The end of the “INF Treaty” and the US-China military balance

ABSTRACT

Whereas much of the debate about the demise of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has focused on the European context and Russia’s alleged treaty violations, Asia looms large in the minds of proponents of the United States’s immediate withdrawal from the treaty. For many proponents, the fast-changing military balance in Asia and China's conventionally armed missiles constitute a sufficient cause for withdrawal. What does the end of the INF Treaty bode for the US-China military balance? This article argues that, although there are some near-term benefits for the US position in the conventional military balance with China, the advantages offered by prohibited missiles are minor and can be readily substituted by extant capabilities that are compliant with the treaty. Given the negative implications of the end of the INF Treaty for the future of arms control, the costs and benefits of withdrawing from the treaty require further examination; the military balance in Asia is an unpersuasive rationale for withdrawing from an important part of the arms-control architecture.

KEYWORDS:

• INF Treaty
• Russia
• China
• arms control
• missiles

Notes

1 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Says Russia Tested Cruise Missile, Violating Treaty,” New York Times, December 20, 2017, <www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/world/europe/us-says-russia-tested-cruise-missile-in-violation-of-treaty.html>. Formally the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the treaty prohibits Washington and Moscow from possessing any ground-launched missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, whether armed with nuclear or conventional warheads.

2 On February 1, 2019, Trump suspended compliance with the INF Treaty and gave formal notice that it would withdraw 180 days hence. Julian Borger, “Donald Trump Confirms US Withdrawal from INF Nuclear Treaty,” Guardian, February 1, 2019, <www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/01/inf-donald-trump-confirms-us-withdrawal-nuclear-treaty>.

3 Eric Sayers, “The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Future of the Indo-Pacific Military Balance,” War on the Rocks, February 13, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/asia-inf/>; Scott A. Cuomo, “It’s Time to Make a New Deal: Solving the INF Treaty’s Strategic Liabilities to Achieve U.S. Security Goals in Asia,” Texas National Security Review, November 26, 2018, <https://tnsr.org/2018/11/its-time-to-make-a-new-deal-solving-the-inf-treatys-strategic-liabilities-to-achieve-u-s-security-goals-in-asia/>; Ryan Browne, “What’s behind Trump’s Decision to Ditch a Decades-Old Arms Control Treaty?” CNN, October 22, 2018, <www.cnn.com/2018/10/21/politics/trump-russia-inf-treaty-decision/index.html>; “Remarks by President Trump before Marine One Departure,” White House, October 22, 2018, <www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-marine-one-departure-18/>; Adam Taylor, “INF Treaty: China May Factor into Trump Decision to Pull out of Deal with Russia,” Washington Post, October 23, 2018, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/10/23/how-china-plays-into-trumps-decision-pull-out-inf-treaty-with-russia/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1faf00f1c4eb>; John Hudson and Paul Sonne, “Bolton Pushes Trump Administration to Withdraw from Landmark Arms Treaty,” Washington Post, October 19, 2018, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/bolton-pushes-trump-administration-to-withdraw-from-landmark-arms-treaty/2018/10/19/f0bb8531-e7ce-4a34-b7ba-558f8b068dc5_story.html?utm_term=.44534a4b9caf>.

4 “China Military Power: Modernizing A Force to Fight and Win,” Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019, <www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf>; Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” 2018; “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, United States Air Force, 2017, <www.nasic.af.mil/Portals/19/images/Fact%20Sheet%20Images/2017%20Ballistic%20and%20Cruise%20Missile%20Threat_Final_small.pdf?ver=2017-07-21-083234-343>.

5 Eric Sayers and Sugio Takahashi, “America and Japan in a Post-INF World,” War on the Rocks, March 8, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/america-and-japan-in-a-post-inf-world/>; Abraham Denmark and Eric Sayers, “Exiting the Russia Nuclear Treaty Impacts Military Strategy in Asia,” The Hill, October 25, 2018, <https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/413183-exiting-the-russia-nuclear-treaty-impacts-military-strategy-in-asia>; Gabe Collins, “Time to Put China’s Rocketeers on Notice,” National Interest, February 8, 2017, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/time-put-chinas-rocketeers-notice-19372?nopaging=1>; David Deptula, “Whether the U.S. Scraps the INF or Stays in, China Must Be Checked,” Forbes, November 4, 2018, <www.forbes.com/sites/davedeptula/2018/11/05/whether-inf-in-or-out-china-must-be-checked/#5b73ee8c6ce3>.

6 Amy F. Woolf, “Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, February 8, 2019, <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5736414/R43832-2.pdf>.

7 Jen Judson, “More Fire Power: US Army Sets out to Develop New Missiles in FY20,” Defense News, March 20, 2019, <www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2019/03/20/more-fire-power-us-army-sets-out-to-develop-new-missiles-in-fy20/>; Robert Burns, “Pentagon Plans Tests of Long-Banned Types of Missiles,” Associated Press, March 13, 2019, <www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/03/13/pentagon-plans-tests-of-long-banned-types-of-missiles/>.

8 Michael Kofman, “Under the Missile’s Shadow: What Does the Passing of the INF Treaty Mean?” War on the Rocks, October 26, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/under-the-missiles-shadow-what-does-the-passing-of-the-inf-treaty-mean/>.

9 For an examination of the applications of notional US INF-range missiles against China, see Jacob Heim, “Missiles for Asia? The Need for Operational Analysis of U.S. Theater Ballistic Missiles in the Pacific,” RAND, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR945>. On the implications of the China factor for the European context, see Ulrich Kühn, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Europe in a Post-INF World,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 26, Nos. 1–2 (2019), pp. 1–12, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2019.1593677>.

10 “Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, June 27, 2019, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43832.pdf>.

11 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The PLA Rocket Force: Evolving beyond the Second Artillery Corps (SAC) and Nuclear Dimension,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 13, 2016, <www.csis.org/analysis/pla-rocket-force-evolving-beyond-second-artillery-corps-sac-and-nuclear-dimension>.

12 Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., “Military Assessment of the Security Challenges in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region,” prepared statement for the House Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., April 26, 2017, <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20170426/105870/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisH-20170426.PDF≥; “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat.”

13 Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, “Meeting the Anti-access and Area-Denial Challenge,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003, <https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2003.05.20-Anti-Access-Area-Denial-A2-AD.pdf>.

14 M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey, “Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter-Intervention,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2014), pp. 171–87, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2014.1002164>.

15 In principle, it is possible for the United States to press for air- and sea-launched missiles to be covered in a revised or entirely new treaty. It is important to consider, however, that the United States currently enjoys a great advantage in terms of the capabilities and number of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles relative to both Russia and China.

16 Jan Van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, “AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 18, 2010, <https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/airsea-battle-concept>. For a critical view as to whether such an approach is even necessary, see Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2016), pp. 7–48, <https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00249>. For a skeptical take on the effectiveness of anti-access capabilities, see Shahryar Pasandideh, “How Effective Are Anti-access Capabilities? Technological Change and the Feasibility of Power Projection,” working paper.

17 Sayers, “The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Future of the Indo-Pacific Military Balance”; Sayers and Takahashi, “America and Japan in a Post-INF World”; Denmark and Sayers, “Exiting the Russia Nuclear Treaty Impacts Military Strategy in Asia.”

18 On the underlying notion of a competitive strategy, see Thomas G. Mahnken, ed., Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2012).

19 T.X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict," Strategic Forum: National Defense University, June 2012, <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-278.pdf>; Joshua Rovner, “AirSea Battle and Escalation Risks,” Policy Brief 12, 2012, <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/08m367zt>.

20 These ideas have a long history. See, for example, Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “How to Deter China,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 2 (2015), <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-02-16/how-deter-china>.

21 For example, the well-known US Tomahawk cruise missile is capable of reaching a speed of around 885 kilometers per hour. It would therefore take a Tomahawk missile some 135 minutes to strike a (non-moving) target 2,000 kilometers away. Although there is some variation in speed, all subsonic turbojet- and turbofan-powered cruise missiles face the same operational limitations. For the Tomahawk’s speed, see US Navy, "Fact File: Tomahawk Cruise Missile,” Department of the Navy, April 26, 2018, <www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=1300&ct=2>.

22 David Larter, “It’s Official: The US Navy Has a New Ship Killer Missile,” Defense News, June 4, 2018, <www.defensenews.com/naval/2018/06/01/its-official-the-us-navy-has-a-new-ship-killer-missile/>.

23 Jeremy Hsu, “Why the Army Is Back in the Ship-Killing Business,” Wired, March 1, 2017, <www.wired.com/2017/03/army-converting-missiles-ship-killers-china/>.

24 Otto Kreisher, “China’s Carrier Killer: Threat and Theatrics,” Air Force Magazine, December 2013, <www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2013/December%202013/1213china.pdf>.

25 On US surface ships, each vertical launch system cell can hold either a BMD interceptor, such as the SM-3, or a Tomahawk cruise missile.

26 Aaron Mehta, “It’s Official: DoD Told to Take Cut with FY20 Budget,” Defense News, October 26, 2018, <www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/10/26/its-official-dod-told-to-take-cut-with-fy20-budget/>.

27 On escalation risks, see Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2013), pp. 49–89, <https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00114>; James M. Acton, “Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War,” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2018), pp. 56–99, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00320>; Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 4 (2017), pp. 50–92, <https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00274>.

28 In principle, such pre-emptive strikes against Chinese missile garrisons are already possible but the mobile nature of naval deployments and the additionally highly transient nature of aircraft (i.e., limited flight time) result in considerable logistical challenges in the coordination of large-scale strikes. In contrast, ground-launched missiles are more amenable to the large-scale (conventional) “first strikes” necessary against a target country such as China.

29 Federation of American Scientists, “BGM-109 Tomahawk—Smart Weapons,” April 15, 2019, <https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/bgm-109.htm?>.

30 “Fact File: Tomahawk Cruise Missile.”

31 Sydney J. Freedberg, “Tomahawk vs. LRASM: Raytheon Gets $119M for Anti-ship Missile,” Breaking Defense, September 11, 2017, <https://breakingdefense.com/2017/09/tomahawk-vs-lrasm-raytheon-gets-119m-for-anti-ship-missile/>.

32 “Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM),” Lockheed Martin, <www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/long-range-anti-ship-missile.html>.

33 Sam LaGrone, “Lockheed Testing LRASM Launchers for Future Frigate, Submarines,” US Naval Institute News, January 12, 2017, <https://news.usni.org/2017/01/12/lockheed-testing-lrasm-future-frigate-submarines>.

34 Chris Pocock, “US Navy’s New Anti-ship Missile Makes Progress,” Aviation International News, December 15, 2015, <www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2015-12-15/us-navys-new-anti-ship-missile-makes-progress>.

35 For an overview of the New START Treaty, see Amy F Woolf, “The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions,” Congressional Research Service, April 5, 2019, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41219.pdf>. On the conventionally armed Trident, see Bruce M. Sugden, “Speed Kills: Analyzing the Deployment of Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2009), pp. 113–46, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.34.1.113>; Austin Long, Dinshaw Mistry, and Bruce M. Sugden, “Going Nowhere Fast: Assessing Concerns about Long-Range Conventional Ballistic Missiles,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2010), pp. 166–84, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2010.34.4.166>.

36 Jen Judson, “Army Pushes to Get Precision Strike Munition to the Force by 2023,” Defense News, October 7, 2018, <www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ausa/2018/10/08/army-pushes-to-get-precision-strike-munition-to-the-force-by-2023/>.

37 “Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW),” Army Technology, n.d., <www.army-technology.com/projects/advanced-hypersonic-weapon-ahw/>.

38 Woolf, “Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty”; Marc Thornberry, “H.R.2810—115th Cong., 1st sess. (2017–2018): National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018,” Pub. L. No. H.R.2810 (2017), <www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2810>.

39 On hypersonic munitions, see James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2, 2018, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonic-weapons-explainer-pub-75957>; James M. Acton, “Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions about Conventional Prompt Global Strike,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013, <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/cpgs.pdf>.

40 Sydney J. Freedberg, “What Weapons Will the US Build after the INF Treaty?” Breaking Defense, October 22, 2018, <https://breakingdefense.com/2018/10/what-weapons-will-the-us-build-after-the-inf/>.

41 Vice Admiral Paul Grosklags, Lieutenant General Rudder, and Rear Admiral Scott Conn, “Navy and Marine Corps Aviation Programs,” prepared statement for the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., March 6, 2018.

42 The crisis in relations between Seoul and Beijing over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense ballistic-missile-defense system is suggestive of the constraints on the deployment of US INF-range missiles to South Korea.

43 Xian also approximates for the start of the Gansu corridor, a geographical chokepoint that divides China “proper” from western China (i.e., Xinjiang and Tibet).

44 Sayers, “The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Future of the Indo-Pacific Military Balance”; Denmark and Sayers, “Exiting the Russia Nuclear Treaty Impacts Military Strategy in Asia.”

45 “Fact File: Tomahawk Cruise Missile.”

46 Tara Copp, “China Has Practiced Bombing Runs Targeting Guam, US Says,” Defense News, October 31, 2017, <www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2017/10/31/china-has-practiced-bombing-runs-against-guam-us-says/>.

47 Denmark and Sayers, “Exiting the Russia Nuclear Treaty Impacts Military Strategy in Asia.”

48 On overflights, see Joshua Pollack, “Nuclear Deterrence and the Revenge of Geography,” Arms Control Wonk, September 24, 2017, <www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1204122/nuclear-deterrence-the-revenge-of-geography/>.; National Research Council, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008 and Beyond (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2008), pp. 77–79.

49 Akiko Kashiwagi and Simon Denyer, “In Japan’s Okinawa, Voters Deliver a Resounding No to New U.S. Military Base," Washington Post, February 24, 2019, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in-japans-okinawa-voters-deliver-a-resounding-no-to-new-us-military-base/2019/02/24/95283a46-3858-11e9-b786-d6abcbcd212a_story.html?utm_term=.2a3422e6f011>; Eric Johnston, “Japan’s Two Aegis Ashore Anti-missile Candidate Sites Run into Local Opposition,” Japan Times, December 11, 2018, <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/12/11/national/japans-two-aegis-ashore-anti-missile-candidate-sites-run-local-opposition/>.

50 Denmark and Sayers, “Exiting the Russia Nuclear Treaty Impacts Military Strategy in Asia.”

51 See Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear?”; Goldstein, “First Things First.”

52 Joseph Trevithick, “USAF, Army, and Navy Join Forces to Field America’s First Operational Hypersonic Weapon,” The Drive, October 11, 2018, <www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/24181/usaf-army-and-navy-join-forces-to-field-americas-first-operational-hypersonic-weapon>; Steve Trimble and Guy Norris, “Sandia’s Swerve Could Lead to First-Gen Hypersonic Production Line,” Aviation Week, October 11, 2018, <https://aviationweek.com/air-dominance/sandia-s-swerve-could-lead-first-gen-hypersonic-production-line>.

53 Sydney J. Freedberg, “Army Will Field 100 km Cannon, 500 km Missiles: LRPF CFT,” Breaking Defense, March 23, 2018, <https://breakingdefense.com/2018/03/army-will-field-100-km-cannon-500-km-missiles-lrpf-cft/>; Sydney J. Freedberg, “Army Building 1,000-Mile Supergun,” Breaking Defense, October 11, 2018, <https://breakingdefense.com/2018/10/army-builds-1000-mile-supergun/>.

54 Adam Taylor, “INF Treaty: China May Factor into Trump Decision to Pull out of Deal with Russia,” Washington Post, October 23, 2018, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/10/23/how-china-plays-into-trumps-decision-pull-out-inf-treaty-with-russia/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1faf00f1c4eb>; Paul Sonne and John Hudson, “Trump Orders Staff to Prepare Arms-Control Push with Russia and China,” Washington Post, April 25, 2019, <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-orders-staff-to-prepare-arms-control-push-with-russia-and-china/2019/04/25/c7f05e04-6076-11e9-9412-daf3d2e67c6d_story.html?utm_term=.fd8c2ddd4a99>

55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Remarks on the US Suspending INF Treaty Obligations and Beginning Withdrawl Process,” Beijing, February 2, 2019, <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1635268.shtml>.

56 Adam Ni and Bates Gill, “China’s New Missile Force: New Ambitions, New Challenges (Part 1),” China Brief, Vol. 18, No. 14 (2018), <https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-new-missile-force-new-ambitions-new-challenges-part-1/>.

57 “Insight: China Builds New PLARF Missile Base on Hainan,” Shepherd Media, August 29, 2018, <www.shephardmedia.com/news/defence-notes/insight-china-builds-new-plarf-missile-base-hainan/>.

58 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China”; Ankit Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile Armed with a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” The Diplomat, December 28, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-newly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/>.

59 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Remarks on the US Suspending INF Treaty Obligations and Beginning Withdrawl Process,” Beijing, February 2, 2019, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1635268.shtml>; Robin Emmott, “China Rebuffs Germany’s Call for U.S. Missile Deal with Russia,” Reuters, February 16, 2019, <www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-china-idUSKCN1Q50NZ>.

60 Kashiwagi and Denyer, “In Japan’s Okinawa, Voters Deliver a Resounding No to New U.S. Military Base"; Eric Johnston, “Japan’s Two Aegis Ashore Anti-missile Candidate Sites Run into Local Opposition,” Japan Times, December 11, 2018, <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/12/11/national/japans-two-aegis-ashore-anti-missile-candidate-sites-run-local-opposition/>.