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ABSTRACT
The Iran deal is a European success story of “effective multilateralism.” An initiative by three European states, initiated in response to the US-led military action in Iraq, ultimately demonstrated that proliferation risks can be addressed by diplomacy. Over a decade's time, the European Union (EU) framed the negotiations over Iran's nuclear program in a way that enabled two hostile parties—the United States and Iran—to meet in talks leading to a successful understanding. Two years after its implementation, the deal seems to be working. However, despite Iranian compliance, the deal now faces an uncertain future. The Donald J. Trump administration's Iran policy remains unclear, though there are indications to expect diverging views between the United States and the European Union, further challenging a transatlantic link that had already faced challenges during the negotiations. This article re-examines the history of the negotiations through the lens of the strategic choice the EU faces in its foreign and security policy: steering between effective multilateralism and transatlantic relations.
Notes
1 HR 1191, Pub. Law 114-17, May 2015.
2 Council of the European Union, “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World,” December 12, 2003, <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world>, p. 9.
3 Author's interview with a former senior European Union External Action (EEAS) official, March 18, 2015, London.
4 For a detailed analysis of the CFSP in relation to effective multilateralism, see Ben Kienzle, “The EU and the International Regimes in the Field of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” paper delivered to the Network of Excellence on Global Governance, Regionalisation and Regulation, 6th EU Framework Programme for Research Conference, Brussels, April 24–26, 2008.
5 Madeleine K. Albright, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), <https://archive.org/stream/usparticipationi1994unit/usparticipationi1994unit_djvu.txt>, p. 13.
6 Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review (June–July 2002), <www.hoover.org/research/power-and-weakness>.
7 Chief inspector Hans Blix testified to the Security Council, on March 7, 2003, that verification of Iraq's compliance with its nonproliferation obligations “would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever.” Briefing of the Security Council, March 7, 2003: oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, <www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/security_council_briefings.asp#7>. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the IAEA, testified on the same day that “With our verification system now in place, barring exceptional circumstances, and provided there is sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq, we should be able within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme. These few months would be a valuable investment in peace because they could help us avoid a war. We trust that we will continue to have your support as we make every effort to verify Iraq's nuclear disarmament through peaceful means, and to demonstrate that the inspection process can and does work, as a central feature of the international nuclear arms control regime.” Mohamed ElBaradei, “The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq,” statement to the United Nations Security Council, January 27, 2003, <www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/elbaradei27jan03.htm>
8 The French ambassador to the United States explains the background for the E3 in Kelsey Davenport and Elizabeth Philipp, “A French View on the Iran Deal: An Interview with Ambassador Gérard Araud,” Arms Control Today, July 5, 2016. <www.armscontrol.org/print/7550>.
9 Council of the European Union, “European Security Strategy,” p. 1
10 For a more in-depth analysis, see Tarja Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran: Inside EU negotiations (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017).
11 “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1970, Article IV, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf>.
12 Seyed Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), p. 124.
13 IAEA, INFCIRC/637, November 26, 2004, p. 4.
14 For the conflict of objective guarantees, see Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, pp. 34–35.
15 Oliver Meier, “European Efforts to Solve the Conflict over Iran's Nuclear Programme: How Has the European Union Performed?,” EU Non-Proliferation Consortium: Non-Proliferation Papers, No. 27, February 2013, <www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/eu-consortium/publications/nonproliferationpaper-27>.
16 Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, p. 169.
17 Arms Control Association (ACA), “History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” Fact Sheets and Briefs, January 21, 2014, <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals>.
18 Jean du Preez, “The New IAEA Resolution: A Milestone in the Iran–IAEA Saga,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 1, 2005, <www.nti.org/analysis/articles/new-iaea-resolution/>.
19 Derek Scally, “Rice Supports EU Call for UN Action on Iran,” Irish Times, January 13, 2006, <www.irishtimes.com/news/rice-supports-eu-call-for-un-action-on-iran-1.1001096>.
20 The negotiations are referred to either as “P5+1,” indicating the permanent members of the Security Council and Germany, or as “E3+3,” indicating the three EU states plus China, Russia, and the United States. I have used “P5+1” to underline the role of the UN Security Council as indicated in the EU understanding of multilateralism (see Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, p. 8)
21 ACA, “History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue.”
22 UN Security Council Resolution 1696, July 31, 2006, <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1696%282006%29>.
23 Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, p. 41.
24 UN Security Council Resolution 1737, S/RES/1737, December 23, 2006; UN Security Council Resolution 1747, S/RES/1747, March 24, 2007; UN Security Council Resolution 1803, S/RES/1803, March 3, 2008; UN Security Council Resolution 1835, S/RES/1835, September 27, 2008; UN Security Council Resolution 1929, S/ RES/1929, June 9, 2010.
25 On the uncompleted work plan, see Peter Crail, “IAEA: Iran Work Plan Progress Incomplete,” Arms Control Today, March 1, 2008, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_03/IAEA>.
26 NIE, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2007), <www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/20071203_release.pdf>.
27 The UN Security Council “Endorses, in this regard, the proposals of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union's High Representative, for a long term comprehensive arrangement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.” UN Security Council Resolution 1969, S/RES/1696, July 31, 2006.
28 Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, pp. 41–43.
29 For the Tehran Declaration text: <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/joint-decl.pdf>.
30 See each of the IAEA Board Reports for 2010: <www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-reports>.
31 Council Decision 2007/140/CFSP of July 26, 2010, concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position, 2010 OJ 195/39, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:195:0039:0073:EN:PDF>.
32 “3130th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs,” press release, Council of the European Union, Brussels, November 30 and December 1, 2011, <www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126518.pdf>.
33 Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP of January 23, 2012, amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran, 2012. OJ L 19/22, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:019:0022:0030:EN:PDF>.
34 Politiken, “Ashton – No Talk Now of Iran Military Action,” News in English, January 11, 2012, <http://politiken.dk/newsinenglish/ECE1504639/ashton--no-talk-now-of-iran-military-action/>.
35 Laura Rozen reports there were “about nine or 10 secret US–Iran bilateral meetings over the nine months between March and November 2013.” Laura Rozen, “Inside the Secret US–Iran Diplomacy that Sealed Nuke Deal,” Al-Monitor, August 11, 2015, <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/iran-us-nuclear-khamenei-salehi-jcpoa-diplomacy.html>.
36 JCPOA, Vienna, July 14, 2015. <http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensiveplan-of-action_en.pdf>.
37 Author's interview with a former senior State Department official, February 9, 2015, Washington.
38 Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, p. 110.
39 Joseph Cirincione, “Origins of Regime Change in Iraq, Proliferation Analysis,” March 19, 2003, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/03/19/origins-of-regime-change-in-iraq-pub-1214>.
40 Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, p. 47.
41 John Bolton, Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad (New York: Threshold, 2007), p. 144.
42 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Iran's Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities: A Net Assessment (London, 2011), p. 26.
43 Seyed Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012).
44 A laptop was received by US intelligence with information on Iran's nuclear program. The origins of these documents have not been revealed. See Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, pp. 34, 62–63.
45 Author's interview with a former E3 ambassador, England, December 18, 2015.
46 Annalisa Giannella, “EU Non-Proliferation Policy and Implementation,” paper delivered to the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference, Brussels, February 3–4, 2012.
47 Cronberg, Nuclear Multilateralism and Iran, p. 96.
48 See, for example, “Lunchtime keynote with U.S. Senator Tim Kaine,” Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Washington, DC, March 20, 2017, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/20/lunchtime-keynote-with-senator-tim-kaine-pub-68235>.
49 See for example Suzanne DiMaggio, “Dealing with North Korea: Lessons from the Iran Nuclear Negotiations,” Arms Control Association, July/August 2017.
50 Author's interview with a former White House advisor on nonproliferation, Boston, May 22, 2015.
51 Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, p. 165.
52 David Morrison and Peter Oborne, “US Scuppered Deal with Iran in 2005, Says then British Foreign Minister,” Open Democracy, September 23, 2013, <www.opendemocracy.net/david-morrison-peter-oborne/us-scuppered-deal-with-iran-in-2005-says-then-british-foreign-minister>.
53 “Trump Threatens to Rip up Iran Nuclear Deal unless US and Allies Fix ‘Serious Flaws’,” The Guardian, October 13, 2017, <www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/13/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-congress>.
54 In 2004, Iran proposed to the United States that negotiations can include not only the nuclear issue but also regional aspects. The proposal communicated to President Bush through the Swiss ambassador never received an answer. See footnote 55 and Robert M. Shelala II, Nori Kasting, and Anthony H. Cordesman, “US and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of the EU, the EU3 and the Non-EU European States,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2, 2012, <https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/130602_AfPak_Cent_Asia.pdf>.
55 Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Slaps New Sanctions on Iran, after Certifying Its Compliance with Nuclear Deal,” Washington Post, July 18, 2017, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-certifies-that-iran-is-meeting-terms-of-nuclear-deal/2017/07/17/58d0a362-6b4a-11e7-b9e2-2056e768a7e5_story.html?utm_term=.452e7c023838>.
56 Paul R. Pillar, “Fake Arguments for Killing Iran-Nuke Deal,” Consortiumnews.com, September 18, 2017, <https://consortiumnews.com/2017/09/18/fake-arguments-for-killing-iran-nuke-deal/>.
57 The prime minister stated that ”I opposed the the deal because it doesn't prevent Iran from getting nukes. It paves the way for Iran to get nuclear weapons.” Reuters, “Benjamin Netanyahu to Discuss ‘Bad’ Iran Nuclear Deal with Donald Trump,” The Guardian, December 4, 2016, <www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/04/benjamin-netanyahu-donald-trump-iran-nuclear-deal>.
58 Pub. Law 114-17, 114th Cong., 1st sess., May 2015, <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-114publ17/html/PLAW-114publ17.htm>.
59 Matthew Lee, “Trump Hands Nuke Deal ‘Last Chance,’ Waives Iran Sanctions,” Washington Post, January 12, 2018, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/officials-iran-deal-survives-trump-will-waive-sanctions/2018/01/12/02677228-f7b1-11e7-9af7-a50bc3300042_story.html?utm_term=.215742f871ba>.
60 Holland, “Trump Issues Ultimatum to ‘Fix’ the Iran Nuclear Deal,” <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-decision/trump-issues-ultimatum-tofix-iran-nuclear-deal-idUSKBN1F108F>.
61 Joint Statement from Prime Minister Theresa May, Chancellor Angela Merkel, and President Emmanuel Macron following President Trump's Statement on the United States' New Iran Strategy, Iran Watch, October 13, 2017, <www.iranwatch.org/library/governments/france/president/joint-statement-prime-minister-theresa-may-chancellor-angela-merkel-president-emmanuel-macron>.
62 “Iran Nuclear Deal: Trump to Extend Sanctions Waiver-Reports,” BBC News, January 12, 2018, <www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42657313>.
63 Council of the European Union, “EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” December 9, 2003. <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015708%202003%20INIT>.
64 “U.S. Will Not Interfere in EU Trade with Iran: Tillerson,” Reuters, October 20, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa/u-s-will-not-interfere-in-eu-trade-with-iran-tillerson-idUSKBN1CP1NL>.
65 Author's interview with a US economist in Washington, February 20, 2015.
66 “European Business Deals with Iran Are Safe: Tillerson,” Al-Monitor, October 20, 2017, <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/afp/2017/10/us-diplomacy-iran-europe-trade.html#ixzz4ys9mxILa>.
67 Cardiner Harris, “Tillerson Warns Europe against Iran Investments,” New York Times, October 22, 2017, < www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/world/middleeast/tillerson-iran-europe.html?_r=0>.
68 European Council, “Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 Protecting against the Effects of the Extra-territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting Therefrom,” November 22, 2017, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996R2271:EN:HTML>.
69 Tarja Cronberg and Tytti Erästö, “Will the EU and the USA Part Ways on the Iran Deal?” SIPRI, October 22, 2017, <www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/will-eu-and-usa-part-ways-iran-deal>.
70 Krishnadev Calamur, “Iran Deal Has ‘Implications for the Credibility’ of the U.S., EU Ambassador Says,” The Atlantic, October 6, 2017, <www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/eu-ambassador-iran-deal/542307/>.
71 Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Europe's Business Heads Aim to Keep Iran Nuclear Deal despite US Threat,” The Guardian, October 6, 2017, <www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/06/europes-business-heads-aim-to-keep-iran-nuclear-deal-despite-us-threat>.
72 Council of the European Union, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy,” June 2016, <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf>.
73 Remarks by HR/Vice-President Federica Mogherini following the Ministerial Meeting of the E3/EU + 3 and Iran, EEAS, September 21, 2017, <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_az/32546/RemarksbyHighRepresentative/Vice-PresidentFedericaMogherinifollowingtheMinisterialMeetingoftheE3/EU+3andIran>.
74 S/RES/1696 (2006), paragraph 4.
75 JCPOA, p. 3, point viii, <www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf>.
76 At the January 12, 2018, presentation of the his statement, President Trump called for long-range missiles and nuclear-weapon programs to be tied together, and for the threat of “severe sanctions” for further missile tests. See Holland, “Trump Issues Ultimatum to ‘Fix’ the Iran Nuclear Deal.”