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ABSTRACT
Although the nuclear safeguards established in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) are explicitly confined to application in Iran, some experts and policy makers have considered whether these supplementary measures could be applied to other states of proliferation concern. While the JCPOA has provided some useful additions to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards toolkit, its legacy for the broader IAEA safeguards mission is unclear. To better assess this potential legacy, this article considers the JCPOA in the context of the evolution of safeguards, particularly the developments following the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent changes to safeguards implementation in Iraq. The article then describes the JCPOA’s safeguards in Iran and the potential to apply similar provisions elsewhere.
Notes
1 “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007. No subsequent public US intelligence community assessments have contradicted this finding.
2 See, for example, “Policy Memo: The Iran Nuclear Agreement: Could It Inform Future Nonproliferation and Disarmament?” Stanley Foundation, November 11, 2016; Thomas Pickering, “JCPOA: A New Gold Standard for Non-Proliferation Agreements,” June 7, 2017, <www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iraninsight/jcpoa-a-new-gold-standard-for-non-proliferation-agreements>.
3 Mark Hibbs, “Iran and the Evolution of Safeguards,” in Larry MacFaul, ed., Verification & Implementation: A Biennial Collection of Analysis on International Agreements for Security and Development (London: VERTIC, 2015), pp. 2, 19.
4 The IAEA previously only applied safeguards to specified items.
5 “Source material” is “uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; and such other material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine.” “Special fissionable material” is “plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine” (“IAEA Safeguards Glossary,” International Nuclear Verification Series No. 3, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2001 (hereafter “Safeguards Glossary”). See “The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) (hereafter “INFCIRC/153”).
6 “Transcript of Interview with Laura Rockwood: Segment One—INFCIRC 153,” June 26, 2006, <https://cgs.pnnl.gov/fois/doclib/RockwoodTranscript(153).pdf>.
7 “The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency” (hereafter “Safeguards System”); “Safeguards Glossary.”
8 “Safeguards System.” A “safeguards approach” is a “set of safeguards measures designed to” detect the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material within a specific amount of time, “depending on the type of material.”
9 “Safeguards System.”
10 “IAEA Safeguards: Staying Ahead of the Game,” International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007. p.10
11 Ibid.; “Safeguards Techniques and Equipment: 2011 Edition,” International Nuclear Verification Series No. 1 (Rev. 2), International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011, p. 55.
12 “Safeguards Techniques and Equipment,” p. 2. The “Safeguards Glossary” defines “containment” as “[s]tructural features of a facility, containers or equipment which are used to establish the physical integrity of an area or items (including safeguards equipment or data) and to maintain the continuity of knowledge of the area or items by preventing undetected access to, or movement of, nuclear or other material, or interference with the items.” The glossary adds that “[t]he continuing integrity of the containment itself is usually assured by seals or surveillance measures … and by periodic examination of the containment during inspection.” The glossary defines “surveillance” as the “collection of information through inspector and/or instrumental observation aimed at detecting movements of nuclear material or other items, and any interference with containment or tampering with IAEA equipment, samples and data.”
13 See, for example, Mark Goodman, Dunbar Lockwood, Michael D. Rosenthal, and James W. Tape, “Strengthening Safeguards Authorities and Institutions,” paper delivered at the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) 49th Annual Meeting, Nashville, TN, July 13–17, 2008; “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System Including Implementation of Additional Protocols,” Report by the Director-General, GC(51)/8, July 23, 2007.
14 K. Naito, “Hexapartite Safeguards Project: A Retrospective,” in Addressing Verification Challenges: Proceedings of an International Safeguards Symposium on Addressing Verification Challenges Organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, 16–20 October 2006 (Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007), pp. 609–61.
15 Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), April 3, 1991, <www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/687.pdf>, , paragraphs 9 (a), (b), and 12.
16 UNSCOM verified Iraq’s compliance with Resolution 687’s requirements relating to chemical and biological weapons, and delivery vehicles.
17 Security Council Resolution 1957, adopted in 2010, terminated these provisions.
18 Letter dated 6 October 1997 from the Director-General of the IAEA to the Secretary-General, S/1997/779.
19 Inspectors returned to Iraq shortly after the Security Council adopted Resolution 1441, in November 2002. Then IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei stated, on March 7, 2003, that the agency had “found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq” and would, “in the near future,” before able to “provide the Security Council with an objective and thorough assessment of Iraq’s nuclear-related capabilities.” The inspectors left Iraq shortly before the US-led invasion later that month. See also Work Programme of IAEA in Iraq Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999), March 19, 2003.
20 “Work & Results,” Iraq Nuclear Verification Office, <www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Invo/what.html>.
21 Plan for Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq’s Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).
22 GOV/2554/Attachment 2/Rev.2: “Submission of Design Information: The Provision and Use of Design Information.”
23 “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2003/40, June 6, 2003.
24 Jacques Baute, “Timeline Iraq: Challenges & Lessons Learned from Nuclear Inspections,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 46, No. 1 (2004). The Iraq Nuclear Verification Office carried out the Security-Council-mandated inspections concerning Iraq’s nuclear program.
25 “Work & Results,” Iraq Nuclear Verification Office.
26 Iran had not previously agreed to amend its subsidiary arrangements to include this requirement, despite the IAEA Board of Governors’ 1992 decision described above.
27 Joint Statement at the End of a Visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, and Germany, October 21, 2003. See “Iran’s Nuclear Programme: A Collection of Documents,” presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, January 2005, London, 2005, p. 41.
28 Iran agreed to these suspensions pursuant to the 2003 agreement and a subsequent 2004 agreement with the same governments. This monitoring stopped when Iran stopped adhering to the suspension agreements in 2005.
29 Iran has resumed implementing Code 3.1 pursuant to the JCPOA.
30 Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) (hereafter “INFCIRC/540”); INFCIRC/153.
31 Such activities may be permitted by the JCPOA-established Joint Commission “for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.”
32 These activities, too, may be permitted by the JCPOA-established Joint Commission (see above).
33 “Press Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on IAEA Report on Iran’s Nuclear Activities,” November 8, 2011.
34 The Joint Commission, which is composed of Iran, the P5+1, and the European Union’s High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to “carry out” certain JCPOA- assigned functions.
35 In “exceptional circumstances,” the agency may give less than two hours.
36 INFCIRC/153.
37 According to the IAEA, an inspection is deemed to be “special” when it is in addition to IAEA routine inspections or “involves access to information or locations” that have not been identified to the IAEA as part of the agency’s implementation of safeguards in that country.
38 Olli Heinonen, “The Case for an Immediate IAEA Special Inspection in Syria,” PolicyWatch 1715, Policy #171, November 5, 2010; John Carlson and Russell Leslie, “Special Inspections Revisited,” paper delivered at INMM 2005 Symposium, July 2005. Carlson and Leslie argue that “[T]he longer the provisions were not used, the more they came to be regarded as being available only in very exceptional circumstances. This perception may have been strengthened by the 1993 case which occurred in adversarial circumstances.” Some experts have advocated that the IAEA use such inspections more frequently (Goodman et al., “Strengthening Safeguards Authorities and Institutions”).
39 The IAEA can draw such a conclusion “on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation … to ascertain that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities in a State, and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in a State.” “Supplementary Document to the Report on The Conceptualization and Development of Safeguards Implementation at the State Level (GOV/2013/38),” GOV/2014/41, Report by the Director-General, August 13, 2014.
40 The IAEA defines the state-level concept as “the general notion of implementing safeguards in a manner that considers a State’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities and capabilities as a whole, within the scope of the safeguards agreement.” In developing and implementing safeguards approaches tailored for specific countries, the IAEA uses what it describes as “objective safeguards-relevant factors” (GOV/2014/41).
41 Laura Rockwood, “The Politics of Safeguards,” paper delivered at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, Washington, DC, March 24, 2015; Cindy Vestergaard, “Safeguarding the Front-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” Trust & Verify, July–September 2015.
42 “Safeguards Measures Applicable in Conversion Plants Processing Natural Uranium,” Policy Paper 18, International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Manual, October 1, 2003.
43 Vestergaard, “Safeguarding the Front-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.”
44 See, for example, Goodman et al., “Strengthening Safeguards Authorities and Institutions”; Pickering, “JCPOA.”
45 North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, but that decision has not been formally recognized by other treaty states parties.