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ABSTRACT
This article provides an inside view of the sustained effort by the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) which was key to the development of the international seismic network included in the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Over the course of the GSE’s twenty-year-long journey, part of which was at the height of the Cold War, the GSE went from being a little-known entity that reviewed and encouraged research to designing and testing elements of a seismic verification system. Their work eventually included full-scale testing of the seismological component of the final global system that is now implemented by the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization. The other three monitoring networks comprised in the treaty—radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound—are modeled after the seismic network. The article identifies some key conditions that made GSE a successful endeavor. Prime among these was the strong engagement among scientists and scientific institutions in many countries that contributed large resources. The formal work at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva was just the tip of the iceberg, but very important. This official intergovernmental framework provided a connection to the political community, and a frame for organizing extensive global development and testing activities. GSE was given long-term mandates and self-determination of management and leadership, facilitating a sustained and goal-oriented process. Based on their leadership experience in the GSE and the CTBTO Preparatory Commission Verification Working Group, the authors also provide some reflections on how the concept of scientific expert groups and new scientific developments could prove useful in future efforts toward nuclear-disarmament verification.
Notes
1 “Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international cooperative measures to detect and identify seismic events,” CCD PV.714, Decision of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of 22 July 1976. See also Sweden, “Working Paper on Co-operative International Measures to Monitor a CTBT”, CCD/482; CCD/495, Sweden, “Terms of Reference for a Group of Scientific Governmental Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events,” CCD/PV.704.
2 The views presented in this article are those of the authors and may not reflect, and do not represent, those of the institutions, organizations, and national authorities with which the authors are or have been associated.
3 Ola Dahlman, Svein Mykkeltveit, and Hein Haak, Nuclear Test Ban: Converting Political Visions to Reality (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2009). See also United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on Suspension of Nuclear Tests,” A/3897, August 28, 1958.
4 The Panel on Seismic Improvement, chaired by Lloyd Berkner, published its report, “The Need for Fundamental Research in Seismology,” in January 1959. A lengthy discussion of its findings can be found in United States Disarmament Administration, Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests: History and Analysis of Negotiations, Department of State Publication 7258, Disarmament Series 4, October 1961, pp. 335–54.
5 K.H. Barth, “The Politics of Seismology. Nuclear Testing, Arms Control, and the Transformation of a Discipline,” Social Studies of Science, Vol. 33 (2003), pp. 743–81.
6 Later, a US-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program was established in 1994, with more narrow objectives and funding. See Nancy Prindle, “US-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 111–18.
7 Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Official Records: 28th Session, General Assembly, United Nations, New York, 1975, <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/A-9141.pdf>.
8 Subsequently called National Defense Research Agency, or Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI).
9 Ola Dahlman and Hans Israelsson, Monitoring Underground Nuclear Explosions (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier, 1977).
10 CCD/PV.714, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events; Decision of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of 22 July 1976. See also CCD/482, Sweden, “Working Paper on Co-operative International Measures to Monitor a CTBT”; CCD/495, Sweden, “Terms of Reference for a Group of Scientific Governmental Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events,” CCD/PV.704 (Sweden).
11 CCD/558, “Letter Dated 9 March 1978 from the Chairman of the Ad-Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events to the Co-chairman of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Transmitting the Final Report of the Ad-Hoc Group.”
12 CD/570, “Terms of Reference for the Continued Work of the CCD Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events,” May 9, 1978.
13 CD/43, “Letter Dated 25 July 1979 from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament Transmitting the Second Report of the Ad Hoc Group.”
14 CD/PV.48, “Terms of Reference for the Continued Work of the CD Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events,” August 7, 1979.
15 CD/448, “Third Report to the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events,” August 16, 1984.
16 Progress report to the CD on the fourteenth session of the GSE, CD/318, August 19, 1982.
17 CD/720, “Fourth Report to the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Report on the Group of Scientific Experts’ Technical Test (GSETT) 1984,” August 18, 1986.
18 See CD/724, USSR, ”Seismic Verification of the Non-Conducting of Nuclear Tests (Proposal Concerning the Exchange of Seismic Level II Data),” August 15, 1986.
19 CD/903, “Fifth Report to the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Technical Concepts for a Global System for International Seismic Data Exchange,” March 17, 1989.
20 CD/1144, “Report on the Group of Scientific Experts’ Second Technical Test (GSETT-2). Sixth Report to the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events,” March 13, 1992.
21 CD/1254, “Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on International Seismic Monitoring and the GSETT-3 Experiment,” March 25, 1994.
22 CD/1423, “Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to the Conference on Disarmament on the GSETT-3 Experiment and Its Relevance to the Seismic Component of the CTBT International Monitoring System,” August 15, 1996.
23 Jaap Ramaker, Jenifer Mackby, Peter D. Marshall, and Robert Geil, The Final Test: A History of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Negotiations (Vienna: CTBTO, 2003).
24 Ibid.
25 CD/1372, “Progress to the Conference on Disarmament on the Forty-Second Session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events,” December 21, 1995.
26 See Ola Dahlman, Jenifer Mackby, Svein Mykkeltveit, and Hein Haak, Nuclear Test Ban: Converting Political Visions, and Detect and Deter: Can Countries Verify the Nuclear Test Ban? (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2011).
27 See “Nanotechnology: The Next Frontier for Maritime Security,” <www.nanowerk.com/news/newsid=1488.php>; <www.areadevelopment.com/logisticsInfrastructure/April2012/new-technology-protects-US-seaports-26252522.shtml>.
28 The Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “The United Kingdom — Norway Initiative: Further Research into the Verification of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement,” NPT/CONF.2015/WP.31, April 22, 2015, <www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/NPT-CONF2015-WP.31_E.pdf>.
29 Ministry of Defence, “UK hosts international nuclear disarmament verification exercise,” October 25, 2017, <www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-hosts-international-nuclear-disarmament-verification-exercise>. See also “Deferred Verification: Verifiable Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks for Disarmament Purposes,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 26 (2019), <www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2019.1628414>; Christine Parthemore, “Technology in Context: Lessons from the Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 23 (2016), <www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2016.1177263>.
30 See <www.ipndv.org>.
31 United Nations, “Group of Governmental Experts to Consider the Role of Verification in Advancing Nuclear Disarmament,” A/74/90, May 15, 2019.
32 United Nations, “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 2019,” A/RES/74/50, December 19, 2019.