Command and Control of India's Nuclear Forces

Abstract

The Indian government has not made a public comment about the status of its nuclear weapon program since approving a nuclear doctrine in 2003. However, there is now enough information in the public domain to determine that the command-and-control system for the nuclear program has steadily matured in accordance with the intent of the approved nuclear doctrine. The Indian government has successfully mitigated many of the issues that plague the conventional military. The result is a basic command-and-control system that is focused only on the delivery, if ordered by the prime minister, of nuclear weapons. The system is not as robust as those of the United States and Russia, but is in place and ready as new Indian nuclear weapons enter into operation. The command-and-control system is developing to meet India's needs and political compulsions, but not necessarily as part of a more assertive nuclear policy.

KEYWORDS:

• India
• South Asia
• deterrence
• command and control
• nuclear policy

Notes

1. Bharatiya Janata Party, “Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat: Election Manifesto 2014,”. <http://bjpelectionmanifesto.com/>

2. Ashton B. Carter, “Nuclear Command and Control,” in Graham T Allison, Jr., Robert D. Blackwill, Albert Carnesale, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Robert P. Beschel, Jr., eds., A Primer for the Nuclear Age (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990), <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/a_primer_for_the_nuclear_age.pdf>.

3. BJP Party President Rajnath Singh told the Hindustan Times that “The no-first-use policy for nuclear weapons was a well thought out stand of the NDA government led by Atal Behari Vajpayee. We don't intend to reverse it,” in Kumar Uttam, “No First Use Nuclear Policy to Stay: Rajnath, Hindustan Times, April 14, 2014, <www.hindustantimes.com/elections2014/election-beat/no-first-use-nuclear-policy-to-stay-rajnath/article1-1207761.aspx>. For a good compilation of the US command and control system and a discussion on its evolution, see Robert D. Critchlow, “Nuclear Command and Control: Current Programs and Issues,” CRS Report to Congress, May 3, 2006, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33408.pdf>.

4. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” August 17, 1999, <www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18916/Draft+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine>.

5. Prime Minister's Office, “Cabinet Committee On Security Reviews Progress In Operationalizing India's Nuclear Doctrine,” press release, January 4, 2003, <http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html>.

6. Christopher Clary, “Guarding the Nuclear Guardians,” India in Transition, Center for the Advanced Study of India of the University of Pennsylvania, July 15, 2013, <http://casi.sas.upenn.edu/iit/clary>.

7. Two examples of the increasing access to the nuclear program are Vipin Narang, “Five Myths about India's Nuclear Posture,” Washington Quarterly (Summer 2013), p. 143, where he argues that India's nuclear program has changed substantially over the last decade. See also Guarav Kampani, “Is the Indian Nuclear Tiger Changing Its Stripes? Data, Interpretation and Fact,” Nonproliferation Review 21 (September/December 2014). Both demonstrate greater access to the nuclear programs than what is commonly believed.

8. Carter, “Nuclear Command and Control.”

9. It is unknown when India first developed a nuclear weapon capability. In his seminal work on India's early doctrine, Ashley Tellis concluded that India had a nuclear option prior to 1998 but did not have a nuclear arsenal. Ashley J. Tellis, “India's Emerging Nuclear Doctrine: Exemplifying the Lessons of the Nuclear Revolution,” NBR Analysis (May 2001), pp. 18–19.

10. Tellis assessed that the Indian political leadership aimed for the nuclear weapons to be “political instruments of deterrence rather than military tools of warfighting.” There was a desire by “Indian security managers to avoid the high costs involved in developing a large and costly nuclear inventory and redesigning and reequipping conventional forces for the nuclear battlefield.” Tellis, “India's Emerging Nuclear Doctrine,” pp. i-ii.

11. Ministry of External Affairs, “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board.”

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Jasjit Singh, paper presented at the 49th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, “Confroning the Challenges of the 21st Century,” Rustenburg, South Africa,September 7–13, 1999. Ashley Tellis expounds on this reasoning of the Indian policy elites in “India's Emerging Nuclear Doctrine.”

15. In a tacit 2012 acknowledgement that the nuclear system had to continue to develop, a group of prominent strategists close to the Manmohan Singh-led Congress government noted that “our nuclear policy should emphasize the hardening and survivability of our arsenal. In the face of the growing nuclear arsenals in our neighbourhood, we need to ensure an assured second-strike capability. Our main effort must be devoted to the development of the maritime leg of our nuclear capability and the accompanying command and control systems. We also need to work towards the operationalization of our missile defence capabilities.” Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran, and Siddharth Varadarajan, Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in The Twenty First Century, New Delhi, India, <www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/NonAlignment%202.0_1.pdf>.

16. “Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India's Nuclear Doctrine.”

17. Ibid.

18. Shyam Saran, “India's Nuclear Weapons Not for National Pride,” The Tribune, May 9, 2013 <http://www.tribuneindia.com/2013/20130509/edit.htm> .

19. Ibid.

20. Prime Minister's Office, “Cabinet Committee On Security Reviews Progress.”

21. Some literature, including P.R. Chari, “Release Authority: Who Will Press the Button?,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Article #2858, May 9, 2009, <www.ipcs.org/print_article-details.php?recNo=2880> and Mohammed Badrul Alam, “India's Nuclear Doctrine and Tenuous Chain of Command,” Center for Land Warfare Studies, Article 1526, March 17, 2010, <www.claws.in/index.php?action=details&m_id=527&u_id=111> discuss that the alternative chains of command are in an amended copy of the Government of India Blue Book of 1995, which discusses military contingencies, and the Red Book of 1999, which designates the alternate chains of command. These classified documents are believed to clearly designate the activities necessary during war and who would be responsible in the case of an incapacitating event. When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh underwent heart surgery in 2009, the senior cabinet minister, Finance Minister Pranab Mukerjee, was nominally in charge but was not named an officiating prime minister. This decision appears to be based on a decision of the Congress Party rather than a clearly established hierarchy. See “Prime Minister Undergoing Heart Bypass Surgery: Nation Prays,” Hindustan Times, January 24, 2009, <www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/newdelhi/prime-minister-undergoing-heart-bypass-surgery-nation-prays/article1-370367.aspx>.

22. There are a few uniformed positions that are listed as part of the MOD including the services' technical managers who act as functional experts in the purchase of defense articles, but are still tied closely to their services. There are no uniformed military in the key policy making offices—the major complaint of strategic analysts.

23. See Economist, “India as a Great Power: Know Your Own Strength,” March 30, 2013, <www.economist.com/news/briefing/21574458-india-poised-become-one-four-largest-military-powers-world-end>.

24. See Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, p. 286, for a detailed assessment of the earliest iterations of command and control, particularly the reasoning behind these decisions.

25. Manoj Joshi and Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, “National Security: Need for a Doctrine,” Observer Research Foundation Special Report: 4, New Delhi, (February 2014), <www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/issuebrief/attachments/specialreport_4_1392021784765.pdf>, p. 3. Joshi is a longtime journalist covering national security issues and a member of the Naresh Chandra Committee that issued a 2012 report on improving defense management. In this cited report, he and Iyer-Mitra give a detailed explanation of why India needs a doctrine. Much of their discussion is relevant to why it is difficult to determine the true state of the India's nuclear command and control.

26. Sandeep Unnithan, “Synergy Stalled,” India Today, June 4, 2011, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/chief-of-integrated-staff-post-vacant-for-months/1/140277.html>.

27. In the United States, the armed services were forced through the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. This legislation provided a forcing function for the services to place its best officers in joint positions, including not allowing promotion to general officer/flag officer without joint experience and education and requiring that officers with joint experience get promoted at a rate equal to or above the average of all officers. India does not have any of these requirements.

28. Saikat Datta, “’DNA’ Exclusive: Gen VK Singh tells PM some hard truths,” Digital News Agency, March 28, 2012, <www.dnaindia.com/india/report-dna-exclusive-gen-vk-singh-tells-pm-some-hard-truths-1668283>.

29. Digital News Agency, “Parliamentary panel confirms ammo shortage in army,” May 1, 2012, <www.dnaindia.com/india/report-parliamentary-panel-confirms-ammo-shortage-in-army-1682836>.

30. Manu Pubby, “Navy Chief DK Joshi Takes Responsibility for Spate of Accidents, Resigns,” Indian Express, February 26, 2014, <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/navy-chief-dk-joshi-takes-responsibility-for-spate-of-accidents-resigns/99/>.

31. See “What Ails the Indian Navy: 10 Mishaps That Led to The Navy Chief's Resignation,” Indian Express, February 26, 2014,< http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/what-ails-the-navy-warships-10-mishaps-in-last-seven-months/99/> for a detailed look at ten separate incidents that have resulted in serious damage to naval vessels and have also caused other property damage and/or casualties including deaths.

32. “Indian Armed Forces Face Shortage of Officers, Personnel,” IBN Live, <http://ibnlive.in.com/news/indian-armed-forces-face-shortage-of-officers-personnel/376616-3.html>.

33. Shyam Saran, “Is India's Nuclear Deterrent Credible?,” Speech at India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, India, April 24, 2013, <http://ris.org.in/publications/reportsbooks/654> provides a remarkably candid defense of the Indian nuclear program with details that are not often confirmed by senior leaders of the Indian government, even when speaking in a private capacity as he was at this event.

34. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “India's Nuclear Forces, 2007,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 63 (July/August 2007), p. 74.

35. Saran, “Is India's Nuclear Deterrent Credible?,” p. 7.

36. Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, “Someone's Got A Secret,” Roundtable: Nuclear Journalism in the Developing World, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 19, 2012, <http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-journalism-developing-world/someone%E2%80%99s-got-secret>.

37. This has not eliminated the fighting between services. According to several press reports, the army attempted to ensure that the SFC Commander in Chief would always be an army officer. The army reportedly claimed that it had the most effective arsenal and until the triad was truly operational, the commander should always be an army lieutenant general. For more information, see Zee News, “Indian Army wants sole right over post of Strategic Forces Commander, July 29, 2013, <http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/indian-army-wants-sole-right-over-post-of-strategic-forces-commander_865310.html>.

38. Ali Ahmed, “Indian Nuclear Command and Control – II,” Indian Defence Review, July 13, 2011, <www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/indian-nuclear-command-and-control--ii>.

39. Press Trust of India, “PM Manmohan Singh Reviews Status of Nuclear Command Authority,” Economic Times, October 7, 2013, <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-07/news/42794383_1_strategic-forces-command-nuclear-arsenal-sfc>.

40. Saran, “Is India's Nuclear Deterrent Credible?,” p. 20.

41. Ibid., p. 11.

42. Ibid., p. 21.

43. Manu Pubby, “Prithvi launches part of war game,” Indian Express, October 9, 2013, <http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/prithvi-launches-part-of-war-game/1180091/>.

44. Ibid. See also Press Trust of India, “India Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Prithvi-II Missile,” Times of India, January 7, 2014, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-test-fires-nuclear-capable-Prithvi-II-missile/articleshow/28505420.cms>.

45. “Strategic Command to Acquire 40 Nuclear Capable Fighters,” Hindustan Times, September 12, 2010, <www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/newdelhi/strategic-command-to-acquire-40-nuclear-capable-fighters/article1-599141.aspx>.

46. A.K. Singh, “The Nuclear Factor Does Not Impinge Upon My Conventional Capabilities,” Interview with Force, October 2006, p. 40, <www.forceindia.net/38-40.pdf>.

47. Saran, p. 7.

48. See Narang, “Five Myths about India's Nuclear Posture,” pp. 148–49, for a more detailed explanation of the current status of the nuclear arsenal. He assesses that weapons, especially those that could be used against Pakistan, are capable of being launched within seconds or minutes of receiving a confirmed launch order—which is subject to a two-man control procedure. He notes that, as the security of having components stored with three different agencies is unwound, there is a need for increasing the sophistication of permissive action links.

49. Saran, p. 11.

50. For a detailed look on the development and readiness of the weapon systems that would be used, see Kampani, “Is the Indian Nuclear Tiger Changing Its Stripes? Data, Interpretation and Fact,” Nonproliferation Review 21 (September 2014). Kampani makes a compelling argument that despite claims of maturation of the command-and-control systems, the actual weapons are still in development and need further testing.

51. Many commentators argue that there needs to be more transparency in order to establish stronger credibility and add to the deterrence effect. Retired Rear Admiral Raja Menon argues that a military system without a CDS and with the SFC reporting directly to the PMO is problematic. There are valid arguments to support these cases, but this paper is focused on the ability to execute a nuclear strike when directed. To achieve this goal, the apparent structure where the SFC receives orders from the executive committee (read the National Security Advisor) is adequate and more straightforward. See Raja Menon, “A mismatch of nuclear doctrines,” The Hindu, January 22, 2014, <www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/a-mismatch-of-nuclear-doctrines/article5602609.ece>.

52. For tepid praise for an organization that he describes as “a skeleton nuclear staff,” see ibid. He notes the more positive decision to include a recently retired SFC commander as an advisor to the NSA staff.

53. Much more is advertised about the close cooperation of the Indian Army's missile groups due to the periodic tests that occur of the Prithvi and Agni missiles. Little is published on the relationships with the other services. In addition, the army has requested to retain the SFC commander's billet for the army because, it argues, that they control the preponderance of the force. The navy and air force have pushed back on this assertion, but beyond that, there are no details of the relationship that has been developed.

54. See Narang, “Five Myths about India's Nuclear Posture,” p. 150, for a discussion on how quickly India can respond and focus on launch after hit approach.

55. See Clary, “Guarding the Nuclear Guardians,” for further discussion on details of possible security issues.