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ABSTRACT
While most contemporary analyses of South Asian nuclear dynamics acknowledge the presence of a strategic triangle between the region’s three nuclear players, the primary focus usually remains on the rivalry between India and Pakistan. Discussions of Sino-Indian relations remain limited. This is likely attributed to the stability in the two countries’ relations, yet it is worth asking why this stability exists and whether it is likely to continue in the future. Although China and India have an acrimonious relationship, their asymmetric nuclear capabilities and threat perceptions mitigate the danger of a traditional security dilemma. India may perceive China’s nuclear aggrandizement to be a security threat, but the same is not true of China, which has a vastly superior nuclear force and is largely shaping its nuclear-force structure in response to the threat it perceives from the United States. This dynamic makes a serious conventional or nuclear conflict highly unlikely.
Notes
1 Doklam is a disputed area between China and Bhutan, India’s northern neighbor and ally. When China attempted to extend an existing road into Doklam in June 2017, Bhutan enlisted India’s support, and a seventy-three-day military standoff ensued.
2 There are rational reasons a state might wage conventional war, even if it stands a high risk of defeat. See James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1995), pp. 379–414. This is presumably less true, however, when nuclear weapons enter the calculus, due to the amount of destruction they can cause.
3 The most outright violation, from the Indian perspective, is China’s supply of nuclear reactors to Pakistan despite Pakistan not being a member of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and under full International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. This is argued in India and elsewhere to facilitate the enhancement of Pakistan’s nuclear-weapon program. Economic Times, “Supply of Nuclear Reactors to Pakistan under NSG Norms: China,” July 12, 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/supply-of-nuclear-reactors-to-pakistan-under-nsg-norms-china/articleshow/53538429.cms?from=mdr>. Indian reports also allege that China is assisting Pakistan’s nuclear-weapon program by selling it dual-use technology. Examples include the eight diesel-electric submarines China sold to Pakistan in 2015 and the 2018 sale of a Chinese high-quality optic system believed to be critical for testing multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles. See Sandeep Unnithan, “A Peek into India's Top Secret and Costliest Defence Project, Nuclear Submarines,” India Today, December 10, 2017, <www.indiatoday.in/magazine/the-big-story/story/20171218-india-ballistic-missile-submarine-k-6-submarine-launched-drdo-1102085-2017-12-10>; Stephen Chen, “China Provides Tracking System for Pakistan’s Missile Program,” South China Morning Post, March 22, 2018, <www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2137643/china-provides-tracking-system-pakistans-missile-programme>.
4 Zeev Maoz, Paul L. Johnson, Jasper Kaplan, Fiona Ogunkoya, and Aaron Shreve, “The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0: Logic, Characteristics, and Comparisons to Alternative Datasets,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022002718784158>.
5 John W. Lewis and Litai Xue, China Builds the Bomb, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991); Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace (New Delhi: HarperCollins India, 2000); Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000).
6 While scholars generally agree that China’s nuclearization was motivated by security concerns, there is more debate about the primary drivers of the Indian program. Chengappa, Tellis, and others attribute the decision to perceived security threats, while Perkovich posits that it was the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) desire for prestige and bureaucratic self-interests that propelled the program.
7 “Talk by Mao Zedong at an Enlarged Meeting of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Politburo (Excerpts),” April 25, 1956, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Mao Zedong wenji [Selected writings of Mao Zedong], Vol. 7 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1999), p. 27, trans. Neil Silver, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114337>.
8 On US threats during the Taiwan Strait Crisis, see Gordon H. Chang, “To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis,” International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1988), p. 108; Abram M. Shulsky, Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), p. 10. On US threats during the Korean War see Michael Gordon Jackson, “Beyond Brinkmanship: Eisenhower, Nuclear War Fighting, and Korea, 1953–1968,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2005), pp. 52–75.
9 People’s Daily, “Statement by the People’s Republic of China on 16 October 1964,” October 17, 1964. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 105-01262-01, 22-26. Obtained by Nicola Leveringhaus. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/134359>.
10 Bernard Weinraub, “India Becomes 6th Nation to Set off Nuclear Device,” New York Times, May 19, 1974, p. A1.
11 John F. Burns, “India Sets 3 Nuclear Blasts, Defying a Worldwide Ban; Tests Bring a Sharp Outcry,” New York Times, May 12, 1998, p. A1.
12 “Indian Government Statement on Nuclear Tests,” May 11, 1998, <www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/IndiaStatement.shtml>.
13 John F. Burns, “India’s New Defense Chief Sees Chinese Military Threat,” New York Times, May 5, 1998, p. A6.
14 A third reason cited was Pakistani “terrorism and militancy. See The Pioneer, “Article Faults India’s Approach to China,” May 21, 1998, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=41039283>.
15 The United States was the primary reason China began developing nuclear weapons, but, after the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s, China also considered the Soviet Union a substantial nuclear threat. In fact, the USSR was the primary threat facing China from the late 1960s to mid-1980s.
16 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 74, No. 4 (2018), pp. 171–78; Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 74, No. 6 (2018), p. 361–66.
17 The conventional variants of the DF-21 include the DF-21C land-attack missile and DF-21D antiship missile.
18 China does not deploy its DF-21s on the border, so mobilization would be required to achieve maximum range into Indian territory.
19 Kristensen and Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019,” pp. 171–72; Missile Defense Project, “DF-41 (Dong Feng-41 / CSS-X-20),” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 12, 2016, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-41/>.
20 There are also reports of India developing an Agni-VI missile with a range exceeding 8,000 kilometers, but this has not been confirmed by the Defense Research and Development Organization. Yogesh Joshi and Frank O’ Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), pp. 20–21.
21 US Office of Naval Intelligence. “The People’s Liberation Army Navy, A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, 2009,” <https://fas.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-navy.pdf>; Brendan Thomas-Noone and Rory Medcalf, “Nuclear-Armed Submarines in Indo-Pacific Asia: Stabiliser or Menace?” Lowy Institute, September 2015, pp. 7–8.
22 Minnie Chan and Kristian Huang, “Is China About to Abandon Its ‘No First Use’ Nuclear Weapons Policy?” South China Morning Post, February 7, 2019, <www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2184577/could-china-abandon-its-no-first-use-nuclear-weapons-policy>.
23 Kelsey Davenport, “India’s Submarine Completes Tests,” Arms Control Today, April 2016, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-03/news/india%E2%80%99s-submarine-completes-tests>.
24 Aqeel Akhtar, “Nuclear Submarines Shift Strategic Balance of Indian Ocean,” International Institute of Strategic Studies, January 29, 2019, <www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/01/nuclear-submarines-indian-ocean>.
25 Unnithan, “A Peek into India’s Top Secret and Costliest Defence Project.”
26 Shan Jie, “Trial Flight Soon for New Type of Chinese Stealth Bomber,” Global Times, October 9, 2018, <www.globaltimes.cn/content/1122324.shtml>; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, May 2, 2019), p. 61; US Defense Intelligence Agency, “China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win,” DIA-02-1706-085. (January 2019), p. 37, <www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf?utm_source=Daily%20on%20Defense%20(Template)_01/16/2019&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=WEX_Daily%20on%20Defense>.
27 Kristensen and Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019,” p. 172; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2019 (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, May 2, 2019), p. 41.
28 The Mirage 2000H has a range of 1,800 kilometers and is deployed primarily at Gwalior Air Force Station in northern Madhya Pradesh. The Jaguar has a range of 1,600 kilometers and the squadrons with secondary nuclear missions are stationed at Ambala Air Force Station in northwestern Haryana and Gorakhpur Air Force Station in northeastern Uttar Pradesh. See Kristensen and Korda, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2018.”
29 Joshi and Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia, pp. 25–27.
30 Sebastien Roblin, “Just How Stealthy Are France's Rafales F4.2s?” National Interest, July 13, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/profile/sebastien-roblin>.
31 India describes its nuclear doctrine as “credible minimum deterrence.” This wording was included in the government’s pronouncement of the Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine in 1999 and the one-page brief issued by India’s Cabinet Committee for Security in 2003. See Ministry of External Affairs, “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” August 17, 1999; Jawed Naqvi, “Vajpayee Takes over Nuclear Command,” The Dawn, January 5, 2003. Although China’s nuclear strategy seems consistent with the idea of “minimum deterrence,” the Chinese have not adopted this wording. Instead, China only uses the word “minimum” to describe its nuclear-force structure and not its nuclear strategy or doctrine. See, for example, China’s last three Defense White Papers: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” July 2019, Sec. II; Information Office, “China’s Military Strategy in 2015,” May 2015, Sec. II; Information Office, “China’s National Defense in 2010,” March 2011. China also uses the descriptor “lean and effective” to describe its nuclear force, and used only this description in the 2006 and 2008 Defense White Papers. Information Office, “China’s National Defense in 2008,” January 2009, Sec. II; Information Office, “China’s National Defense in 2006,” December 2006, Sec. II.
32 Though minimum deterrence is typically associated with threatening a retaliatory strike on civilian centers, some propose it could be consistent with so-called “infrastructure targeting,” where states target assets critical to an enemy’s economy. On the classical understanding of minimum deterrence, see Keith B. Payne and James Schlesinger, eds., Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2013), pp. 17–18. On infrastructure targeting, see Hans Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, “From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,” Occasional Paper No. 7, Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council, April, 2009, pp. 31–33.
33 Kristensen and Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019;” Kristensen and Korda, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2018.”
34 This assumes a perfect single-shot kill probability. In actuality, for China to ensure that it hits all 53 cities, more than 53 weapons would be necessary. Additional weapons would also be necessary depending upon the desired level of destruction, since one warhead would not suffice to destroy an entire large city.
35 This would require China to have robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems to locate the missiles as well as offensive systems that could impede missile delivery upon discovery. China currently has no such ability. (This is also why China cannot be said to have “first-strike capability” against India.)
36 The Chinese government does not explicitly endorse or recognize the city-classification system. Instead, the system is a matter of convention legitimized by Chinese media. Marcelo Duhalde, “Classifying China’s Cities,” South China Morning Post, October 10, 2016, <www.scmp.com/infographics/article/2026637/classifying-chinas-cities>.
37 These figures represent traditional calculations based upon administrative borders as counted by the United Nations. Numbers from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) appear different, because its calculations are based on functional urban areas. The OECD reports China as having fifteen cities with populations over 15 million. See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision,” 2018, <https://population.un.org/wup/>; OECD, OECD Urban Policy Reviews: China 2015 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264230040-en>.
38 Dorcas Wong, “China’s City-Tier Classification: How Does It Work?” China Briefing, February 27, 2019, <www.china-briefing.com/news/chinas-city-tier-classification-defined/>. At least one Indian researcher has suggested that China, as an authoritarian state, might not value its citizens to the same extent as a democracy would. In this case, a high-value target might be defined in terms of economic output. See Gurmeet Kanwal, “India’s Nuclear Force Structure 2025,” Regional Insight, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-force-structure-2025-pub-63988>.
39 Kristensen and Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019;” Kristensen and Korda, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2018.”
40 This assumes a circular error probable of 1,000 meters and a 70-percent assurance level. See Kanwal, “India’s Nuclear Force Structure 2025.”
41 The Pioneer, “Agni-V Propels India into Elite Club,” December 27, 2016, <www.dailypioneer.com/2016/page1/agni-v-propels-india-into-elite-club.html>.
42 Daily Excelsior, “Agni-V,” September 18, 2013, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=36033548>; Political and Defence Weekly, “Decks Cleared for Test of Agni-V,” March 6, 2012, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=30496336>; The Pioneer, “DRDO Briefs PM about Launch of Agni-V Nuclear Missile, Future Program,” April 22, 2012, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=40068645>.
43 Indian reports on the capabilities of the Agni-V include Shankar Roychowdhury, “Nuclear Realities,” Asian Age Online, October 1, 2013, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=36114622>; Deccan Herald Online, “Commentary Urges India to Address Military Operational Gaps for National Security,” May 29, 2012, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=40074917>. Kristensen and Korda also note that loading the Agni-V with multiple warheads will likely limit its range. “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2018,” p. 364.
44 Deccan Herald, “Indian Expert: Test Deterrent against China,” May 16, 1998, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=41038947>.
45 The Pioneer, “Rao’s ‘Cold Feet’ Said to Halt Operation of Agni,” January 3, 1996, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=40909871>.
46 India was not alone in overestimating the size of China’s nuclear force. US researchers and the US government published similar miscalculations, as did the Japanese government (though it cited Indian research). See S.R. Valluri, “Lest We Forget,” Current Science, Vol. 76, No. 9 (1999), p. 1,182; Christopher E. Paine, Thomas B. Cochran, and Robert S. Norris, The Arsenals of the Nuclear Weapon Powers: An Overview (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 1996), p. 13; Hans M. Kristensen, “DIA Estimates for Chinese Nuclear Warheads,” Federation of American Scientists, May 31, 2019, <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/05/chinese-nuclear-stockpile/>; National Institute for Defense Studies, Asian Strategic Review 2002 (Tokyo, 2002), p. 114. For readjusted force numbers, see Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 66, No. 4 (2010), pp. 77–83.
47 Deccan Herald, “India to Test Fire Agni-II Missile in ‘Very Near’ Future,” September 5, 1998, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=41039509>; The Pioneer, “Capability of New Agni Missile ‘Guarded Secret,’” August 20, 1998, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=41036631>.
48 Rahul Datta: “India Plans 6,000-km Range Agni-IV Missile,” Times of India, December 13, 2007, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-plans-6000-km-range-Agni-IV-missile/articleshow/2618413.cms>; The Pioneer, “Agni Test-Fired Successfully,” May 8, 2008, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=30887070>; Political and Defence Weekly, “Agni-V to Be Test-Fired by Year-End,” July 7, 2011, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=32782103>; The Pioneer, “India Considering Proposal to Develop 10,000 km-range ICBMs,” June 19, 2011, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=39841884>.
49 S.N. Sachadeva, “China’s Nuke Buildup,” Daily Excelsior, May 8, 2008, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=30887591>.
50 Sandeep Unnithan, “The Secret Undersea Weapon,” India Today, January 17, 2008, <www.indiatoday.in/magazine/defence/story/20080128-the-secret-undersea-weapon-735178-2008-01-17>.
51 Ibid.
52 K. Sundarji, “Strategy in the Age of Nuclear Deterrence and Its Application to Developing Countries,” unpublished monograph, Simla, June 21, 1984.
53 S.N. Sachadeva, “China's Nuke Buildup,” Daily Excelsior, May 8, 2008, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=30887591>; Political and Defence Weekly, “Launch of 1st Submarine INS Arihant to Put India in Nuclear Weapon Triad Class,” January 3, 2012, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=30530621>.
54 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 3 (2008), pp. 42–45.
55 John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001); Zhen Han and Jean-Francois Belanger, “Balancing Strategies and the China–India Rivalry,” in T.V. Paul, ed., China-India Rivalry in the Globalization Era (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018); Joshi and O’Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia.
56 Arun Kumar Singh, “Navy, Coast Guard Must Get More Funds, Powers,” Asian Age, June 2, 2008, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=32742826>; Rahul Bedi, “Indian Army Chief Plans Nuclear-Proof, Hi-tech Force,” Asian Age, January 16, 2001, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=36704558>; Gurmeet Kanwal, “India’s Borders,” Force, January 1, 2008, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=30670583>.
57 Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts, China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2000); Jeffrey G. Lewis, Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007); Chu Shulong and Rong Yu, “China: Dynamic Minimum Deterrence,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 161–87.
58 Richard H. Ullman, “No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 4 (1972), pp. 669–83.
59 While India once threatened large-scale nuclear retaliation, most Indian policy makers and strategists now advocate a more restrained response, preferring to characterize Indian nuclear retaliation as “punitive” rather than “massive.” Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine Debate,” Regional Insight, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-debate-pub-63950>.
60 Sheru Thapliyal, “Nuclear and Missile Threat from China: China’s Second Artillery Corps,” Indian Defense Review, July 1, 2008, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=31416552>.
61 People’s Daily, “Statement by the People’s Republic of China on 16 October 1964”; “Qiao Guanhua’s Speech at the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly,” November 15, 1971, <http://bbs.news.163.com/bbs/country/403543534.html>; “Huang Hua’s Speech at the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament,” June 11, 1982. <http://www.reformdata/content/19820308/18968.html>;
62 The Soviet Union had its own NFU policy but abandoned it in 1993. This same year, it made a bilateral commitment to China agreeing not to target China or use nuclear force first in a conflict with China. This commitment was reaffirmed in Article 2 of the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation.
63 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “White Paper: China: Arms Control and Disarmament,” Beijing, November 1995, <www.china.org.cn/e-white/army/index.htm>.
64 The Pioneer, “Article Defends India's Nuclear Doctrine,” September 15, 1999, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=36613463>; Vinay Shankar, “No First Use?” Asian Age, September 7, 2001, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=36114622>; Pravin Sawhney, “Different Nuclear Doctrines,” The Pioneer, June 3, 2004, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=35675755>; Gurmeet Kanwal, “China Poses a Long-Term Strategic Challenge to India,” Political and Defence Weekly, July 5, 2011, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=32775232>; Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar, “India–Pakistan and Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Step Closer to the Abyss,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Online, November 30, 2013, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=37807949>.
65 Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Online, “Delhi Article Urges India to Discard Nuclear Doctrine of ‘Unacceptable Damage,’” October 30, 2009, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=39690512>; Ali Ahmed, “Nuclear Implication of the Two-Front Formulation,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, January 29, 2010, <https://idsa.in/idsacomments/NuclearImplicationsoftheTwoFrontFormulation_aahmed_290110>.
66 This explanation also implies that China would be willing to use (tactical) nuclear weapons on the battlefield, which is generally thought to be outside the scope of a minimum deterrence strategy.
67 Bhumitra Chakma, ed., The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011), p. 103, fn. 29.
68 The Pioneer, “Article Views Nuclear Tests, ‘Real Battle,’” May 13, 1998; The Pioneer, “Article Views Rise of New Missile Threats,” August 27, 1998, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=41042597>; The Pioneer, “Flights of Fancy,” June 4, 2004, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=35678996>; Sawhney, “Different Nuclear Doctrines.”
69 The 2017 Doklam incident is the most recent example.
70 The Pioneer, “Editorial Sees PRC Strategy to Undermine Security,” October 23, 1996, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=40890064>.
71 Sawhney, “Different Nuclear Doctrines.”
72 Economic Times, “Has India Just Beaten China in the Doklam Conflict?” July 12, 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/has-india-just-beaten-china-in-the-doklam-conflict/articleshow/60256870.cms>.
73 The Pioneer, “Editorial Sees PRC Strategy to Undermine Security,” October 23, 1996; Ananth Krishnan, “Missile Muscle,” India Today, March 20, 2017, <www.indiatoday.in/magazine/neighbours/story/20170320-india-china-nuclear-plarf-agni-v-mirv-beijing-985949-2017-03-14>; Yusuf Unjhawala, “A New Chinese Threat Warrants a Review of NFU Policy,” Live Mint, September 6, 2018, <www.livemint.com/Opinion/PAWKKFNEQgg2gdLPpgxLXO/Opinion--A-new-Chinese-threat-warrants-a-review-of-NFU-poli.html>.
74 Jyotishman Bhagawati, “China’s Grand Strategy in Asia,” Vivekananda International Foundation, December 21, 2016, <www.vifindia.org/article/2016/december/21/china-s-grand-strategy-in-asia>.
75 Subhash Kapila, “China Generates Strategic Polarisation in Asia,” Political and Defence Weekly, July 24, 2012, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=30363233>
76 Bruce Stokes, Dorothy Manevich, and Hanyu Chwe, “Three Years in, Modi Remains Very Popular,” Pew Research Center, November 15, 2017, p. 26.
77 Mohan Malik, “Distant Dream,” Force, October 1, 2007, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=32164160>; Arvind Gupta, “China’s Defence White Paper 2013: Lessons for India,” Political and Defence Weekly, April 30, 2013, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=30005798>; Bertil Lintner, “India–China War Unlikely, but Beijing in No Rush to Settle Border Issues,” India Today, January 22, 2018,
78 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 188.
79 State Department FOIA Release, “Classified Report to Congress on the Non-Proliferation and Practices of the People’s Republic of China,” 1997, secret, excised copy, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB114/chipak-26.pdf>. Indian reports detailing Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear program often also mention that China played a substantial role in the construction of Pakistan’s first plutonium-production reactor at Khushab, but the actual extent of China’s involvement remains unclear. See Mark Hibbs, “US Now Believes Pakistan Used Khushab Plutonium in Bomb Program,” Nucleonics Week, July 16, 1998; The Pioneer, “India: Article Criticizes India’s China Policy,” April 29, 1998, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=41030546>; The Pioneer, “Columnist Feels India Must Negate Sino-Pak Nuclear Collaboration,” August 31, 2000, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=40925149>.
80 Douglas Waller, “The Secret Missile Deal,” Time, June 30, 1997, <https://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/06/23/time/missiles.html>.
81 Though the guidelines of the NSG are voluntary and lack an enforcement mechanism. See Reuters, “China Signs Deal to Build New Nuclear Reactor in Pakistan: WNN,” November 24, 2017, <www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-nuclear-china/china-signs-deal-to-build-new-nuclear-reactor-in-pakistan-wnn-idUSKBN1DO1W6>.
82 In fact, evidence indicates that China also provided Saudi Arabia and Iran with nuclear-weapon-related assistance. Henry Sokolski, Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “China’s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities,” 110th Cong., 2nd sess., May 20, 2008, pp. 3–4, <www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/5.20.08Sokolski.pdf>.
83 The Pioneer, “Article on Indian N-Tests, World Response,” May 27, 1998, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=41027496>.
84 Ralph A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman, and Matt Pottinger, “Progress Despite Disagreements: The Sixth China-US Strategic Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics,” Issues & Insights, Vol. 12, No. 5 (2011), p. 9.
85 Xinhua, “China and India Are Partners Rather than Rivals,” April 19, 2012, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=40104167>.
86 China did not officially respond to the second and third tests of the Agni-V which took place in 2013 and 2015. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on December 27, 2016,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, December 27, 2016, <www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1427046.shtml>; Economic Times, “Agni-5 Test: China Hopes for Strategic Balance in South Asia,” July 14, 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/agni-5-test-china-hopes-for-strategic-balance-in-south-asia/articleshow/56200362.cms?from=mdr>.
87 Shih Chun-yu, “‘Agni’ Sustains Big-Power Dream; India’s Ambitions Are on a Global Level,” Ta Kung Pao, April 20, 2012, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=33422792>. Chinese-language sources accessed through World News Connection did not include the original Chinese titles.
88 Ralph A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman, and David Santoro, “Reaching an Inflection Point? The Tenth China–US Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics,” Issues and Insights, Vol. 16, No. 20 (2016), p. 7.
89 Yin Han, “India Missile Tests Have China as Obvious Target: Specialists,” Global Times, February 8, 2018. <www.globaltimes.cn/content/1088915.shtml>.
90 Michael Glosny, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs, US-China Strategic Dialogue Phase VIII Report, 2014-008 (Washington, DC: Naval Postgraduate School and the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014), p. 6.
91 Beijing Central People’s Radio, “Commentary on Nuclear Tests,” May 21, 1998, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=41015334>; Xinhua, “Article Criticizes India for Conducting Nuclear Tests,” June 7, 1998, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=41028675>; Richard Weixing Hu, “India’s Nuclear Bomb and Future Sino-Indian Relations,” East Asia, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1999), pp. 40–68; Li Wenyun, “India Is Determined to Become a Nuclear Power,” Renmin Ribao, June 11, 2001, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=36659481>; Li Hongmei: “Veiled Threat or Good Neighbor?” Renmin Ribao, June 19, 2009, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=31707111>; Shih Chun-Yu, “‘Agni’ Sustains Big-Power Dream; India’s Ambitions Are on a Global Level,” Ta Kung Pao, April 20, 2012, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=33422792>.
92 Renmin Ribao, “PRC Article Says India Needs to Eliminate ‘Anxiety about China,’” September 6, 2001, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=36629783>; Cao Yongsheng and Xu Yong, “India Seeks 21st Century Major Power Status,” Jiefangjun Bao, February 11, 2002, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=36493868>.
93 People’s Daily, “Yindu guochan zhanlue heqianting suo zhang daodan shecheng jin 750 gongli” [The missile range of India’s indigenous strategic nuclear submarine is only 750 km], June 6, 2012, <http://news.cntv.cn/20120106/106723.shtml>.
94 Nie Hongyi, “India Prepares to Establish Nuclear Armored Troops,” Jiefangjun Bao, September 3, 2001, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=36632371>.
95 Shih Chun-Yu, “‘Agni’ Sustains Big-Power Dream.”
96 Srikanth Thaliyakkattil, “Chinese Perceptions on Indiás Long Range Missile Development: How Credible Is India’s Deterrence against China?” Institute of South Asian Studies, May 30, 2017, <https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/975472a2-c8da-4421-96d0-02b56ab26db6/pdf>.
97 Yin Han, “China Should Enhance Presence in Indian Ocean to Counter India’s Missile Tests: Experts,” Global Times, January 1, 2018, <www.globaltimes.cn/content/1085585.shtml>.
98 Robert S. Rochlin, “Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Memorandum: Implications of an Indian Nuclear Weapons Test,” December 11, 1995, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Mandatory Declassification Review request, obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #10, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116338>; Charles S. Robb, “Crisis in South Asia,” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong, 2nd sess., May 13, 1998, p. 3.
99 On June 3, 1998, Chinese President Jiang Zemin made clear that, despite India’s nuclear weaponization, China had no intention of resuming nuclear tests. See Xinhua Hong Kong Service, “Jiang Zemin Denies PRC Plans to Resume Nuclear Tests,” June 3, 1998.
100 The domestic argument was particularly tied to the nationalist stance of the ruling BJP. The BJP was charged with using the tests to consolidate its coalition government consisting of more than 10 political parties. See Shih Chun-yu, “Dangerous Prospects of India’s Nuclear Test,” Ta Kung Pao, May 13, 1998, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=37174508>.
101 Xinhua, “China: Article Criticizes India for Conducting Nuclear Tests,” June 7, 1998.
102 Su Xiangxin, “China: India Confrontational towards PRC, Zhongguo Xinwen She [China News Service], May 17, 1998.
103 China Radio International, “CRI [China Radio International] Decries India’s ‘China Threat Theory,’” May 21, 1998, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=37169407>.
104 Zib Mo, “Risks Behind India’s Military Buildup,” Renmin Ribao, December 18, 2011.
105 Shih Chun-yu, “‘Agni’ Sustains Big-Power Dream.”
106 Ibid.; Global Times, “India Successfully Tests Agni-V Intercontinental Missile,” April 19, 2012, <www.globaltimes.cn/content/705683.shtml>.
107 Economic Times, “China Says It Never Recognized India, Pakistan as Nuclear States,” March 1, 2019, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-says-it-never-recognised-india-pakistan-as-nuclear-states/articleshow/68219413.cms?from=mdr>. This is the reason China provided for why it continues to oppose India’s entry into the NSG.
108 Xin Benjian, “Who Is Promoting Nuclear Proliferation?” Renmin Ribao, October 26, 2005, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=33440613>; Wen Xian and Wang Lei, “US, India Try to Form Closer, High-Profile Partnership,” Renmin Ribao, November 26, 2009, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=32960588>.
109 Yao Yuan, “United States Spurs Nuclear Military Expansion in Asia,” Ta Kung Pao, August 16, 2006, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=32821771>.
110 Chen Xulong, “The United States ‘Plays with Fire’ in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Issue,” Liaowang, August 23, 2010, <http://wnc.eastview.com/wnc/article?id=32473491>.
111 John Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 44.
112 This is not to discount the risk of inadvertent or accidental conflict escalation occurring between the two powers. For a detailed analysis of this possibility, see Joshi and O’Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia, pp. 109–12.