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ABSTRACT
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has been beset with its relationship with India ever since New Delhi and Washington in 2005 announced that they would strike up a bilateral partnership requiring that the NSG lift longstanding restrictions aimed at blunting India’s nuclear development. India’s history of hostility to the very mission of the NSG has prompted questions and even suspicion about India’s reasons for wanting to join the arrangement. These concerns continue to affect NSG members’ views about the terms under which India might become a participant; to date India has not been admitted into the group. While India has not openly articulated an elaborate official catalog of its reasons, Indian participants and observers have provided several partial explanations for India’s strong desire for NSG membership. Their statements suggest that a number of specific Indian interests concerning India’s nuclear-energy program would be advanced by NSG participation, but also that India’s ultima ratio is its quest for greater international political status. A historical approach to the case also permits the conclusion that India applied for NSG membership following an evolution in New Delhi’s perceptions of its security threats as well as of the strategic significance of its nuclear-energy program.
Notes
1 Pranab Dhal Samanta, “India Applies for NSG Membership Ahead of PM Marendra Modi’s US Visit,” Economic Times, June 13, 2016, <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-applies-for-nsg-membership-ahead-of-pm-narendra-modis-us-visit/articleshow/52562366.cms>.
2 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,” Washington, DC, July 18, 2005, <www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2005-07-25/pdf/WCPD-2005-07-25-Pg1182.pdf>.
3 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India,” Washington, DC, November 8, 2010, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/joint-statement-president-obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india>.
4 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb; The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 25.
5 Karsten Frey, India’s Nuclear Bomb and National Security (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 10.
6 Jasjit Singh, Indian Express, December 10, 2003, cited in ibid.
7 Robert G. Joseph, Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, prepared remarks before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, Hearing on US–India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, November 2, 2005, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/55968.htm>.
8 R. Nicholas Burns, “On-the-Record Briefing on the Status of the U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative,” Washington, DC, July 27, 2007, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/89559.htm>.
9 Siddharth Varadarajan, “Ghost of Tarapur Haunts Reprocessing Agreement with U.S.,” The Hindu, December 16, 2009, <www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/siddharth-varadarajan/Ghost-of-Tarapur-haunts-reprocessing-agreement-with-U.S./article16855708.ece>.
10 As a reporter during Burns’s press briefing on July 27, 2007, pointed out, “India is assured that there won’t be another Tarapur in the future,” a reference to a protracted dispute between the United States and India over consent rights concerning the fuel for Indian nuclear-power reactors at Tarapur, in the aftermath of India’s 1974 nuclear-explosive test. See Joseph F. Pilat, The Non-Proliferation Predicament (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1995), pp. 85–86. See Nicholas J. Burns, press briefing, New Delhi, March 2, 2006, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/89559.htm>.
11 Burns, press briefing. Statements from US officials suggest that, at an early stage of the negotiation, the United States and India had settled on a formula to put under IAEA safeguards the “majority” of India’s nuclear-power plants—fourteen of twenty-two—a selling point that would allow US officials to claim that, in fifteen years, “up to 90%” of India’s nuclear-energy program would be under safeguards, an assertion that did not take into consideration the existence and further development of India’s strategic nuclear infrastructure, including future fast-neutron reactors used for production of plutonium for weapons. Burns made clear that it was India’s “sovereign decision to keep [its two breeder reactors] apart from the deal.”
12 Kalman A. Robertson and John Carlson, “The Three Overlapping Streams of India’s Nuclear Programs,” Harvard University Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, April 2016, <www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/thethreesoverlappingtreamsofindiasnuclearpowerprograms.pdf>, p. 4.
13 “Statement by External Affairs Minister of India Shri Pranab Mukherjee on the Civil Nuclear Initiative,” MEA, September 5, 2008, <www.nti.org/media/pdfs/6_ea.pdf?_=1316627913>.
14 Communication dated 10 September 2008 received from the Permanent Mission of Germany to the Agency regarding a “Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India,” INFCIRC/734 (Corrected) September 19, 2008, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2008/infcirc734c.pdf>.
15 “Debate: India and the Multilateral Export Control Regimes,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2016), <http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ORF-Occasional-Paper_92.pdf>, p. 186.
16 Devirupa Mitra, “Exclusive: India’s 300-Page Application for NSG Membership,” The Wire, January 7, 2016, <https://thewire.in/47017/revealed-indias-300-page-application-for-nsg-membership/>.
17 “Communication Received from the Permanent Mission of India to the International Atomic Energy Agency Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology,” INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part 1/Add.a, May 9, 2016, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc254r12p1a1-infcirc254r9p2a1.pdf>.
18 Lok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1272, MEA, November 23, 2016, <www.mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/27665/QUESTION_NO1272_NSG_MEMBERSHIP>.
19 William Burr, “A Scheme of Control: The United States and the Origins of the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” International History Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2014), pp. 252–76.
20 Mark Hibbs, “Israel Prepared to Ratify CTBT, Resume Bid for NSG,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 49, No. 48 (2008), p. 7.
21 Devirupa Mitra, “Exclusive: India's 300-page Application for NSG Membership,” The Wire, January 7, 2016, <https://thewire.in/47017/revealed-indias-300-page-application-for-nsg-membership>.
22 Arun Vishwanathan, “India’s Entry into the NSG: A Long-Winded Process,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2016), p. 221.
23 Hibbs, “Israel Prepared to Ratify CTBT, Resume Bid for NSG,” pp. 26–28.
24 See Mark Hibbs, Toward a Nuclear Suppliers Group Policy for States Not Party to the NPT (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016).
25 “NSG waiver has attendant risks, govt. tells Lok Sabha,” The Hindu, December 15, 2016, <www.thehindu.com/news/national/NSG-waiver-has-attendant-risks-govt.-tells-Lok-Sabha/article16806879.ece>.
26 In the case of Japan, Indians say, the export of listed goods to NSG-participating-country destinations is “almost automatic.” Debnath Shaw, “Dimensions of Nuclear Suppliers Group and India's Deliberations with the Group Over Past Decade,” MEA, September 2, 2016, <www.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?546>.
27 Mitra, “Exclusive: India’s 300-Page Application for NSG Membership.”
28 In 2011, Indian industry projected an installed nuclear-power capacity of 20,000 MW for 2020 and about 60,000 MW in the early 2030s. In 2014, Prime Minister Singh projected an installed nuclear capacity of 24,000 MW for 2024. As of mid-2017, actual capacity is 6,780 MW. P. Sunderarajan, “India Committed to Safety of Nuclear Plants: PM,” The Hindu, January 13, 2014, <www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-committed-to-safety-of-nuclear-plants-pm/article5573879.ece>.
29 “India to Build 10 Heavy Water Reactors to Boost Nuclear Power,” Hindustan Times, May 17, 2017, <www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-to-build-10-heavy-water-reactors-to-boost-nuclear-power/story-acIr6MwKGwe5hrZSqIKQ9K.html>; M.R. Srinivasan, “Ending India’s Nuclear Dependency,” The Hindu, May 19, 2017, <www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/ending-nuclear-dependency/article18491521.ece>; Brahma Chellaney, “‘Homegrown’ Power Plan Will Boost Indian Nuclear Industry,” Nikkei Asian Review, June 16, 2017, <http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Brahma-Chellaney/Homegrown-power-plan-will-boost-Indian-nuclear-industry>.
30 “Communication Received from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Certain Member States’ Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology,” INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1a, November 8, 2016, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r13p1.pdf>.
31 The White House, “Joint Statement: The United States and India: Enduring Global Partners in the 21st Century,” Office of the Press Secretary, June 7, 2016, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/07/joint-statement-united-states-and-india-enduring-global-partners-21st>.
32 Author’s interviews with Western government officials, Vienna and Washington, March and April 2017.
33 Alyssa Ayres, “India, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Paris Climate Accord,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 9, 2016, <www.cfr.org/blog-post/india-nuclear-suppliers-group-and-paris-climate-accord>.
34 Debnath Shaw, “Dimensions of Nuclear Suppliers Group and India’s Deliberations with the Group over Past Decade,” MEA, September 2, 2016, <www.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm?546>.
35 Mark Landler and Jane Perlez, “Rare Harmony as China and U.S. Commit to Climate Deal,” New York Times, September 3, 2016, <www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/world/asia/obama-xi-jinping-china-climate-accord.html>.
36 INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 a.
37 “Suo Motu Statemetn in Lok Sabha by EAM on Nuclear Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology,” August 10, 2011, MEA, <www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/49/Suo+Motu+Statement+in+Lok+Sabha+by+EAM+on+Nuclear+Enrichment+and+Reprocessing+Technology>.
38 Author’s interviews with participating government officials, June and July 2017. See “Especially Designed or Prepared Auxiliary Systems, Equipment, and Components for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants,” <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r13p1.pdf>.
39 Sachin Parashari, “Pokhran II Not Fully Successful: Scientist,” Times of India, August 27, 2009, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pokhran-II-not-fully-successful-Scientist/articleshow/4938610.cms>.
40 “Suo Motu Statement in Lok Sabha by EAM on Nuclear Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology.”
41 Shyam Saran, “India May Have to Wait for a Possible Opening in the Future,” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2016), p. 194.
42 Email communications to the author from government participants in WA, MTCR, and the Australia Group, July and August 2017.
43 Smriti Jain and Aruava Biswas, “BrahMos Missile with Higher Range: This ‘Killer’ India–Russia Project Will Scare Pakistan and China,” Financial Express, October 19, 2016, <www.financialexpress.com/india-news/brahmos-missile-range-highlights-india-russia-modi-putin-mtcr-pakistan-china/424178/>.
44 Tommy Wilkes and Siva Govindasamy, “India’s Modi Wants More Technology Transfer from Global Defense Firms,” Reuters, February 18, 2015, <www.reuters.com/article/us-airshow-india-modi-idUSKBN0LM0CW20150218>. See also Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Arka Biswas, “Wassenaar Arrangement: The Case of India’s Membership,” Observer Research Foundation Occasional Paper, May 2016, <http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ORF-Occasional-Paper_92.pdf>.
45 Praveen Swami, “What Are MTCR and NSG, and Why Does India Want to Be Their Part,” Indian Express, June 10, 2016, <http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/narendra-modi-us-visit-mtcr-nsg-obama-us-congress-2844186/>.
46 Ibid.
47 “L&T, AREVA Sign MoU for N-power Plant Components,” Odisha Sun Times, April 11, 2015, <http://odishasuntimes.com/lt-areva-sign-mou-for-n-power-plant-components/>.
48 T.S. Subramanian, “Koodankulam Is Back,” Frontline, Vol. 15, No. 14 (1998), <www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1514/15140890.htm>.
49 “NSG waiver has attendant risks, govt. Tells Lok Sabha,” The Hindu, December 15, 2016, <www.thehindu.com/news/national/NSG-waiver-has-attendant-risks-govt.-tells-Lok-Sabha/article16806879.ece>.
50 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1948), Chapter 6.
51 Barry O’Neill, “Nuclear Weapons and the Pursuit of Prestige,” dissertation draft, University of California, Los Angeles, May 2002. See section 6, “Sources of National Prestige through History,” <www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/boneill/prestap5.pdf>.
52 United Nations General Assembly, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Fourteenth Meeting, June 9, 1988, A/S-15/PV.14, <http://fissilematerials.org/library/gan98.pdf>.
53 IAEA, INFCIRC/539, November 29, 2000, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc539r1.pdf>, para. 32.
54 Interview with Indian official, August 2017.
55 Daryl G. Kimball, “NSG Membership Proposal Would Undermine Nonproliferation,” Arms Control Now, December 21, 2016, <www.armscontrol.org/blog/ArmsControlNow/2016-12-21/NSG-Membership-Proposal-Would-Undermine-Nonproliferation>.
56 Concerning the bilateral Indian–US agreement for nuclear cooperation which prompted the 2008 NSG waiver, in the case of a nuclear test by India, the United States may terminate nuclear cooperation with India, but that step is not required by law and could be waived by the president. See Paul K. Kerr, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India,” Congressional Research Service, June 26, 2012, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33016.pdf>, pp. 25–28.
57 Kimball, “NSG Membership Proposal Would Undermine Nonproliferation.”
58 Western government ambassador, personal communication, Vienna, June 2011.
59 Ashton B. Carter, “America’s New Strategic Partner,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (2006), <www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/060701_fa_india_pdp.pdf>.
60 Gideon Rachman, “Welcome to the Nuclear Club, India,” Financial Times, September 22, 2008, <www.ft.com/content/3643cb9e-88b9-11dd-a179-0000779fd18c>.
61 Author interviews with officials from NSG PGs, Brussels, May, 2011; Mark Hibbs, The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), pp. 17–26.
62 Private communication from an official from an NSG participating government, September, 2017
63 <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/14/india-threatens-to-pull-plug-on-peacekeeping/ and http://un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/>.
64 Dhruva Jaishankar, “Decoding India's Nuclear Status,” The Wire, April 3, 2017, <https://thewire.in/120800/decoding-india-nuclear-status/>.
65 Mark Hibbs, “The Nuclear Suppliers Group and Geostrategic Politics,” Strategic Trade Review, Autumn 2017, Issue 05, pp. 5–24.