Combating nuclear smuggling? Exploring drivers and challenges to detecting nuclear and radiological materials at maritime facilities

ABSTRACT

International concern over nuclear terrorism has grown during the past few decades. This has driven a broad spectrum of efforts to strengthen nuclear security globally, including the widespread adoption of radiation-detection technology for border monitoring. Detection systems are now deployed at strategic locations for the purported purpose of detecting and deterring the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials. However, despite considerable investment in this area, few studies have examined how these programs are implemented or the operational challenges they face on a day-to-day basis. This article seeks to address this with a focus on radiation-detection efforts at maritime facilities. Utilizing practitioner interviews and a survey, this article identifies the factors that influence the planning and use of these systems in this fast-moving environment. The results clearly demonstrate that the implementation of these systems varies significantly across different national and organizational contexts, resulting in a fragmented global nuclear-detection architecture, which arguably undermines efforts to detect trafficked nuclear-threat materials. Greater consideration should therefore be given to developing international standards and guidance, designing and adopting tools to support key parts of the alarm assessment process, and broader sharing of good practice.

KEYWORDS:

• nuclear terrorism
• nuclear security
• radiation detection
• maritime supply chain
• border monitoring

Notes

1 ITDB, IAEA, <www-ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.asp>.

2 “IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database: Incidents of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control—2017 Fact Sheet,” IAEA, December 31, 2016, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/17/12/itdb-factsheet-2017.pdf>, p. 3.

3 See, for instance, J.A. Azuara, “Main issues in the Acerinox Event,” in IAEA, Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Materials, Proceedings of an international Conference, Dijon, France, September 14–18, 1998, pp. 45–51; IAEA, The Radiological Accident in Lilo (Vienna, 2000).

4 “IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database,” p. 2.

5 There is wide variation in terms of impact across the different weapon types and scenarios in which radiological and nuclear materials could be used. For a detailed discussion, see Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2005).

6 “Measures to Improve the Security of Nuclear Materials and Other Radioactive Materials,” IAEA Board of Governors General Conference, GOV/2001/37-GC(45)/20, August 14, 2001; Miles A. Pomper, Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, and George M. Moore, “Treatment, Not Terror: Strategies to Enhance External Beam Cancer Therapy in Developing Countries while Permanently Reducing the Risk of Radiological Terrorism,” Stanley Foundation, February 2016, <www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/report/TreatmentNotTerror212.pdf>; Emily S. Ewell, “NIS Nuclear Smuggling since 1995: A Lull in Significant Cases?” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 5 (1998), pp. 120–23.

7 Tyson Gustafson, “Radiological and Nuclear Detection Devices,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, April 19, 2017, <www.nti.org/analysis/articles/radiological-nuclear-detection-devices>.

8 Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Wrestling with Deterrence: Bush Administration Strategy after 9/11,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2008), p. 241

9 See, for example, US Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Combatting Nuclear Smuggling: NNSA’s Detection and Deterrence Program Is Addressing Challenges but Should Improve Its Program Plan,” GAO-16-460, June 2016, pp. 9–10, 21–22; Oak Ridge National Laboratory, “Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence FY2016: Data Analysis Annual Report,” January 2017, pp. 13–14.

10 These interviews are drawn upon in this article in a non-attributable manner.

11 Richard T. Kouzes, “Detecting Illicit Nuclear Materials: The Installation of Radiological Monitoring Equipment in the United States and Overseas Is Helping Thwart Nuclear Terrorism,” American Scientist, Vol. 93, No. 5 (2005), p. 425.

12 Kay Bird, “The First Line against Terrorism,” Washington Post, December 12, 2001, <www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2001/12/12/the-first-line-against-terrorism/4a53ee41-f528-4a4f-9f9b-64d38353a03c/?utm_term=.ae16fd1a0f95>.

13 Jerome I. Friedman and William A. Little, “Robert Hofstadter,” Biographical Memoirs, Vol. 79, <www.nap.edu/read/10169/chapter/11#175>, p.175.

14 Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, “Radiation Detectors,” New Yorker, April 9, 2007, <www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/04/09/mail>.

15 Ibid.

16 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Defusing Armageddon: Inside Nest, America's Secret Nuclear Bomb Squad (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009), p. 1.

17 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons into the US,” TS 190512, July 1970, <www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001211144.pdf> p. 4.

18 Ibid., pp. 4–5.

19 Richelson, Defusing Armageddon, pp. 236–40.

20 Cameron Reed, “The Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST),” Physics and Society, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2013), <www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/201301/reed.cfm>.

21 Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 1996, <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1996-09-01/postmodern-terrorism-new-rules-old-game>.

22 John H. Nuckolls, “Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers: Proliferation and Terrorism,”Science, Vol. 267, No. 5201 (1995), pp. 1112–14.

23 William C. Potter, “Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage from the Post-Soviet States,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 8 (1995), pp. 9–16.

24 Lyudmila Zaitseva and Friedrich Steinhäusler, “Nuclear Trafficking Issues in the Black Sea Region,” Non-proliferation Papers No. 39, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2014, <www.sipri.org/publications/2014/eu-non-proliferation-papers/nuclear-trafficking-issues-black-sea-region>, p. 3.

25 G. Smagala, “Measures to Detect and Control Radioactive Contaminated Metallurgical Scrap at Border Checkpoints in Poland,” in Workshop on Radioactive Contaminated Metallurgical Scrap (New York and Geneva: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe), pp. 123–30; M. Fabretto, “Monitoring of Scrap Loads at Gorzia Border Checkpoints: A Thirty Months Experience and Some Suggestions,” Ibid., pp. 31–42.

26 GAO, “Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,” GAO-02-426, <www.gao.gov/assets/240/234392.pdf#page=36>, p. 36

27 IAEA General Conference, GC(38)/RES/15, “Measures against Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material,” September 1994, <www-legacy.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC38/GC38Resolutions/English/gc38res-15_en.pdf>.

28 38th IAEA General Conference, “Secondary Plenary Meeting,” September 1994, <www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC38/GC38Records/English/gc38or-2_en.pdf>, p. 6.

29 P. Beck, K. Duftschmid, and C. Schmitzer, “ITRAP: The Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program,” in Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive Materials, pp. 265–69.

30 Ibid.

31 Three technical guidance documents were produced: IAEA, “Prevention of the Inadvertent Movement and Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive Materials,” IAEA-TECDOC-1311, September 2002, <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/te_1311_web.pdf>; IAEA, “Detection of Radioactive Materials At Borders,” IAEA-TECDOC-1312, September 2002, <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/te_1312_web.pdf>; IAEA, “Response to Events Involving the Inadvertent Movement or Illicit Trafficking of Radioactive Materials,” IAEA-TECDOC-1313, September 2002, <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/te_1313_web.pdf>.

32 As just one example, funding provided to the US Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program expanded from $3 million in fiscal year 1998 to $40.1 million in fiscal year 2001. GAO, “U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning,” GAO-02-426, <www.gao.gov/assets/240/234392.pdf>, p. 10

33 US agencies involved in counter-illicit smuggling efforts included the Department of Energy (DoE), Department of State (DoS), Department of Defence (DoD), the US Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the US Coast Guard. Radiation-detection equipment was provided through the Office of the Second Line of Defence (SLD) program in the DoE, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (DoS), the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance program in the DoS, the Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement program in the DoS, and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme and International Counterproliferation program in the DoD. GAO, “Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,” GAO-02-426, <www.gao.gov/assets/240/234392.pdf#page=5>, p. 6–8.

34 Ibid., p. 11.

35 Ibid.

36 Brian M. Jenkins, “The New Age of Terrorism,” in Brian M. Jenkins, ed., McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006).

37 UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, for example, placed a legal obligation on all UN member states to put in place “appropriate effective border controls” to prevent the trafficking of weapons-of-mass-destruction-(WMD)-related goods. United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1540, April 28, 2004, <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540%20(2004)>.

38 GAO, “Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,” GAO-02-426, May 2002, <www.gao.gov/assets/240/234392.pdf#page=5>, p. 2; GAO, “Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries,” GAO-05-840T, June 21, 2005, <www.gao.gov/assets/120/111799.pdf>, p. 2.

39 The Telegraph, “Ports Equipped to Deter Nuclear Attack,” May 14, 2003, <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1430029/Ports-equipped-to-deter-nuclear-attack.html>.

40 UK Parliament, “Memorandum Submitted by the Home Office,” Select Committee on Defence, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmdfence/417/417we02.htm>; David Blunkett, speech to the House of Commons, June 10, 2004, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Vol. 422 (2004), Cols. 525–26.

41 Richard T. Kouzes, “Detecting Illicit Nuclear Materials: The Installation of Radiological Monitoring Equipment in the United States and Overseas Is Helping Thwart Nuclear Terrorism,” American Scientist, Vol. 93, No. 5 (2005), p. 442.

42 GAO, “Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Megaports Initiative Faces Funding and Sustainability Challenges,” GAO-13-37, October 2012, <www.gao.gov/assets/650/649759.pdf>.

43 Ibid. p. 9; GAO, “Combating Nuclear Smuggling: NNSA’s Detection and Deterrence Program Is Addressing Challenges but Should Improve Its Program Plan,” GAO-16-460, June 2016, <www.gao.gov/assets/680/677895.pdf>, p. 8.

44 “Joint Statement on Maritime Supply Chain Security,” Nuclear Security Summit, April 5, 2016, <www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/joint-statement-on-maritime-supply-chain-security>.

45 “Nuclear Security Summit Enhancing the Security of the Maritime Supply Chain Gift Basket: Best Practice Guide for Removing Nuclear and Radiological Materials that Are out of Regulatory Control from the Global Maritime Supply Chain,” Nuclear Security Summit, March 2016, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/568be36505f8e2af8023adf7/t/57051237859fd04c9fdd0699/1459950136051/Joint±Statement±on±Maritime±Supply±Chain±Security±Best±Practices.pdf>.

46 The Act noted that “A container that was loaded on a vessel in a foreign port shall not enter the United States (either directly or via a foreign port) unless the container was scanned by nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection equipment at a foreign port before it was loaded on a vessel.” See “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,” Public Law 110–53, 110th Congress, August 3, 2007.

47 A two-year extension was passed in 2012, 2014, 2016, and seemingly 2018. See section 1701 (b) (4) of the Act.

48 Dimitrios Anagnostakis, “Securing the Transatlantic Maritime Supply Chains from Counterterrorism: EU–U.S. Cooperation and the Emergence of a Transatlantic Customs Security Regime,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 39, No. 5 (2016), p. 463.

49 “Shipping and World Trade—Overview,” International Chamber of Shipping, <www.ics-shipping.org/shipping-facts/shipping-and-world-trade>.

50 “How Many Shipping Containers Are There in the World?” Budget Shipping Containers, <www.budgetshippingcontainers.co.uk/info/how-many-shipping-containers-are-there-in-the-world/>.

51 “Top 50 World Container Ports,” World Shipping Council, <www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-trade/top-50-world-container-ports>.

52 John Frittelli and Jennifer E. Lake, “Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S. Port and Maritime Security,” CRS Report for Congress, January 19, 2007, p. 2.

53 In this context, materials of particular concern (threat materials) include fissile materials such as plutonium and HEU and strong radioactive sources (IAEA Category 1, 2, and 3). For a discussion on the destructive and disruptive potential of different nuclear and radiological materials please see Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2005).

54 Hugh Griffiths and Michael Jenks, “Maritime Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows,” SIPRI Policy Paper 32, 2012, <www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRIPP32.pdf>, p. 1.

55 This delicate balance occasionally manifests in the public domain; see Daniel Boffey, “‘Dirty Bombs’ May Have Been Missed by Private Border Staff as Games Approach,” The Guardian, July 7, 2012 <www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/07/border-agency-terrorism-games-dirty-bombs>.

56 “Revised KYOTO Convention,” World Customs Organization, 2006, <www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/conventions/pf_revised_kyoto_conv.aspx>.

57 GAO, “Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of Its Cargo Targeting System,” October 2012, <www.gao.gov/assets/650/649695.pdf>.

58 Ibid.

59 Gary M. Gaukler, Chenhua Li, Yu Ding, and Sunil S. Chirayath, “Detecting Nuclear Materials Smuggling: Performance Evaluation of Container Inspection Policies,” Risk Analysis, November 1, 2011, pp. 535–46.

60 Jonathan Medalia, “Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations,” Congressional Research Service, June 4, 2010, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R40154.pdf>.

61 Ibid., p. 105.

62 World Nuclear Association, “Naturally-Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM),” December 2016, <www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/radiation-and-health/naturally-occurring-radioactive-materials-norm.aspx>.

63 For examples of differences in background radiation levels, see “Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence FY2016: Data Analysis Annual Report,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, January 2017, pp.13–14; Tom Burr, James R. Gattiker, Kary Myers, and George Tompkins, “Alarm Criteria in Radiation Portal Monitoring,” Applied Radiation and Isotopes, No. 65 (2007), p. 580.

64 La Fonda Sutton-Burke, “Detection Instruments: Operation and Maintenance Challenges,” Technical Meeting on Radiation Detection Instruments for Nuclear Security,” IAEA, Division of Nuclear Security, Vienna, April 4, 2016.

65 Gary M. Gaukler, Chenhua Li, Yu Ding, and Sunil S. Chirayath, “Detecting Nuclear Materials Smuggling: Performance Evaluation of Container Inspection Policies,” Risk Analysis, November 1, 2011, p. 534.

66 Radiation-detection expert at international organization, personal interview with one of the authors, July 12, 2018.

67 IAEA, “Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control,” IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 21, 2013, p. 37

68 Radiation readings are taken at fractions of a second as the container passes through the RPM. These can be used to construct a radiation profile of counts versus container occupancy time.

69 “International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code, 2016 Edition,” International Maritime Organization, <www.imo.org/en/Publications/Documents/IMDG%20Code/IMDG%20Code%202016%20Edition/QK200E_122017.pdf>.

70 Radiation-detection expert at international organization, personal interview with one of the authors, July 12, 2018.

71 “Evaluating Testing, Costs, and Benefits of Advanced Spectroscopic Portals for Screening Cargo at Ports of Entry Interim Report (Abbreviated Version),” National Academy of Sciences, 2009, p. 3.

72 Nitin Bakshi, Stephen E. Flynn, and Noah Gans, “Estimating the Operational Impact of Container Inspections at International Ports,” Management Science, Vol. 57, No. 1 (2011), p. 10.

73 GAO, “Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from Cancelled Radiation Portal Monitor Program Could Help Future Acquisitions,” GAO-13-256, May 2013, pp. 10–11.

74 Stephen E. Flynn, “America the Vulnerable,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 (2002), <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2002-01-01/america-vulnerable>.

75 For more details on the survey that underpins this study, please refer to the Appendix at the end of this article.

76 IAEA, “Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control.”

77 Fifteen of twenty-four respondents had national guidance in place.

78 Quoted from a single survey respondent.

79 Four of twenty-four did not have national-level guidance, and five were unsure about it.

80 Of thirteen respondents to this question, six reported that over 80 percent was scanned; four reported less than 20 percent; two reported 40–59 percent; one reported 60–79 percent.

81 Note that seaports are selected for participation in the Megaports Initiative based on a number of factors including shipping volume but also threat factors, container export destimations, and proximity to facilities with special nuclear materials. See GAO, “Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Megaports Initiative Faces Funding and Sustainability Challenges,” GAO-13-37, October 2012, p. 2.

82 Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Networks,” in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., Networks and Netwars (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p. 71.

83 Twenty-four respondents claimed that their system scanned imports, and twenty-one suggested that exports were scanned.

84 Fourteen respondents claimed that their system scanned transshipments.

85 Paola Papa, “US and EU Strategies for Maritime Transport Security: A Comparative Perspective,” Transport Policy, No. 28 (2013), p. 79.

86 Former public health official, personal interview with one of the authors, July 19, 2017.

87 M.-A. Descalle, D. Manatt, and D. Slaughter, “Analysis of Recent Manifests for Goods Imported through US Ports,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Report, UCRL-TR-225708, October 2006, <https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/339093.pdf>.

88 “Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence FY2016: Data Analysis Annual Report,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, January 2017, p.12.

89 Eleven respondents had found orphaned or disused sources; seventeen, contaminated goods; six, radiological sources mislabeled on the manifest; six, nuclear material; and six, special nuclear materials. One respondent also found “medical isotopes in waste.”

90 One known example involving the detection of HEU by border-monitoring equipment occurred in Georgia in 2000. Please see GAO, “Nuclear Nonproliferation: US Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning,” GAO-02-426, May 2002, <www.gao.gov/assets/240/234392.pdf#page=36>, p. 33.

91 Gary M. Gaukler, Chenhua Li, Yu Ding, and Sunil S. Chirayath, “Detecting Nuclear Materials Smuggling: Performance Evaluation of Container Inspection Policies,” Risk Analysis, November 1, 2011, p. 549

92 Given sensitivities around the interception of HEU and plutonium, it was not possible to obtain more information on how and in what quantities special nuclear material was detected.

93 Nine of twenty-one respondents placed innocent alarms at over 10 percent of cargo; three of twenty-one respondents placed innocent alarms at less than 1 percent of cargo.

94 Given sensitivities, respondents were not asked to identify alarming thresholds for RPMs.

95 Four of twenty-one respondents suggested that secondary inspections were undertaken in less than 1 percent of cases; five of twenty-one suggested 1–10 percent of cases; two of twenty-one suggested that they were undertaken in 11–50 percent of cases; three of twenty-one suggested they were undertaken in more than 90 percent of cases and seven of twenty-one responded to the question by selecting “unknown.”

96 Twenty of twenty-three respondents suggested they had RPMs; eighteen of twenty-three had handheld detectors; and sevent of twenty-three had vehicle-based systems. Five of twenty-three respondents suggested they had access to all three types. Seth Van Liew, William Bertozzi, Nathan D’Olympia, Wilbur A. Franklin, Stephen E. Korbly, Robert J. Ledoux, and Cody M. Wilson, “Identification and Imaging of Special Nuclear Materials and Contraband Using Active X-ray Interrogation,” Physics Procedia, Vol. 90 (2017), p. 314.

97 More importance was placed by respondents on informing national rather than international bodies.

98 Representative of global shipping company, personal interview with two of the authors, September 15, 2015.

99 Ibid.

100 Designated as International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code Class 7.

101 See, for instance, IAEA, “Strengthening Control over Radioactive Sources in Authorized Use and Regaining Control over Orphan Sources,” IAEA-TECDOC-1388, <www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/te_1388_web.pdf>, p. 10

102 Eighteen of thirty-six respondents indicated that international partnership had been involved in initiating their radiation detection programs.

103 Sixteen of twenty-four respondents suggested that their system was to detect all MORC; five suggested that theirs focused on health and safety risks alone.

104 B. Wilson and K. Van Haperen, Soft Systems Thinking, Methodology and the Management of Change (London, UK: Macmillan, 2015), p. 107.

105 Renate Sefzig, Bejoy Saha, and Gisela Stoppa, “Co-60 contaminated stainless steels in Germany experiences and first steps,” presentation delivered at the International Conference on Control and Management of Inadvertent Radioactive Material in Scrap Metal, Tarragona, Spain, February 23–27, 2009, pp. 87, 265–67, 323.

106 Wenkai Li, Colin Jones, and Mark Goh, Planning and Scheduling for Maritime Container Yards (Heidelberg, Germany: Springer, 2015), pp. 15–16.

107 Cimen Karatas-Cetin, “Port and Logistic Chains: Changes in Organizational Effectiveness,” in Dong-Wook Song, Photis Panayides, eds., Maritime Logistics, 2nd edn, (London, UK: Kogan Page, 2015), pp. 343–72.

108 Twelve of twenty-five respondents noted that target alarm rate was the most important factor in determining alarm thresholds.

109 Only eight of twenty-five indicated that it was based on the material that the system was seeking to detect.

110 Radiation-detection expert at international organization, personal interview with one of the authors, July 12, 2018.

111 Comments by several survey respondents.

112 Seventeen of twenty-one respondents felt their organization was able to manage the number of innocent alarms produced by NORM.

113 Four of twenty-three respondents noted that detaining containers in order to carry out secondary and tertiary inspections was the greatest challenge they faced.

114 Eight respondents of twenty-three selected sustainability costs as the greatest challenge; fourteen respondents selected cost-related issues as the greatest challenge (sustainability costs, inspection costs, staffing shortages, and equipment malfunction).

115 Radiation-detection expert at international organization, personal interview with one of the authors, July 12, 2018.

116 Seven observe training once a year, five observe training two to three times a year, two had never been trained, three were trained less than once a year, and two reported training for only new officers.

117 GAO, “Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Megaports Initiative Faces Funding and Sustainability Challenges,” GAO-13-37, October 2012, pp. 28–35.

118 For example, 85 percent of Megaports program funding was cut in 2012. “Obama Slashes Funding for Megaports Program,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, December 11, 2012; Russia, accounting for 45 percent of the US Second Line of Defense program’s sites, halted much cooperation in the area of nuclear security in 2014. See GAO, “Combatting Nuclear Smuggling: NNSA’s Detection and Deterrence Program Is Addressing Challenges but Should Improve Its Program Plan,” p. 3.

119 Sixteen out of twenty-one respondents supported the development of new technical international scanning guidelines or requirements.

120 IAEA, “Technical and Functional Specifications for Border Monitoring Equipment,” Nuclear Security Series No. 1, 2006; IAEA, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control,” Nuclear Security Series No. 2, 2011; IAEA, “Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material,” Nuclear Security Series No. 6, 2007; IAEA, “Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control,” Nuclear Security Series No. 21, 2013.

121 <www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/7400/Technical-and-Functional-Specifications-for-Border-Monitoring-Equipment##description>.

122 Suggested by eleven of twenty-one respondents.

123 Wyn Q. Bowen and Christopher Hobbs, “Sensitive Nuclear Information: Challenges and Options for Control,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2014), pp. 225–26.

124 IAEA, “Improved Assessment of Initial Alarms from Radiation Detection Instruments,” CRP-J02005, and “Advancing Radiation Detection Equipment for Detecting Nuclear and Other Radioactive out of Material out of Regulatory Control,” CRP-J02012, <http://cra.iaea.org/cra/explore-crps/all-active-by-programme.html>.

125 Ibid.

126 Note there currently exists a technical document for “Monitoring for Radioactive Material in International Mail Transported by Public Postal Operators” (NSS No. 3).

127 “Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence FY2016: Data Analysis Annual Report,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, January 2017, p. 12.

128 IAEA, “IAEA Launches Mobile Application Tool for Radiation Alarm and Commodity Evaluation,” June 9, 2017, <www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-launches-mobile-application-tool-for-radiation-alarm-and-commodity-evaluation>.

129 “IAEA’s Mobile App Helps Sri Lanka to Fight Smuggling of Radioactive Materials,” Nuclear Asia, June 13, 2018, <www.nuclearasia.com/gallery/iaeas-mobile-app-helps-sri-lanka-fight-smuggling-radioactive-materials/2331/>.

130 “Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence FY2016: Data Analysis Annual Report,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, January 2017, pp. 8, 26.

131 There is a host of data-science techniques such as dynamic time warping, random forest, and neural networks that could potentially be applied to RPM data in support of the alarm assessment process.

132 GAO, “Combatting Nuclear Smuggling: NNSA’s Detection and Deterrence Program is Addressing Challenges but Should Improve Its Program Plan,” GAO-16-460, June 2016, p. 17.