![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
Global nuclear dangers have jumped since President Barack Obama’s 2009 Prague speech affirmed the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Today’s nuclear dangers range from growing US–Russian political–military confrontation and the virtual collapse of bilateral nuclear arms control through the greatest divisions ever within the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to North Korea’s coming capability to attack the United States with nuclear-armed missiles. The Donald J. Trump administration has maintained that nuclear weapons are essential to US security, though it has also affirmed the US commitment to the goal of nuclear abolition. Frustrated by lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and energized by concerns about the risk of use of nuclear weapons, nearly 125 countries have now negotiated a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It was signed by fifty countries when it opened for signature in September 2017. None of the nuclear-weapon states will adhere to the treaty and it will not reduce today’s nuclear dangers. The interests of all of the key protagonists—the United States and its allies, the other NPT nuclear-weapon states, and the supporters of the new Prohibition Treaty—would best be served by rebuilding habits of cooperation among them to reduce global nuclear dangers and advance the NPT’s nuclear disarmament goal. One possible rallying point would be a vision of the strategic elimination of nuclear weapons as instruments of strategy, power, and security—not their complete physical elimination—by 2045, one hundred years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Strategic elimination would have specific dimensions in terms of policy, operations, numbers, institutions and planning, and transparency verification. Priorities for action now stand out both to reduce today’s global nuclear dangers and to put in place the building blocks for strategic elimination.
KEYWORDS:
- nuclear weapons
- nuclear disarmament
- arms control
- Nuclear Posture Review
- nuclear abolition
- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
- Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
- Prohibition Treaty
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
- United States
- Russia
- China
- North Korea
- strategic elimination
- nuclear risk reduction
- humanitarian impact
- verification
- nuclear testing
Acknowledgments
An earlier version of parts of the argument presented in this article appeared as Lewis A. Dunn, “Redefining the U.S. Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament: Analysis and Reflections,” Center for Global Security and Cooperation, Livermore Paper on Global Security #1, October 2016. The author thanks the center for allowing him to draw on that earlier paper. The author also thanks Daniel Horner for his helpful editing support in preparing this version of his argument.
Notes
1 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague as Delivered,” April 5, 2009, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.
2 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p. 30.
3 The terms “NWS” and “NNWS” refer specifically to NPT states parties with and without nuclear weapons, as defined by the NPT, unless otherwise noted.
4 For a discussion, see Olga Oliker, “Unpacking Russia’s New National Security Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 7, 2016.
5 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 25.
6 See Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike ‘De-escalation,’” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 13, 2014, <http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation>. Sokov notes that the same language was used in the 2014 version of the military doctrine.
7 For a discussion of what he calls “Russia’s theory of victory,” including its nuclear dimensions, see Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), pp. 128–38. Also see Elbridge Colby, “Russia’s Evolving Nuclear Doctrine and Its Implications,” Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, January 12, 2016, <www.frstrategie.org/publications/notes/web/documents/2016/201601.pdf>.
8 Sokov, Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike ‘De-escalation.’”
9 See Jens Stoltenberg, “The Secretary General Annual Report, 2015,” January 2016, <www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_127529.htm>. p. 19.
10 See, for example, “Russia Threatens to Aim Nuclear Missiles at Denmark Ships if It Joins NATO Shield,” Reuters, March 22, 2015.
11 Joint Soviet–US Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva, November 21, 1985.
12 For broader appraisal, see Alexey Arbatov, “Understanding the US–Russia Nuclear Schism,” Survival, Vol. 59, No. 2 (2017), pp. 33–66.
13 Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty and Challenging Trump,” New York Times, February 14, 2017.
14 For a review of NATO’s initial responses, see Jeffery A. Larsen, “Time to Face Reality: Priorities for NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit,” Research Paper, Research Division, NATO Defence College, Rome, No. 126, January 2016.
15 See “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference,” February 13, 2016, <www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions>12047.htm>.
16 Ibid.
17 For proposals for more far-reaching changes of NATO nuclear posture, see, for example, Matthew Kroenig, “The Renewed Russian Nuclear Threat and NATO Nuclear Deterrence Posture,” Atlantic Council, February 2016, <www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Russian_Nuclear_Threat.pdf>.
18 On Obama administration objectives and an interim assessment of results by a former Obama administration official, see Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, pp. 147–52.
19 This discussion draws on my participation over the past decade in a series of meetings involving US and Chinese participants, including semi-official so-called “track-one-and-a-half” meetings of officials acting in their private capacities and independent experts as well as track-two meetings of think-tank experts and academics.
20 Several Chinese military experts in conversations with the author have highlighted these proposals.
21 On this last point, see Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, p. 169. This assessment also reflects the author’s participation in many US–Chinese discussions of no-first*use.
22 For a review of Obama efforts to foster a dialogue on strategic stability with China, see Brad Roberts, “Strategic Stability under Obama and Trump,” Survival, Vol. 59, No. 4 (2017), pp. 47–71, passim.
23 See “Iran Fulfilling Nuclear Deal Commitments: IAEA Chief,” Reuters, October 30, 2017.
24 See Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, “Trump Disavows Nuclear Deal, but Doesn’t Scrap It,” New York Times, October 13, 2017, <www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html>. Kelsey Davenport, “Trump Sets U.S. to Violate Iran Deal,” Arms Control Today, November 2017, pp. 20–21.
25 Reuters, “Trump Administration Tightens Iran Sanctions, Tehran Hits Back,” February 3, 2017, <www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-usa/trump-administration-tightens-iran-sanctions-tehran-hits-back-idUSKBN15H253>.
26 See Testimony of Kenneth M. Pollack on Regional Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran before the Committee on Foreign Affairs the United States Senate, July 9, 2015, <www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Regional-Implications-of-a-Nuclear-Deal-with-Iran-1.pdf>.
27 On this possibility, see Alexander B. Downes and Lindsey A. O’Rourke, “The Trump Administration Wants Regime Change in Iran. But Regime Change Usually Doesn’t Work,” Washington Post, July 31, 2017.
28 More generally, see Joel S. Wit and Sun Young Ahn, North Korea’s Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy, (Washington, DC: US–Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015).
29 On the current capability, see Ryan Browne and Niole Gaouette, “Mattis Says North Korea Isn’t Capable of Striking the US,” CNN, December 16, 2017, <www.cnn.com/2017/12/15/politics/mattis-north-korea-icbm/index.html>.
30 See Shane Smith, North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy (Washington, DC: US–Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015). For an extended discussion of North Korea’s “theory of victory,” including nuclear threats and use, see Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, pp. 60–74.
31 For a recent report, see Anna Fifield, “Push for Nuclear Weapons Gains Support in South Korea,” Washington Post, March 21, 2016, p. A7.
32 See Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis, 2nd. edn. (Washington, DC, Stimson Center, 2014).
33 Reflecting that frustration, the Indian military has developed a doctrine for a strong conventional strike across the Indian–Pakistani border as a possible response to a terrorist attack from Pakistan and designed to force Pakistan to control militant groups operating from its territory against India. This so-called “Cold Start” doctrine has only recently been acknowledged by the military. See “What Is India’s ‘Cold Start’ military doctrine?” The Economist, January 31, 2017, <www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/02/economist-explains>.
34 On the overall nuclear interaction between India and Pakistan and its dangers, see Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, eds., Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2013). For an assessment of Pakistan’s expanding capabilities for battlefield use of nuclear weapons (but also alternatives to that course of action), see Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Stimson Center, 2015).
35 This judgment is based on over three decades of working on NPT issues; conversations with other people involved in NPT matters show that it is widely shared.
36 See, for example, Alexander Kmentt, “The Development of the International Initiative on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and Its Effect on the Nuclear Weapons Debate,” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 899 (Autumn 2015), p. 706.
37 On thinking among many NNWS, including on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, see ibid., pp. 682 ff., p. 706.
38 The first conference was held in Oslo in 2013; the second conference in Nayarit outside of Mexico City in 2014.
39 See Conference on Disarmament, CD/2039, August 28, 2015, “Note Verbale Dated 25 August 2015 from the Permanent Mission of Austria.”
40 The Netherlands participated in the negotiations in an attempt to influence the outcome but then was the only participating country to vote against forwarding the Prohibition Treaty to the UNGA.
41 For a discussion of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, including the divisions, see William C. Potter, “The Unfulfilled Promise of the 2015 NPT Review Conference,” Survival, Vol. 58, No. 1, (February–March 2016), pp. 151–78. The five NPT NNWS are sometimes known as the P5 because they are also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.
42 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 30.
43 John Landay, “Trump Administration to Review Goal of World without Nuclear Weapons: Aide,” Reuters, March 21, 2017, <www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-nuclear/trump-administration-review-goal-of-world-without-nuclear-weapons-aide-idUSKBN16S1M6>.
44 See Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review,” February 2018, p. 2, <www.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx>.
45 This judgment and the ones that follow about the impact on US allies in Europe and Asia reflect the author’s continuing conversations with officials and experts either from these countries or with past responsibilities for US security relationships with them.
46 For a sobering appraisal of the risks in the most dangerous US–Soviet nuclear crisis by a former US Secretary of Defense, see William Perry, “The Risk of ‘Blundering’ into Nuclear War: Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Arms Control Today, December 2017, p. 43; more generally, see Patricia Lewis, Heather Williams, Benoit Pelopidas, and Susan Aghlani, “Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy,” Chatham House Report, 2014.
47 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, pp. 25, 31.
48 The following references are drawn from the provisions of the NPT, United Nations, certified true copy (XXVI-9), August 2017.
49 On the 1996 advisory opinions, see the discussion in Michael J. Matheson, “The Opinions of the International Court of Justice on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 91, No. 3 (1997), pp. 417–35.
50 The preceding statements reflect the author’s ongoing conversations with officials and experts from NWS.
51 For a more detailed discussion of these conditions, see Dunn, “Redefining the U.S. Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament.” Also see George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), especially Section 1; Christopher A. Ford, “Why Not Nuclear Disarmament?” New Atlantis, Spring 2010, <www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/why-not-nuclear-disarmament>.
52 For one possible set of US posture changes, all with implications for China, see John R. Harvey, “Commentary: Negating North Korea’s Nukes,” Defense News, February 15, 2016, <www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2016/15/commentary-negating-north-koreas-nukes/>.
53 The International Court of Justice, in its discussion of Article VI of the NPT in its 1996 advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, also emphasizes the need for results. In its words, “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict international control.” See the discussion of the 1996 opinions in Matheson, “The Opinions of the International Court of Justice on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.”
54 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, Final Document, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), New York, 2000, p. 14.
55 For a more complete discussion, see Dunn, “Redefining the U.S. Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament.”
56 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p. 55.
57 See John Landay, “Trump Administration to Review Goal of World without Nuclear Weapons: Aide,” Reuters, March 21, 2017.
58 For one discussion, see John M. Donnelly, “Top Air Force General Open to Changes in Nuclear Arms,” CQ Roll Call, February 7, 2017. Calls for new, more precise and more discriminate nuclear weapons have long been a staple in the debate over US nuclear requirements.
59 For perspectives on a path forward, see Leslie Gelb, “Russia and America: Toward a New Détente,” National Interest, July–August 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-america-toward-new-detente-13077>.; Steven Pifer, “Crisis over Ukraine: Contingency Planning Memorandum Update,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 9, 2015, <www.cfr.org/report/crisis-over-ukraine>.
60 For a comparable argument and a sampling of agenda items, see Robert Einhorn, “Prospects for U.S.–Russian Nonproliferation Cooperation,” Brookings, February 26, 2016, <www.brookings.edu/research/prospects-for-u-s-russian-nonproliferation-cooperation/>.
61 On the importance of great-power status to Moscow and ways to acknowledge such status, see, Gelb, “Russia and America.”
62 “In Call with Putin, Trump Denounced Obama-Era Nuclear Arms Treaty—Sources,” Reuters, February 9, 2017, <www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-putin/exclusive-in-call-with-putin-trump-denounced-obama-era-nuclear-arms-treaty-sources-idUSKBN15O2Ab>.
63 On the Russian stake in continued arms control, see Olga Oliker, “U.S.–Russian Arms Control: The Stakes for Moscow,” Arms Control Today, May 2017, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-05/features/us-russian-arms-control-stakes-moscow>.
64 See Kingston Reif, “Hill Wants Development of Banned Missile,” Arms Control Today, December 2017, p. 35.
65 Joint Soviet–US Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva, November 21, 1985, <www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38086>.
66 For a broader discussion, see Paul Bernstein, “Making Russia Think Twice about Nuclear Threats,” March 9, 2016, <http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/making-russia-think-twice-about-nuclear-threats>.
67 For a more detailed and congruent discussion of the themes of this semi-official dialogue, see Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, pp. 152–59.
68 For some variants on this concept, see David C. Gompert and Philip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability (Washington, DC: US National Defense University, 2011); Wu Riqiang, “China’s Anxiety about U.S. Missile Defense: A Solution,” Survival, October–November 2013, pp. 29–52.
69 Pledge presented at the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons by Austrian Deputy Foreign Minister Michael Linhart, Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, December, 8–9, 2014, <www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14_Austrian_Pledge.pdf>.
70 The first preparatory committee meeting for the 2020 Review Conference took place in May 2017; the next two meetings will take place in 2018 and 2019.
71 The members of the six-party talks were China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia, along with North Korea.
72 For a discussion of such an approach entailing “simultaneous negotiated phase-by-phase movement toward a peace treaty accompanied by denuclearization” by a person long involved with this problem, first officially and then as an independent expert, see Joel S. Wit, Trapped in No-Man’s Land: The Future of US Policy toward North Korea (Washington, DC: US–Korea Institute at SAIS, 2016). This approach also figured in my discussions with Chinese officials and experts.
73 Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “U.S. to Stage Drill with Three Carriers as Trump visits Asia,” Reuters, November 6, 2017, <www.reuters.com/article/us-trump-asia-carriers/u-s-to-stage-drill-with-three-carriers-as-trump-visits-asia-idUSKBN1D62OQ>; Jesse Johnson, “U.S. Sends Nuclear-Capable B-2 Stealth Bomber on Mission in Pacific Ahead of Trump Visit to Asia,” Japan Times, October 29, 2017, <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/10/29/asia-pacific/u-s-sends-nuclear-capable-b-2-stealth-bomber-mission-pacific-ahead-trump-visit-asia/>.
74 On the origins of the deterrence dialogues, see Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, pp. 202–03.
75 Two US experts also have recently explored the possibility of encouraging Pakistani nuclear restraint, or what they call a “normal nuclear Pakistan,” in return for measures that would enhance that country’s international political and economic standing. See Krepon and Dalton, U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis.
76 See Michael Krepon, “Crises in South Asia: Trends and Potential Consequences,” in Michael Krepon and Nate Cohn, eds., “Crises in South Asia: Trends and Potential Consequences,” Stimson Center, September 2011, especially pp. 20–26 on “US Crisis Management,” <www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Crisis%20in%20South%20Asia%20Trends%20and%20Potential%20Consequences.pdf>.
77 Patricia Zengerle, “U.S. Congress to Let Iran Deadline Pass, Leave Decision to Trump,” Reuters, December 12, 2017, <www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-congress/u-s-congress-to-let-iran-deadline-pass-leave-decision-to-trump-idUSKBN1E62HP>.
78 See, generally, Suzanne Maloney, “Under Trump, U.S. Policy on Iran Is Moving from Accommodation to Confrontation,” Brookings, May 11, 2017, <www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/05/11/under-trump-u-s-policy-on-iran-is-moving-from-accommodation-to-confrontation/>.
79 Such a threat to withdraw from the NPT would go one step beyond Egypt’s decision to withdraw from the 2013 second Preparatory Committee session for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.
80 The partnership’s three working groups are focused respectively on “Monitoring and Verification Objectives,” “On-Site Inspections,” and “Technical Challenges and Solutions.” For a summary of the results of Phase I of the partnership, see IPNDV, “Phase I Summary Report: Creating the Verification Building Blocks for Future Nuclear Disarmament,” November 2017; for more detailed papers and reports, see <www.ipndv.org>.
81 IPNDV, “Phase I Summary Report,” p. 4.
82 For an elaboration of this point, see Perkovich and Acton, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons, pp. 99–115.