Anarchy and the new arms race

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Notes

1 These tests were in 2010, 2013, and 2014. See Frank A. Rose, “Ensuring the Long-Term Sustainability and Security of the Space Environment,” US Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, Omaha, Nebraska, August 13, 2014, <www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2014/230611.htm>.

2 Recent statements by policy makers include Senator Jon Kyl in 2010, Congressman Michael Turner in 2011, and Congressman Doug Lamborn in 2013, in, respectively, “Senate Debate on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty,” 111th Cong., 2nd sess., December 16, 2010, <www.c-span.org/video/?297119-1/senate-session, ∼2:14); “Turner Opening Statement for Hearing on U.S. Strategic Forces,” 112th Cong., 1st sess., March 2, 2011, <https://turner.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/turner-opening-statement-for-hearing-on-us-strategic-forces>; Kathleen E. Masterson, “China Cited by Foes of Nuclear Budget Cuts,” Arms Control Today (December 2011), <http://legacy.armscontrol.org/print/5152>.

3 Note that Zhang’s book was published in February 2015, before the Department of Defense published its April 2015 report on China's MIRVed (armed with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles) DF-5s, and therefore does not discuss these here.

4 The DF-31A does not carry MIRVs and the DF-41 is not deployed; however, both are reportedly capable of doing so, as highlighted by Zhang.

5 These are Zhang's estimates. For further reference, see Bill Gertz, “China Flight Tests New Multiple-Warhead Missile,” Washington Free Beacon, April 19, 2016, <http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-flight-tests-multiple-warhead-missile/>.

6 China's People's Liberation Army documents have long discussed the Chinese nuclear arsenal as a “lean and effective” force, in explicit contrast to a “minimal” or “maximal” one, though the phrase “minimum deterrence” is the best Western alignment with the preferred Chinese formulation.

7 See Charles Ferguson, “Sparking a Buildup: U.S. Missile Defense and China's Nuclear Arsenal,” Arms Control Today, March 1, 2000, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_03/cfmr00>; Brad Roberts, “China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond,” Institute for Defense Analysis, September 2003, <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/bmd.pdf>; Andrew S. Erickson, “China's Ballistic Missile Defense Countermeasures: Breaching America's Great Wall in Space?” in Lyle J. Goldstein and Andrew S. Erickson, eds., China's Nuclear Force Modernization, Naval War College Newport Paper 22, 2005, pp. 65–91; Nicholas Khoo and Reuben Steff. “This Program will not be a Threat to Them: Ballistic Missile Defense and US relations with Russia and China,” Defense & Security Analysis 30 (2013), pp. 17–28.

8 Andrew M. Sessler (chair), “Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System,” Union of Concerned Scientists, April 2000, <www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/cm_all.pdf>.

9 Yoshida Reiji, “Beijing's Senkaku Goal: Sub ‘Safe Haven’ in South China Sea,” Japan Times, November 7, 2012, <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/11/07/national/beijings-senkaku-goal-sub-safe-haven-in-south-china-sea/>; Christian Conroy, “China's Ballistic-Missile Submarines: How Dangerous?” National Interest, November 18, 2013, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/chinas-ballistic-missile-submarines-how-dangerous-9414>; Office of Naval Intelligence, “The People's Liberation Army Navy, A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics,” 2009, p. 22.

10 Although it is generally believed that China does not have an aircraft dedicated exclusively to the delivery of nuclear missiles, it is thought that a number of Hong-6 bombers and Qian-5 attack aircraft have been configured to deliver either conventional or nuclear missiles, since China conducted nuclear tests in the 1970s and 1980s using the H-6. Taking this into account, an operational sea-based nuclear force would allow China to effectively have a nuclear triad.

11 The most recent Department of Defense report on China's military capabilities, published in 2016, only goes so far as to say that China is likely to progress its antisatellite capabilities, but does not speculate further.

12 Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey G. Lewis, “Understanding China's Antisatellite Test,” Nonproliferation Review 15 (June 2008), pp. 335–47.

13 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Jeffrey G. Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007); Taylor Fravel and Evan Medeiros, “China's Search for Assured Retaliation,” International Security 35 (Fall 2010), pp. 48–87.