China's Nuclear Forces and Their Significance to India

Abstract

The Indian nuclear program is a response to a perceived politico-strategic threat from China as opposed to a military-operational one that New Delhi began after perceiving an “ultimatum” from China in 1965. Consequently, India is in the process of acquiring an assured second-strike capability vis-à-vis China to meet the requirements of general deterrence. While India has always been concerned about the Sino-Pakistani nuclear/missile nexus, China has become wary of the growing military ties between the United States and India in recent years, especially because of the military implications of the US-India civil nuclear deal. Given the growing conventional military gap between the two states, India is not lowering its nuclear threshold to meet the Chinese conventional challenge. Instead, India is upgrading its conventional military strategy from dissuasion to deterrence against China. While the overall Sino-Indian nuclear relationship is stable, it will be challenged as China acquires advanced conventional weapons that blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear conflict.

KEYWORDS:

• India
• China
• Pakistan
• deterrence
• South Asia
• regional stability
• nuclear policy

Notes

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11. See Garver, Protracted Contest, pp. 194–204.

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23. This distinction may also have a role to play in explaining the gradual weaponization of India's nuclear program.

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55. David Shambaugh, “The Insecurity of Security: The PLA's Evolving Doctrine and Threat Perceptions Towards 2000,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 13 (Spring 1994), pp. 3–25, in particular pp. 20–21. While Chinese analysts did toy with the idea of tactical nuclear weapons in the 1980s, there is no credible evidence that China possesses these weapons today.

56. See “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” Ministry of External Affairs (India), August 17, 1999, <www.mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18916/Draft+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine>; and Prime Minister's Office, “Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India's Nuclear Doctrine,” January 4, 2003, <http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html>.

57. The 2003 modifications to the 1999 draft diluted India's no-first-use posture, connoting India's willingness to retaliate with nuclear weapons if Indian territory or Indian forces are attacked by biological or chemical weapons.

58. “Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India's Nuclear Doctrine.”

59. “India Not to Engage in N-Arms Race: Jaswant,” Hindu, November 29, 1999, p. 1.

60. Gaurav Kampani, “India: The Challenges of Nuclear Operationalization and Strategic Stability,” in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Travis Tanner, ed., Strategic Asia 2013–14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013), pp. 98–128.

61. For example, see Sachin Parashar, “Pokhran II Not Fully Successful: Scientist,” Times of India, August 27, 2009, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pokhran-II-not-fully-successful-Scientist/articleshow/4938610.cms>.

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65. For the classic treatment of this concept, see McGeorge Bundy, “Existential Deterrence and Its Consequences,” in Douglas MacLean, ed., The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age (Totowa: Rowman and Allenheld, 1984), pp. 3–13.

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68. By themselves, Indian nuclear-capable aircraft may be able to hit some targets in Yunnan and Sichuan provinces. India's fleet of six Russian-built Ilyushin Il-78 midair refueling aircraft can potentially double the range of these aircraft. However, it is not clear if they will be able to perform their mission within Chinese airspace. The deployment of airborne early warning aircraft along with the fighter and refueling aircraft may complicate the operation but may enable India to actually hit targets in the Chinese heartland.

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95. Interestingly, this base was developed by the United States during World War II for “over the hump” operations against the Japanese in China. Jayanta Gupta, “Panagarh gears up for role in Arunachal's defence,” Times of India, September 4, 2013, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/kolkata/Panagarh-gears-up-for-role-in-Arunachals-defence/articleshow/22298938.cms>.

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103. “India, China agree on host of defence cooperation measures,” Times of India, February 24, 2014.

104. Most recently, the two sides signed the Border Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2013.