Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons:

ABSTRACT

Russian political leaders and military strategists are growing increasingly concerned about “strategic conventional weapons”—a broad category that appears to include all non-nuclear, high-precision, standoff weapons—and about long-range, hypersonic weapons, in particular. These concerns are complex and multifaceted (and, in some cases, contradictory), but chief among them are the beliefs that strategic conventional weapons could prove decisive in a major conflict and that Russia is lagging behind in their development. US programs to develop and acquire such weapons—namely, the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program—are of great concern to Russian strategists, who argue both that the United States seeks such weapons for potential use against Russia—its nuclear forces, in particular—and because strategic conventional weapons are more “usable” than nuclear weapons. Asymmetric responses by Russia include increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, efforts to enhance the survivability of its nuclear forces, and investments in air and missile defenses. There is also strong—but not completely conclusive evidence—that Russia is responding symmetrically by attempting to develop a long-range, conventionally armed boost-glide weapon.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• prompt global strike
• conventional weapons
• boost-glide weapons
• strategic stability
• missiles

Notes

1. Some of the material in this paper originally appeared in James M. Acton, Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf>. It has been extensively revised for this publication.

2. Vladimir Putin, remarks at meeting on “Drafting the 2016–2025 State Armament Programme,” Moscow, September 10, 2014 (official translation available from <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/22930>); Vladimir Putin, Address to the Federal Assembly, Moscow, December 12, 2013 (official translation available from <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6402>); Vladimir Putin, remarks at meeting on “Implementing the 2011–2020 State Arms Procurement Programme,” St. Petersburg, June 19, 2013 (official translation available from <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5615>); Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 19, 2012 (translation available from <http://rt.com/politics/official-word/strong-putin-military-russia-711>); Vladimir Putin, Address to the Federal Assembly, Moscow, May 10, 2006 (official translation available from <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml>).

3. Putin, address to the Federal Assembly, 2013.

4. This figure includes three tests within the Enhanced Effectiveness (E2) and Life Extension Test Bed (LETB) programs (which were intended to develop a terminally guided ballistic missile), two tests of the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2 (HTV-2), and two tests of the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW). The Department of Defense has stated that the 2011 AHW test was a success. The outcome of the 2009 LETB test is not known publicly. Acton, Silver Bullet?, pp. 38, 43; David Alexander and Andrea Shalal, “Experimental U.S. Hypersonic Weapon Destroyed Seconds After Launch,” Reuters, August 25, 2014, <www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/25/us-usa-military-hypersonic-idUSKBN0GP1ED20140825>.

5. For example, Yevgeny Miasnikov, “Precision-Guided Conventional Weapons,” in Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, eds., Natalia Bubnova, trans. ed., Nuclear Reset: Arms Reduction and Nonproliferation (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2012), pp. 434–42, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nuclear_reset_Book2012_web.pdf>.

6. For example, Alexei Arbatov, Gambit or Endgame? The New State of Arms Control, Carnegie Paper (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, March 2011), p. 16, <www.carnegieendowment.org/files/gambit_endgame.pdf>; Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, The Great Strategic Triangle, Carnegie Paper (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, April 2013), p. 26, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/strategic_triangle.pdf>.

7. Acton, Silver Bullet?, pp. 113–18.

8. Putin, Address to the Russian Federal Assembly, 2006. See also Sergei Lavrov, “New START Treaty in the Global Security Matrix: The Political Dimension,” Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn 7 (July 2010) (official translation available from <www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/25909cfe1bbd1c6ec325777500339245?OpenDocument>); Anatoly Antonov, “Russia Forced to Develop Global Prompt Strike Weapons,” Security Index 19 (September 2013), p. 5.

9. Yelena Chernenko, “Takiye Sistemy Budut Nosit’ Isklyuchitel'no Opasnyy Kharakter” [Such Systems Will Be Exceptionally Dangerous], interview with Sergei Ryabkov, Kommersant (December 12, 2013), p. 8, <http://kommersant.ru/doc/2366153>.

10. Putin, “Being Strong.”

11. Putin, remarks at meeting on “Implementing the 2011–2020 State Arms Procurement Programme.”

12. Vladimir Putin, remarks at meeting on “Developing High-Precision Weapons,” Sochi, November 29, 2012 (official translation available from <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6346>).

13. Antonov, “Russia Forced to Develop Global Prompt Strike Weapons,” p. 4.

14. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, February 5, 2010, para. 22 (translation available from <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf>).

15. Quoted in Yelena Chernenko and Ivan Safronov, “Razgonka Vooruzheniy” [The Arms Race Enters a New Stage], Kommersant (December 12, 2013), p. 8, <http://kommersant.ru/doc/2365917>.

16. Miasnikov, “Precision-Guided Conventional Weapons,” p. 432.

17. Vladimir Dvorkin, “Reducing Russia's Reliance on Nuclear Weapons in Security Policies,” in Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter, eds., Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, Occasional Paper 15 (Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2009), p. 19, <www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/op15.pdf>.

18. Antonov, “Russia Forced to Develop Global Prompt Strike Weapons,” p. 6; “Russia Plans Rail-Mounted Missiles to Counter U.S. Global Strike Program,” RIA Novosti, December 18, 2013, <http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20131218/185683711/Russia-Plans-Rail-Mounted-Missiles-to-Counter-US-Global-Strike.html>.

19. For example, Mikhail Remizov, “Tsena Voprosa” [The Cost of the Matter], Kommersant (December 12, 2013), p. 8, <http://kommersant.ru/doc/2365705>.

20. Anatoly I. Antonov, remarks, NATO-Russia Council Meeting (July 2007), <http://web.archive.org/web/20080704102317/http://www.nato-russia-council.info/htm/EN/news_33.shtml>.

21. Miasnikov, “Precision-Guided Conventional Weapons,” pp. 432–33.

22. Chernenko, “Takiye Sistemy Budut Nosit’ Isklyuchitel'no Opasnyy Kharakter.”

23. Lavrov, “New START Treaty in the Global Security Matrix.”

24. Arbatov, Gambit or Endgame?, p. 21.

25. Arbatov expressed this latter view that a Russian nuclear response could sufficiently deter a US conventional first strike in a book published by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations and the Russian academy of Sciences in 2010. See: Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Sergey Oznobishchev, Non-Nuclear Factors of Nuclear Disarmament: Ballistic Missile Defense, High-Precision Conventional Weapons, Space Arms (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2010), p. 34, <www.nuclearsecurityproject.org/uploads/publications/NON_NUCLEARFACTORSOFNUCLEARDISARMAMENT_062210.pdf>.

26. Arbatov, Gambit or Endgame?, pp. 20–21. He goes on to add that, “Ohio-class submarines [some of which have been converted to carry cruise missiles] are designed to stay on patrol for long periods of time and to remain undetectable even to sophisticated anti-submarine warfare systems, and heavy bombers are capable of penetrating advanced air defenses. Rogue states and terrorists possess neither anti-submarine warfare nor serious air-defense systems.”

27. US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs: Budget Request from the U.S. Strategic Command, Northern Command, Transportation Command, and Southern Command, HASC no. 110-40, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 21, 2007, p. 6, <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg37320/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg37320.pdf>.

28. For example, see the references in Miasnikov, “Precision-Guided Conventional Weapons.”

29. Antonov, “Russia Forced to Develop Global Prompt Strike Weapons,” pp. 6–7. This concern is also mentioned in passing in Alexei Arbatov, “New Global Strike Systems Create Serious Problems for Russia,” Carnegie Moscow Center, October 24, 2013, <http://carnegie.ru/2013/10/24/new-global-strike-systems-create-serious-problems-for-russia/gtpk>.

30. The author has heard both concerns raised in the same conversation.

31. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Department of Defense, transcript of briefing with Robert Gates and James Cartwright, September 17, 2009, <www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4479>.

32. Arbatov, “New Global Strike Systems Create Serious Problems for Russia.”

33. Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 260–61. See also Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), transcript of briefing with Robert Gates and James Cartwright.

34. Quoted in “Russia Warns of Nuclear Response to U.S. Global Strike Program,” RIA Novosti, December 11, 2013, <http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20131211/185462951/Russia-Warns-of-Nuclear-Response-to-US-Global-Strike-Program.html>.

35. Sergei M. Rogov, Viktor Esin, Pavel S. Zolotarev, and Valeriy Yarynich, “Sood'ba Stratyegichyeskih Vooroozhyeniy Poslye Pragi” [The Fate of Strategic Arms After Prague], Nyezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozryeniye [Independent Military Review], August 27, 2010, <http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010–08-27/1_strategic.html>.

36. Arbatov, Dvorkin, and Oznobishchev, Non-Nuclear Factors of Nuclear Disarmament, p. 35.

37. Putin, remarks at meeting on “Drafting the 2016–2025 State Armament Programme.”

38. “Russia Announces Plans to Upgrade Nuclear, Air Defense Forces,” Agence France-Press, September 10, 2014, <www.defensenews.com/article/20140910/DEFREG01/309100040/Russia-Announces-Plans-Upgrade-Nuclear-Air-Defense-Forces>.

39. “Russia Plans Rail-Mounted Missiles to Counter U.S. Global Strike Program.”

40. The State Armaments Program for 2011–20 calls for the procurement of fifty-six divisions of S-400 air defense systems and ten divisions of S-500 systems. Vladimir Shabanov, “Major Army Modernization Program to Cost Russia Over 20 Trillion,” Pravda (March 1, 2011), <http://english.pravda.ru/business/finance/01-03-2011/117052-russian_army-0>.

41. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, para. 27.f.

42. Arbatov, Dvorkin, and Oznobishchev, Non-Nuclear Factors of Nuclear Disarmament, p. 26.

43. Putin, “Being Strong.”

44. Department of State, Adhere to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements, July 2014, p. 8, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf>.

45. Acton, Silver Bullet?, pp. 104–6.

46. For a discussion of the physics of boost-glide weapons and the challenges confronting their development, see James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons,” Science & Global Security 23 (October 2015), pp. 191–219.

47. “Russia to Develop Precision Conventional ICBM Option,” RIA Novosti, December 14, 2012, <http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20121214/178154441.html>. The potential for the new missile to carry a maneuvering warhead had been noted long before Karakayev's announcement. See Pavel Podvig, “Would Russia Build a New MIRVed ICBM?,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 20, 2010, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/12/would_russia_build_a_new_mirve.shtml>.

48. This translation, provided by Yevgeny Miasnikov, is from the original Russian interview. The emphasis has been added by this author. Anatoly Antonov, “Rossiya Vynuzhdena Zanyat'sya Sozdaniyem Strategicheskogo Oruzhiya V Neyadernom Osnashchenii” [Russia Must Develop Non-Nuclear Strategic Arms], Indeks Bezopasnosti [Security Index] 19 (2013), p. 16, <www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/11/13722618170.pdf>. The English edition of Security Index quotes Antonov as saying something slightly different, namely that “the United States pushed us, and we are forced to start such an arms race in the future.” See Antonov, “Russia Forced to Develop Global Prompt Strike Weapons.”

49. Chernenko and Safronov, “Razgonka Vooruzheniy.”

50. Putin, address to the Federal Assembly, 2013, emphasis added.

51. This has been confirmed by US officials involved in the New START negotiations.

52. Russia has advertised its development of a MaRV designed to defeat terminal missile defenses. This is a distinct effort from the program discussed elsewhere in this section. Pavel Podvig, “MARV is Back,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, August 5, 2014, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/08/marv_is_back.shtml>.

53. Robert Godwin, Dyna-Soar: Hypersonic Strategic Weapons System (Burlington, Ontario, Canada: Apogee Books, 2003), p. 7.

54. Nikolai Sokov, “Military Exercises in Russia: Naval Deterrence Failures Compensated by Strategic Rocket Success,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, February 24, 2004, <http://cns.miis.edu/stories/040224.htm>.

55. Sokov, “Military Exercises in Russia;” Pavel Podvig, “Russian Hypersonic Vehicle—More Dots Added to Project 4202,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, August 26, 2014, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/08/russian_hypersonic_vehicle_-_m.shtml>.

56. Sokov, “Military Exercises in Russia.” Some reports cited by Sokov describe the re-entry vehicle essentially as a hypersonic cruise missile and not a MaRV. However, it seems extremely unlikely that a hypersonic cruise missile would be launched by a booster as powerful as an ICBM.

57. The use of a Topol missile was reported in Sokov, “Military Exercises in Russia;” the use of a Stiletto missile was reported in Pavel Podvig, “Putin's Miracle Weapon Revisited,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, February 7, 2005, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2005/02/putins_miracle_weapon_revisite.shtml>.

58. Podvig, “Putin's Miracle Weapon Revisited.” Solomonov is the general designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology. His personal and organizational rivalry with NPO Mashinostroyeniya, which designed the SS-19, is well known.

59. Nikolai Sokov, “The Future Shape of Russia's ICBM Force Clarified,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 9, 2005, <http://cns.miis.edu/stories/051109.htm>. Reports quoted by Sokov refer to the re-entry vehicle as Igla. However, this name may be incorrect since Igla is a man-portable air defense system.

60. Pavel Podvig, “Confusion About Topols,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, November 2, 2005, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2005/11/confusion_about_topols.shtml>.

61. Pavel Podvig, “Test of Anti-Missile Defense Capabilities of Ballistic Missiles,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, November 1, 2005, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2005/11/test_of_antimissile_defense_ca.shtml>.

62. President of Russia, transcript of press conference with the Russian and foreign media, Moscow, February 1, 2007, <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/01/1309_type82915type82917_117600.shtml>.

63. This paragraph and the next are drawn from Podvig, “Russian Hypersonic Vehicle—More Dots Added to Project 4202;” Pavel Podvig, “Some New Missile System to be Deployed in Dombarovskiy,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 18, 2013, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/some_new_missile_system_to_be.shtml>; Pavel Podvig, “Test of a ‘Hypersonic Vehicle’ in September Ended in Failure,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 2, 2013, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/test_of_a_hypersonic_vehicle_i.shtml>; Pavel Podvig, “Object 370, Project 4202 and Construction in Dombarovskiy,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, February 6, 2013, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/02/object_370_project_4202_and_co.shtml>; Pavel Podvig, “New Warhead Tested in a UR-100NUTTH/SS-19 Launch,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, December 27, 2011, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2011/12/new_warhead_tested_in_a_ur-100.shtml>.

64. Podvig, “Russian Hypersonic Vehicle—More Dots Added to Project 4202.”