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Viewpoints

Dark forces awaken: the prospects for cooperative space security

 

ABSTRACT

International cooperation on outer-space security has fluctuated over the past decades, marked by periods of common endeavor and relative stability as well as times of destabilizing developments and rising tensions. A high-water mark of space-security diplomacy was the 2013 UN Group of Governmental Experts consensus report on “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities,” which set out a rich menu of measures and promised new levels of cooperative security among states. Regrettably, the report was followed by a series of negative developments that threaten to reverse the cooperative trend it espoused. These developments include the introduction (by Russia and China) and rejection (by the United States) of a revised draft treaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT); the adoption by the UN General Assembly of a divisive resolution on “no first placement” of space weapons; the failure of the European Union to gain support for its proposed Code of Conduct, as well as escalating strategic tensions. This viewpoint analyzes the re-emergence of these “dark forces” and their implications for multilateral diplomacy and makes suggestions for remedial action to preserve outer-space security.

Notes

1 This apocryphal quote has also been referenced with the omission of the word “my.” See Elizabeth M. Knowles, What they didn’t say: a book of misquotations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. vi–33.

2 UN General Assembly, “Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities,” A/68/189, Sixty-eighth session, July 29, 2013.

3 The EU-initiated draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, discussed later in this viewpoint, is an important if still unrealized exception.

4 On January 11, 2007, China successfully used an SC-19 ASAT missile to destroy a defunct Chinese weather satellite. Thirteen months later, the United States used a RIM-161 Standard Missile 3 to destroy a defunct US satellite. Despite US government claims that the February 2008 test was not “part of an anti-satellite development and testing program,” other governments—particularly those of China and Russia—were unconvinced. See Ross Liemer and Christopher F. Chyba, “A Verifiable Limited Test Ban for Anti-satellite Weapons,” Washington Quarterly 33 (2010), pp. 149–50.

5 Ibid., p. 9.

6 Conference on Disarmament (CD), “Draft ‘Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects,’” CD/1839, February 29, 2008, and CD/1985, June 12, 2014, <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/604/02/PDF/G0860402.pdf?OpenElement>. The original proposal leading to the PPWT was contained in CD/1679 of June 28, 2002: “Possible elements of the future international legal instrument on the prevention and deployment of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects.”

7 CD, “Draft ‘Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects.’” The US critique of the PPWT is contained in CD/1847 of August 26, 2008 and CD/1998 of September 3, 2014. The Sino-Russian rebuttal is contained in CD/2042 of September 14, 2015.

8 See, for instance, Frank A. Rose, “Challenges to Arms Control in Space and Pragmatic Way Ahead,” 3rd ARF Workshop on Space Security, Session II, Beijing, November 30, 2015, <http://state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/250231.htm>.

9 Robert A. Wood, Remarks at the 70th UN General Assembly First Committee Thematic Discussion on Outer Space, Disarmament Aspects, New York City, October 23, 2015, <usun.state.gov/remarks/6920>

10 Statement by the Chinese Delegation at the Thematic Discussion on Outer Space at the First Committee of the 70th Session of the UNGA, New York, October 23, 2015, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com15/statements/23October_China.pdf>.

11 Ibid.

12 UN General Assembly, “No placement of weapons in outer space,” A/RES/69/32, Sixty-ninth session, December 2, 2014, <www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/32>.

13 EU Explanation of Vote delivered by Italy, October 30, 2014, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com14/eov/L14_Italy.pdf>

14 The voting result on A/RES/70/27 in the General Assembly in 2015 was 129 in favor, four opposed, and forty-six abstentions. See <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com15/votes-ga/27.pdf>.

15 Victor Vasiliev, Statement at the Joint Ad hoc meeting of the First and Fourth Committees of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, October 22, 2015, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com15/statements/22October_SpaceGGE.pdf>.

16 James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Statement delivered to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., February 9, 2016, p. 9, <www.dni.gov/files/documents/SASC_Unclassified_2016_ATA_SFR_FINAL.pdf>.

17 Ibid., p. 10.

18 Ibid.

19 Douglas Loverro, “Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Budget Request for National Security Space Activities,” Statement before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces House Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., March 15, 2016 pp. 3–4, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20160315/104620/HHRG-114-AS29-Wstate-LoverroD-20160315.pdf>.

20 European External Action Service, “Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,” Version 31, March 2014, <http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/pdf/space_code_conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf>. The institutional support aspects are outlined in sections 5 to 9 of the text, pp. 7–13.

21 Article 41 of the Treaty on European Union outlines the funding of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), of which the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an integral part. The policy is further described in Articles 42 to 46, in Chapter 2, Section 2 of Title V (“Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy”), and in Protocols 1, 10, and 11 and Declarations 13 and 14. See “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,” December 13, 2007, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M%2FTXT>.

22 BRICS Joint Statement Regarding the Principles of Elaboration of International Instruments on Outer Space Activities, New York, July 27, 2015, <www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1623220>. States of the Non-Aligned Movement also voiced opposition.

23 “Many participants considered that the United Nations General Assembly could be the most appropriate forum for negotiating a code, noting its universal membership and its ability to address all issues of a cross cutting, multi committee [sic] nature. It was suggested that an open-ended working group could rotate between Vienna, Geneva and New York in order to take advantage of the expertise available at each of those locations.” Chair's Summary, Multilateral Negotiations on an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, New York, July 27–31, 2015, paragraph 16, <www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000098436.pdf>.

24 Jacek Bylica, European External Action Service, UNGA 70th Session, First Committee Thematic Discussion on Outer Space, United Nations, New York, October 23, 2015, <www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com15/statements/23October_EU.pdf>.

25 Timothy Farnsworth, “Space Code Process Called ‘Unsuccessful,’” Arms Control Today 46 (March 2016), p. 5.

26 “Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities,” Article IV, paragraph 8.1.

27 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies,” 1967, Article I.

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