The South African Denuclearization Exemplar

ABSTRACT

South Africa's nuclear disarmament is a unique historical case, notable in part for the dramatic shift from deception to cooperation. The unprecedented transparency it demonstrated in order to convince the international community of the veracity of their disarmament is heralded as an exemplar for verifiable denuclearization. Less known is how this case affords insights into how a nuclear weapon program can be clandestinely hidden by the ambiguity provided by an otherwise completely legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy program. Using a variety of open sources, including newly declassified internal South African and US government reports, it can be shown that South Africa employed a variety of deceptive tactics before it disarmed, and even for nearly two years after becoming a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This article reviews that information to derive instructive lessons on the lengths that a nuclear proliferant state might go to conceal its true capabilities and intentions, and to thwart international discovery of the existence and full extent of an existing—or, in this case, a former—nuclear weapon program.

KEYWORDS:

• South Africa
• verification
• transparency
• disarmament
• proliferation
• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Notes

1. Some of the more complete bibliographies can be found in Verne Harris, Sello Hatang, and Peter Liberman, “Unveiling South Africa's Nuclear Past,” Journal of Southern African Studies 30 (September 2004), pp. 457–75, <http://qcpages.qc.edu/Political_Science/profmat/Unveiling%20South%20Africa's%20nuclear%20past.pdf>; Anna-Mart Van Wyk, “South Africa's Nuclear Programme and the Cold War,” History Compass 8 (July 2010), pp. 562–72, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2010.00699.x/full>; Nuclear Threat Initiative, “South Africa,” Country Profiles, January, 2014, <www.nti.org/country-profiles/south-africa/nuclear/>; Peter Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” International Security 26 (Fall 2001), pp. 45–86.

2. Both Iraq and Libya, as NPT signatories, employed similar subterfuge to conceal their unsuccessful clandestine nuclear weapon programs from IAEA inspectors. Valuable nonproliferation lessons learned can be similarly derived from the revelations derived from each country's rollback (involuntary and voluntary, respectively). International Atomic Energy Agency, “Iraq Nuclear File: Key Findings,” June 29, 2007, <www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Invo/factsheet.html> and International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” GOV/2004/59, August 30, 2004, pp. 5–7, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-59.pdf>. For more on South Africa, see: Frank V. Pabian, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program: Lessons for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” Nonproliferation Review 3 (Fall 1995), p. 2, <http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/31pabian.pdf>.

3. Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement,” Arms Control Today, December 1995/January 1996, p. 3, <www.armscontrol.org/system/files/ACT_South%20Africa_9601.pdf>.

4. Such “plays on words” helped to foster the kind and level of ambiguity that the South African government deliberately wanted to exhibit at the time.

5. Ibid., p. 3.

6. Even at the height of indignation in response to international pressures concerning the discovery of the Kalahari test site, Prime Minister John Vorster said, “We are still seriously considering accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and we would be prepared to discuss the matter with the United States … .” John Vorster, “Excerpt from the Honourable The [sic] Prime Minister's Speech in Cape Town,” August 24, 1977, p. 4, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116617>.

7. Hannes Steyn, Richardt Van Der Walt, and Jan Van Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament: South Africa's Nuclear Experience, 2nd ed. (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2005), p. 36. In 1982, the Atomic Energy Board was renamed the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) and in 1985 subsumed UCOR (the parastatal Uranium Corporation that operated the Y-Plant at Valindaba).

8. Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 4.

9. Keith Campbell, “SA marks twentieth anniversary of move from nuclear weapons to nonproliferation,” Engineering News, July 8, 2011, <www.engineeringnews.co.za/print-version/sa-marks-twentieth-anniversary-of-move-from-nuclear-weapons-to-nonproliferation-2011-07-08>.

10. Adolf von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, “Nuclear Verification in South Africa,” IAEA Bulletin 1, January 1995, <www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull371/37105394248.pdf>.

11. Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 4. For India, it may have been “ambivalence,” but for South Africa it is more accurately “pointed ambiguity.” South Africa wanted a capability to fire a warning shot. PNEs offered them the initial step in that direction. The exposure of the Kalahari test site preparations in 1977 and subsequent international outcry effectively negated that first option.

12. “New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation,“ CIA Directorate of Intelligence, March 30, 1983, p. 1. <www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB181/sa26.pdf>.

13. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Pelindaba and Valindaba Facilities, South Africa,” Institute for Science and International Security, October 26, 2000, <http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/pelindaba-and-valindaba-facilities-south-africa/13#images>.

14. Johan Slabber, “Remarks presented at the International Conference: The Historical Dimensions of South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” Pretoria, December 10, 2012, <www.wilsoncenter.org/article/international-conference-the-historical-dimensions-south-africas-nuclear-weapons-program>.

15. IAEA, “The Agency's Verification Activities in South Africa,” GC(XXXVII)/1075, Attachment 1, September 9, 1993, <www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC37/GC37Documents/English/gc37-1075_en.pdf>.

16. Richardt Van Der Walt served as the general manager of the Atomic Energy Corporation, Hannes Steyn was the senior general manager of research and development at the Armaments Corporation of South Africa, and Jan Van Loggerenberg was formerly chief of the South African Air Force and chief of staff operations. Steyn, Van der Walt, and Van Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament, p. 39.

17. Ibid.

18. For more background on the perceptions within an Afrikaner world view, see Central Intelligence Agency, “South Africa: Policy Considerations Regarding a Nuclear Test,” August 18, 1977, <www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB181/sa18.pdf>

19. Members of the Warsaw Pact, or the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance, included Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union. The Cuban military, too, was significantly involved in Angola throughout the conflict over the former Portuguese colony's independence.

20. Pabian, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program,” p. 4.

21. Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess, South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), p. 30. Those authors correctly point out that the role of the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB)—the secretive, all-male, Calvinist, Afrikaner organization—was not insignificant. All of the key players in South African political decision making, whether senior politicians, military leaders, scientists, or influential academics, were all members of the AB. As such, it is fair to say that they were nationalistic and would have a common background/culture/view of the world.

22. Robert Scott Jaster, “The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy Under Pressure,” Foreign Affairs, (Fall 1989), pp. 28–29.

23. Stumpf, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 6.

24. Steyn, Van Der Walt, and Van Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament, p. 42. See also Liberman for details on the decision making at the time, including a description of the formation of a steering committee (the Witvlei, or White Marsh, Committee) on nuclear weapon policy in 1978, and which decided in July 1979 to “acquire a credible deterrent.” Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” p. 53. Botha described the cabinet meeting process in an interview: “We had inherited the system of collegiate Cabinet government from the British. There was thus no official voting in Cabinet, but every minister had the right to express their point of view. In the end the chairperson sums up the debate and his opinion becomes the Cabinet decision. If Cabinet ministers still did not agree, the way was open to them to resign. There was no other way. In reality, the government's decision was the PM's decision in summarizing what he believed it should be.” Sue Onslow, “Former South African Foreign Minister RF ‘Pik’ Botha in an interview with Dr. Sue Onslow,” Pretoria, July 15, 2008, <http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/5806/2/Pik_Botha_Transcript_Appendix_1.pdf>, p. 10. Armscor, the state arms procurement and production agency, was assigned responsibility for weapon design, production, delivery systems, and storage. The AEB would furnish the highly enriched uranium. See Harris, Hatang, and Liberman, “Unveiling South Africa's Nuclear Past,” p. 464.

25. Al J. Venter, in association with Nicholas Paul Badenhorst, and Pierre Lowe Victor, How South Africa Built Six Atom Bombs And Then Abandoned its Nuclear Weapons Program (Johannesburg: Ashanti Publishing, 2008), p. 6. The authors claim that the decision to build seven deliverable weapons was made in July 1979 by the “Witlei Committee,” along with the decision to shift management of the program from the AEB to Armscor, but no reference is provided.

26. Steyn, Van der Walt, and Van Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament, p. 74.

27. Venter, How South Africa Built Six Atom Bombs And Then Abandoned its Nuclear Weapons Program, pp. 111–12, 127. It should be noted that Venter claims that six mobile TELs had actually been “deployed” (at a base called “red light”) and that he had been told that a total of thirty-nine RSA-2s (two-stage intermediate-range ballistic missiles) “were to be acquired,” and those missiles would be deployed “in five ‘flights’ (six TELs and missiles per flight) with the remaining nine presumably intended to serve as a strategic reserve in the event of mishap or breakdown.” See also “Denel mulls space business,” defenceWeb, October 5, 2011, <www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19717>.

28. Onslow, “Former South African Foreign Minister RF ‘Pik’ Botha in an interview with Dr Sue Onslow.”

29. Harris, Hatang, and Liberman, “Unveiling South Africa's Nuclear Past.”

30. Steyn, Van Der Walt, and Van Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament, p. 80.

31. Ibid., p. xv.

32. Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, eds., War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa, (Cape Town: David Philips, 1989), p. 238. For more on the details and controversy over the arrested South African employees, see: “Rift with South Africa Widens,” Glasgow Herald, September 26, 1984, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2507&dat=19840926&id=u8tAAAAAIBAJ&sjid=zKUMAAAAIBAJ&pg=2979,5194139>.

33. Times Wire Services, “Paper Reports S. African Plan for Antarctic Airstrip,” Los Angeles Times, December 29, 1986, <http://articles.latimes.com/1986-12-29/news/mn-1167_1_runway>.

34. Central Intelligence Agency, “Trends in South Africa's Nuclear Security Policies and Programs,” October 5, 1984, p. 28, <www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB181/sa27.pdf>.

35. David Albright, “South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons,” Institute for Science and International Security, May 1, 1994, <http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/south-africas-secret-nuclear-weapons/13>.

36. Dr. Johan Slabber, personal conversation with the author, December 10, 2012. NOTE: An extremely detailed, recently declassified, 1978 US intelligence report on this second shaft (identified in the report as the “Kalahari drill site” with the first shaft labeled the “tower site”) remotely determined from satellite imagery (two photos were included) that the “best total-hole-depth estimate is 169 to 227 m.” That is impressive given the actual drilled depth was 216 meters.

37. “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 5.

38. Steyn, Van Der Walt, and Van Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament, p. 41.

39. Ibid., p. 41.

40. Outside observers have termed South Africa's strategy of testing “catalytic deterrence,” or their “ace-in-the-hole.” See, on the former: Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995); on the latter, see: Michele A. Flournoy, Kurt M. Campbell, “South Africa's Bomb: A Military Option,” Orbis 32 (Summer 1988), p. 401. Waldo Stumpf, “Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons Programme,” presentation delivered at the 50 Years After Hiroshima conference, Unione Scienziati per il Disarmo, Castiglioncello, Italy, September 28- October 2, 1995, <www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/stumpf.htm>. Peter Liberman corroborates Stumpf's claim that this three-phase strategy was initiated in April 1978, reporting that then-Defense Minster P.W. Botha approved a memorandum, drafted by Army Brigadier John Huyser, outlining these three incremental options (in which Huyser recommended “openly joining the nuclear club” that was described as the third phase). Liberman also says that this three-phase strategy was further refined in 1983 by a new Armscor policy working group headed by Dr. André Buys, then-general manager of the Circle facility, to include in the third phase three separate escalatory steps: 1) overt declaration and/or an underground nuclear test; 2) an atmospheric demonstration 1,000 kilometers off the South African coast; 3) the threat of use in a military theater for self-defense. Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” pp. 53–57.

41. Waldo Stumpf, “Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons Programme,” presentation delivered at the conference, “50 Years After Hiroshima,” Unione Scienziati per il Disarmo, Castiglioncello, Italy, September 28-October 2, 1995, <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/stumpf.htm>.

42. Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” p. 56.

43. Ibid., p. 57.

44. Waldo Stumpf never addressed the advanced development of ballistic missile and/or cruise missiles that they were beginning to undertake at the time the program was halted, although other principals later did. It clearly was related to strategic defense, which would eventually have enabled South Africa to threaten anyone, at any distance, with assured destruction. That capability seems to be the only rational explanation for the efforts underway at Advena New Laboratories, and would be the same strategy employed by the superpowers that had prevented major war between them since 1945. Additional research is also necessary to determine the veracity of the claim that up to thirty-nine RSA-2 ballistic missiles were to be built (with a total of thirty deployed throughout the country in five flights of six missiles and mobile launchers each; see note 27). Specifically, what kinds of warheads were intended for those missiles? If nuclear, that would call into serious question most of the former government's claims regarding the total number of nuclear weapons to be built and the ultimate purpose of those weapons.

45. Pabian, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program,” p. 9.

46. David Albright, Paul Brannan, Zachary Laporte, Katherine Tajer, and Christina Walrond, “Rendering Useless South Africa's Nuclear Test Shafts in the Kalahari Desert,” Institute for Science and International Security, November 30, 2011, <http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Vastrap_30November2011.pdf>

47. “President P.W. Botha suffers a stroke,” South African History Online, January 18, 1989, <www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/president-pw-botha-suffers-stroke>.

48. Venter, How South Africa Built Six Atom Bombs And Then Abandoned its Nuclear Weapons Program, p. 64.

49. Nuclear Weapons Archive, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: Putting Down the Sword,” September 7, 2001, <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Safrica/SABuildingBombs.html>.

50. Murrey Marder and Don Oberdorfer, “How West, Soviets Acted to Defuse S. African A-Test,” Washington Post, August 28, 1977.

51. David Albright, et al., “Rendering Useless South Africa's Nuclear Test Shafts in the Kalahari Desert.”

52. Cyrus Vance to F.W. (‘Pik’) Botha, August 19, 1977, South African Nuclear History collection, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114153>. NOTE: This letter was first briefly mentioned by Martha S. Van Wyk's 2007 study, and it was Van Wyk's research that formed the basis of the Wilson Center Legacy Archives. Martha S. Van Wyk, “Ally or Critic? The United States’ Response to South African Nuclear Development, 1949–1980,” Cold War History 7 (May 2007), p. 210.

53. David Albright and Mark Hibbs, “South Africa: The ANC and the Atomic Bomb,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 49 (April 1993), p. 35, <http://books.google.com/books?id=aAsAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA32&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false>. In an interview with former South Africa Foreign Minister F.W. (“Pik”) Botha, he claimed that the US ambassador showed him ten to twelve photographs of the Kalahari drill site which Botha believed were taken by a Soviet satellite and given to the Americans. See Onslow, “Former South African Foreign Minister RF ‘Pik’ Botha in an interview with Dr Sue Onslow,” p. 10.

54. “Telegram from South African Embassy in the US on President Carter's Press Conference on the Kalahari Nuclear Test Site,” August 23, 1977, South African Nuclear History collection, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116609>.

55. Martha S. Van Wyk, “Ally or Critic?,” p. 409.

56. It should be noted that India had also carried out a similar “campaign of disinformation” with regard to its impending underground nuclear tests of May 1998. In April 1998, immediately following the parliamentary elections that led to the Hindu nationalist party takeover of the government, the new Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee assured a visiting US delegation—led by then-Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson—that no nuclear tests were planned. See Thomas Graham and Keith A. Hansen, Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 45, 46.

57. Steyn, Van Der Walt, and Van Loggerenberg, “Armament and Disarmament,” p. 40.

58. Roy E. Horton, III, “Out of South Africa: Pretoria's Nuclear Weapons Experience,” ACDIS Occasional Paper, p. 4, <http://acdis.illinois.edu/assets/docs/276/OutofSouthAfricaPretoria39sNuclearWeaponsExperience.pdf>.

59. Ibid., pp. 40–41.

60. Onslow, “Former South African Foreign Minister RF ‘Pik’ Botha in an interview with Dr Sue Onslow,” p. 10.

61. Pabian, “South Africa's Nuclear Weapon Program: Lessons for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” p. 8.

62. Ibid., p. 8.

63. David Albright, “South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons,” ISIS Report, May 1994, <http://isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/ir0594.html>.

64. From panel discussions with former South African government officials Victor Zazeraj and Jean du Preez during the international conference, “The Historical Dimensions of South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program,” organized and hosted by Monash South Africa, in collaboration with the Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa), and Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP), Pretoria, South Africa, December 9-12, 2012. <www.wilsoncenter.org/article/international-conference-the-historical-dimensions-south-africas-nuclear-weapons-program>.

65. “NPIHIP Releases 20 Documents on the South African Nuclear Program,” February 1, 2012, <www.wilsoncenter.org/article/npihp-releases-20-documents-the-south-african-nuclear-program>.

66. Richard Carter memorandum to Herbert Beukes, November 17, 1989, South African Nuclear History Project, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114186>.

67. Stumpf, “Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 7.

68. IAEA, “South Africa's Nuclear Capabilities,” GC(XXXV)/RES/567, September 4, 1992, pp. 8–9. <www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC36/GC36Documents/English/gc36-1015_en.pdf>.

69. Ibid., p. 9.

70. Ibid.

71. David Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July-August 1994, p. 42.

72. Albright, Hinderstein, “Pelindaba and Valindaba Facilities, South Africa.”

73. “The South African Peaceful Nuclear Program: Its Dependence upon Foreign Assistance, an Intelligence Assessment,” National Foreign Assessment Center, November 1979. p. 9, <www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB181/sa22.pdf>.

74. Declassified US State Department Memorandum, “South African: Nuclear Case Closed?” December 19, 1993, <www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB181/sa34.pdf>.

75. Mohamed ElBaradei, “Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” Vienna, Austria, February 28, 2005, <www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/2005/ebsp2005n002.html>.

76. Purkitt, pp. 120–21.

77. More specific details of IAEA verification following-up on South African declarations and the additional implications of the “roll-back” can be found in Sara Kutchesfahani and Marci Lombardi, “South Africa,” Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation, 2008, pp.289–306, <http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookdescription.cws_home/714662/description#description>

78. Mark T. Clark, quoting F.W. de Klerk, “Small Nuclear Powers,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2004, p. 283, <www.npolicy.org/books/Getting_MAD/Ch10_Clark.pdf>.

79. Peter Liberman, “Israel and the South African Bomb,” Nonproliferation Review 11 (Summer 2004), p. 77.

80. Andrew Newman, “Innovating Verification: Building Global Capacity,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 16, 2014, p. 8, <www.nti.org/analysis/reports/innovating-verification-building-global-capacity/>.

81. Purkitt and Burgess provide a useful, complementary ten-point summary as well. See Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 82.

82. Sanctions hurt, but did not halt the program; isolation (and humiliation?) appeared to strengthen South Africa's resolve.

83. According to Horton, initially, only about 35-100 personnel actually worked at the Circle building, but with the addition of Advena Central Laboratories, the number grew to about 300 total, about half of which were engaged directly in building weapons in 1989. See Horton, “Out of South Africa: Pretoria's Nuclear Weapons Experience,” p. 12. Waldo Stumpf reported that the total number of personnel involved over the fifteen-year history never exceeded “1,000 individuals” and no more than 250 at any given time. See Stumpf, p. 6.

84. In late 1978, when the CIA first detected a military presence at the Valindaba uranium enrichment plant, the only explanation suggested was that South Africa must have progressed to producing weapon-usable uranium for which military protection was then necessary. The two suspected reasons were: 1) for the purpose of indigenously supplying fuel to the SAFARI-1 research reactor, or 2) “possible stockpiling of highly enriched uranium for military use, as part of a long-term effort to establish a nuclear weapons option.” National Foreign Assessment Center, “Scientific Intelligence Weekly Review,” April 30, 1979, <www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB181/sa20.pdf>.

85. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 51. Note that neither South Africa nor Brazil was an NPT signatory at the time, but now both are NPT signatories. And that is a principal difference between the South African case and that of nuclear weapon threshold states today, because South Africa did not accede to the NPT until after it had abandoned its program, and hence was not legally prohibited from seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. The focus of US policy toward South Africa during the period of weaponization was primarily to apply intense diplomatic and economic pressure to force South Africa to simply accede to the NPT. With respect to nations of contemporary concern, e.g., Iran and Syria, which are already signatories (North Korea had been a signatory for a few years before withdrawing), US (and international) nonproliferation policy focus is to simply have them keep their commitments as specified in the treaty.

86. Or Rabinowitz, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and Its Cold War Deals, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Donald L. R. Goodson, “Catalytic Deterrence? Apartheid South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Strategy,” Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 39 (August 2012), pp. 209–30.