NUCLEAR STABILITY AT LOW NUMBERS

Abstract

Chinese writings on the workings of nuclear stability, deterrence, and coercion are thin and politicized. Nevertheless, it is possible to glean, from direct and inferential evidence, rather pessimistic conclusions regarding Chinese views of nuclear stability at low numbers. While China has been living with low numbers in its own arsenal for decades, today it views missile defense and advanced conventional weapons as the primary threat to nuclear stability. More generally, China views nuclear stability as wedded to political amity. Because none of these would be directly addressed through further US and Russian arsenal reductions, China is unlikely to view such reductions as particularly stabilizing. While there is little in Chinese writing to suggest lower US and Russian numbers would encourage a “race to parity,” there are grounds to worry about China becoming more assertive as it gains confidence in Beijing's own increasingly secure second-strike forces.

Keywords:

• China
• nuclear weapons
• deterrence
• strategic stability
• arms control

Notes

1. There is some evidence of rising threat perceptions regarding Russian fourth generation weapons and simulated nuclear testing. See Guo Yang, “Looking at the US Strategy of a Nuclear-Free World From the Perspective of the New Partnership Capacity” [从新军事革命视用看美国的世界无核化战略] Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Modern International Relations], Beijing, July 20, 2010; OSC CPP20101014671002. The author is a junior officer and PhD student who is a general staff member at a division of the PLA General Staff Department. Similarly, see concerns about US-Russian missile defense collaboration: 吳日強 [Wu Riqiang],“少核武器情形下的战略稳定性研” [Research on the Nature of Strategic Stability under Conditions of Low Numbers], 清华大学法学博士学位论文 [PhD Thesis at Tsinghua University], May 2012, pp. 106–07.

2. But that baseline is clearer relative to the 1990s than to today, as China is only now confident of its survivable second strike.

3. The phrase “sprint to parity,” as a hypothetical future option for China, is attributed to Donald H. Rumsfeld, then-secretary of defense, who said in 2002 that “a country could decide that they would like to try to sprint toward parity or superiority in nuclear capabilities.” Testimony in Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction: The Moscow Treaty, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., July 9, 17, 23 and September 12, 2002 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), p. 99.

4. See, in this issue, David S. Yost, “Risks for European Strategic Stability with Low Numbers of US and Russian Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review 20 (July 2013), pp. 206–45, and Nikolai Sokov, “Assessment of Russian Attitudes Toward Phased, Deep Reductions of Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review 20 (July 2013), pp. 247–61.

5. The numbers of Chinese warheads are based on the findings in Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 6 (November 1, 2011), <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/6/81.full.pdf+html>.

6. Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., Feb 16, 2012, p. 19, <www.dia.mil/public-affairs/testimonies/2012-02-16.html>.

7. One Chinese author writes, “One basic definition is to be able to accept a level of nuclear warheads surviving a strike being less than the standard for mutually assured destruction. … therefore for strategic stability purposes … less than 100 nuclear warheads qualifies as a ‘low number of nuclear weapons,’ should be widely accepted.” 吳日強 [Wu Riqiang], “少核武器情形下的战略稳定性研” [Research on the Nature of Strategic Stability under Conditions of Low Numbers], pp. 16–17. Although Wu is a junior scholar, he has studied under Li Bin, a very well-connected professor who formerly worked in the Chinese nuclear weapon community.

8. For more information on the debunking of such estimates, see James Acton, “The Underground Great Wall: An Alternative Explanation,” Proliferation Analysis, Carneigie Endowment for International Peace, October 26, 2011, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/26/underground-great-wall-alternative-explanation>, and Gregory Kulacki, “The Sources of Karber's Sources,” All Things Nuclear Blog, Union of Concerned Scientists, December 7, 2011, <http://allthingsnuclear.org/the-sources-of-karbers-sources/>. Addressing this case and the broader dangers of such pseudo-intelligence work, see Joshua Rovner, “Intelligence in the Twitter Age,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 26 (February, 2013), pp. 260–71.

9. Burgess, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb 16, 2012

10. Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson, and Christopher Yeaw, “Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and Its Implications for the United States,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32 (2009), pp. 67–114.

11. On all these see Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson, and Christopher P. Twomey, “The People's Liberation Army's Selective Learning: Lessons of the Iran-Iraq ‘War of the Cities’ Missile Duels and Uses of Missiles in Other Conflicts,” in Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen, eds., Chinese Lessons From Other Peoples’ Wars (Carlisle, Penn: Strategic Studies Institute Book, 2011).

12. Dingli Shen, “Chinese Nuclear Policy and Modernization Plans,” Global Change, Peace & Security 23 (2011), pp. 263–69.

13. M. Taylor Fravel and Evan. S. Medeiros, “China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security 35 (2010), pp. 48–87.

14. Chase, Erickson, and Yeaw, “Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization.”

15. “Although the goal of a nuclear-free world is welcome, the majority of Chinese experts and analysts are not so optimistic about the prospect of its realization.” Hui Zhang, “China's Perspective on a Nuclear-Free World,” Washington Quarterly 33 (March, 2010), pp. 139–55.

16. “New Treaty, New Nuclear Game,” Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], Open Source Center, CPP20100409787004, April 8, 2010.

17. Fan Jishe: “The ‘Third Path’ of the United States Nuclear Policy,” Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], Open Source Center, CPP20100420710003, April 20, 2010, p. 3.

18. “Many Chinese experts and analysts are not optimistic about Russia's commitment to deep reductions either.” Zhang, “China's Perspective on a Nuclear-Free World,” p. 144.

19. Xinhua, “PRC UN Envoy Calls for Continued Efforts in Promoting Nuclear Disarmament,” Open Source Center, CPP20100505338001, May 4, 2010.

20. Lu Desheng, “China To Speak up More on Arms Control and Disarmament—Special Interview With Secretary General of China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, Li Hong,” Jiefangjun Bao [PLA Daily], Open Source Center, CPP20100610710005, June 10, 2010, p. 4.

21. Chen Xulong, “The ‘American Stance’ at Nuclear Security Summit,” Liaowang [Wide Angle], No. 14, Open Source Center, CPP20100413710017, April 5, 2010, pp. 58–59; Wu Ting, “China May Take Unilateral and Symbolic Nuclear Disarmament Actions” (Interview with Zhang Guihong, vice dean of Academy of International Studies of Fudan University and expert in international multilateral mechanism), Dongfang Zaobao [Southern Morning Newspaper], Open Source Center, CPP20100427001002, April 26, 2010.

22. The author has managed semi-annual “track-two” meeting with about twenty Chinese military and civilian experts (and their US counterparts) on nuclear issues continually since 2005. At a broad level, see Hu Yumin: “China Plays Constructive Role in Process of Arms Control and Disarmament,” Jiefangjun Bao [PLA Daily], CPP20100706788001, July 6 2010, p. 4; Liu Zhenming, “Actively Promote the International Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation Process, Ensure that Nuclear Power Benefits Mankind,” Qiushi [Seeking Truth], No. 11, Open Source Center, CPP20100601710012, June, 1, 2010. Liu is Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs.

23. Teng Jianqun, “New Theory of Nuclear Deterrence,” Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [Research in International Problems], Open Source Center, CPP20091210671001, Nov 13, 2009, pp. 13–18. Teng is deputy secretary general of China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and a retired senior PLA officer.

24. 鹿音 [Lt. Col. Lu Yin], “如何构建中美新型战略稳定?” [How to Construct a New Type of Sino-US Strategic Stability], 现代国际关系 [Contemporary International Relations], No. 10, 2012, p. 37. Col. Lu is a researcher at the National Defense University.

25. Zhang Baohui, “US Missile Defence and China's Nuclear Posture: Changing Dynamics of An Offence–Defence Arms Race,” International Affairs 87 (2011), pp. 555–69.

26. Thomas Fingar, “Worrying About Washington: China's Views on the US Nuclear Posture,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (2011), pp. 51–68.

27. Zhang, “China's Perspective on a Nuclear-Free World,” p. 145.

28. Interestingly, as India's arsenal grows, China may be faced with challenges to this perception, since India, too, avers to a NFU policy.

29. Bin Li and Hongyi Nie, “An Investigation of China-U.S. Strategic Stability,” World Economics & Politics, No. 2 (2008), p. 2, English translation available at <www.ucusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/Li-and-Nie-translation-final-5-22-09.pdf>.

30. Gordon G. H. Chang, “To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis,” International Security 12 (April 1988), pp. 96–123; Rosemary R. J. Foot, “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict,” International Security 13 (1988), pp. 92–112.

31. Zhang, “China's Perspective on a Nuclear-Free World,” p. 147.

32. For instance, 鹿音 [Lt. Col. Lu Yin], “如何构建中美新型戰略穩定?” [How to Construct a New Type of Sino-US Strategic Stability], 现代国际关系 [Contemporary International Relations], No. 10, 2012, p. 35.

33. Xinhua, “Commentary: Why a Successful NPT Review Conference Is So Crucial?,” Open Source Center, CPP20100503968152, May 3, 2010.

34. Chinese Defense White Paper, 2008. This is also a dominant theme throughout 吴日强 [Wu Riqiang], “少核武器情形下的战略稳定性” [Research on the Nature of Strategic Stability under Conditions of Low Numbers].

35. Zhang Baohui, “The Security Dilemma in the US-China Military Space Relationship,“ Asian Survey 51 (March 2011), p. 320.

36. Li and Nie, “An Investigation of China-U.S. Strategic Stability,” p. 5.

37. 吴日强 [Wu Riqiang], “少核武器情形下的战略稳定性研” [Research on the Nature of Strategic Stability under Conditions of Low Numbers], p. 82. Given the most recent shifts in Obama administration policy, this may wane over time.

38. Although, presumably, the necessities of verification would greatly complicate this. Even seeing a MIRV bus probably yields significant technological information about the nature of countermeasures being used.

39. Zhang, “US Missile Defence and China's Nuclear Posture: Changing Dynamics of An Offence–Defence Arms Race,” p. 562.

40. Shen, “Chinese Nuclear Policy and Modernization Plans,” p. 266.

41. Wu Riqiang, “Survivability of China's Sea-Based Nuclear Forces,” Science & Global Security 19 (May 2011), pp. 91–120.

42. Eben Lindsey, Michael Glosny, and Christopher P. Twomey, “Conference Report: U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase VI,” NPS Technical Report NS12-01, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, January 2012.

43. Xu Tianran, “India Postpones Missile Test,” Global Times, April 19, 2012, <www.globaltimes.cn/DesktopModules/DnnForge%20-%20NewsArticles/Print.aspx?tabid=99&tabmoduleid=94&articleId=705632&moduleId=405&PortalID=0>.

44. Xu Tianran, “India Postpones Missile Test,” Global Times, April 19, 2012, <www.globaltimes.cn/DesktopModules/DnnForge%20-%20NewsArticles/Print.aspx?tabid=99&tabmoduleid=94&articleId=705632&moduleId=405&PortalID=0>.

45. Chen Xulong: “The ‘American Stance’ at Nuclear Security Summit,” Liaowang [Wide Angle], No. 14 Open Source Center, CPP20100413710017, April 5, 2010, pp. 58–59.

46. See relevant chapters in Scobell, Lai, and Kamphausen, eds., Chinese Lessons From Other Peoples’ Wars.

47. Guo Yang, “Looking at the US Strategy of a Nuclear-Free World From the Perspective of the New Partnership Capacity.”

48. Wu Chunsi, “Zhongmei he guanxi di zouxiang” [Trends in Sino-US nuclear relationship], in Zhu Mingquan, Wu Chunsi, and Su Changhe, eds., Weishe yu wending: zhongmei he guanxi [Deterrence and Stability: The China-US Nuclear Relationship], (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2005), pp. 296–97.

49. Li and Nie, ”An Investigation of China-U.S. Strategic Stability,” pp. 6–7.

50. Wu, “Survivability of China's Sea-Based Nuclear Forces”; Zhang, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship.”

51. Wu, “Survivability of China's Sea-Based Nuclear Forces”; Zhang, “The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship.”

52. 鹿音 [Lt. Col. Lu Yin], “如何构建中美新型戰略穩定?” [How to Construct a New Type of Sino-US Strategic Stability], 现代国际关系 [Contemporary International Relations], No. 10, 2012, pp. 35–36.

53. Lou Chunhao and Zhang Mingming, “South Asia's Strategic Importance, China's South Asian Strategy,” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], Open Source Center, CPP20100324671002, February 20, 2010, pp. 42–47. The authors are, respectively, a research assistant at the Institute of South Asian and Southeast Asian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), and master's graduate from School of International Studies, Renmin University. They are publishing in the flagship CICIR journal, however, so their junior status might be a bit misleading.

54. Han Hua, “Nuclear Weapons and Stability in South Asia: Questions of Escalation and Arms Race,” unpublished paper, June 2012.

55. Zhang Tuosheng (retired PLAN captain) quoted in “China's Nuclear Security, Situation, and Breakthroughs,” Shijie Zhishi [World Knowledge], Open Source Center, CPP20100810671003, April 16, 2010, pp. 22–23.

56. In particular, the Clinton administration's diplomacy in South Asia in 1999 is highlighted frequently. See Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb (Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

57. Han Hua, “Nuclear Weapons and Stability in South Asia,” p. 5.

58. Han Hua, “Nuclear Weapons and Stability in South Asia,” p. 6.

59. When engaged on this, Chinese interlocutors emphasize robust personnel reliability assessments and their separation of warheads from launch vehicles. Again, these are unaffected by reducing arsenal sizes.

60. Zhang, “China's Perspective on a Nuclear-Free World,” p. 147.

61. See, for example, Liu Qing, “Appeasing Abe: The US Retreats from its Stance on the Diaoyu Islands,” China-US Focus, February 22, 2013, <www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/>. Liu Qing is Director of the Department for American Studies at the Chinese Institute of International Studies, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs-affiliated think tank.

62. Despite much attention by the US-South Korea alliance managers over the past several years regarding “pyroprocessing” proposals for spent nuclear fuel and other modifications of the US-South Korea nuclear energy agreements, there has been scant mention of this issue in the Chinese press.

63. Note, however, that one important statement, by Sha Zukang, a former arms control rhetorician at the Foreign Ministry, suggested China viewed nuclear compellence as useful in preventing Taiwanese independence. That statement has been repeatedly repudiated by Chinese officials, military officers, and connected civilian analysts.

64. Thomas J. Christensen, “The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China's Strategic Modernization and US-China Security Relations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35 (August 2012), pp. 447–87. As noted at the beginning of this article, there are some signs these discussions are occurring at the margins of Chinese policy deliberations.

65. James Fearon, “Selection Effects and Deterrence,” International Interactions 28 (2002), pp. 5–29.

66. 吳日強 [Wu Riqiang], “少核武器情形下的战略稳定性研” [Research on the Nature of Strategic Stability under Conditions of Low Numbers], pp. 112–3.

67. 第二炮兵 [PLA Second Artillery Force], 第二炮兵战役学 [Science of Second Artillery Campaigns] (Beijing, China: People's Liberation Army Press, 2004), especially chapters 10 and 11. This document enjoys limited circulation in China, but is widely available in the west and Taiwan. It is reportedly used for training and instruction in the PLA. For the best parsing of this source, see Fravel and Medeiros, “China's Search for Assured Retaliation.”

68. In contrast, see Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority or the Balance of Resolve? Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” International Organizations 67 (January, 2013). pp. 141–71.

69. 鹿音 [Lt. Col. Lu Yin], “如何构建中美新型战略稳定?” [How to Construct a New Type of Sino-US Strategic Stability], p. 37.

70. 鹿音 [Lt. Col. Lu Yin], “如何构建中美新型战略稳定?” [How to Construct a New Type of Sino-US Strategic Stability], p. 37.