Cooperative Threat Reduction in the former Soviet states: legislative history, implementation, and lessons learned

ABSTRACT

The US Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, founded in the early 1990s to secure Soviet weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, chemical, and biological—and promote WMD nonproliferation, has enjoyed great success. CTR has spent over $10 billion in the last twenty-five years to help eliminate thousands of nuclear warheads, dozens of nuclear submarines, 35,000 metric tons of chemical agent, and thousands of strategic missiles, bombers, and missile silos in former Soviet states. But it has also been beset with numerous funding, political, bureaucratic, technical, and planning challenges. The author reviews the history of CTR funding and legislation, discusses obstacles to implementation, and identifies five broad lessons from the program's early experiences that are applicable to future global security projects.

KEYWORDS:

• Cooperative Threat Reduction
• former Soviet Union
• Russia
• chemical weapons
• biological weapons
• WMD elimination
• Congress

Notes

1. Soviet nuclear force estimates are contained in the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1991-1992 (London: Brassey’s, 1991), pp. 30-45.

2. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, H.R. 2100, 102nd Cong., (1991-1992). See also Theodor Galdi, “The Nunn-Lugar Program for Soviet Weapons Dismantlement: Background and Implementation,” Congressional Research Service, Report 94-985-F, December 11, 1995.

3. Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, H.R. 3807, 102nd Cong., (1991-1992), <www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/102/hr3807/text/enr>. The eight negative votes were all Republican; see <www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=102&session=1&vote=00274.>

4. Senate amendments 1441, 1443, and 1444. See <www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/house-bill/3807/amendments?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22hr3807%5C%22%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=1>.

5. H.R. 3807, Title II, Part C, “Administrative and Funding Authorities.”

6. H.R. 3807, Title II, Part B, “Findings and Program Authority.”

7. Originally Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers for Relief from the Effects of Natural Disasters, for Other Urgent Needs, and for Incremental Costs of “Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” H.J. Res. 157, 102nd Cong., (1991-1992).

8. See the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, H.R. 5600, 102nd Cong., (1992), Pub. L. No. 102-484, especially Title XI, Section 1112, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/house-bill/5006/text>.

9. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, H.R. 5504, 102nd Cong., (1992), later becoming Pub. L. No. 102-396.

10. National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 2401, 103rd Cong., (1993), later becoming Pub. L. No. 103-160.

11. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, H.R. 3116, 103rd Cong., (1993), later becoming Pub. L. No. 103-139.

12. National Defense Authorization Act, S. 2182, 103rd Cong., (1994), later becoming Pub. L. No. 103-337.

13. For further discussion and background on CTR programs, see the Congressional Research Service reports by Amy F. Woolf, Mary Beth Nikitin, Paul Kerr, and other experts on nonproliferation issues, many available on the Federation of American Scientists website at <www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/index.html>.

14. National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 1530, 104th Cong., (1995). This was vetoed by President Bill Clinton, but the FY 96 Defense Appropriations bill, H.R. 2126, became Public Law 104-61. The second condition related to biological weapons is “[t]hat Russia has agreed with the United States and the United Kingdom on a common set of procedures to govern visits by officials of the United States and United Kingdom to military biological facilities of Russia, as called for under the Joint Statement on Biological Weapons issued by officials of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia on September 14, 1992.”

15. Ibid.

16. See “The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START),” US Department of State, July 31, 1991, and the “Protocol to The Treaty between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on The Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” Lisbon, Portugal, May 23, 1992.

17. See, for example, Global Security, “Chapayevsk Sredne-Volzhskiy Chemical Plant,” n.d., <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/chapayevsk.htm>, and Federation of American Scientists, “Chemical Weapons,” n.d., <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/cbw/cw.htm>.

18. Ibid.

19. The author of this article took part in this first on-site visit to Shchuch’ye in 1994 as a professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee. These observations are his own. An interesting series of articles on Russia's Cold War military legacies written by David Hoffman in the Washington Post began with “Russia's Forgotten Chemical Weapons,” Washington Post, August 16, 1998, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/coldwar/leonidovkaa.htm>.

20. For the much-delayed opening of the chemical-weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye in 2009, see Steven Eke, “Russia opens WMD disposal plant,” BBC News, May 29, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8074083.stm>.

21. There was a warning in 2012 that the Umbrella Agreement would not be renewed by Russia. See “Nunn-Lugar Program Could Survive Despite Russian Objections, Experts Say,” Global Security Newswire, October 11, 2012, <www.nti.org/gsn/article/ctr-program-could-survive-despite-russian-objections-experts-say/>. But in 2013, the two signed a follow-on bilateral agreement limited to nuclear energy. See Department of Energy, “United States, Russia Sign Agreement to Further Research and Development Collaboration in Nuclear Energy and Security,” September 16, 2013, <http://energy.gov/articles/united-states-russia-sign-agreement-further-research-and-development-collaboration-nuclear>.

22. See “Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, March 11, 2016, <www.international.gc.ca/gpp-ppm/global_partnership-partenariat_mondial.aspx?lang=eng>.

23. This author helped lead the CTR outreach efforts in Russia for chemical weapons destruction, missile destruction, and submarine dismantlement along with Green Cross colleagues in Switzerland and Russia. See <www.gcint.org>.

24. See, for example, annual “national dialogues” on global chemical weapons destruction, organized by three Green Cross national affiliates: Green Cross Russia, Green Cross Switzerland, and Global Green USA. “Tenth Russian National Dialogue on Chemical Weapons Nonproliferation and Destruction,” Moscow, October 28–29, 2008.

25. For a thoughtful review of CTR in recent years, see National Academy of Sciences, Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2009).