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Notes
1 Private discussions of author with officials.
2 Hu Side, “Zhongguo Hewuqi Zhi Lu” [The road toward China's nuclear weapons], Global Science, No. 12, 2007, <http://tech.sina.com.cn/d/2008-01-03/17061952215.shtml?from=wap>.
3 Ibid.
4 Yu Min Yianshi Bashi Huadan Wenji [Essay collection for academician Yu Min's eightieth birthday celebration], (Beijing: Atomic Energy Press, 2006).
5 Zhou Junlun and Qiang Huanwen, eds., Nie Rongzhen Bainian Danchen Jinian Wenji [Memorial essays for Nie Rongzhen's 100th birthday], (Beijin: PLA, 1999), p. 546.
6 John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “China's Ballistic Missile Programs Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” International Security, 1992, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1992), p. 33.
7 Sun Xiangli, He Shidai de Zhanlie Xianze: Zhongguo He Zhanlie Wenti Yanjiu [Strategic choice in the nuclear age: on China's nuclear strategy], (Center of Strategy Study of Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics, 201), p. 31.
8 For more details, see Hui Zhang, “China's Fissile-Material Production and Stockpile,” IPFM Research Report No. 17, January 2018, <http://fissilematerials.org/library/rr17.pdf>.
9 “Countries: United States,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, <http://fissilematerials.org/countries/united_states.html>.
10 Lars-Erik De Geer, “The Radioactive Signature of the Hydrogen Bomb,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 2 (1991), pp. 351–63.
11 Zhang, “China's Fissile Material Production and Stockpile.”
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 10.
14 “Wo guo jian cheng chao di pin dui qian shen shui tong xin xi tong” [China's super-low-frequency deep-water submarine communication system comes online], August 9, 2016, <www.360doc.com/content/16/0809/17/16755731_582051969.shtml>.
15 Neal, R. Wagner, “The Laws of Cryptography with Java Code,” 2003, <www.cs.utsa.edu/~wagner/lawsbookcolor/laws.pdf>, pp. 68–69.
16 Reuters, “Chinese Quantum Satellite Sends ‘Unbreakable’ Code,” August 9, 2017, <www.reuters.com/article/us-china-space-satellite/chinese-quantum-satellite-sends-unbreakable-code-idUSKBN1AQ0C9>.
17 CSIC, “Tui dong shuang fang liang zi ling yu shen du he zuo—Hu Wenming hui jian zhong ke da chang wu fu xiao zhang Pan Jianwei” [Towards a closer cooperation in the quantum realm—Hu Wenming meets with USTC Deputy Principal Pan Jianwei], August 30, 2017, <www.csic.com.cn/zgxwzx/csic_jtxw/326964.htm>.
18 Xin lang jun shi [Sina Military], “Zhong shi: Zhong guo qian ting jing yun xing chao e cai yong xin ji shu dian fu shi jie ren zhi” [Chief: stealth level of Chinese submarines surpasses that of Russia, adopting groundbreaking new technologies], September 16, 2017, <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2017-09-16/doc-ifykywuc4571651.shtml>.
19 Ji et al., “Towards Quantum Communications in Free-Space Seawater,” Optics Express, Vol. 25, No. 17 (2017), pp. 19,795–806, <www.osapublishing.org/oe/abstract.cfm?uri=oe-25-17-19795>.
20 “Pi Mei ‘pu lu zhao’ guo chan lu ji da xing zhan lue yu jing lei da xian shen dong bei mou di” [Comparable to ‘PAVE PAWS’ Chinese land-based large-scale strategic early warning radar appears in the northeast), Guan cha zhe [The Observer], August 7, 2015, <www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2015_08_07_329772.shtml>. These reports are based on pictures taken by civilians of what looks like phased-array warning systems that resemble US PAVE PAWS. The range estimate of 5,500 km in the report is based on the assumption that these systems will have a similar range as the AN FPS-132, which has a reported range of 3,000 miles (approximately 4,800 km), according to the US Missile Defense Agency, “Upgraded Early Warning Radars,” AN/FPS-132, Fact Sheet, July 2016, <www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/uewr1.pdf>.
21 Chen Mengmeng, “Zhong guo er du bu shu chao da gui mo tian bno lei da fu gai zheng ge ri ben” [China deploys large-scale sky-wave radar for the second time, covering the entirety of Japan], <http://military.china.com/important/11132797/20170120/30194046_all.html>.
22 Ibid.
23 Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, “Depressed Trajectory SLBMs: A Technical Evaluation and Arms Control Possibilities,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 3 (1992), pp. 101–15, <http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs03gronlund.pdf>.
24 “Zhong guo dian ke shou bud an guang zi liang zi lei da xi tong yan zhi cheng gong” [CETC's first single-photon quantum radar successfully developed], China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, September 7, 2016, <http://wmdw.jswmw.com/home/content/?1174-3887947.html>.
25 For an overview of the technology and its potential benefits, see Elsa Kania and Stephen Armitage, “Disruption under the Radar: Chinese Advances in Quantum Sensing,” China Brief, Vol. 17, No. 11 (2017), <https://jamestown.org/program/disruption-under-the-radar-chinese-advances-in-quantum-sensing/>.
26 For a good non-technical explanation of this technology, see Philip Ball, “Quantum Mechanics Could Improve Radar,” Physics, February 27, 2015, <https://physics.aps.org/articles/v8/18>.
27 Zhang Wen, Zhang Naiqian, and Zhang Deyu, “Liang zi lei da: Dong cha wei lai zhan chang qian li yan” [Quantum radar: the instrument of the future battlefield], PLA Daily, September 22, 2016, <http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp/content_7271314.htm>.
28 Zhao Tong, “Strategic Warning and China's Nuclear Posture,” The Diplomat, May 28, 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/strategic-warning-and-chinas-nuclear-posture/>.
29 Kevin L. Pollpeter, Michael S. Chase, and Eric Heginbotham, “The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space Operations,” RAND, 2017, <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2000/RR2058/RAND_RR2058.pdf>,pp. 13–14.
30 The PLARF recently conducted an exercise in response to a “radioactive pollution incident caused by natural disasters.” “Jia ru wo guo mou di tu fa he wu ran huo jian jun jiang ru he jiu yuan?” [How will the PLARF respond if there is a radioactive pollution incident?], Guan cha zhe [The Observer], August 17, 2017, <www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2017_08_17_423313.shtml>.
31 Cristina Garafola, “People's Liberation Army Reforms and Their Ramifications,” blog, RAND, September 23, 2016, <www.rand.org/blog/2016/09/pla-reforms-and-their-ramifications.html>.
32 The two individuals are the former PLARF commander Wei Fenghe and the new CMC member Zhang Shengmin, who is reported to be the CMC's “anti-graft chief,” a very powerful position in the current political climate. Xinhua, “China Promotes Military Anti-graft Chief to General,” China Daily, November 2, 2017, <www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-11/02/content_34040675.htm>.
33 Yang Zi, “Rocket Force Gaining Power in China's Army-Dominated PLA,” Asia Times, September 23, 2017, <www.atimes.com/article/rocket-force-gaining-power-chinas-army-dominated-pla/>.
34 Congressional Record—Senate, December 18, 1987, pp. 36, 184–85.
35 As quoted in Congressional Record—Senate, March 21, 1988, p. 4,517.
36 Ibid., p. 4,554.
37 Ibid., p. 4,524.
38 Ibid., p. 4,516.
39 Eric Lindeman, Michael Knapik, and Naoki Usui, “DOE Trying to Tie U.S.–Japan Agreement to Uranium, SWU Sales, AVLIS Funding,” Nuclear Fuel, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1988), p. 1; Eric Lindeman, “DOE Concedes U.S. Won't Get Business in Japan Unless New Pact Is Approved,” Nuclear Fuel, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1988), p. 1.
40 Milton M. Hoenig, “Production and Planned Use of Plutonium in Japan's Nuclear Power Reactors during 30-Year Base Period of the Proposed U.S.–Japan Agreement,” in United States–Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., March 2, 1988.
41 “MOX Fuel in Japan: Summary of Shipments, Use, and Storage,” International Panel on Fissile Materials Blog, June 10, 2014, <http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2014/06/mox_shipments_to_japan.html>. Summarizing Japan's use of plutonium in mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, it reported that only “1,888 kg has been irradiated in reactors.” Since then, no additional MOX fuel has been loaded in Japan's reactors due to reduced use of nuclear power following the 2011 Fukushima accident.
42 “Japan Nuclear Panel Plans Reduction in Plutonium Stockpile, but Details Remain Unclear,” Kyodo, October 4, 2017, <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/10/04/national/japan-nuclear-panel-plans-reduction-plutonium-stockpile-details-remain-unclear/#.WdT3Q4WcFZV>.