Interagency and intra-agency aspects of US elimination activities

ABSTRACT

This article examines the operational, legal, organizational, and funding aspects of interagency and intra-agency coordination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) elimination missions conducted by the United States. To illustrate the demands and complexities of these operations, it discusses the requirements of a WMD elimination mission in North Korea following the collapse of the Kim Jong-un regime. It recommends that the US Department of Defense and the broader US government re-examine and expand pre-crisis planning assumptions and associated concepts of operation, and also work to defuse interagency conflicts by establishing clear priorities and encouraging international partners to take a more active role in WMD elimination missions.

KEYWORDS:

• Weapons of mass destruction
• disarmament
• chemical weapons
• biological weapons
• North Korea

Notes

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2. Leo James Mahoney, “A History of the War Department Scientific Intelligence Mission (ALSOS), 1943-1945,” PhD diss., Kent State University, 1981; Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. 230–31.

3. Rebecca K.C. Hersman, “Eliminating Adversary Weapons of Mass Destruction: What's at Stake?,” Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Occasional Paper 1 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004), p. 15.

4. Government Accountability Office, “Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund: State Should Better Assure the Effective Use of Program Authorities,” (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, November 2012), <www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-83>.

5. Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, Stat. 3292 (2015); Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf, “The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress,” (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014).

6. Chi K. Cheung, “Cape Ray Diplomacy: How a U.S. Merchant Vessel Took Center Stage in Foreign Relations,” InterAgency Journal 6 (Spring 2015), pp. 8–16.

7. Ibid.

8. Bureau of Public Affairs, “Fact Sheet: US Contributions to the International Effort to Eliminate Syria's Chemical Weapons Program,” US Department of State, November 5, 2013, <www.state.gov/t/217199.htm>.

9. Massimo Calabresi and Timothy J. Burger, “Who Lost the WMD?,” Time 162 (July 7, 2003), p. 32.

10. Charles Duelfer, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD,” (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004), <www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html>.

11. For a more thorough treatment of estimated stockpiles of North Korea's weapon-usable material, see in particular, David Albright and Christina Walrond, “North Korea's Estimated Stocks of Plutonium and Weapons Grade Uranium,” Institute for Science and International Security, August 16, 2012, <http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/dprk_fissile_material_production_16Aug2012.pdf>.

12. Joel Wit and Sun Young Ahn, “North Korea's Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy,” US-Korea Institute at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, February 2015, <http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/NKNF-NK-Nuclear-Futures-Wit-0215.pdf>.

13. “Strategic Weapon Systems,” Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – China and Northeast Asia, February 2, 2016, <https://janes.ihs.com/ChinaNorthAsia/Display/1303174>.

14. See Leah Schwarting, “U.S. Commander: NK Might Have Miniaturized Nuclear Capabilities,” Talk Radio News Service, October 24, 2014, <www.talkradionews.com/pentagon/2014/10/24/u-s-forces-korea-commander.html#.VW8rwjYw9Fp>.

15. Ministry of National Defense, “2010 Defense White Paper,” Republic of Korea, December 11, 2012, p. 35, <www.nti.org/media/pdfs/2010WhitePaperAll_eng.pdf>.

16. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea's Chemical Warfare Capabilities,” US-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, <http://38north.org/2013/10/jbermudez101013/>; see also Joseph S. Bermudez, “North Korea's Chemical Warfare Capabilities,” October 10, 2013, <http://38north.org/2013/10/jbermudez101013/#_ftn11>.

17. See Bruce Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse (RAND Corporation, 2013), <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR331/RAND_RR331.pdf>.

18. Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, “2015 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” Department of State, June 5, 2015, <www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2015/243224.htm>. In addition, see Bruce Bennett, “The Challenges of Biological Weapons,” RAND Corporation, October 2013, <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT401/RAND_CT401.pdf>.

19. See Ministry of National Defense, “2012 Defense White Paper,” Republic of Korea, December 11, 2012, p. 36, <www.mnd.go.kr/cop/pblictn/selectPublicationUser.do?siteId=mnd_eng&componentId=51&categoryId=0&publicationSeq=585&pageIndex=1&id=mnd_eng_021400000000>. See also Melissa Hanham, “Kim Jong Un Tours Pesticide Facility Capable of Producing Biological Weapons,” US-Korea Institute at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, July 9, 2015, <http://38north.org/2015/07/mhanham070915/>.

20. See Bennett, “Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse.”

21. Ibid.

22. WMD elimination operations do not fall under Cooperative Threat Reduction, which is done in conjunction with a host/partner nation in permissive environments. WMD elimination operations take place after the start of hostilities and before the full transition to civilian control. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Joint Publication 3-40 (Washington, DC: 2014), <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_40.pdf>.

23. This scenario is based upon the assumption that DOD is leading the elimination mission. It is entirely plausible that the president could assign a different entity, person, or organization to be in charge of the WMD hunt. In this alternative scenario, the president, acting in the role of commander-in-chief, could designate an individual to lead the hunt for WMD (as President George W. Bush did in 2003 when he assigned Dr. David Kay as head of the Iraq Survey Group) or could turn the entire mission over to the intelligence community. Presumably, this would depend on a permissive or semi-permissive environment.

24. While the term “WMD elimination” is no longer doctrinally correct, as it has been replaced by the “control, defeat, disable, and dispose” mission as articulated in the 2014 Department of Defense Strategy to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is nevertheless a useful term of art within DOD's WMD-countering community.

25. See Gerard Vavrina and John Greaves, “Nuclear Disablement Team Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Parts 1 and 2,” NBC Report (Fall/Winter 2003), pp. 7–10, <www.hsdl.org/?view&did=481846>; and Gerard Vavrina and John Greaves, “Nuclear Disablement Team Operations in Operation Iraq Freedom, Part 2,” NBC Report (Spring/Summer 2004), pp. 27–32, <www.hsdl.org/?view&did=481844>. Currently, the United States has two nuclear-disablement teams ready to be deployed. Note that nuclear-disablement teams do not do “render safe.” They examine program-related sites and sensitive materials. The mission to render safe constituted weapons is entrusted to another entity.

26. For a more thorough treatment of possible command relationships on the peninsula for a WMD elimination operation, see Bruce Bennett and Jennifer Lind, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” International Security 36 (Fall 2011), pp. 84-119.

27. See Joint Publication 3-40, “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” October 2014, Chapter III, Section 4, <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_40.pdf>.

28. See Bennett, “Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse.”

29. China could make major contributions, and almost certainly would become involved in any North Korean collapse scenario, given its geographic proximity, but the political situation may make it impossible to gain their cooperation in advance of the event. Yun Sun, “The North Korean Contingency: Why China Will Not Cooperate,” US-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, July 25, 2014, <http://38north.org/2014/07/ysun072514/>.

30. The same concern about nationals from non-nuclear-weapon states coming into contact with nuclear-weapon material or design information also applies to non-nuclear-weapon “sending states” that contribute forces to UN Command, such as Australia.