What Do We Mean by Nuclear Proliferation?

ABSTRACT

What do we mean by nuclear proliferation? What does it mean to proliferate? This article investigates both the literal and figurative meaning of the term “proliferation.” It argues that many of the definitions and conceptualizations of nuclear proliferation often used by scholars are either limited in their utility or logically inconsistent. It then reconceptualizes and redefines the term, incorporating an understanding of both its etymological origins and the geopolitical context in which the phenomenon occurs. It concludes by exploring the potential impact that the politicization of the phenomenon may have on the identification of occurrences of proliferation, from both an academic and a policy-making perspective.

KEYWORDS:

• Proliferation
• theory
• Iran
• nuclear policy

Notes

1. For examples, see David Mutimer, The Weapons State: Proliferation and the Framing of Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); Matthew Woods, “Inventing Proliferation: The Creation and Preservation of the Inevitable Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” Review of International Affairs 3 (September 2004), pp. 416–42; and Benoît Pelopidas, “The Oracles of Proliferation: How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical Reading that Limits Policy Innovation,” Nonproliferation Review 18 (September 2011), pp. 297–314.

2. I use this term to purposefully distinguish it from “nonproliferation,” which also has a number of potential meanings, including a state's decision to not proliferate, the various institutions, laws, and mechanisms established to prevent or deter proliferation (a.k.a. the nonproliferation regime), or the norm or taboo against the development of nuclear weapons.

3. Michael Intriligator and Dagobert Brito, “Nuclear Proliferation and Stability,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 3 (July 1978), p. 173.

4. Although that may, too, be contingent on a state's decision maker's ability to decipher what may be conflicting or imperfect information provided by the various stakeholders involved in the potential development of said weapon.

5. Measures of nuclear latency have been given by a number of scholars, including Stephen Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 246; Sonali Singh and Christopher Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (December 2004), pp. 859–85; and Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (February 2007), pp. 167–94.

6. Alex Montgomery and Scott Sagan, “The Perils of Predicting Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), p. 302–28, which was updated and reprinted in Robert Rauchhaus, Matthew Kroenig, Eric Gartzke, Causes and Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, (New York: Routledge 2011), p. 352, and Scott Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Annual Review of Political Science 14 (June 2011), pp. 225–44.

7. Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York, NY: Times Books/Henry Holt 2004); John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009).

8. For examples, see George Quester, “More Nuclear Nations?: Can Proliferation Now Be Stopped?” Foreign Affairs 53 (October 1974), pp. 77–97, Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 78–108; Eric Arnett, “Deterrence After Nuclear Proliferation: Implications for Nuclear Forces and Defense Spending,” Nonproliferation Review 1 (Winter, 1994) pp. 10–17; Kenneth Waltz, “Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons,” Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation: Policy Paper Series (1995), pp. 1–14; Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (March 1996), pp. 43–60; Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1997); and Lewis Dunn, “Countering Proliferation: Insights from Past ‘Wins, Losses, and Draws,'” Nonproliferation Review 13 (November 2006), pp. 479–89.

9. Montgomery and Sagan, “The Perils of Predicting Proliferation,” (2009).

10. Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, “A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), pp. 151–60.

11. For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Jacques E.C. Hymans, “The Study of Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation: Toward a New Consensus?” in William C. Potter with Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: The Role of Theory (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 13–37, and Jacques E.C. Hymans, “When Does a State Become a ‘Nuclear Weapons State'? An Exercise in Measurement Validation,” in Potter with Mukhatzhanova, Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century, pp. 102–23.

12. Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 3.

13. Ibid., p. 6

14. For the former, see Matthew Fuhrmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” International Security 34 (Summer 2009), pp. 7–41; Matthew Fuhrmann, “Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: the Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), pp. 181–208; Matthew Kroenig, “Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), pp. 161–80; and Matthew Kroenig, “Exporting the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Proliferation,” American Political Science Review 103 (February 2009), pp. 113–33. For an example of research on the decision making processes of states, see Jacques E.C. Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

15. For the former, see Singh and Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test;” Jo and Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation;” and Phillipp Bleek, “Why Do States Proliferate? Quantitative Analysis of the Exploration, Pursuit, and Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons,” in Potter, Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: The Role of Theory pp. 159–92. For the latter, see Victor Asal and Kyle Beardsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior,” Journal of Peace Research 44 (March 2007), pp. 139–55.

16. For a discussion of horizontal proliferation, see Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, “A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation,” and for vertical proliferation, see Herbert York, “Vertical Proliferation,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 38 (December 1982), pp. 47–50.

17. Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” American Political Science Review 64 (December 1970), pp. 1033–53, and David Collier and James E. Mahon, Jr., “Conceptual ‘Stretching' Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 87 (December, 1993), pp. 845–55. For an excellent discussion of the efficacy of using quantitative analysis to study nuclear proliferation, see either Hymans, “When Does a State Become a ‘Nuclear Weapons State'? An Exercise in Measurement Validation,” or Francis J. Gavin, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Nuclear Weapons,” 2014 H-Diplo/International Security Studies Forum, <http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Forum-2.pdf>. See also Goertz, Social Science Concepts.

18. Robert Adcock and David Collier, “Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research,” American Political Science Review 95 (2001), pp. 529–46. Notable exceptions include Michael Horowitz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), pp. 234–57, which investigates whether the number of years a state has possessed nuclear weapons impacts their conflict propensity; Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” International Organization 67 (January 2013), pp. 141–71, which distinguishes between possession superiority and inferiority; and Erik Gartzke, Jeff Kaplow, and Rupal Mehta, “The Determinants of Nuclear Force Structure,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), which further unpacks possession by investigating the determinants of nuclear force deployment (and its effects).

19. For examples, see Daniel Geller, “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 34 (June 1990), pp. 291–310; Asal and Beardsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior;” Robert Rauchhaus, “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), pp. 258–77; and Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo, “Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (April 2009), pp. 209–33. and Gartzke and Kroenig, “A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation.”

20. For the former, see Gartzke and Jo, “Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes,” and for the latter, see Asal and Beardsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior.”

21. For further information, see Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics;” Collier and Mahon, “Conceptual ‘Stretching' Revisited;” and Goertz, Social Science Concepts.

22. Goertz, Social Science Concepts.

23. Ibid., p. 6.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Gartzke and Kroenig, “A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation,” p. 153.

27. Pelopidas, “The Oracles of Proliferation.”

28. For discussions of geopolitical context, see Allan Pred, “Context and Bodies in Flux: Some Comments on Space and Time in the Writings of Anthony Giddens,” in John Clark, Cecilia Modgil, and Sohan Modgil, Anthony Giddens: Consensus and Controversy (London: The Falmer Press, 1990), pp. 117– 29; John Agnew, “Mapping Politics: How Context Counts in Electoral Geography,” Political Geography 15 (1996); pp. 129–46; and Colin Flint, “Electoral geography and the social construction of space: The example of the Nazi party in Baden, 1924–1932,” GeoJournal 51 (July 2000), pp. 145–56.

29. Examples include Singh and Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test;” Jo and Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation;” and Bleek, “Why Do States Proliferate? Quantitative Analysis of the Exploration, Pursuit, and Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons.”

30. It should be noted that, although I focus on the development of nuclear weapon production capabilities for the remainder of this article, similar logics could be applied to an increase in the quality or quantity of a state's existing nuclear arsenal. Thus, one could ask the question as to whether the United States, for example, engaged in nuclear proliferation after its ratification of the NPT, which commits it to eventual disarmament, by increasing both the size and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal.

31. For examples of research investigating the linkages between the exportation of nuclear technologies and proliferation, see Kroenig, “Exporting the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Proliferation,” and Fuhrmann “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements.”

32. See Mutimer, The Weapons State; Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press 2009); and Pelopidas, “The Oracles of Proliferation.”

33. Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms.

34. Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

35. An example of such a definition might be: “nuclear growth or propagation that occurs after the entry-into-force of the NPT.”

36. For examples of this research, see Ernest Campbell, “The Internalization of Moral Norms,” Sociometry 27 (December 1964), pp. 391–412; and Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52 (Autumn 1998), pp. 887–917.

37. See Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: the United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 472, and Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms.

38. John Carlson, “Defining Noncompliance: NPT Safeguards Agreements,” Arms Control Today, May 2009, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_5/Carlson>.

39. For examples of research on rivalry and its effects, see Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivalry (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 2001); and Michael Colaresi, Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson, ‪Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: ‪Position, Space and Conflict Escalation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008).

40. John Borrie, “Humanitarian Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban,” International Affairs 90 (May 2014), pp. 625–46.

41. “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on India,” CNN World News, May 13, 1998, <www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/13/india.us/>.

42. Ibid.

43. For further information, see Mark Fitzpatrick, “US-India Nuclear Cooperation Accord: Implications for the Non-proliferation Regime,” Asia-Pacific Review 15 (May 2008), pp. 76–85; and Nobuyasu Abe, “Rebuilding the Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation Regime in the Post-US-India Deal World,” Asia-Pacific Review 16 (May 2009), pp. 56–72. See also “U.S.- India: Civil Nuclear Cooperation,” US Department of State, <www.state.gov/p/sca/c17361.htm>.

44. Alireza Nader, “Chinese-Iranian Ties in the Face of the Nuclear Crisis,” RAND Blog, November 12, 2012, <www.rand.org/blog/2012/11/chinese-iranian-ties-in-the-face-of-the-nuclear-crisis.html>.

45. For a discussion on perception bias, and its potential effects, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

46. See Sarah Kreps, “Shifting Currents: Changes in National Intelligence Estimates on the Iran Nuclear Threat,” Intelligence and National Security 23 (2008), pp. 608–28; and Alex Montgomery and Adam Mount, “Misestimation: Explaining US Failures to Predict Nuclear Weapons Programs,” Intelligence and National Security 29 (2014), pp. 357–86.

47. Mahdi Obeidi and Kurt Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2004), pp. 242.