Statement by Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov at a Plenary Meeting of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on the New START Treaty, January 14, 2011], Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 14, 2011, document 20-14-01-2011.

4. RIA-Novosti, “Rossiya ne budet Razoruzhatsya v Odnostoronnem Poryadke, Zayavil Putin” [Russia Will Not Disarm Unilaterally, Putin Declares], February 24, 2012; Putin, “Transcript of remarks on global threats to nuclear security, strengthening defense, and enhancing the readiness of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” Sarov, February 24, 2012, <http://archive.premier.gov.ru/events/news/18248>.

5. See, for example, the statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, Center for Energy and Security, Moscow, September 7, 2012, <http://ceness-russia.org/data/page/p909_1.pdf>; or his statement at the conference “Nuclear Weapons in the 21^st Century” in November 2012.

6. “Vystuplenie Zamestitelya Ministra Inostrannyih Del Rossii S. Ryabkova v MGIMO (Y) MID Rossii na Konferentsii Rossiiskogo Soveta po Mezhdunarodnym Delam ‘Yadernoe Razoruzhenie i Mezhdunarodhaya Bezopasnost v 21 veke” [Transcript of a Presentation of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S. Ryabkov at a Conference “Nuclear Disarmament and International Security in the 21^st Century” at MGIMO(U) held by the Russian Council on International Affairs at MRIMO(U)], Moscow, November 8, 2012, <www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-dvbr.nsf/8329e2a2d0f85bdd43256a1700419682/c32577ca00173dc044257ab0004fe7f6!OpenDocument>.

7. For details on Russia's 2000 Military Doctrine, see Nikolai Sokov, “Russia's Nuclear Doctrine,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 1, 2004, <www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russias-nuclear-doctrine/>.

8. “Osnovnye Polozheniya Voennoi Doktriny Rossiiskoi Federatsii” [The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation], Izvestiya, November 18, 1993, pp. 1, 4.

9. For details of the debates on the role of tactical nuclear weapons in Russia in the mid-1990s, see Nikolai Sokov, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons Elimination: Next Step for Arms Control,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (Winter 1997), pp. 17–27.

10. Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, May 27, 1997, <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm>. The text of the 1997 National Security Concept can be found at <http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Russia1997.pdf>. The 1998 decisions included a decree of Boris Yeltsin “On urgent measures toward reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” (July 1997), and two Security Council documents: “The Concept of Development of Nuclear Forces until 2010” and “The Foundations (Concept) of State Policy in the Area of Defense Development until 2005” (July-August 1998). The texts of these documents are classified, but their general thrust could be gleaned from newspaper publications. See “Sovet Bezopasnosti RF Reshil Sokhranit Trekhkomponentnyi Sostav Strategicheskikh Yadernykh Sil” [The Security Council Has Decided to Retain a Strategic Nuclear Triad], Interfax, No. 4, July 3, 1998; “Russia to be Major Nuclear Power in 3d Millennium—Official,” ITAR-TASS, July 3, 1998; Ivan Safronov and Ilya Bulavinov, “Boris Yeltsin Podnyal Yadernyi Shchit” [Boris Yeltsin Has Elevated the Nuclear Shield], Kommersant-Daily, July 4, 1998; Yuri Golotuyk, “Yadernoe Razoruzhenie Neizbezhno” [Nuclear Disarmament is Unavoidable], Russkii Telegraph, July 11, 1998; Yuri Golotuyk, “Moskva Skorrektirovala Svoi Yadernye Argumenty” [Moscow Has Adjusted its Nuclear Arguments], Russkii Telegraph, July 4, 1998; Anatoli Yurkin, “Perspektivy Voennogo Stroitelstva” [The Prospects of Military Posture-Building], Krasnaya Zvezda, August 5, 1998, pp. 1,3; Oleg Falichev, “Vpervye So Vremeni Miluykovskikh Reform” [For the First Time Since Mluykov's Reform], Krasnaya Zvezda, August 18, 1998, pp. 1, 2.

11. “Aktualnye Zadachi Razvitiya Vooruzhennykh Sil RF” [The Key Tasks of the Development of Russian Armed Forces], (Moscow: Voeninform, 2003).

12. For the analysis of nuclear policy-related elements of the 2000 National Security Concept and Military Doctrine, see Sokov, “Russia's Nuclear Doctrine.”

13. Aktualnye Zadachi Razvitiya Vooruzhennykh Sil RF, p. 43.

14. Independent Russian experts believe that missile defense systems the United States could realistically develop and deploy in the near future will not have the technical capability or be deployed in numbers sufficient to undermine the deterrence relationship between the two states. See, for example, Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, eds., Missile Defense: Confrontation and Cooperation (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2013). Russian concerns are related to a significantly more distant future—perhaps ten or more years from now. The intensity of Moscow's rhetoric around the missile defense issue, which tends to portray the system as an immediate threat to Russian deterrence capability, is thus inflated for political reasons.

15. Sokov, “Russia's Nuclear Doctrine.”

16. The notion of global war is self-explanatory; the category of regional wars pertains to the situation when Russia faces a coalition of states, some among them out of the area and/or some of them nuclear. The example the drafters of the 2000 Military Doctrine had in mind was the escalation of the war in Chechnya through direct military involvement of the United States and its allies. The doctrine also included two other categories—one “local war’” (in which Russia faced one or more neighboring states that had limited goals) and “military conflict,” which meant fighting with non-state actors (like the war in Chechnya). See also “Menyaetsya Rossiya, Menyaetsya i ee Voennaya Doktrina” [As Russia Changes, its Military Doctrine Changes Too], Izvestiya, October 14, 2009.

17. See, for example, Arbatov, “Deep Cuts and de-Alerting: A Russian Perspective,” p. 321.

18. Intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) talks took place in 1981–87. One of the key issues was whether all NATO INF missiles (US, UK, and French) should be counted under the future treaty or only US ones; in the end, the Soviet Union dropped its demand and the treaty only covered the Soviet and the US intermediate-range missiles. One can argue that the level of the US and the Soviet strategic forces at that time was so high that the UK and the French nuclear weapons did not matter much.

19. Alexei Arbatov, “Perekhod k Mnogostoronnemu Yadernomu Razoruzheniyu: Problemy i Varianty” [Transition to Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament: Problems and Variants].

20. See Department of State, Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), December 8, 1987, Article II, para. 6, Article VII, para. 4, <www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm>. If deployed in Kaliningrad oblast, Iskanders can reach many of the targets in Russia's vicinity that the Russian military regard as potential staging grounds for air strikes against its territory, such as, namely, Poland. In the past, Russian armed forces were known to simulate limited nuclear strikes against these targets.

21. RIA-Novosti, “India Uspeshno Ispytala Pervuyu Krylatuyu Raketu Sobstvennoi Razrabotki” [India Has Successfully Tested the First Cruise Missile of Its Own Design], March 12, 2013.

22. It was recently reported that India is considering leasing another nuclear submarine of the same type as the Nerpa. See RIA-Novosti, “India Mozhet Vzyat v Lizing Vtoruyu APL Tima Nerpa” [India Might Lease the Second Neerpa-Type Nuclear Submarine], March 12, 2013.

23. Such an agreement could feature, for example, a limit on the number of US interceptors capable of shooting down strategic missiles. Since Russia has several hundred ICBMs, such a limit could be quite high—and thus represent a threat to the Chinese deterrence capability, which is quite small.

24. RIA-Novosti, “Razvitie Ontozhenii Mezhdu RF i Indiei Otvechaet Interesam Mira—MID KNR” [MFA of China: Development of Relations between Russia and India Corresponds to the Interest of Peace], December 26, 2012.