A nuclear-armed North Korea without ICBMs: the best achievable objective

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the North Korean nuclear crisis from a balance-of-power perspective. It is in the long-term interests of international peace for a secure and independent North Korea to serve as a buffer between US and Chinese ground forces. However, the conventional military advantage of the South Korean-American alliance over North Korea has grown drastically since the end of the Cold War, threatening North Korea’s survival. Since North Korea lacks any reliable ally, nuclear weapons represent its most cost-effective way to restore a balance of power and thus secure itself. Accepting security guarantees in exchange for its nuclear arsenal is rhetorically appealing but not a viable approach. North Korea’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), however, has overcompensated for the post-Cold War imbalance, inviting talk in Washington of waging a preventive war. Persuading North Korea to give up its ICBM capability, not its nuclear arsenal, should therefore be the primary objective of US diplomacy.

KEYWORDS:

• North Korea
• missiles
• disarmament
• East Asia
• regional security
• balance of power
• realism

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Marcus Holmes, Jeff Kaplow, Sameer Lalwani, Todd Robinson, Mike Tierney, the anonymous reviewers, and the editors of Nonproliferation Review for constructive criticism and guidance.

Disclaimer

This article reflects the authors’ personal views. It does not represent the positions of the institutions in which they work. All errors and oversights remain their own.

Notes

1 Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit, June 12, 2018, <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/>.

2 Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, “North Korea’s Nuclear Program Isn’t Going Anywhere,” Foreign Affairs, August 13, 2018, <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-08-13/north-koreas-nuclear-program-isnt-going-anywhere>.

3 P.J. Tobia, “The Upside of a Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Chat with Kenneth Waltz,” PBS NewsHour, July 6, 2012, <www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/among-those-who-study-international/>.

4 Mark S. Bell, “Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2015), pp. 87–119, <https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00204>.

5 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4 (2012), pp. 2–5.

6 For a rich discussion on China’s shifting foreign policy goals, see Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2011), pp. 41–72; Thomas J. Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2002), pp. 5–21; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2003), pp. 5–56.

7 James R. Holmes, “China’s Monroe Doctrine,” The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2012/06/chinas-monroe-doctrine/>.

8 Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb.”

9 This theory of state behavior in an anarchic system is drawn from the following realist works: Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics among Nations : The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th edn. (New York : Knopf, 1967), <https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/12404331>; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 4th edn. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962).

10 In response to China’s “betrayal,” North Korea halted most high-level exchanges with China until 1999. See Ying Fu, “The Korean Nuclear Issue: Past, Present, and Future A Chinese Perspective,” Brookings Institution, May 2017, <www.brookings.edu/research/the-korean-nuclear-issue-past-present-and-future/>.

11 The complexity of Sino-North Korean relations and China’s North Korea policy are further explained in the following section.

12 The source for North Korea’s GDP estimation is Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook,” <www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html>.

13 Ralph C. Hassig and Kongdan Oh, North Korea: Through the Looking Glass (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 13.

14 Fu, “The Korean Nuclear Issue.”

15 In 1974, as China’s first leader speaking at the United Nations General Assembly, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping blasted the superpowers for pursuing hegemony, and vowed that “China is not a superpower, nor will ever seek to be one.” Deng Xiaoping, “Speech by Chairman of the Delegation of the People’s Republic of China Teng Hsiao-Ping at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly,” April 10, 1974, <www.marxists.org/reference/archive/deng-xiaoping/1974/04/10.htm>.

16 Fu, “The Korean Nuclear Issue.”

17 Article II of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of China and the DPRK states that, “In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.” Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, July 11, 1961, as it appeared in Peking Review, Vol. 4, No. 28 (1961), p. 5.

18 In April 2017, there was a vigorous debate in China about whether China should abandon North Korea and whether China was obliged to come to North Korea’s defense.

19 Chol Kim, “Refrain from Making Reckless Remarks Undermining the DPRK-China Relations,” Korean Central News Agency, May 3, 2017, <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1493850746-343187325/commentary-on-dprk-china-relations/?utm_content=bufferd701a&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer>.

20 For the text of the Budapest Memorandum, see <www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/12/13943175580.pdf>.

21 Press Statement by First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of DPRK, Korean Central News Agency, May 16, 2018, <https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1526482853-432433886/press-statement-by-first-vice-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-dprk/>.

22 For leading works in this genre, see Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); David Sobek, Dennis M. Foster, and Samuel B. Robinson, “Conventional Wisdom? The Effect of Nuclear Proliferation on Armed Conflicts, 1945–2001,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2012), pp. 149–62.

23 Michael Elleman, “North Korea’s Hwasong-14 ICBM: New Data Indicates Shorter Range than Many Thought,” 38 North, November 29, 2018, <www.38north.org/2018/11/melleman112918/>.

24 Fu, “The Korean Nuclear Issue,” p. 19.

25 For the most current analyses of this topic, see James M. Acton, Jeffrey G. Lewis, and David Wright, “Video Analysis of the Reentry of North Korea’s July 28, 2017 Missile Test,” Arms Control Wonk, November 9, 2018, <www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1206084/dprk-rv-video-analysis/>; Elleman, “North Korea’s Hwasong-14 ICBM.”

26 Ankit Panda, “A Great Leap to Nowhere: Remembering the US–North Korea ‘Leap Day’ Deal,” February 29, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/a-great-leap-to-nowhere-remembering-the-us-north-korea-leap-day-deal/>.

27 Despite important similarities, space-launch-vehicle capability does not necessarily equate to an ICBM capability. For more on the technological differences, see, for instance, Michael Elleman, “Why Iran’s Satellite Launch Does Not Amount to an ICBM Test,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, January 17, 2019, <www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/01/iran-satellite-launch>.

28 John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (1993), pp. 50–66, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20045622>.

29 “Third Plenary Meeting of Seventh C.C., WPK Held in Presence of Kim Jong Un,” Korean Central News Agency, April 21, 2018, <www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/DPRK_Report_Third_Plenary_Meeting_of_Seventh_Central_Committee_of_WPK.pdf>.