SPEED BUMP ON THE ROAD TO GLOBAL ZERO

Abstract

The prospect of the United States continuing to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal to “very low numbers” has raised questions in Japan and South Korea, where US extended deterrence guarantees are premised on the “nuclear umbrella.” In both countries, however, concerns focus less on numerical arsenal size than on the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet evolving threats and on the degree of broader US commitment to these alliances. This article assesses developments in US-Japan and US-South Korea relationships in response to the Obama administration's nuclear disarmament policies, focusing on how the evolutionary course of those relationships may in turn condition prospects for sustaining this US nuclear policy direction. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term, but also that US nuclear arsenal size is secondary to broader political, strategic, and military factors in meeting these challenges. The evaluation concludes that strong alliance relationships and strategic stability in East Asia can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, but also that deterioration of these relationships could imperil core US nuclear policy and nonproliferation objectives.

Keywords:

• Japan
• South Korea
• North Korea
• East Asia
• United States
• extended deterrence
• nuclear weapons
• nuclear disarmament

Notes

1. The assessment considers potential arsenal level reductions in a range of 1,000 to 100 deployed warheads, but also examines more figurative meanings of “low” levels, including both capability and policy components.

2. See Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: Increasing Transparency in the US Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” May 3, 2010, <www.defense.gov/npr/docs/10-05-03_Fact_Sheet_US_Nuclear_Transparency__FINAL_w_Date.pdf>. The Soviet stockpile, at its peak, has been estimated at 45,000 weapons. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66 (July/August 2010), pp. 77–83.

3. The NPR was first publicly summarized at a Department of Defense briefing on January 9, 2002. The classified review was subsequently obtained by the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times. Substantial unofficial excerpts are available at GlobalSecurity.org <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>. For an assessment of these nuclear policy debates, see Wade L. Huntley, “Threats All The Way Down: US Strategic Initiatives in a Unipolar World,” Review of International Studies 32 (January 2006), pp. 49–67.

4. Hans Kristensen, “United States Reaches Moscow Treaty Warhead Limit Early,” Federation of American Scientists (FAS), FAS Strategic Security Blog, February 9, 2009, <www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/02/sort.php>.

5. Department of Defense, “Fact Sheet: Increasing Transparency in the US Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.”

6. “Systems capable of striking a wide range of targets throughout an adversary's territory may dissuade a potential adversary from pursuing threatening capabilities.” “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” p. 12.

7. Barack Obama, “Remarks By President Barack Obama,” Prague, April 5, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered>.

8. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, p. A15. This “senior statesmen” statement represented the collective viewpoint of sixteen other bipartisan, high-level specialists participating in a conference convened for the purpose of articulating this viewpoint.

9. See, for example, the direct response by Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007, p. A19.

10. One example is the elevated prominence of disarmament at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's 2007 International Nonproliferation Conference. See Proceedings of the 2007 Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Ronald Reagan International Trade Center, Washington, DC, June 25–26, 2007, <www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=986&&prog=zgp&proj=znpp>. See also William J. Perry, Brent Scowcroft, and Charles D. Ferguson, US Nuclear Weapons Policy, Independent Task Force Report 62, Council on Foreign Relations, April 2009 <www.cfr.org/proliferation/us-nuclear-weapons-policy/p19226>.

11. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April 6, 2010, <www.defense.gov/npr/>.

12. New START, culminating the Obama administration's efforts to “reset” US-Russia relations, was signed in April 2010, ratified by the US Senate on December 22, 2010, and entered into force on February 5, 2011. Under the treaty terms, each deployed and nuclear-armed heavy bomber counts as one warhead toward this limit. The White House, “Key Facts About the New START Treaty,” <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/key-facts-about-new-start-treaty>. See also US Department of State, “New START,” <www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index.htm>.

13. “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” p. 6.

14. “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” p. 7.

15. See, for example, Scott D. Sagan, “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapon Attacks,” International Security 24 (Spring 2000), pp. 85–115.

16. “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” p. 15.

17. “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” p. 16.

18. See, for example, Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Judith Reppy, eds., Getting to Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament (Stanford University Press, 2011), and James Acton, Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security (Adelphi Series 50, No. 417, March 2011).

19. See, for example, Jeffrey Lewis, “Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Northeast Asia,” Nautilus Institute Special Report, August 1, 2012, <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/extended-nuclear-deterrence-in-northeast-asia/>; Rory Medcalf and Fiona Cunningham, eds., Disarming Doubt: The Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence in East Asia (Lowy Institute and the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2012); James L. Schoff, “Changing Perceptions of Extended Deterrence in Japan,” in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, eds., Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age (Georgetown University Press, 2012); Paul J. Saunders, Extended Deterrence and Security in East Asia: A US-Japan-South Korea Dialogue, Center for the National Interest, January 2012, <www.cftni.org/2012-Extended-Deterence-In-East-Asia.pdf>; and Richard C. Bush III, “The US Policy of Extended Deterrence in East Asia: History, Current Views and Implications,” Brookings Institution Arms Control Series, February 2011, <www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/02/arms-control-bush>.

20. On the role of this factor in thinking through extended deterrence implications as nuclear arsenals approach zero, see Matthew Evangelista, “Nuclear Abolition or Nuclear Umbrella? Choices and Contradictions in US Proposals,” in Kelleher and Reppy, eds., Getting to Zero, p. 300.

21. Many analysts believe this remark was misperceived, distorted, or not made at all; other Chinese military leaders, however, have made similar remarks. See Joseph Kahn, “Chinese General Threatens Use of A-Bombs if US Intrudes,” New York Times, July 15, 2005, <www.nytimes.com/2005/07/15/international/asia/15china.html>. The US-China nuclear relationship is the subject of another paper in this special section (see Christopher P. Twomey, “Nuclear Stability at Low Numbers: The Perspective from Beijing,”) and beyond the scope of this present article. The point is only that extended deterrence always carries a higher burden for demonstrating the will to follow through with the retaliatory threats—a burden that the trajectory of nuclear reductions may make even weightier.

22. For a report on one such recent track-two trilateral dialogue focusing specifically on issues of strategic nuclear deterrence, see Paul J. Saunders, Extended Deterrence and Security in East Asia.

23. On the absence of a multilateral security alliance in East Asia, see Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization 56 (Summer 2002), pp. 575–607. Although the obsolescence of the Cold War era “hub-and-spoke” system is a frequent point of discussion among regional specialists and in track-two settings, a deeper exploration of this topic is beyond the scope of this article.

24. Research for the section on Japan was supported by Kei Koga, “Assessing the Impact of Low Nuclear Numbers on Strategic Stability: Background Paper on Japan,” November 27, 2012. Material drawn from this work includes an applicable notation to “JBP” (Japan Background Paper). Research for the section on South Korea was supported by Jinho Park, “Literature Survey Paper on the Potential Impact on the Korean Peninsula of US Reductions of Its Nuclear Forces,” December 9, 2012, provided in support of this project. Material drawn from this work includes an applicable notation to “KBP” (Korea Background Paper). The author happily acknowledges the indispensable contribution to the present article that these background researchers provided.

25. Japan Defense Agency, “Showa 52 nendo iko ni kakawaru boeikeikaku no taiko” [1976 National Defense Program Guidelines], October 29, 1976, <www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19761029.O1J.html>; Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Heisei 8 nendo iko ni kakawaru boeikeikaku no taiko” [1996 National Defense Program Guidelines], November 28, 1996, <www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei/sankou/951128taikou.html>. [As cited in JBP, p. 6].

26. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Heisei 17 nendo iko ni kakawaru boeikeikaku no taiko ni tsuite” [About 2004 National Defense Program Guideline], December 10, 2004, <www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2004/1210taikou.html> [As cited in JBP, p. 6]. According to one analyst, Japan's NDPG is “the most fundamental, capstone document in Japanese defense policy that analyzes Japan's security environment; defines roles, missions, and capabilities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and outlines force structure.” Japan has released only four NDPGs, in 1976, 1995, 2004, and 2010. Sugio Takahashi, “Crafting Deterrence and Defense: The New Defense Policy of Japan,” October 10, 2012, <www.tokyofoundation.org/en/topics/japan-china-next-generation-dialogue/crafting-deterrence-and-defense>.

27. The planned system consisted of Aegis-based SM-3 mid-course interceptors and ground-based PAC-3 terminal phase interceptors. “On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures,” Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Office of the Prime Minister, Government of Japan, December 19, 2003, <www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html>; Masako Toki, “Missile defense in Japan,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 16, 2009, <www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/missile-defense-japan>.

28. Japanese Ministry of Defense, “Successful Completion of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Intercept Test Flight Test in Hawaii,” December 17, 2007, <www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/lastest/press20071217.html>. Japan was the first country other than the United States to successfully test the Aegis system.

29. For an early English-language reading, see Ken Jimbo, “Japanese perceptions of Obama's nuclear ‘twin commitments,’” Japan Times, March 5, 2009, <www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2009/03/05/commentary/japanese-perceptions-of-obamas-nuclear-twin-commitments>.

30. The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, East Asian Strategic Review 2010 (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2010), p. 260, <www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/east-asian/e2010.html>; Hirofumi Tozaki, Kaku gunshuku to Nichibei domei: kakudai yokushi he no eikyo [Nuclear Disarmament and US-Japan Alliance: effects on the extended deterrence], Research Report, in Kakugunshku wo meguru aratana doko [New Trend for Nuclear Disarmament], Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research Report, (2009), p. 58. <www.cpdnp.jp/eng/research/2008-%8Aj%8CR%8Fk%82%CC%90V%82%BD%82%C8%93%AE%8C%FC-CPDNP.pdf>; Pacific Forum CSIS, The Alliance Rebounds, But Expectations Remain a Problem: The Fourth US-Japan Strategic Dialogue, July 2011, p. 16, <csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_vol11no14%20-%20English.pdf> [As cited and described in JPB, p. 7].

31. For example, Yukio Satoh, “‘Kakunaki sekai’ to nihon no anzenhosho” [“World Without Nuclear Weapons” and Japan's Security], Kokusai Mondai 595 (October 2010), pp. 56–57. [as cited in JBP, p. 7].

32. Tsutomu Suzuki, “Reisengo no NATO ni okeru beikoku no kakudai yokushi: ‘kakudaiyokushi no shinraisei kensho to kyokun jiko’ oyobi ‘nichibei kyouka he no gani’” [US Extended Deterrence in NATO after the Cold War: “Testing Credibility and Learning Lessons of Extended Deterrence” and “Implications for Strengthening the US-Japan Alliance],” Rikusen Kenkyu [The Journal of Ground Warfare], (July 2012), p. 14; Sugio Takahashi, “Kakuheiki wo meguru shomondai to nihon no anzenhosho: NPR—shin START taisei, ‘Kakuheiki no nai Sekai,’ Kakudai yokushi” [Issues Surrounding Nuclear Weapons and Japan's Security: NPR, New START, “The World without Nuclear Weapons,” and Extended Deterrence], Kaigai Jijo (Journal of World Affairs) 58, (July-August 2010), p. 49. [as cited in JBP, pp. 8–9].

33. Brad Glosserman (Rapporteur), “Japan-US Security Relations: A Testing Time for the Alliance. A Conference Report,” Issues & Insights 9 (March 2009), p. 3, <csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_v09n14.pdf> [as cited in JBP, p. 9].

34. Japan's attention to this specific capability traces to the Bush administration reportedly telling Japan in 2001 that the United States was retaining then-stored nuclear-capable Tomahawk missiles for potential deployment specifically to reinforce nuclear extended deterrence of Japan. See Jeffrey Lewis, “Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Northeast Asia,” and Michito Tsuruoka, “Why the NATO Nuclear Debate Is Relevant to Japan and Vice Versa,” Policy Brief, German Marshall Fund, October 8, 2010, <www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf//galleries/ct_publication_attachments/Tsuruoka_NuclearDebate_Oct10_final.pdf>.

35. Kenji Matsuyama, “Kaku no kakudai yokushi to nihon no anzenhosho: kaku tomaho-ku taieki no ronten” [Nuclear Extended Deterrence and Japan's Security: Discussion about Retirement of the Nuclear Tomahawk], Refarensu, January 2011, pp. 51–52, <www.ndl.go.jp/jp/data/publication/refer/pdf/072004.pdf>; Sugio Takahashi, “Kakuheiki wo meguru shomondai to nihon no anzenhosho” [Issues Surrounding Nuclear Weapons and Japan's Security], p. 47; Takashi Kawakami, “Beikoku no kakuseisaku no doko: 8 nen buri no ‘kakutaisei no minaoshi (NPR)’ wo yomitoku” [US Nuclear Policy: Analysis on the New NPR Rippo to Chosa, 309 (October 2010), p. 48. [as cited and described in JBP, pp. 16–17]. On the rationale for the Tomahawk retirement, see Jeffrey Lewis, “Why The Navy Should Retire TLAM-N,” ArmsControlWonk.com, December 13, 2009, <lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2560/why-the-navy-should-retire-tlam-n>; and Hans M. Kristensen, “Japan, TLAM/N, and Extended Deterrence,” July 2, 2009, <www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/07/tlam.php>.

36. JBP, p. 2, identifying politician Katsuya Okada as one such voice before he changed his position and withdrew support for no first use and negative security assurances.

37. While China and North Korea are the most frequently mentioned countries potentially posing threats to Japan, threat concerns themselves are often somewhat generalized, and Japan's recent National Defense Program Guidelines, perhaps for political reasons, have not cited specific threats. JPB, p. 4.

38. See Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Not Going Nuclear: Japan's Response to North Korea's Nuclear Test,” Arms Control Today (June 2007), <www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/CoverStory>; Yukio Satoh, “Reinforcing American Extended Deterrence for Japan: An Essential Step for Nuclear Disarmament,” AJISS-Commentary, 57 (February 3, 2009), <www.jiia.ormjp/en_commentary/pdf/AIISS-Commentary57.pdf>; Tozaki, Kaku gunshuku to Nichibei domei: kakudai yokushi he no eikyo [Nuclear Disarmament and US-Japan Alliance: effects on the extended deterrence], p. 59 [as cited in JBP, p. 13].

39. Jeffrey Lewis, “Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Northeast Asia.”

40. For those who argued the insufficiency of the Extended Deterrence Dialogue, see Masahiko Sasajima, Kaku gunshukuka no kakudai yokushi to nihon [The Extended Deterrence and Japan under Nuclear Disarmament], Yomiuri Kuoh Tari [Yomiuri Quarterly] 14 (Summer 2010), p. 15. [as cited in JBP, p. 1]. For a discussion on the unprecedented results that developed from the EDD, see Yukio Satoh, [“World Without Nuclear Weapons” and Japan's Security], p. 49 [as cited in JBP, p. 13].

41. Jeffrey Lewis, “Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Northeast Asia;” see also Katsuya Okada, “Okada gaisho kara beikokumuchokan, kokubochokan he no shokan” [Letter to US State Secretary and Defense Secretary from Foreign Minister Okada], in Nuclear Weapon & Nuclear Test Monitor, February 15, 2010, p. 2. <www.peacedepot.org/nmtr/bcknmbr/nmtr346.pdf> [as cited in JBP, p. 13], and Hans M. Kristensen, “Japanese Government Rejects TLAM/N Claim,” January 24, 2010, <www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/01/japanrejects.php>.

42. Brad Glosserman (Rapporteur), “Celebrate or Separate? The Japan-US Security Treaty at 50: A Conference Report,” Issues & Insights 10 (January 2010), p. 13, <csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_v10n15.pdf>. [as cited in JBP, p10].

43. On the establishment of an institutionalized interaction similar to NATO's NPG, see Tsutomu Suzuki, [US Extended Deterrence in NATO after the Cold War], pp. 19–21. [as cited in JBP, p. 13]. For a fuller consideration of this comparison, see Michito Tsuruoka, “Why the NATO Nuclear Debate Is Relevant to Japan and Vice Versa.” For arguments for a less structured strategic dialogue on extended deterrence, see Taku Ishikawa, “Dai 2 sho: Kaku Gunshuku to higashi ajia no anzen hosho” [Chapter 2: Nuclear Disarmament and East Asian Security], in Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (CPDNP), Japan Institute of International Affairs, “Kakuheiki no nai sekai” ni muketa kadai no saikento [Reconsideration Towards “The World Without Nuclear Weapons”] (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2011), p. 23.

44. Joint Statement of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, June 21, 2011, <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166597.htm>.

45. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee—Toward a Deeper and Broader US-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership,” June 21, 2011, <www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdfs/joint1106_01.pdf>. [as cited in JBP, p. 14].

46. Ministry of Defense, “National Defense Program Guidelines (Dec. 17, 2010),” <www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/national.html>. See also National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, East Asian Strategic Review 2011 (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2011), pp. 263–64. [as quoted in JBP, p. 5, note 3].

47. At the same time, the 2010 NDPG also maintained that “the extended deterrence provided by the United States, with nuclear deterrent” remains “a vital element” for Japan's security, “as long as nuclear weapons exist.” Ministry of Defense, “National Defense Program Guidelines (Dec. 17, 2010),” p. 2. This conclusion is emphasized by Matake Kamiya in “US-Japan Alliance on the Recovery Path,” Issues & Insights 11, (July 2011), p. 6. [as noted and cited in JBP, p. 6]. Note, however, that this stipulation also parallels language in President Obama's Prague speech and provisions of the US 2010 NPR, which assert the US intention to maintain fully effective and credible nuclear forces to serve necessary security functions so long as the disarmament objective remains a work in progress.

48. Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012 (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2012), p. 105, <www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2012.html>. [as quoted in JBP, p. 18–9.] See also Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era, Japan's Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation, August 10, 2010, <www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo_e.pdf>. This council's report became the basic framework of the 2010 NDPG. [as cited by JBP, p. 2].

49. Sugio Takahashi, “Crafting Deterrence and Defense: The New Defense Policy of Japan,” [originally cited in JBP, p. 19]. On the inadequacy of traditional extended deterrence in light of such recent North Korean provocations, see Jeffrey Lewis, “Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Northeast Asia.”

50. Sugio Takahashi, “Crafting Deterrence and Defense: The New Defense Policy of Japan,” [originally cited in JBP, p. 19]. Similar concerns with meeting China's “low-intensity” threats were expressed by Japanese participants in the trilateral track-two conference reported in Paul J. Saunders, Extended Deterrence and Security in East Asia: A US-Japan-South Korea Dialogue.

51. The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, East Asian Strategic Review 2012 (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2012), p. 249 [as quoted in JBP, p. 19].

52. “The Alliance Rebounds, But Expectations Remain a Problem: The Fourth US-Japan Strategic Dialogue,” pp. 1, 5–6 [as cited in JBP, p. 11].

53. Ministry of Defense, “Nichibei boei-sho kaidan no gaiyo” [Summary of US-Japan Defense Ministers’ Meeting], October 25, 2011, <www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2011/10/25_gaiyou.html>; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: April 27, 2012, by Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Panetta, Minister for Foreign Affairs Gemba, Minister of Defense Tanaka,” April 27, 2012, <www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/pdfs/joint_120427_en.pdf> [as cited in JBP, pp. 19–20]. See also Yoichi Kato, “Kokusai kankyo no henka no nakano nichibei domei” [US-Japan Alliance in the context of Changing International Envoronment], Kokusai Mondai 608 (Jan-Feb., 2012), pp. 33–35 [as cited in JBP, pp. 21–2].

54. Hiroyuki Seki, “Beikokubo yosan sakugen no doko to ajia taiheiyo no zenpou puresensu” [Shrinking US Military Defense and US Forward Deployment in the Asia Pacific Region], Kaikankou Senryaku Kenkyu 2 (May 2012), pp. 39–43, <www.mod.go.jp/msdf/navcol/SSG/review/2-1/2-1-3.pdf>; Michihiko Suzuki, “Ajia taiheiyo jushi no gunjisenryaku he tankan dekiruka: kokubohi no ohabasakugen tono ryoritsu ni nayamu beikoku” [Can the United States focus its military strategy on the Asia-Pacific region?: US facing dilemmas due to the drastic cut of its defense budget], Senryakuken repoto (April 18, 2012), pp. 5–6.; Yuki Tatsumi, “Amerika no kokubo yosan sakugen giron washinton de futtochu: ‘ajia taiheiyo jushi’ senryaku he no eikyo wa?” [Intensive Discussion over Reduction of US Military Budget: Effects on “Rebalancing to Asia-Pacific” Strategy?], Wedge, May 29, 2012, <wedge.ismedia.jp/articles/-/1927?page=1>, [as cited and described in JBP, pp. 17–18].

55. Tetsuya Umemoto, “Beikoku no kakuseisaku to ‘kakuheiki naki sekai’” [US Nuclear Policy and ‘Global Zero’], Kokusai Mondai 595 (October 2010), p. 10 [as cited and described in JBP, p. 8]. Note that this reasoning inverts the nuclear arms race dynamics typically taken to have driven US and Soviet buildups during the Cold War.

56. Sugio Takahashi, “Kakuheiki wo meguru shomondai to nihon no anzenhosho” [Issues Surrounding Nuclear Weapons and Japan's Security], pp. 41–42; The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, East Asian Strategic Review 2010, p. 261 [as cited and described in JBP, p. 8].

57. For an articulation of these latter conditions, see Christopher P. Twomey, “Asia's Complex Strategic Environment: Nuclear Multipolarity and Other Dangers,” Asia Policy 11 (January 2011), pp. 51–78.

58. For recent overviews of Japan's consideration of nuclear weapons, see Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Japan's Policy and Views on Nuclear Weapon: A Historical Perspective,” Malaysian Journal of History, Politics, & Studies 37, 2012; Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo's Nuclear Option,” Naval War College Review 62 (Summer 2009), pp. 59–78; and Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests,” Congressional Research Service, RL34487, February 19, 2009.

59. In 2002–03, as the Agreed Framework with North Korea was collapsing, the Bush administration seemed to insinuate that it might view a nuclear Japan more benignly than previous US governments. See Charles Krauthammer, “The Japan Card,” Washington Post, January 3, 2003, p. A19, and Mitsuru Kurusawa, “East Asian Regional Security and Arguments for a Nuclear Japan,” prepared for a workshop on Prospects for East Asian Disarmament, Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima, Japan, March 11–12, 2004, <http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/image/Kurosawa.pdf>.

60. The existence of the report was disclosed by the Asahi Shimbun on February 20, 2003 <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/japan/nuke.htm>. Matake Kamiya argues that “Japan is not willing, interested, or able to become a nuclear power;” see “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?” Washington Quarterly 26 (Winter 2002–03), pp. 63–75.

61. For a somewhat contrary argument, see Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation,” International Security 36 (Fall 2011), pp. 154–89.

62. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, Nihon no gunshuku, fukakusan gaiko (dai 5 han) [Japan's Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Diplomacy (5th Edition)] (Tokyo; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2011), p. 7 [as cited in JBP, p. 22].

63. James L. Schoff, “Changing Perceptions of Extended Deterrence in Japan.”

64. The original Mutual Defense Treaty contained no specific US provision of extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea; this came later, at the 11th SCM in 1978. Subsequently, “the annual SCM has concluded each year with a specific expression of the US commitment to provide its nuclear umbrella.” Cheon Seong Whun, “The Significance of Forming a ROK-US Extended Deterrence Policy Committee,” Korean Institute for National Reunification, November 3, 2010, p. 4, <www.kinu.or.kr/upload/neoboard/DATA02/co10-39(E)1.pdf>.

65. Hans Kristensen, “A History of US Nuclear Weapons in South Korea,” The Nuclear Information Project, September 28, 2005, <www.nukestrat.com/korea/koreahistory.htm>.

66. Jae-bong Lee, “Namhanui haekmoogi baechiwa bookhanui haekmoogi gaebal: Hanbandoui bihaekhwaul wihayeo” [Deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea and North Korea's development of nuclear weapons: Toward Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula], Peace Studies 9 (December 2008), pp. 31–33 [as cited in KBP, p. 1].

67. Hans Kristensen, “The Withdrawal of U.S. Nuclear Weapons from South Korea,” The Nuclear Information Project, September 28, 2005, <www.nukestrat.com/korea/withdrawal.htm>.

68. As quoted in KBP, p. 2; an English version of the declaration is available at the Federation of American Scientists’ website, <www.fas.org/news/skorea/1991/911108-d4111.htm>.

69. Hans Kristensen, “The Withdrawal of U.S. Nuclear Weapons from South Korea.” These two justifications are also somewhat contradictory, as North Korea itself accurately, if bombastically, recognized when its reported commentary on the announced planned withdrawal observed that, with its intercontinental reach, “the US nuclear threat to us would not be dispelled, even though nuclear weapons are taken out of South Korea.” Rodong Sinmun, November 1, 1991 [as cited in Kristensen, “The Withdrawal of U.S. Nuclear Weapons from South Korea”].

70. For a review of this period, see Wade L. Huntley, “US Policy toward North Korea in Strategic Context: Tempting Goliath's Fate,” Asian Survey 47 (May/June 2007), pp. 455–80.

71. Siegfried S. Hecker, “A Return Trip to North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex,” Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, November 20, 2010.

72. For the 2005 Statement of Principles, see US Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005,” <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm>. For the 2007 Action Plan, see Reuters, “North Korea hands over plutonium documents,” May 8, 2008, <www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSN0833667920080508>.

73. For an elaboration of this interpretation, see Dongjin Jeong, “China's Foreign Policy Toward North Korea: The Nuclear Issue,” Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2012.

74. The statement was issued by former Prime Ministers Hong-koo Lee and Sung-joo Han, former Speaker of National Assembly Kwan-young Park, and former Korean War ROK Army Chief of Staff Sun-yup Paik. The original statement is available at Daily NK <www.dailynk.com/korean/read.php?cataId=nk00900&num=84683>. [as described in KBP, p. 1].

75. Cheon Seong Whun, “The Significance of Forming a ROK-US Extended Deterrence Policy Committee,” p. 5.

76. “Mi haekmoogi gamchook choojinhaedo hankookeh haekwoosan gyesok jeahgong” [Continuing the provision of nuclear umbrella to Korea while reducing US nuclear weapons], Dong-A Ilbo 2, April 2, 2010, <news.donga.com/3/all/20100402/27299519/1>; “Advance Consultation Held on the US Nuclear Posture Review,” Press Release, ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, April 6, 2010 <www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/press/pressreleases/index.jsp?menu=m_10_20> [as cited in KBP, p. 7].

77. “S. Korea–U.S. to organize a joint committee for extending nuclear deterrence,” Hankyoreh, October 9, 2010, <english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/443035.html>. See also Cheon Seong Whun, “The Significance of Forming a ROK-US Extended Deterrence Policy Committee,” p. 5.

78. US Pacific Command, “Presence with a Purpose,” November 2011, <www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/presence-with-a-purpose/201111.shtml>; see also “S. Korea, U.S. to conduct exercise on deterrence,” Yonhap News Agency, November 4, 2011, <english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/11/04/64/0301000000AEN20111104002800315F.HTML>. [also cited in KBP, p. 6].

79. “S. Korea, U.S. agree to set N. Korean nuclear deterrence policy by 2014, Yonhap News Agency, October 24, 2012, <english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/10/24/58/0301000000AEN20121024006651315F.HTML> and “South Korea, US to Devise Detailed Deterrence Posture Against North,” Global Security Newswire, October 25, 2012,<www.nti.org/gsn/article/south-korea-us-2014-devise-detailed-deterrence-posture-against-north/>.

80. “Seoul and Washington agree to set up a new joint security committee,” ROK Ministry of National Defense, December 14, 2010, <www.mnd.go.kr/mndEng_2009/WhatsNew/RecentNews/> [also cited in KBP, p. 6].

81. Jeffrey Lewis, “Extended Deterrence Policy Committee,” October 19, 2010, <lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3057/extended-deterrence-policy-committee>; and Jeffrey Lewis, “Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Northeast Asia.”

82. Chang Kwoun Park, “ROK-US Cooperation in preparation for hostile actions by North Korea in possession of nuclear weapons,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 22 (December 2010), Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), p. 512 [as cited in KBP, p. 6.].

83. Jeffrey Lewis, “Extended Deterrence Policy Committee.”

84. “Seoul Moves to Enhance Nuclear Deterrence,” Korea Herald, October 13, 2006, as cited in Jeffrey Lewis, “Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Northeast Asia.”

85. “S. Korea–U.S. to organize a joint committee for extending nuclear deterrence” [also cited in KBP, p. 6]. Earlier in 2009, following North Korea's second nuclear test, the nuclear component of US extended deterrence was referenced for the first time in a US-ROK joint presidential summit statement. “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, June 16, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-vision-for-the-alliance-of-the-United-States-of-America-and-the-Republic-of-Korea>. See also Cheon Seong Whun, “The Significance of Forming a ROK-US Extended Deterrence Policy Committee,” p. 4.

86. “Mi ‘gamchook’ Il ‘bihaekhwa’ naenougnundeh hankookeun ‘haekwoosan yogoo’” [US: reduction, Japan: nonproliferation, and Korea: requesting nuclear umbrella], Hankyoreh, December 6, 2009, <www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/391813.html> [as cited in KBP, p. 13].

87. Yong-ok Park, “Dokjajeokin daebook haekukjeh sudan sigeuphee hwakbohaeya” [Developing Korea's own deterrence means against North Korea], Monthly Chosun 30 (July 2009), p. 90 [as cited in KBP, p. 9].

88. Duyeon Kim, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Korea: A Temporary or Perennial Debate?” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, June 2011, <www.armscontrolcenter.org/issues/northkorea/articles/tactical_nuclear_weapons_and_korea/>.

89. “Cheongwadae, cheonsoolhaek sinjoong … kookbangwehgyodangkookja ‘bookjoong abbak wehgyo’” [Blue House, prudent about tactical nuclear weapons … defense and foreign affairs government officials ‘diplomacy pressuring North Korea and China’], Korea JoongAng Daily, March 1, 2011 [as cited in KBP, p. 3].

90. “Haekgwa kookik” [Nuclear Weapons and National Interests] Dong-A Ilbo, March 1, 2011, <news.donga.com/3/all/20110228/35206765/1> [as cited in KBP, p. 3]. For a discussion of potential motivations behind the comment, see Duyeon Kim, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons & Korea: A Temporary or Perennial Debate?”

91. “U.S. denies tactical nuke redeployment in Korea,” Korea Times, May 16, 2012, <www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/05/116_111097.html>. See also “Cheonsoolhaek chaebaechi nonran” [Controversial redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons], Segye Ilbo, March 2, 2011, <www.segye.com/Articles/News/Opinion/Article.asp?aid=20110302005223&subctg1=02&subctg2=01> [as cited in KBP, p. 5].

92. Il-do Hwang, “Obamaeui daegyoomo haek pyegi, hanbando haekwoosan chulsoohana: bookhani hwahaktan ssado haekeungjing mothae haek jakgyeseo bookhan sakjehdeol soodo” [Obama's massive reduction of nuclear weapons, withdrawing nuclear umbrella from Korea], Shindonga 53 (April 2010), pp. 276–77, <shindonga.donga.com/docs/magazine/shin/2010/04/02/201004020500017/201004020500017_1.html>. See also “Conservatives renew call for nuclear weapons on Korean Peninsula,” Hanhkyoreh, March 1, 2011, <www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/465872.html>; and “Cheonsoolhaek option choonbidae itda” [Tactical nuclear option is ready], Munhwa Ilbo, March 2, 2011, <www.munhwa.com/news/view.html?no=2011030201070523116002> [as cited in KBP, pp. 5, 12].

93. “Bihaekhwa geobooga jachohanun nam cheonsoolhaek chaebaechi” [South Korea's redeployment of nuclear weapons caused by refusing denuclearization], Dong-A Ilbo, May 15, 2012. See also Chul-ho Chung, “Migook 2012 shingookbangcheonryakgwa hankookeui goonsacheonryak balcheonbanghyang” [US 2012 New Defense Strategy and Korea's development of military capabilities], Situation and Policy, The Sejong Institute, February 2012, p. 28, <www.sejong.org/Pub_ci/PUB_CI_DATA/k2012-02_7.PDF> [as cited in KBP, pp. 4, 7].

94. Seong Whun Cheon, “Migookeuh daehan haekwoosanjeongchaekeh gwanhwan yeongoo” [Study of US nuclear umbrella policy over Korea], October 2012, pp. 221–22 [as cited in KBP, p. 4].

95. Assessment provided by KBP, p. 4.

96. Hee-sang Kim, “Haek hwaksangwa hanbando/dongbookaheui cheonryak gyunhyung-bookhan haekmoonjeh” [Nuclear proliferation and the Korean Peninsula], presented at Korea Foundation Global Seminar, Konjiam Resort, Gwangju City, Gyeonggi Do, Korea, March 25, 2011; [as cited in KBP, p. 11].

97. “South Korea should get nuclear weapons: Rep. Chung,” Dong-A Ilbo, June 4, 2012, <english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2012060446358> [as cited in KBP, p. 3]. See also Duyeon Kim, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons & Korea: A Temporary or Perennial Debate?”

98. “Book2cha haeksilhoum leehoo” [After North Korea's second nuclear test], Segye Ilbo, May 28 2009 [as cited in KBP, p. 4].

99. Seung-joo Baek, “Cheonsoolhaekmoogieui hanbando jaebanip gwanryun anbojeok silik pyongga” [Analyzing security cost and benefit caused by the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons], Northeast Asia Strategic Analysis, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), June 11, 2012, <www.kida.re.kr/nasa/report/upload_report/N120612.pdf> [as cited in KBP, p. 6].

100. Duyeon Kim, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons & Korea: A Temporary or Perennial Debate?”

101. Complete data provided by East Asia Institute Senior Researcher Chung Wonchill on December 7, 2012. Some poll results are available at: <www.eai.or.kr/type_k/p1.asp?catcode=1116100000>.

102. Seong Whun Cheon, “Migookeuh daehan haekwoosanjeongchaekeh gwanhwan yeongoo” [Study of US nuclear umbrella policy over Korea], pp. 221–22 [as cited in KBP, pp. 4–5].

103. “2/3 of S. Koreans Support Nuclear Armament,” Chosun Ilbo, February 21, 2013, <http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/02/21/2013022100645.html>; Martin Fackler and Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Flirts With Nuclear Ideas as North Blusters,” New York Times, March 10, 2013, <www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/as-north-korea-blusters-south-breaks-taboo-on-nuclear-talk.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&>.

104. Toby Dalton and Yoon Ho Jin, “Reading Into South Korea's Nuclear Debate,” PacNet #20, Monday, March 18, 2013, <http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-20-reading-south-koreas-nuclear-debate>.

105. David E. Sanger, “In U.S., South Korean Makes Case for Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, April 9, 2013, <www.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/world/asia/in-us-south-korean-makes-case-for-nuclear-arms.html>. Representative Chung's full presentation is available on the web site of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/04/09/keynote-m.j.-chung-member-national-assembly-of-republic-of-korea/fv9t>.

106. Jinho Park, “Response to PacNet #20–‘Reading Into South Korea's Nuclear Debate,’” PacNet #20R, Monday, April 2, 2013, <http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-20r-response-pacnet-20-reading-south-koreas-nuclear-debate>.

107. “North Korea ends peace pacts with South,” BBC News, March 8, 2013, <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21709917>; “Missile Defense Announcement as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel,” Department of Defense, March 15, 2013, <www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1759>; Thom Shanker and Choe Snag-hun, “U.S. Runs Practice Sortie in South Korea,” New York Times, March 28, 2013, <www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/world/asia/us-begins-stealth-bombing-runs-over-south-korea.html>.

108. Thom Shanker and Choe Snag-hun, “U.S. Runs Practice Sortie in South Korea.”

109. Won-gon Park, Migookeui daehankook haekwoosan jeongchaek boonseok mit pyongga [The US nuclear umbrella policy for South Korea: Analyses and Evaluation], Defense Policy Study 75, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), Fall 2007, p. 44, <www.kida.re.kr//data/2007/10/18/2%28%B9%DA%BF%F8%B0%EF%29.pdf> [as cited in KBP, p. 8].

110. Seong Whun Cheon, “Migookeuh daehan haekwoosanjeongchaekeh gwanhwan yeongoo” [Study of US nuclear umbrella policy over Korea], pp. 168–69 [as cited in KBP, pp. 12–13].

111. See, for example, Saunders, Extended Deterrence and Security in East Asia: A US-Japan-South Korea Dialogue.

112. “Korea urges US to allow ‘peaceful nuclear enrichment,” Korea Times, September 17, 2012, <www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/09/120_120091.html> [as cited in KBP, p. 14].

113. Choe Snag-hun, “South Korea and U.S. Fail to Reach Deal on Nuclear Energy,” New York Times, April 24, 2013, <www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/world/asia/south-korea-and-us-fail-to-reach-nuclear-energy-deal.html>; Yonhap News Agency, “S. Korea fails to win U.S. nod for nuclear enrichment,” April 24, 2013, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/04/24/36/0301000000AEN20130424007200315F.HTML>.

114. Jeffrey Lewis, “Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Northeast Asia.”

115. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, chapter 25, <www.constitution.org/mac/prince25.htm>.