![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Abstract
This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan's policy makers solved a nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic's nuclear status with the aim of maximizing the state's strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev's course of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period.
Notes
1. On Kazakhstan denuclearization, see Murat Laumulin, “Kazakhstan's Nuclear Policy and the Control of Nuclear Weapons,” in The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed., George H. Quester (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 181–211; William C. Potter, The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation: The Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995), pp. 16–19, 35–42; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 138–82; Nursultan Nazarbayev, Epitsentr Mira [The Epicenter of Peace], 2nd ed. (Almaty: Atamura, 2003).
2. On neorealist assumptions on nuclear proliferation, see Benjamin Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Security Studies 2 (1993), pp. 37–78.
3. William J. Long, and Suzette R. Grillot, “Ideas, Beliefs, and Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine,” Nonproliferation Review 7 (2000), pp. 24–40.
4. “Contribution to International Security,” Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the United States, <www.kazakhembus.com/page/contribution-to-international-security>, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Country Profile—Kazakhstan,” <www.nti.org/country-profiles/kazakhstan>.
5. For the review of the approach, see Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
6. B.I. Finel, “Black Box or Pandora's Box: State Level Variables and Progressivity in Realist Research Programs,” Security Studies 11 (2001), p. 204.
7. Paul T. Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, “Foreign Policy-Making at the Top: Political Group Dynamics,” in Paul T. Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 8.
8. Omurserik Kasenov, Dastan Eleukenov, and Murat Laumulin, Kazakhstan and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Almaty: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994), p. 4.
9. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 138–41.
10. President Nazarbayev, cited by US Secretary of State James Baker in a report by John McWethy, ABC World News Tonight with Peter Jennings, December 17, 1991, LexisNexis Academic.
11. “Nazarbayev-Bush letter,” January 7, 1992, Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (hereinafter APRK), fond 5N, opis 1, delo 289, I. 2. The filing system used in the APRK is identical to the systems in Soviet and Russian archives. Basic archival categories in Russian are Fond, Opis, Delo, List. Fond designates an integral group of records from a single office or source, usually arranged as they were created in their office of origin; Opis is a numbered hierarchical subdivision within a fond that list all of the files or storage units; Delo is a reference to a file or a storage unit and List refers to a specific document page. See Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, Archives of Russia Five Years After: ”Purveyors of Sensations” or “Shadows Cast to the Past”? (Amsterdam: International Institute of Social History, 1997), p. 18. The archival documents in Russian cited in this article were translated into English by the author.
12. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 141.
13. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 141.
14. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 141.
15. Dumas cited in Mikhail Shchipanov, “Easier to Deal With Bush,” Kuranty, February 8, 1992, p. 3. Also, consider the following excerpt from the Nazarbayev-Dumas dialogue: “Dumas: ‘Will you have more [nuclear] tests?’ Nazarbayev: ‘No, I put a ban on them. … For now.’” (Emphasis added.) See “Minutes of the talks between President Nazarbayev and French state minister–Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas in Almaty, January 25, 1992,” APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 218, l. 13.
16. Steve Doughty, “West Must Pay Us to Destroy Our Nuclear Weapons,” Daily Mail, January 20, 1992, p. 10.
17. In general, Nazarbayev is believed to be a skilled diplomat. Reiss makes an inquisitive inference about Nazarbayev's ability to manipulate a situation in negotiations. Explaining the episode of Nazarbayev's stopover in Moscow on May 17, 1992, en route to Washington, to discuss with Yeltsin his upcoming negotiations with the Americans, Reiss presumes: “From his press statement after this meeting, it was clear that Nazarbayev had fooled Yeltsin into allowing Almaty to keep half of its SS-18s beyond the seven-year START framework … Nazarbayev's cleverness alerted Washington to the possibility that he might attempt a similar ploy in Lisbon.” See Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 146.
18. “Nazarbayev-Bush letter,” April 7, 1992, APRK, f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1361, l. 27.
19. President Nazarbayev, as quoted in the Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, April 28, 1992: “I sent a letter to President Bush in which I informed him of our desire to become a non-nuclear state. However, pending the destruction of the nuclear warheads, I asked him to temporarily view Kazakhstan as a nuclear state.” It is unknown, though, whether the president meant the April 7, 1992, letter, as that letter does not include any passage containing the term “temporary nuclear state.” See “Nazarbayev-Bush letter,” April 7, 1992, APRK, f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1361, ll. 25–28.
20. “Main provisions of the Foreign Policy Concept,” MFA, April 9, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 154–55.
21. “Nazarbayev Seeks ‘Parity’ in Atom Cuts: When Others Disarm, So Will Kazakhstan,” Washington Post, February 23, 1992, p. A26.
22. On May 1, 1992, in an interview with Japanese TV, Nazarbayev stated that “Kazakhstan will retain its nuclear weapons for at least 15 years,” quoted by NHK TV, May 1, 1992, transcript, as reported in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 4, 1992. On May 2, 1992, during talks with Watanabe in Almaty, Nazarbayev told the Japanese diplomat that the republic “had no alternative but to keep nuclear weapons unless Russia, USA and China will guarantee the security of Kazakhstan,” quoted in “Kazakh Leader Shows Understanding of Territorial Dispute,” Japan Economic Newswire, May 2, 1992.
23. “Joint declaration between the United States and Kazakhstan by President Bush and Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, May 19, 1992.” US Department of State, Dispatch, vol. 3, no. 21, May 25, 1992.
24. Omurserik Kasenov, and Kairat Abuseitov, The Future of Nuclear Weapons in the Kazakh Republic's National Security (McLean, Virginia: Potomac Foundation, 1993), p. 6.
25. “Nazarbayev-Bush letter,” May 16, 1992, APRK f. 5, op. 1, d. 289, l. 49.
26. “Foreign Policy and National Security Concept,” Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS), (undated; first half of 1992), APRK f. 166N, op. 1, d. 13, l. 5.
27. Agence France Presse, “Kazakhstan President Seeks Security Guarantees in Exchange for Disarmament,” May 6, 1992, LexisNexis Academic.
28. Nazarbayev, Epitsentr Mira [The Epicenter of Peace], p. 98.
29. “Minutes of the talks between Nazarbayev and Dumas,” APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 218, I. 1–19.
30. “Minutes of the talks between Nazarbayev and Dumas,” APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 218, I. 1–19.
31. Foreign policy expert, name and place withheld by request, interview with author, February 20, 2012.
32. Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), pp. 44.
33. “Bush-Nazarbayev letter,” December 28, 1991, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 20, l. 267–79.
34. “Bush-Nazarbayev letter,“ December 28, 1991, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 20, l. 278.
35. “Baker-Nazarbayev letter,” March 20, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 20, l. 43.
36. “NATO statement on NPT Accession,” April 22, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 40.
37. “MFA annual report,” MFA, April 12, 1993, APRK, f. 75N, op. 1, d. 2, l. 4.
38. Jonathan Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan (London: Continuum, 2009), p. 137. Before the proclamation of independence, on August 29, 1991, Nazarbayev closed the Semipalatinsk testing polygon—an action that certainly required some basic understanding of the nuclear problem.
39. “Nazarbayev–Baker letter,” April 7, 1992, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1361, l. 25.
40. Potter, Politics of Nuclear Renunciation, p. 16.
41. For the description of Kazakhstan's foreign policy making structure see Oumirseric Kasenov, “The Institutions and Conduct of the Foreign Policy of Postcommunist Kazakhstan,” in Adeed Dawish and Karen Dawish, eds., The International Politics of Eurasia, vol. 4: The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, pp. 263–85).
42. Daniiar Ashimbayev, “Kazakhstanskaia Diplomatiia: Kadry [The Kazakhstani Diplomacy: Cadre],” Kontinent. 3 (2004), p. 18; High-ranking governmental official, name withheld by request, interview with author, October 25, 2011, Astana.
43. Kasenov, “Institutions and Conduct,” p. 267.
44. Tuleitai Suleymenov, former foreign minister of Kazakhstan, interview with author, Astana, December 7, 2011. Salim Kurmanguzhin, former deputy foreign minister of Kazakhstan, interview with author, Almaty, February 10, 2012.
45. “CSS annual report,” CSS, (undated; first half of 1993), APRK 166N, op. 1, d. 9, l. 2.
46. Former official of the administration of the President of Kazakhstan, name withheld by request, interview with author, November 30, 2011, Astana.
47. Kasenov, “Institutions and Conduct,” p. 268.
48. Stephen F. Burgess and Togzhan Kassenova, “The Rollback States: South Africa and Kazakhstan,” in Tanya Ogilvie-White and David Santoro, eds., Slaying the Nuclear Dragon: Disarmament Dynamics in the Twenty-First Century (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2012), pp. 85–117.
49. Nazarbayev as quoted in Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan, p. 138
50. For the explications of the points, see the interview with Burkytbai Aiaganov, Krasnaia Zvezda, February 26, 1992, p. 3.
51. Isinaliev sent the article to Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, but it remained unpublished. See Isinaliev, “Net Garantii Bezopasnosti [No Guarantees for Security],” May 21, 1992, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1381, ll. 20–22.
52. Burgess and Kassenova, “The Rollback States: South Africa and Kazakhstan,” pp. 99–100.
53. Burgess and Kassenova, “The Rollback States: South Africa and Kazakhstan,” p. 99.
54. Laumulin, “Kazakhstan's Nuclear Policy,” p. 188.
55. For Nazarbayev's view on the nuclear debate in Kazakhstani society, see Nazarbayev, Epitsentr Mira [The Epicenter of Peace], pp. 28–38.
56. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 143.
57. Nursultan Nazarbayev and Peter Conradi, Nursultan Nazarbayev: My Life, My Times and the Future (Northampton: Pilkington Press, 1998), pp. 139–50; Nazarbayev, Epitsentr Mira [The Epicenter of Peace]; Kassym-Zhomart Tokaev, Pod Stiagom Nezavisimosti. Ocherki o Vneshnei Politike Kazakhstana [Under the Banner of Independence. Essays on Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy] (Almaty: Bilim, 1997).
58. Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan, pp. 137–38.
59. Only in one instance does Nazarbayev directly credit the presence of the adviser, who was the Russian general from the strategic forces branch providing expert advice to the president at the negotiation rounds in Washington. Nazarbayev recalls: “All the time the Russian officer was sitting next to me, giving me advice and correcting any mistakes which I made.” See Nazarbayev and Conradi, Nursultan Nazarbayev, p. 148.
60. Makhmud Kasymbekov, the Head of the Chancellery of the President, interview with author, Astana, November 24, 2011; Kurmanguzhin, interview with author, February 10, 2012; Suleymenov, interview with author, December 7, 2011.
61. Nazarbayev and Conradi, Nursultan Nazarbayev, p. 146.
62. Nazarbayev and Conradi, Nursultan Nazarbayev, p. 149. It is possible that this was due to Zhukeyev's subsequent move to the opposition camp.
63. Tokaev, Pod Stiagom Nezavisimosti Under the Banner of Independence}, p. 696.
64. Reiss, Bridled Ambitions, p. 142.
65. Potter, Politics of Nuclear Renunciation, p. 41.
66. “To the issue of the nuclear policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Policy memorandum,” undated (circa February–April 1992), APRK, f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, I. 185–89. The document is not dated, however in the text it refers to an article published in Kazakhstanskaia Pravda on February 1, 1992, and the April 9, 1992 MFA foreign policy concept contains different positions then those proposed in this document.
67. “To the issue of the nuclear policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Policy memorandum,” APRK, f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 186.
68. “To the issue of the nuclear policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Policy memorandum,” APRK, f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 189.
69. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” March 30, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 232–36.
70. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” March 30, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 235.
71. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” March 30, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 236.
72. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” April 13, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 163–69.
73. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” April 13, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 167–68.
74. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” April 13, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 168.
75. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” April 25, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 49–57.
76. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” April 25, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 55.
77. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” April 25, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 53.
78. Here Suleymenov cites Kozyrev's statement on the same subject made on April 11, 1992. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” April 25, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 56.
79. “Nazarbayev-Baker letter,” April 29, 1992, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, l. 42–44.
80. “Nazarbayev-Baker letter,” April 29, 1992, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, l. 43.
81. Exact dates were not specified in the draft Protocol. There was a blank space left instead in Article 6. “Nazarbayev-Baker letter,” April 29, 1992, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, l. 44.
82. “Nazarbayev-Baker letter,” April 29, 1992, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, l. 44.
83. “Nazarbayev-Baker letter,” April 29, 1992, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, l. 44.
84. The text of the “Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” (the Lisbon Protocol) is very similar to the text of the document proposed by Baker in April. It is important to highlight that the three issues discussed between Nazarbayev and Suleymenov in the above exchange of letters are reflected in the protocol. First, in accordance with Article 5 of the protocol, Kazakhstan (together with Belarus and Ukraine) would join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state in the “shortest possible time.” Second, in accordance with Article 6, Kazakhstan (together with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine) would exchange their ratification instruments with the United States. Third, the provision of temporary storage of Russian nuclear weapons on the territories of the three states is omitted from the protocol.
85. Potter indicates February-April 1992 as “the crucial period of reassessment of Kazakhstan's nuclear posture.” See Potter, The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation, p. 40.