The Success of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and its Contribution to the Nonproliferation Regime

Abstract

The 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in The Hague was a resounding success, both in organizational terms and in terms of substance. The new substance can be found in the Communiqué, as well as in innovative joint statements by participants, all of which may be considered as implementation of actions decided upon in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The next two years in the NSS process cannot be business as usual. This viewpoint makes some suggestions for NSS states to undertake between now and the final summit in 2016, including preparations for winding down the NSS process as we know it.

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear Security Summit
• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
• fissile materials
• highly enriched uranium
• plutonium
• International Atomic Energy Agency
• counterterrorism

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This viewpoint is based on a luncheon presentation the author gave on May 5, 2014, at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), p. 349.

2. Actually, the preparations for amending the Convention started on September 9, 2001. Not surprisingly, the infamous 9/11 terrorist attacks two days later gave a boost to the negotiations.

3. At the time of the Kananaskis Summit, the Group of 8, or G8, consisted of eight of the largest economies on Earth—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States.

4. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Prague, April 5, 2009, <www.whitehouse.gov/video/The-President-in-Prague/#transcript>.

5. Hungarian Foreign Minister János Martonyi had chaired the IAEA Nuclear Security Conference in Vienna in July 2013.

6. For the list of states, see <www.nss2014.com>.

7. I will limit myself to Actions 40–46, as well as 60 and 61. It should also be recognized that the NSS process deliberately focused on a specific subset of issues within the broader nuclear nonproliferation policy areas.

8. “2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Vol. 1,” <http://cns.miis.edu/treaty_npt/pdfs/2010_FD_Part_I.pdf>, p. 26.

9. “2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Vol. 1,” <http://cns.miis.edu/treaty_npt/pdfs/2010_FD_Part_I.pdf>, pp. 26-27.

10. “2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Vol. 1,” <http://cns.miis.edu/treaty_npt/pdfs/2010_FD_Part_I.pdf>, p. 27.

11. “2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Vol. 1,” <http://cns.miis.edu/treaty_npt/pdfs/2010_FD_Part_I.pdf>, p. 27.

12. “2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Vol. 1,” <http://cns.miis.edu/treaty_npt/pdfs/2010_FD_Part_I.pdf>, p. 27.

13. “2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Vol. 1,” <http://cns.miis.edu/treaty_npt/pdfs/2010_FD_Part_I.pdf>, p. 27.

14. Based on regular IAEA budgets, funding for nuclear security assistance increased from €3.19 million in 2010 to €5.09 million in 2014. If extrabudgetary contributions are also factored in, the difference would likely be even greater. See IAEA, “Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference,” GC(53)/RES/5, September 2009, p. 17, <www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Resolutions/English/gc53res-5_en.pdf>, and IAEA, “The Financial Regulations of the Agency,” INFCIRC/8/Rev.3, March 22, 2012, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1959/infcirc8r3.pdf>.

15. “2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document,” p. 28.

16. See, for example, IAEA, “Nuclear Security,” GC(57)/RES/10, September 2013, <www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC57/GC57Resolutions/English/gc57res-10_en.pdf>.

17. “2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document,” p. 28.

18. See, for instance, IAEA, “IAEA Director General Addresses Efforts to Protect against Nuclear Terrorism before UN General Assembly,” PR 2001/24, October 2001, <www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/32/054/32054413.pdf>.

19. Graham T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 2004), pp. 20-23.

20. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2010, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf>.

21. Nuclear material was also returned to the Russian Federation. As noted in the Russian NSS progress report, fresh (790 kg) and spent (1269 kg) HEU has been returned to Russia from fourteen countries: all the Russian-originated fuel from nine (Bulgaria, Latvia, Libya, Romania, Serbia, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Vietnam, and Hungary) and part of the fuel from five (Germany, Poland, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Belarus). See <www.nss2014.com/sites/default/files/documents/russian_federation.pdf>. Project Sapphire was a successful 1994 covert operation of the United States government in cooperation with the Kazakhstan government to secure nearly 600 kilograms of 90 percent enriched uranium that had been intended to fuel submarines. At the time, it was stored with minimal security at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant outside Ust-Kamenogorsk. See Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 64-65.

22. US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking A Balance: A Historical Report On The United States Highly Enriched Uranium Production, Acquisition, And Utilization Activities From 1945 Through September 30, 1996, January 2001, p. 107, <http://fissilematerials.org/library/doe01.pdf>.

23. Cited in John McPhee, “The Curve of Binding Energy, Part III,” New Yorker, December 17, 1973, p. 82.

24. US Department of Energy/ National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, Inquiry into the Security Breach at the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Y-12 National Security Complex, August 2012, <http://energy.gov/ig/downloads/special-report-ig/0868>

25. The Netherlands case may be instructive. Dutch authorities decided in 2013 not to return a total of about 6 kg of HEU that was left in the Netherlands after the conversion of the research reactors in Delft and Petten to lower enrichment levels. Storing it in the dedicated storage facility for all Dutch spent fuel and nuclear waste in the province of Zeeland was considered the most secure, the simplest, and the most cost-effective solution. However, it is a solution that precludes the Netherlands's decision to join the group of “HEU-free” states, one of the new gift baskets. For similar reasons, the Nuclear Threat Initiative lowered the Netherlands's ranking in the “Quantities and Sites” category of its “Nuclear Materials and Security Index” from the 2012 ranking of 7 to 12 in 2014. See Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Nuclear Materials and Security Index,” 2014, p. 20, (http://ntiindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2014-NTI-Index-Report1.pdf). In my view, the NTI methodology on this point is skewed. Why would a first-class Dutch storage facility be more vulnerable than an unknown US storage place?

26. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Non-Paper 3: Comprehensiveness—Understanding Non-civilian Nuclear Materials,” Global Dialogue on Nuclear Security Priorities, 2012, <www.nti.org/media/pdfs/Non-Paper_3_-_Comprehensiveness_-_Understanding_Non-Civilian_Nuclear_Materials_1.pdf?_=1353507850>.

27. IAEA, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,” INFCIRC/225/Rev5, para 1.18, 2011.

28. The United States has given such an assurance and a number of other useful ones in its NSS progress report, <www.nss2014.com/sites/default/files/documents/united_states_of_america.pdf>.

29. Department of Energy Fact Sheet, “Additional Information Concerning Underground Nuclear Weapon Test of Reactor-Grade Plutonium,” June 1994, <http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/osti.gov/www.osti.gov/html/osti/opennet/document/press/pc29.html>.

30. “The Hague Nuclear Security Summit Communiqué,” paragraph 21, <www.nss2014.com/sites/default/files/documents/the_hague_nuclear_security_summit_communique_final.pdf>.

31. During the summits in Washington and Seoul, leaders committed themselves in hundreds of specific ways and most of these commitments have been fulfilled. In The Hague they added—all counted—another 400. Although many are not formulated in ways that are easily measurable, there will be no doubt pressure to deliver on these points.